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PREFACE 
Active participation of Africa's indigenous peoples in world 
affairs has begun and can be expected to rise steeply in the next 
decade. What happens there is of mounting importance to international 
relatione as well as to many individual countries. Because of this, it 
is desirable that past and current events and trends in Africa be 
understood as clearly as possible. The study which follows represents 
an attempt to make a contribution to the greater understanding of a 
small part of the continent's past. 
Recent years have borne witness to the end of an era of political 
stability in Africa. Since World war II, relatively static situations 
have been supplanted time and again by the dynamic, with such frequency 
that dynamic has practically lost its force as a descriptive term 
through its repetition. Nevertheless, it remains perhaps the only one 
appropriate to convey the potency, energy, and drive behind the 
political changes now taking place in that part of the world. 
Yet change is rarely a reflection of only driving forces, and 
certainly not of just new ones. There are forces which, for good or 
evil, operate to retard change; and there are forces which were born 
long ago, some of which have continued to play a large part in the more 
immediate past. An effort to understand change must not exclude these--
the resistant, the old. 
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With the above considerations in mind, five major forces of 
political change in Africa have been singled out. Individually and 
collectively they have operated as retarding or propelling forces, 
variously conditioning political changa at different points in time 
and space. 
The original intention was to examine the manner in which the 
five forces acted to mold the political situation in Uganda as of the 
end of 1944; and then to treat the forces as they operated and inter-
acted during the following decade of accelerated political change up to 
1955. The initial plan proved too broad in scope and had to be narrowed. 
As finally evolved, the study's primary concern has been with 
one of the forces--(British) colonial policy--as it shaped political 
change during the period 1905-1945. Next in importance has been the 
interaction of policy with the other forces. In this manner the 
analysis has been carried out to conform to the initial aim of present-
ing the findings in such a way as to render them susceptible to 
comparisons with forces of political change in other territories. 
Actual political changes and their implications have had to 
assume a subordinate place and have been dealt with in only a prelim-
inary, tentative way. The view has been that after the description and 
analysis of British policy as a force shaping political change, priority 
had then to be accorded to the consideration of the nature and operation 
of the other forces in order that policy's interaction with them might 
be set forth. It has been a matter of priorities; and an understanding 
of the forces of change is a prerequisite for a clearer perception of 
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the character, meaning, and significance of what has taken place, sub-
jects which may be pursued later. 
From the time of its conception to its completion the study has 
benefited from the work of others as indicated in citations in the notes. 
It is desired to express grateful acknowledgment particularly to 
Professor James S. Coleman of the University of California at Los 
Angeles. The insights displayed in his various writings on Africa have 
been most helpful in the formulation of the analytical approach used 
here. 
To Professor William J. Newman of Boston University is owed a 
long-lasting debt. By his method of exploring questions from all sides 
and forcing independent judgments, he early stimulated the search for 
fresh ways to seek answers to new and different problems. 
For the knowledge, guidance, and support which the faculty of 
the African Studies Program at Boston University have so generously 
given in the course of several years--for their encouragement and the 
help which included Program grants-in-aid, the appreciation is strong 
indeed. Special thanks for his abiding interest goes to the Director of 
the Program, Professor William 0. Brown. Dr. Carl G. Rosberg, former 
Research Associate at the Program and currently Assistant Professor of 
Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, also gave 
unstintingly of his time in the formative stages of the project. 
Of inestimable value have been the day-to-day assistance and 
understanding provided by my wife, Margaret Anne, who readily assumed 
additional heavy burdens in order that this study might be realized. To 
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her, my most profound gratitude. 
Miss Gwendolyn Groomes very kindly rendered considerable help by 
typing drafts of Part I. 
Through the award of a Foreign Area Training Fellowship the Ford 
Foundation made the research for the dissertation financially possible 
and gave further material assistance during the drafting of portions of 
the study. To the Foundation and its officers is expressed a signal 
appreciation for the opportunity to implement the project. 
The responsibility for the accuracy of the work and for the 
views advanced therein is of course a wholly personal one and extends in 
no way to the Ford Foundation, nor to any of the numerous individuals to 
whom acknowledgment is made above or in the notes. 
Boston 
August 1960 C. H. Walter Howe 
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INTRODUCTION 
The word-pictures aroused by the name "Africa" have always tended 
to be exotic, imaginative stereotypes. But since World War II the images 
which come to mind have multiplied. New ones have been added; some of 
the old have been altered. 
The postwar change in stereotypes is a reflection of more funda-
mental developments. These include a greatly increased awareness of the 
potential of the continent's human and natural resources. There has 
been a concomitant expanded journalistic and scholarly search for and 
dispersal of knowledge of Africa's present and past. 
Yet despite the fine work produced by a small core of African 
specialists before the war, and despite the burgeoning interest since 
the war, the need for knowledge has far outpaced the supply. Even 
before the war there was a mammoth job to be done in the collection of 
basic facts for the analysis of what were then relatively simple 
issues. Since the war the accelerated rate of change--political, 
economic, social--has rendered the facts more elusive, the issues 
infinitely complex, and the analysis of broader currents necessarily 
very speculative and experimental. Undoubtedly the gap will never be 
closed. But the hope is that it may be lessened in order that the 
West--individuals and governments--may possess sufficient understanding 
of the currents at work in Africa to make value judgments and determine 
1 
policies on rational grounds. It is the motivation toward this goal--
the increase of understanding--which has been the main guide and pro-
pelling force behind the study on Uganda. 
I. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In its most succinct form, the problem is to appraise the part 
played by (British) colonial policy as a force shaping political change 
in Uganda from 1905 to 1945. 
More specifically, the problem is to describe and analyze 
British policy in the Protectorate, assessing its role as one of five 
major forces interacting with each other to shape the extent of the 
1905-1945 political change, making the assessment with particular 
reference to change in the political institutions for governing the 
African population. 1 The political institutions both at the local, 
tribal level and at the central, territorial level are considered. 
With respect to the local, tribal institutions, because of the varia-
tion in British native administration policy in different parts of 
Uganda, a distinction is made in turn between the institutions in the 
areas of direct rule and those in the one area of indirect rule. 
The problem is, then, directed not to the whole gamut of 
political change but primarily to certain spheres of political change. 
The following questions are posed. What was the role of British policy 
as one of five major interacting forces in shaping the extent of 
1Data on the African population of Uganda, broken down by tribe 
for the years 1931 and 1948, are provided in Appendix I. 
2 
political change in the local, tribal institutions in the areas of 
direct rule; and what was it in the area of indirect rule? Further, 
3 
what was the role of policy in fashioning political change in the central, 
territorial institutions? 
II • THE THESIS 
Divided along the lines indicated above, the thesis to be 
tested is as follows. 
First, that British native administration policy was the most 
important force shaping the extensive political change in the local, 
tribal institutions in the areas of decidedly direct rule; and that it 
was one of the two most important forces shaping the relatively limited 
change in the traditional political institutions in the area of indirect 
rule. 
And secondly, that these native administration policies, in 
combination with economic and social development policies and policies 
toward the central institutions, operated as the most important of the 
five forces to shape the limited extent of political change in the 
central institutions. 
Because the thesis contains within it elements of the paradoxi-
cal, it is desirable to state briefly in advance certain of the points 
to be developed in the course of the presentation. 
As a consequence of a British policy of decidedly direct rule in 
certain areas of Uganda, and with special reference to one such area 
(Acholi), the poorly organized traditional tribal polities found there 
4 
were replaced by new, non-traditional political systems. Up to 1945 there 
had not been sufficient time for most of the new institutions to be 
legitimized. Nor had the extent of alien contact and influence been 
sufficient, because of economic and social development policies, to 
facilitate the process of institutionalization. As a result, there was 
an almost complete absence of any understanding of--or desire for 
participation in--the Protectorate's central councils, especially the 
Legislative Council. The latter was regarded as an alien body by the 
Africans of these areas. 
The differing British policy of indirect rule in one area 
(Buganda) operated to maintain the strongly organized traditional 
political system of the Protectorate's largest tribe fundamentally 
intact, although the nature of the policy also permitted internal 
Baganda conflicts to arise and play themselves out. Economic and social 
policies acted to strengthen the system because they facilitated in-
creased alien contact and influence, and advantages accrued to Buganda 
in terms of the marked development of its natural and human resources. 
These same policies generated some of the new conflicts within the 
social system mentioned above, but on the whole the social system 
adapted well to the pressures for change. The end result was a 
political system which led from strength when its people decided par-
ticipation in the Legislative Council would jeopardize their pre-eminent 
and privileged position. (The Baganda political system was especially 
favored after 1938 by a basic shift in the indirect rule policy, which 
became increasingly predisposed to acquiescing to the tribe's views as 
5 
expressed through its traditional institutions.) 
In addition to the foregoing native administration and social 
and economic development policies, which resulted either in an absence 
of pressures for political change in the central territorial institu-
tions or opposition to such change, policies toward the central institu-
tions were themselves inhibitive to change. They tended more to act to 
limit change than to propel it. Those changes which did take place in 
the earlier years occurred only after unofficial non-African pressure 
was exerted on the Government. Later requests from the same source for 
elaboration of the institutions were turned down. 
It is, then, the intention to show that in these ways the 
diverse British policies up to 1945 operated--indirectly and directly, 
unintentionally and intentionally--to shape or to mold the variously 
extensive and limited change in the localized tribal institutions, as 
well as the limited change in the Protectorate's central governmental 
institutions. 
III. SCOPE, METHOD, AND DEFINITIONS 
An indication of the general boundaries of the study is pro-
vided by its title: "Colonial Policy as a Major Variable Force Shaping 
Political Change in Africa: A Case Study of Uganda, 1905-1945." The 
more exact limits, together with some aspects of the analytical methods 
and the definitions used for the study, are discussed with reference to 
1 the component parts of the title. 
lFor more detailed definitions of terms, see Appendix II. 
Colonial Policy as a Major Variable Force 
Political change in a large part of Africa is viewed as being 
shaped during most of the colonial era by five major variable forces: 
the traditional African political systems; the policies of the colonial 
powers; alien contact and influence; events and issues; and the social 
1 
situation and social change. 
6 
2 The five major variable forces. The first of the forces refers 
to the political systems of the diverse African3 tribal or ethnic groups 
as--and if--the essential features of the systems have been handed down 
in appreciable measure from the past; that is, as they are traditional. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the systems' characteristics affecting 
4 
their strength as a force conditioning political change. 
The policies of the colonial powers constitute the second major 
variable force. Colonial refers here to a recognized relation of 
1The five-forces framework would still--in 1960--be a desirable 
tool for analysis of some territories. However, in others the political 
change since World War II, and especially since 1955, has been more 
fundamental in character. As a consequence, certain of the five forces 
(the traditional African political systems, and alien contact and 
influence) have in places been almost completely internalized (within 
the social situation force). Other elements, formerly subsumed under 
one of the five forces, have become sufficiently important of themselves 
to require treatment as new and distinct forces (nationalism, political 
leadership). 
2For a more detailed presentation of the five-forces' approach, 
see Appendix Ill. 
3When used with regard to people, the term African refers to 
those whose ancestors were indigenous to Africa and whose primary ties 
are in Africa. The term is meant to exclude, for example, Boers on the 
one hand and American Negroes on the other. 
4The analytical method used to treat this force is dealt with in 
some detail in Appendix IV. 
dependence and subordination between an African territory and a 
1 
non-African power; as a modifier, it is intended to apply equally to 
colonies, protectorates, and trust territories. Policies are regarded 
simply as the settled courses adopted and followed by governments; the 
7 
term is meant to include both general statements of objectives and actual 
settled practices. 
The third force is alien contact and influence. It refers to 
the direct manifestations of the impact which all non-indigenous2 
elements, excepting the colonial power's policies, have had on a 
colonial territory. As an example, one of the agents of alien contact 
was the missionary; one of the manifestations of the missionary contact 
was Western education; Western education was one of the subforces--as a 
component of alien contact and influence--shaping political change. 
The fourth major variable force which has been isolated 
analytically is events and issues. It refers to such historical 
occurrences, and to such topics about which there is a conflict of 
political views, as have been in and of themselves significant as 
factors of political change either in the total context of Africa or in 
the more restricted context of an area under special study. As examples, 
World Wars I and II are events significant in the total context of 
1Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: 
Frederick Muller Ltd., 1956), p. 20. 
2To stress the etymological meanings of certain compound words 
particularly relevant to colonial situations, the study departs from the 
more commonly accepted American practice and hyphenates the following 
terms: non-official; non-indigenous; non-native; non-alien; 
non-alienation; non-hereditary; and non-traditional. 
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Africa; and federation of the East African territories is an issue 
significant in the more restricted context of Uganda. 
The fifth force is the social situation and social change. The 
phrase refers to the social situation which has existed, at any given 
point in time, as the context for developments of the moment; and it 
refers to the general extent and direction of the drives for social 
change present in the social situation, The force relates, then, to the 
social groups existing in a society, to their respective positions, and 
to trends and pressures for change resulting from the groups' 
interactions with each other, as these have been affected by the rest of 
the forces. 
The dominant concern of the study is with human forces as 
contrasted to nonhuman conditioners of change. The forces listed above 
pertain to the social features of environment. Physical aspects of the 
environment--usually more constant factors--are treated in the study 
only to a limited extent. 
The forces are forces in the sense that they are factors 
characterized by appreciable strength to constrain or to propel change 
1 in many places in Africa in the past. 
The forces are major forces in that each has operated with 
marked effects in a number of dependent African territories; and where 
one has not so acted as a primary force, that fact is of major 
1A factor is defined simply as one of the elements contributing 
to produce a result; a constituent. As an example, a variable 
situational factor is one of the elements contributing to produce a 
certain situation, the situation changing as the element varies. 
significance in comparative analyses. 
The forces are variables in that they have often differed from 
one territory to another, within a territory, and with the passage of 
time. 
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Colonial policy as a major force. Of the five variable forces, 
that of colonial policy has been singled out for primary treatment. For 
this reason, although the detailed presentation relates to the one 
British territory of Uganda, the introductory sections to certain 
chapters in Part II provide limited descriptions of the policies of the 
several principal colonial powers, and more particularly, of the 
policies in other British territories in Africa. The varying operation 
outside of Uganda of the remaining four major forces is beyond the scope 
of the study. 
Political Change in Africa 
Political. The term political refers to all those kinds of 
activities and mechanisms, however crude and inchoate, within a political 
unit, which are prominently related to the making and implementing of 
authoritative decisions, where custom fails to create other patterns for 
private resolution of differences. (Collectively, the activities and 
mechanisms constitute a political system.) The phrase authoritative 
decisions refers to those decisions which are accepted as binding for 
the whole society of the political unit; that is, the people to whom the 
decisions are intended to apply or who are affected by them consider 
that they must or ought to obey. (A political unit is, by definition, a 
10 
territorial entity.) 1 
Change. Change may range from the complete substitution of 
something new in place of something old, to only a slight alteration of 
2 the old. However, change in the institutions, roles, values, and other 
aspects of the world's societies and political systems has rarely if 
ever represented a complete substitution of the new for the old. There-
fore, in this study change is viewed as either the result of the 
interaction of existing elements (forces) in a situation, or the result 
of the injection of one or more new elements (forces) into a situation. 
Political change in Africa as shaped by five forces. The 
general analytical assumption or hypothesis for the study is that 
political change in Africa3 has been shaped4 by the nature and dynamics 
1The definitions have been derived from the concepts advanced by 
David Easton, The Political System: An Inguiry into the State of 
Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 129-134. 
It should be noted that the definition precludes the automatic 
application of the term political to the power structures, policies, and 
like aspects of organizations such as trade unions, churches, clans, 
business firms. This is in contrast to the view of some scholars that 
the definition should not be so restrictive. See Robert A. Dahl, 
"Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science," 
American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), 3-4. But organi-
zations as those listed are not political organizations per se, and, for 
example, power in them is more properly described as social power. These 
organizations, it is held here, can be described as political only when 
they in some way prominently relate to the making and implementing of 
authoritative decisions of a political unit, the latter being by 
definition a territorial entity. 
See Appendices II and IV for more detailed discussions of the 
term political. 
2
change is defined in its ordinary sense--as the substitution or 
succession of one thing in place of another, or any variation or alteration. 
3Africa refers more precisely to the dependent territories in 
Africa during most of the colonial era. The primary concern is with 
Africa south of the Sahara. 
4The verb to shape is used throughout in the sense of to mold, 
to form, to fashion. Its use in the discussion of variable forces 
11 
of the social situation, as the latter has been affected by the policies 
of the colonial powers and by events and issues. 1 
The social situation at any given point in time and space is 
viewed as largely a consequence of the past operation of all the five 
major variable forces--the traditional African political systems; the 
policies of the colonial power; alien contact and influence; events and 
issues; and the earlier social situation with its particular composite 
of inherent social change. 
Policies of colonial powers--the second force--are regarded 
during most of the colonial era as representing a more autonomous force; 
that is, as being relatively more susceptible to rapid change independent 
of the first, third, and fifth forces, yet markedly affecting them. 
Events and issues--the fourth force--are considered in many instances to 
be like policies in this respect. Therefore, in a study of political 
change over a period of time as contrasted to the study of a social or 
political situation as of a given moment, the forces relatively less 
susceptible to independently rapid change may be treated first. The 
potentially more dynamic or erratic forces--policies, and events and 
shaping political change is analagous to the process which might take 
place in the case of ancient earthworks, constructed from materials at 
hand by an architect, artisans, and laborers, then undergoing later 
changes as a consequence of the actions and interactions both of 
indigenous and alien human beings and of variously originating geophys-
ical elements. 
1The approach owes a great deal to concepts advanced by Coleman 
and Rosberg for analyzing African political developments. See James S. 
Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science 
Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 404-426; and James S. Coleman, "The Problem 
of Political Integration in Emergent Africa, 11 Western Political Quarterly, 
VIII (March, 1955), 44-57. Rosberg's ideas were presented in lectures 
at Boston University in the fall of 1955. 
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issues--may then be introduced in order better to present the analysis 
of their interaction with the situation and the forces shaping the 
situation. This is the procedure which has been adopted, subject to one 
modification--that it has not proved feasible to include an analysis of 
the social situation in 1905 in view of its undefined state at that time. 
A Case Study of Uganda, 1905-1945 
Except as indicated below, the study's scope is limited in the 
area sense to the territory of Uganda. The limitation makes possible a 
more intensive focus and analysis within a general framework directed to 
facilitating later comparisons with other African territories. Uganda 
is viewed as particularly fruitful as a territory for a case study, for 
it has combined some of the features both of the colonies of the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria and, at the other end of the geographical and 
1 political scale, of the East African territories of Kenya and Tanganyika. 
British policy as a maJor force. Although attention in the 
1For example, it has resembled the British West African colonies 
in the use of the system of Indirect Rule where indigenous state 
organizations existed, yet with a more direct form of rule for tribes 
lacking centralized authority; in the development of a primarily 
peasant-based cash crop economy; and in the absence of a large alien 
settler community. It has differed most markedly perhaps in Uganda's 
shorter period of contact with the West. 
The characteristics which Kenya and Tanganyika have shared with 
the Protectorate seem to be few--the shorter duration of Western contact, 
compared to the Gold Coast and Nigeria; and the common geographical 
location in East Africa. Some of the dissimilarities might be suggested 
as being the absence of any real instance of indirect rule in Kenya, and 
its less classic implementation in Tanganyika compared to parts of 
Uganda; the greater incidence in the two former territories of an 
indigenous wage labor force working for alien employers; and the 
presence in Kenya--and to a lesser extent in Tanganyika--of a white 
settler community. 
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Uganda study is concentrated on the one force of British policy, data 
and conclusions regarding the other forces are presented in order that 
the interaction of policy with them may be considered. In some cases, 
in the absence of existing detailed authoritative studies dealing with 
the other forces, the conclusions for them are presented more in the 
nature of assumptions. Notice is called to this fact where appropriate. 
British policy in a colonial territory may be approached for 
analysis in any number of ways. Here the foremost emphasis is placed 
upon policy with regard to political institutions of the territory--
specifically the local and the central institutions for governing the 
African population. Secondary emphasis is placed upon the policies 
relating to economic and social development, in view of their effect on 
the other forces shaping political change. 
Political change, As just inferred, a particular political 
change--perhaps the most important--has been chosen to focus the 
analysis of policy. It is the change which took place--in terms 
primarily of its extent--in the political institutions for governing the 
African population at the tribal and at the territorial levels. The 
phrase political institutions means established, structured mechanisms 
for making and implementing authoritative decisions in a political unit. 
The period 1905-1945. The study is concerned for the most part 
with the period from 1905 to 1945. In 1905 control over Uganda's 
affairs within the Government of Great Britain was transferred from the 
Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. The shift in policy was per-
ceptible. In the literal sense, as well as the real sense in some 
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measure, colonial policy as a force in Uganda operated initially only as 
of 1905. This is, then, a convenient and logical date for the 
commencement of the period to be given more detailed study. 
In January 1945 there broke out in Uganda a series of disturb-
ances. These were confined to the part of the territory known as 
Buganda. People were killed, buildings were burned down, and it was 
necessary to bring troops from Kenya to re-establish law and order. The 
disturbances were in the nature of the initial catalytic agent for change 
in the following decade; they constituted the first dynamic event 
1 inaugurating the new era, introduced into and interacting with the 
situation existing at the beginning of 1945. As such, the disturbances 
themselves are outside the scope of this study, being more properly a 
logical point of departure for another research project. Therefore, the 
analysis of British policy as a force for political change is concluded 
as of the New Year of 1945, just prior to the disturbances. 
Summary 
The study is, then, limited primarily to a consideration of 
British policy as it operated in Uganda during the years 1905-1945 to 
shape change in the political institutions at the tribal and at the 
territorial levels. It is, however, cast within a theoretical framework 
1There were more disturbances in 1949. The Kabaka (King) of 
Buganda was deported in 1953 and the Crisis was not resolved until 1955. 
During those years African participation in Legislative Council in-
creased from nil in 1945 to a total of thirty of the sixty members who, 
excluding the voting Governor-President, made up that body in late 1955. 
Of the thirty, five were officials (including two Ministers and one 
Assistant Minister); six were nominated and required to vote with the 
Government on a question of confidence; and the remaining eighteen were 
representative members, for the most part indirectly elected. 
applicable also to analyses of certain major forces in many other 
territories during most of the colonial era; for this reason it should 
1 facilitate comparisons. 
IV. ORGANIZATION AND SOURCES 
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The organization of the study follows logically from the frame-
work of analysis which has been devised as suitable to the problem. As 
for the sources, they are indicated below in the description of the 
organization. One preliminary comment is required. The dissertation 
was carried out as a library research project. General source material 
was collected during 1957 from libraries in Boston, New York, and 
Washington. While in Uganda later on another research project, source 
data which came readily and easily to hand were added, but efforts could 
not be otherwise diverted from the work in progress there to seek out 
additional general material for the dissertation. However, special 
studies of Uganda which had become available through the end of 1959 
were utilized. 
Following the Introduction, Part I describes the setting for the 
subsequent discussion of British policy in_Uganda in 1905-1945. Part I 
deals first with the history of the region now known as Uganda, for the 
period up to 1905. The main general source for the treatment of events 
1The view is that political studies should preferably be carried 
out in relation to theoretical problems, so that factual and theoretical 
knowledge may go hand in hand. The argument for the theoretical approach 
has been ably advanced by David E. Apter, "Theory and Study of Politics," 
American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), 747-762. 
in this and later sections of the study was Professor Kenneth Ingham's 
1 The Making of Modern Uganda, Although the volume lacks a theme and 
fails to provide much in the way of conclusions or interpretation, it 
has nevertheless been found to be quite accurate as a summary of what 
happened and as a source for otherwise illusive items of information. 
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In any case, where there was doubt, historical data from the Ingham work 
were checked also with other accounts such as that in the survey volume 
by Thomas and Scott published in 1935, 2 as well as the autobiographical 
narratives of three Uganda Governors--Bell in the first decade, Mitchell 
3 in the third, and Dundas in the fourth, A number of descriptions by 
the early missionaries and administrators were likewise consulted as a 
check on certain items. 
Standard sources such as Thomas and Scott's Uganda, mentioned 
above, and Uganda's official 1948 Census provided much of the basic 
material for the background chapter on the physical and social environ-
ment, which follows the historical survey. 4 
1(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 1-244. 
2H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1935), pp. 1-43. 
3sir Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., [1946]), pp. 1-212; Sir Philip 
Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: Hutchinson, 1954), especially 
pp. 169-186; and Sir Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd,, 1955), especially pp. 199-224. 
4see, for example, Uganda Protectorate, East African Statistical 
Department--Uganda Unit, 1958 Statistical Abstract (Entebbe, Uganda: 
Government Printer, [1959]), pp. 6-14. 
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The balance of Part I of the study presents the description and 
analysis of two of the major forces--the traditional African political 
systems, and alien contact and influence. In the case of the former, it 
has not been possible to cover all the systems, nor would such extended 
treatment have been within the scope of the study. Data for those which 
have been covered have been derived from studies by trained anthropol-
ogists where these have been available and have been supplemented by 
descriptions of missionaries and officials. 
While the analysis of the traditional African political systems 
in Part I is limited to the state of their existence around 1905, the 
treatment of alien contact and influence is carried up to 1945. The 
separate nature of the two forces calls for their differential handling. 
Part II is devoted to the presentation of the various politically 
significant British policies, first those relating to economic and 
social development and then those relating to the local and the central 
political institutions. The discussions are prefaced by brief reference 
to British policies elsewhere in Africa and in some cases to policies of 
1 
other colonial powers there. Descriptions of the policies in Uganda 
are accompanied by indications of their consequences, for example, with 
regard to change in the traditional African political systems which 
1The chief source for these sections was Lord HaUey, An African 
Survev, Revised, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), Chapters 
V, VI, and VIII. Although having the disadvantages inherent in such a 
width of coverage, the volume is nevertheless regarded as the most 
authoritative of its kind. Also especially helpful because of the 
author's recent service as Governor of Uganda was Sir Andrew Cohen, 
British Policy in Changing Africa (Northwestern University African 
Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 1-83. 
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existed in 1905. At the end of Part II there is a review of British 
policy as it interacted with the other forces. 
Sources for the chapters in Part II and for the chapter on alien 
contact and influence in Part I were very varied. They included those 
already cited, plus all of the official Annual Reports and Blue Books 
for the Protectorate covering the period up to 1945. A helpful general 
work was J. E. Goldthorpe's Outlines of East African Society. 1 A number 
of special reports were also used, such as two prepared by Lord Hailey 
2 
on British policy in Uganda and other African territories. In addition, 
the debates of the Legislative Council for most of the World War II 
years were examined. The one outstanding limitation on the comprehen-
siveness of published source material consulted for the study resulted 
from the relative unavailability of Uganda newspapers for the early 
3 years. It is understood, however, that these were consulted by 
Professor Ingham for his historical volume. 
Having indicated the foremost sources, it remains to give brief 
attention to the extent to which the study covers a field of inquiry not 
l (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 
1958), pp. l-277. 
2Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development 
in British Tropical Africa" (unpublished Report, 1940-42, prepared for 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, [1944]), pp. 176-200. (A per-
sonal communication from H. Hannam, Assistant Librarian, Colonial Office 
Library, dated April 12, 1957, stated that Lord Hailey's report, though 
not published, was no longer regarded as Confidential.) 
Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Terri-
tories, Part I: East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika dGreat Britain,] 
Colonial Office; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 1-85. 
3The New York Public Library had no holdings; the Library of 
Congress had only widely scattered holdings during the 1940-1945 period. 
19 
explored as of the end of 1959. 
Thomas Hodgkin in his Nationalism in Colonial Africa approached 
the problem of surveying the territories in Africa south of the Sahara 
through an analysis of variables which explained differences. 1 Yet the 
scope of his work precluded detailed consideration of any one territory. 
Other writers have used broadly similar approaches to examine special 
2 
aspects of political change in territories besides Uganda. 
However, a primarily analytical study of Uganda, adequate for 
the period covered, had not been published by the beginning of 1960. 
Only half of Colin Legum's book, Must We Lose Africa?, related to 
Uganda; and that half dealt mostly with the Kabaka Crisis of 1953, 
carrying the story only up to the fall of 1954 well before the resolution 
3 
of the crisis. A book by George W. Shepherd, Jr., They Wait in 
Darkness, was concerned almost exclusively with the account of his 
association with the African farmers copperative organization in Buganda 
during the early 1950's.4 One dissertation--written by Mukherjee--does 
parallel the time span and the emphasis on policy of the study that 
follows, but it is so lacking in objectivity as to render it not only of 
5 little value but perhaps even harmful. 
1Hodgkin, pp. 1-256. 
2James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Nigeria" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1953), pp. 1-549; David E.Apter, The 
Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1955), pp. 1-355. 
3 (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1954), pp. 1-125. 
4 (New York: The John Day Company, 1955), pp. 1-308. 
5Ramakrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of Uganda: A Study in 
Acculturation (Berlin: Academie-Verlag, 1956), pp. 1-281. For evidence 
of marked bias, see pp. VII, 17, 43, 98, 100, 101, 108, 215, 249, 267, 
272-274. 
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As far as is known, the presentation here of the material on 
Uganda does not duplicate sources available up to 1960. It is under-
stood that other writers--including Professor David Apter--have been 
preparing for publication additional material relating to Uganda, but 
from the few details available as of the end of 1959 about the work in 
progress there seemed to be no real duplication. There may, however, 
prove to be some overlap with books which appeared in the spring of 
1960. These were published subsequent to the preparation of the study's 
1 drafts and have not been consulted. 
The material which follows, then, is intended as a contribution 
to the understanding of the nature and operation of the forces of 
political change in Africa in general, with specific reference to the 
role of British policy as a force in Uganda up to 1945. 
1The two studies which were available only after the completion 
of the collation and analyses of data for Chapters I-VII were Audrey I. 
Richards (ed.), East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in 
Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 
1960), pp. 1-419; and D. Anthony Low and R. Cranford Pratt, Buganda and 
British OVerrule, 1900-1955: Two Studies (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1960), pp. 1-373. It was not feasible to consult these with a 
view to possible revisions. 
PART I 
THE SETTING AND ITS CHANGING ELEMENTS 
CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The story of Uganda in the half-century before 1905 is marked by 
turbulence and change. It is essentially a chronicle of the impact of 
1 
successive Europeans on the fluid African polities of the primitive era. 
Out of a chain of momentous events came British rule, and peace and 
order followed somewhat hesitantly. In the expanding Protectorate one 
tribe by the turn of the century had gained a position of signal 
prominence which it was to maintain in the years ahead. 
I. THE NARRATIVE PRIOR TO 1893 
Historical accounts of the region begin with the written records 
of the early travelers. But the evidence of oral tradition permits a 
2 
creditable look into the more distant, yet still significant, past. 
The Primitive History 
It is generally assumed that sometime prior to the thirteenth 
century the southern part of what is now Uganda was settled by Bantu 
1Primitive is used here in the sense of nonliterate. 
2The question of where to draw the line between the mythology 
and the history of the traditional versions of events is a difficult 
one. The following account will not deal with the narratives which are 
obviously mythology. 
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peoples, who were cultivators. Commencing in about the fourteenth 
century there were a series of migrations into the area by Hamitic 
pastoralists from the region of modern-day Ethiopia. 1 Further movements 
of Luo peoples, from the Sudan into the northern part of the present 
Protectorate, took place over many years. The degree of mixture of the 
successively newer arrivals with the inhabitants already in the terri-
tory varied greatly. 
By 1850 the peoples of the south and west, of combined Bantu 
and Hamitic strains, had become organized for the most part into kingdoms 
of widely ranging sizes, but all having a measure of centralized admin-
istration. The area had been ruled in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries by the legendary Bachwezi dynasty, but that had disintegrated 
and in its stead there evolved the smaller Bunyoro-Kitara empire. As of 
the mid-nineteenth century the latter had begun to splinter, and its 
pre-eminence was also being seriously challenged by the rise of the 
Kingdom of Buganda. Buganda as a separate political entity dated from 
the fifteenth century, but it was only brought to a position of regional 
strength and 
be succeeded 
prominence by 
2 by Mutesa I. 
Suna, its Kabaka (King) who died in 1856 to 
1Research in fairly recent years has cast some doubt on the 
generally accepted thesis that the Kingdom states in southern Uganda, to 
be referred to shortly, resulted from the conquest and domination of the 
Bantu agriculturalists by "superior" Hamitic pastoralists. Lloyd A. 
Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the 
Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge, England: 
W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [1956]), pp. 27-30. 
2The preceding account has been constructed from many sources. 
Some are: Roland Oliver, "The Royal Tombs of Buganda," Uganda Journal, 
XXIII (September, 1959), 133; C. C. Wrigley, "Some Thoughts on the 
Bacwezi," Uganda Journal, XXII (March, 1958), 12-17; C. C. Wrigley, 
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In contrast to the above political development, the peoples of 
the north and east, who were of Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic origins, were 
grouped in smaller village and clan communities. They sometimes had 
chiefs, but there was generally little or nothing in the 
ized administration at the tribal or even the next lower 
way of central-
1 level. 
Enough of the history of the primitive era is known to confirm 
that when Europeans arrived in previously "pure" African areas they were 
not making contact with a static tribal pattern of life. Europeans 
precipitated change in what was often already a very fluid state of 
affairs. 2 
"Kimera," Uganda Journal, XXIII (March, 1959), 40-41; John Roscoe, 
"Uganda and Some of Its Problems," Journal of the African Society, XXII 
(January, 1923), 98; Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 18-19; J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines 
of East African Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, 
Makerere College, 1958), pp. 35-36; J. P. Crazzolara, The Lwoo, Part I: 
Lwoo Migrations (Museum Combonianum, No. 3; Verona: Missioni Africane, 
1950), pp. l-ll2; H. F. Morris, "The Making of Ankole," Uganda Journal, 
XXI (March, 1957), 1-2; Kenneth Ingham, "Some Aspects of the History of 
Western Uganda," Uganda Journal, XXI (September, 1957),131-132; A. C. A. 
Wright, Review of The Lwoo, Part II: Lwoo Traditions, by J.P. 
Crazzolara, Uganda Journal, XVII (March, 1953), 87-88. 
Writers dispute the "facts" of the history prior to 1800, and 
the existence of the Bachwezi in particular borders on myth, according 
to one school of thought. 
(After the above narrative was constructed from a weighing of 
much conflicting material, another source, dealing with a smaller tribe 
not covered in this study, came to notice as relevant to other tribal 
histories as well; but it was not feasible to attempt to incorporate the 
data. A. W. Southall, "Alur Tradition and Its Historical Significance," 
Uganda Journal, XVIII (September, 1954), 137-165.) 
1[ Great Britain, Colonial Office J Uganda. Report for the Year 1958 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), p. 137. Cited hereafter 
as GB, CO, Uganda, Report for ... 1958. 
2This was especially true of Buganda. C. C. Wrigley, "The 
Christian Revolution in Buganda," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, II (October, 1959), 40. 
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The Explorers 
Although Arabs had penetrated inland to Buganda earlier, it was 
not until 1862 that a European--the explorer, Speke--first visited the 
court of the Kabaka. Though impressed by the power and organization of 
the Kingdom, Speke went away with unfavorable reports of the young 
1 Kabaka Mutesa. 
In 1872 there commenced a period of penetration from the north 
by Sir Samuel Baker, and later by Colonel Gordon, on behalf of the 
Khedive of Egypt. But these moves were opposed by Kabarega, the Mukams 
(King) of Bunyoro-Kitara, nor was much political headway made with 
Mutesa. Gordon discontinued attempts to extend Egyptian influence 
southward, and by 1879 all his posts south of Fatiko (in northern 
Uganda) had been withdrawn. 2 
In the meantime an event of critical importance had taken place. 
In April 1875, Kabaka Mutesa I received the visit of the 
journalist-explorer, Henry Morton Stanley. The men were quite impressed 
with one another. Mutesa, who had matured considerably since the visit 
of Speke, had had at his court for some time Arabs intent on his 
conversion to the Islamic faith. He was interested in learning from 
Stanley more about the Christian religious faith. 
It was decided that Stanley would send a request to England for 
missionaries to come to the Kabaka's capital. London's Daily Telegraph 
1His suggestion in England that missionaries be sent 
heeded by the Church Missionary Society. Ingham, The Making 
pp. 30-31. 
2 Ingham, The Making ..• , pp. 25-36. 
went un-
0 • • , 
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published his letter in November 1875, and the Church Missionary Society 
1 (CMS) took immediate steps and arranged to send a mission to Buganda. 
The Missionaries 
The first Anglican (CMS) missionaries set foot in Uganda in 
1877. In February 1879 additional CMS missionaries arrived as 
reinforcements. A few days later their two-year monopoly, as far as the 
Christian faith was concerned, was shattered with the coming of the 
initial band of Roman Catholics. Accentuating the religious difference 
was the Fathers' nationality. This was not English but rather French, 
for the Catholics were from the White Fathers Mission of Algeria. 
Two trends were to become evident. The first was the increasing 
antipathy of the Kabaka. The missionaries of both faiths were led 
respectively by men who were unaccommodating in nature--Reverend Mackay 
and Father Lourdel. Their manner, combined with the effectiveness of 
the teaching of some of Mutesa's subjects to the extent that his secular 
authority was beginning to be undermined, alienated and antagonized 
Buganda's ruler. Mackay was personally asked to leave in order that he 
might be replaced. The White Fathers withdrew in 1882 for a short 
1George Wilson, "The Progress of Uganda," Journal of the African 
Society, VI (January, 1907), 115; George Wilson, "The Progress of the 
Uganda Protectorate," Journal of the Society of Arts, LV (February, 
1907), 283; Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 33-34. 
There is reason to believe that the Kabaka's desire for, or 
agreement to, a Christian mission may have been motivated as much by his 
wish for support against the current threat from Egypt to the north as 
by a wish for intellectual or spiritual enlightenment. He thought the 
missionaries would supply him with arms as the Arabs had done. D. A. 
Low, Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875-1900 (East African Studies, 
No. 8; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 
[1957)), p. 1. 
time. 1 Mutesa himself was never converted--how could he have 
acknowledged the supremacy of any other power than his own? 2 
The second trend continued along with the first throughout the 
reign of both Mutesa and his successor Mwanga. This was the often 
fierce and bitter rivalry which flared up between the two missions. 
Many of their respective converts were chiefs or sons of chiefs who 
brought with their conversion the automatic allegiance of their 
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supporters. Buganda came to be divided politically into two factions--
the followers of the English Protestant mission and the followers of the 
French Catholic mission. There were also a Muslim faction and a less 
well defined "pagan" political grouping. The religious rivalry led to 
violence on numerous occasions, and the European missionaries themselves 
were not always above rep~oach, certainly taking few steps to conciliate 
3 
the differences between their Christian adherents. 
Mutesa died and was succeeded by his son Mwanga in 1884. 
Persecutions of the Christian converts became more frequent and drastic 
in nature. To Mwanga the Christians were traitors to traditional 
authority by reason of their refusal to obey certain of his commands. 
They, on the other hand, held that the commands violated their Christian 
1rngham, The Making ... , p. 36; Sarah Geraldina Stock, The 
Story of Uganda and the Victoria Nyanza Mission (New York: Fleming H. 
Revell Company, [1892]), pp. 144-145; H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, 
Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 24. 
2 H. P. Gale, "Mutesa 1--Was He a God?: The Enigma of Kiganda 
Paganism," Uganda Journal, XX (March, 1956), 80-81. 
3 Stock, p. 71; John Taylor, Christianity and Politics in Africa 
(London: Penguin Books, 1957), p. 45; Thomas and Scott, p. 24. 
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consciences and that there was a higher authority which required their 
disobedience. The conflict between the new religious and the old 
traditional authority was inevitable. Mwanga apparently realized that 
the converts represented a seditious group which threatened to destroy 
the unity Buganda so sorely needed in the face of a possible European 
. . 1 1.nvas1.on. 
Mwanga's reign turned into a confused whirl of political change, 
punctuated with frequent violence and executions of Christians. Mwanga, 
who lost the Kabakaship twice in two years, was variously supported and 
opposed in turn by the four different factions--the two Christian 
groups, the Muslims, and the pagans. 
Assisted in 1889 by the Catholic faction and joined afterwards 
by the Protestants, the temporarily deposed Mwanga was again Buganda's 
ruler in February 1890. The chief offices of the Kingdom were divided 
between the Protestant and Catholic "parties," and Mwanga became more 
precisely the leader of a major faction (the Catholic) rather than of a 
2 
whole integrated people. 
The Traders cum Administrators 
There had been apprehension in some quarters during the 1880's 
because Germany was showing evidence of designs on Uganda. But this 
matter was settled with the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement on 
1 Low, Religion .•• , p. 7. History proved Mwanga right, for 
better or worse. The Christian chiefs did act to overthrow him, with 
the aid of Lugard whom they invited into the country. 
2rngham, The Making ••• , pp. 37-40. 
July 1, 1890. In return for tiny Heligoland, Germany recognized as a 
sphere of British influence what came later to be known as Uganda. 1 
Following several months' pressure from the British Government 
to send an expedition to Uganda, the Imperial British East Africa 
29 
Company gave the task to Captain Frederick Lugard. The Christian chiefs 
were anxious to have him arrive because of a current Muslim threat from 
2 the direction of Bunyoro. Lugard reached Buganda in December of 1890 
and obtained Mwanga's signature to a treaty, against the Kabaka's will 
3 
according to the Britisher's own admission. By the agreement, which 
was to be valid for two years, the Company "acquired a right to 
intervene in the internal affairs of his kingdom and assumed the 
4 
responsibility for the maintenance of order." 
Much of the following year Lugard spent in the area west of 
Buganda establishing a series of outposts. (He manned them with part of 
a force of Sudanese soldiers he had found abandoned in the north when 
the Mahdists revolt had cut them off from Egypt in 1883.) Lugard 
returned to Kampala--the name given to his Buganda headquarters adjacent 
to the Kabaka's capital at Mengo--late in 1891. There he found orders 
from the Company to withdraw. The Company had decided that the expense 
1 See Thomas and Scott, pp. 29-30. The text of the Agreement may 
be found in [Great Britian,] Foreign Office, Historical Section, Kenya, 
Uganda and Zanzibar (Peace Handbooks, Vol. XVI, No. 96; London: H. M. 
Stationery Office, 1920), p. 99. 
2 Anthony Low, "British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question: 
October-December 1892," Uganda Journal, XVIII (September, 1954), 81; 
Low, Religion •.• , p. 15. 
3F. D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol. II, p. 
41, cited by K. Ingham, "Some Aspects of the History of Buganda," Uganda 
Journal, XX (March, 1956), 6. 
4Thomas and Scott, p. 30. 
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of maintaining the Uganda operation far outweighed what had been 
anticipated, and it was not being balanced by appreciable revenues from 
trade. However, through the efforts of CMS in England, money was raised 
to keep the Company in Uganda until the end of 1892. 
The ever present conflict between the Protestants and the 
Catholics flared into violence early in 1892. Mwanga armed the 
Catholics and Lugard the Protestants. The latter won, and the former 
had to flee. On March 30, 1892, Mwanga returned and made a new treaty 
with Lugard, The Kabaka also became a nominal Protestant--a purely 
political conversion--and a settlement was negotiated with the Catholics 
to give them some of the chieftainships. 1 
Lugard then left for England. There he was successful in 
defending his reputation against vehement charges of partisanship made 
by the Catholic priests in Buganda through the French Government. 2 He 
was also successful, with the concurrent efforts of the CMS, in stirring 
up public opinion in England so that sufficient pressure was brought to 
bear on the Cabinet to prevent Uganda's evacuation--abandonment was the 
3 term some used. 
1 Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 43-49. 
A while later "the fight for the king' s soul went on merrily" 
between Colonel Colvile and the Catholic bishop, the former winning for 
the time being, Colonel Henry Edward Colvile, The Land of the Nile 
Springs (London: Edward Arnold, 1895), pp. 72, 78. 
2John P,Glennon, "Uganda, 1890-1901," Dissertation Abstracts, 
XIX (January, 1959), 1728-1729. 
3The issues were many and were widely debated at the time, See 
Low, Uganda Journal, XVIII, 81-100; [Great Britain, Foreign Office,] 
Further Papers Relating to Uganda, Africa series, No. 1 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1893), p. 3; Philo-Africanus [pseud,], 
"Uganda," Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, V (January, 1893), 55-82, 
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II. A CHRONICLE OF EVENTS, 1893-1905 
The decision to postpone the withdrawal represented a turning 
point. It heralded the first of what proved to be a series of official 
steps, whereby the British Government assumed a steadily increasing 
responsibility in the region. 
The Official Administrators--A Protectorate and a New Kabaka 
The British Government decided to send Sir Gerald Portal as 
Commissioner to Uganda to recommend ~hat should be done, footing the 
bill for the territory's administration for the time being. Portal 
arrived in March 1893. In April an agreement was concluded with the 
European Bishops of the Protestant and Catholic missions for a division 
of the chieftainships among their respective adherents. From this time 
until 1900 the senior office of Katikiro (Prime Minister) was filled by 
two appointees, one for each religion, an astounding innovation in 
1 Buganda. In late May 1893, a provisional treaty was signed with Mwanga. 
In November 1893 Portal recommended that his Government not 
abandon Uganda. Both houses of the British Parliament finally concurred 
in this view in April 1894, though the "decision was not reached without 
2 
a struggle." A protectorate over Buganda was officially announced in 
London on June 18. The Acting Commissioner in Uganda, Colonel Colvile, 
1For the text, see [Great Britain, Foreign Office,] Further 
Papers Relating to Uganda, Africa series, No. 8 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1893), p. 24 and also pp. 13-15; C. J. Wilson, Uganda 
in the Days of Bishop Tucker (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1955), 
pp. 24-25; Ingham, The Making .. , p. 53. 
2Ingham, The Making ., pp. 61-62. 
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formally declared Buganda a Protectorate at an assembly of the Kabaka 
and the chiefs at Mengo on August 27. The same day the Kabaka signed a 
treaty similar to the provisional one of the previous year. It is clear 
1 
that MWanga had little choice; duress was pronounced. 
Also in 1894 the British-led forces defeated Ksbarega, the 
insurgent ruler of Bunyoro, who had to flee to Acholi and Lango. For 
their help in defeating him, the Baganda received part of Bunyoro--the 
Mubende area in particular. (Since that time Bunyoro has agitated for 
the return of these "lost counties" from her more powerful neighbor of 
modern days.) 
The 1894 Protectorate had been proclaimed with regard only to 
Buganda. In 1896 the Foreign Secretary of the British Government added 
2 Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Busoga. 
Mwanga in the meantime was chafing under British rule. In 
November 1896 the British Commissioner fined and otherwise punished the 
3 Ksbaka for sending ivory out of the country via German East Africa. To 
most Baganda such treatment of their Kabaka was inconceivable, highly 
1 Colvile, pp. 297-301. Mwanga evidently at least understood 
what he was signing. Often the treaty-making of those days was just an 
"amiable farce," the chiefs putting some sort of mark on a form treaty, 
the content of which was not at all comprehended. See H. B. Thomas and 
A. E. Spencer, A History of Uganda Land and Surveys and of the Uganda 
Land and Survey Department (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Press, 1938), 
p. 45. 
2Thereby''l.egalizing" the 1894 treaties which had been made with 
the rulers of Toro and Ankole. Ingham, The Making •.. , pp. 59, 66. 
The Ankole treaty in particular was an "amiable farce." Thomas and 
Spencer, p. 45. 
3H. R. Fox Bourne, "The Uganda Protectorate and Its Relation to 
the Sudan," The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, VII (April, 1899), 
328-329. 
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insulting to him and thus to them. Mwanga fled the capital in July 1897 
to raise a force against the Protectorate administration. He drew 
considerable support from the people and chiefs in a wave of hatred of 
1 
the Europeans. Despite the support, he was defeated by the British, 
who were aided by their allies among the Baganda chiefs. 
In September of the same year the approval of the Foreign 
Secretary was obtained for the accession to the throne of Mwanga's one 
year old son, Daudi Chwa. This was duly proclaimed by the Acting 
Commissioner after consultation with a number of chiefs. Three Regents 
were appointed--the Protestant Katikiro (Apolo Kagwa), the Catholic 
2 Katikiro, and another Protestant. 
Earlier, in 1895, there had arrived in Uganda a new group of 
Catholic missionaries, the Mill Hill Fathers from England. The hope was 
that their presence would dispel the previous connection of the 
Protestant and Catholic faiths with England and France respectively. 
This it did in time. 
The Sudanese Mutiny 
One acute crisis was still to be faced before the turn of the 
century. Late in 1897 the Sudanese forces making up the backbone of the 
Protectorate's military establishment mutinied. They had been unable to 
obtain redress with respect to grievances. The consensus of historical 
judgment is that they were sorely tried and were provoked to action by a 
1 A. B. Lloyd, In Dwarf Land and Cannibal Country (London: T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1907), pp. 202-203; Ingham, The Making ., p. 70. 
2Ingham, The Making •.. , pp. 70-71. 
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1 British military command lacking in leadership qualities. Europeans 
2 
were killed, including a CMS missionary who turned combatant. There 
were grave doubts whether the Baganda would remain loyal, for Mwanga had 
escaped from German territory and was attempting with Kabarega to raise 
the people to drive the British out. The situation at the end of the 
year was "disastrous," and the Acting Commissioner was urgently request-
ing that promised troop reinforcements from the Coast and India be 
3 hurried along. 
But the Baganda, after wavering, did not defect. They furnished 
some support, and the mutineers were defeated, Mwanga and Kabarega were 
eventually betrayed by the Lango, among whom they had taken refuge. They 
were captured by the British forces in April 1899 and exiled from the 
4 
country. 
The Sudanese Mutiny had occasioned an even greater military 
emphasis in the Protectorate's administration than had existed 
1The pro and con of the mutiny have been advanced in the follow-
ing sources: J. v. Wild, The Uganda Mutiny. 1897 (London: Macmillan and 
Co. Limited, 1954), pp. 22-23; Ingham, The Making •.. , pp. 72-73; 
Bourne, The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, VII, 336; J. A. 
Meldon, "Notes on the Sudanese in Uganda," Journal of the African 
Society, VII (January, 1908), 145. 
2charles F. Harford-Battersby, Pilkington of Uganda (second 
edition; London: Marshall Brothers, [1898}), pp. 212, 327, 333, 336. 
3[Great Britain, Foreign Office,} Papers Relating to Recent 
Events in the Uganda Protectorate, Africa series, No. 7 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1898), pp. 8-9, 24; Ingham, The Making 
. . .• p. 71. 
4rnteresting are two accounts, diametrically opposed in sym-
pathies, of the two rulers' last efforts to overthrow the Protectorate--
or to drive out the invaders--depending on the particular viewpoint. 
Wild, The Uganda Mutiny, p. 7; Ramakrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of 
Uganda: A Study in Acculturation (Berlin: Academie-Verlag, 1956), p. 130. 
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previously, and the British Government was not pleased with this or with 
the accompanying heavy military expenditures. It was decided that the 
time had come for reorganizing the administration along lines which were 
essentially more civil in character. Sir Harry Johnston was appointed 
Special Commissioner and instructed to undertake this in such a way--
levy of a hut tax and encouragement of native products were suggested--
as to make the Protectorate financially self-sufficient. He arrived in 
Uganda late in 1899. 1 
The Agreement of 1900 
Johnston gave his major attention to Buganda. The people had 
exceeded all his expectations. In his view the Kingdom was the key 
entity, and a lasting plan had to be formulated for its future. On 
March 10, 1900, after considerable negotiation, Johnston finalized a 
twenty-two article Agreement with the Regents of Buganda. It was "the 
most complex and far-reaching agreement ever concluded between an 
2 
African people and an occupying European power." 
In the document, inaccurately called the Uganda Agreement 
because of a linguistic peculiarity, Buganda's boundaries were defined. 
They included the Bunyoro territory handed over to the Kingdom 
previously, as well as an additional section (Kabula) bordering on 
Ankole and an island (Bavuma) having previous close affinity with Busoga. 
Buganda renounced territorial claims to, and the right to exact tribute 
1Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston & the Scramble for Africa 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), pp. 289-290, 298; Ingham, The Making 
_._._., p. 87. 
2oliver, Sir Harry Johnston ••. , p. 299. 
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from, Busoga and other adjoining areas. 
Henceforth, Buganda was to rank as a province of equal rank in 
the evolving Protectorate. Buganda's revenue was to be collected by the 
Protectorate Administration and merged with all Protectorate revenue. 
Protectorate laws would apply to Buganda, but EQ! Ji in conflict ~ 
the Agreement. 
So long as the Kabaka, chiefs, and people cooperated loyally 
with the Protectorate Government, the Kabaka was to be recognized as 
Buganda's native ruler. He was to be styled His Highness and was to be 
entitled to a salute of nine guns. 1 He was to exercise direct rule over 
his people. 
New designations to the positions of Kabaka, his ministers, and 
county chiefs were to require the Protectorate Government's approval. 
County chiefs were to report and be responsible to the Kingdom's state 
ministers appointed by the Kabaka; except that in the matter of 
collection of taxes they were immediately responsible to the Protectorate 
Government, which could request a county chief's dismissal if he failed 
in these duties. 
Provision was made for a Lukiko (native council), whose 
resolutions would require the approval of the Kabaka and the Protectorate 
Government, the Kabaka being obligated to follow explicitly the advice 
of the Protectorate Government in such cases. 
The Agreement went on to deal with the appointment and salaries 
1
rhus he was placed on a level of importance with the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. See Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston ... , p. 307. 
of Buganda's officials, as ,well as with a land settlement, taxes, and 
1 
other subjects. 
The circumstances surrounding the negotiations and the signing 
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2 
of the Agreement are still not fully available. It is certain that the 
two parties to the Agreement were not equals. It is also clear that the 
Agreement was not imposed, as such, on the chiefs of Buganda. They were 
the recognized leaders of their people in the most unusual circumstances 
which existed--an infant Kabaka, his age rendering him powerless to 
carry out his traditional role of strong leadership. The Agreement gave 
the senior chiefs, as well as most if not all other leading figures, 
individual and personal freehold title to large areas of land, land 
which they had never possessed before under the system where all land 
belonged to the Kabaka and authority over it was delegated by him to 
chiefs and other favorites. Johnston in effect bribed the Kingdom's 
notables, but they were willing takers. It should be added that the 
missionaries were fully--and constructively--involved in the negotia-
tiona, advising both parties. 
The main loser from the Agreement was the Kabakaship. It gained 
in prestige vis-a-vis other tribal peoples by reason of the increased 
1The text is contained in[Great Britain, Colonial OfficeJ Uganda 
Protectorate: Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, 
Cmd. 9028 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), pp. 14-23. 
Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal ••.• 
2A definitive study by Dr. Anthony Low has been published since 
this was drafted. D. A. Low, "The Making and Implementation of the 
Uganda Agreement of 1900," Part I of Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-
1955: Two Studies, D. Anthony Low and R. Cranford Pratt (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), pp. 3.-159. 
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size of Buganda, the title of His Highness, and the nine-gun salute. 
But the Kabakaship lost greatly in terms of power within the Kingdom, 
even not counting the ultimate sovereignty given up earlier by Mwanga's 
1 
treaties with Lugard and Portal. 
The important fact about the Agreement in relation to the Uganda 
Protectorate at the time and in later years was, very simply, the special 
position which it accorded to Buganda, whereby the Kingdom was allowed a 
distinctive measure of autonomy in the running of its internal affairs. 
Granted, as a Province of equal rank it became an integral part of the 
Protectorate, but in the process it doubled its size. The prestige which 
accrued over the years to the Kingdom, to the Kabaka, and to the Baganda 
individually and collectively as a result of the Agreement, was 
phenomenal in comparison with that of the rest of the territory's 
2 tribes. Until more is known it can be concluded that the degree of 
enhancement of Buganda's status was of Johnston's making. Another 
Special Commissioner would likely have been content to leave matters 
1Ingham, The Making •.. , pp. 88-91; George Bennett, Review of 
The Making of Modern Uganda, by Kenneth Ingham, Uganda Journal, XXIII 
(March, 1959), 92; J. V. Wild, The Story of the Uganda Agreement 
(London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1955), pp. 92-93; A. B. Mukwaya, 
Land Tenure in Buganda: Present Day Tendencies (East African Studies, 
No. 1, East African Institute of Social Research; Kampala, Uganda: The 
Eagle Press, 1953), pp. 10, 19; L. P. Hair, An African People in the 
Twentieth Century (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1934), pp. 
165-166; Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston •.. , pp. 299-307; S. Joshua L. 
Zake, Reform in Uganda (n.p.: Sapoba Bookshop Press, [1954]), pp. 10-19. 
2Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development 
in British Tropical Africa" (unpublished Report, 1940-42, prepared for 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, [1944]), p. 5. 
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less regularized, in which case the concessions Johnston made would not 
1 have been necessary. 
Other Developments of the Period 
In 1900 and 1901 the British concluded Agreements with Toro and 
Ankole respectively. (There was in addition a much later Agreement in 
1933 with Bunyoro similar to the Toro and Ankole ones.) Although these 
also recognized the rulers of the smaller Kingdoms as the native rulers, 
none were styled His Highness as was the envied Kabaka, and in other 
respects the Agreements were no more than pale imitations of that given 
2 to, or obtained by, Buganda. 
In December 1901 the first locomotive of the Uganda Railway 
reached the shores of Lake Victoria. The time to travel from Kampala to 
3 the coast was thus cut from some three months to six days. 
In April 1902 Uganda's Eastern Province was transferred to the 
East Africa Protectorate (known since 1920 as Kenya). The area included 
the Mau and the Nandi Plateau. 4 The transfer was not regarded as 
significant at the time, for the area was considered as "tiresome" and 
1The conclusion is based on the account of Oliver, Sir Harry 
Johnston ••. , especially p. 307. 
2Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African 
Territories, Part I: East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika ([Great 
Britain,] Colonial Office; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1950), pp. 46-49. 
3sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: Hutchinson, 
1954), p. 63; Ingham, The Making ..• , p. 98. 
4The area was incorporated into the neighboring Protectorate as 
the Kisumu and Naivasha Provinces, since designated as the Northern and 
Central Districts of Nyanza Province. Uganda's pre-1902 Central 
Province became its new Eastern Province. 
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as draining Uganda's resources unduly. However, Uganda lost some 
revenue as a result of the transfer, and the terminus for the Uganda 
Railway was no longer in Uganda. But more important, on the other side 
of the scale, the region contained some of the highlands which later 
were to attract European settlers, and Uganda was spared the problems 
. 1 
wh1.ch would have accompanied such an "asset." 
Administration of other parts of the Protectorate meanwhile 
advanced from the center. By 1901 it was quite established in the 
western Kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole, as well as Busoga to the 
east. During the period 1899 to 1904 the Muganda general, Kakunguru, 
worked with his Baganda civil agents to bring Teso and Bukedi to 
Busoga's north under regularized administration, subsequently turning 
2 
over to the British authorities. 
But in the course of about the same period there grew to 
steadily more alarming proportions an epidemic of sleeping sickness 
which, as of 1905, the Protectorate Government had as yet been 
unsuccessful in arresting. The epidemic, concentrated on the shores of 
the Lake, was claiming many lives. 
On the economic scene, a generally black one in view of the 
Protectorate's annual deficit, there was introduced a bright note in 
1904. Borup, a CMS missionary on the staff of an indirectly affiliated 
commercial company, arranged for the introduction of cotton seed into 
1Ingham, The Making ..• , pp. 102, 115; A. T. Matson, "Uganda's 
Old Eastern Province and East Africa's Federal Capital," Uganda Journal, 
XXII (March, 1958), 46-51. 
2 Ingham, The Making •.• , pp. 117-118. 
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Buganda. Together with the Government's efforts, sufficient was planted 
in 1904 and 1905 to augur well for the cultivation of the crop in the 
future. 
The year 1905 brought two politically significant developments. 
In Ankole the Sub-Commissioner was murdered. As a result, the Ankole 
Agreement was suspended, and a heavy collective fine was imposed on the 
people of the Kingdom. The event was territorially regarded as truly 
grave. 
Also in 1905 another development of wider significance occurred. 
Both the Protectorate of Uganda and that of East Africa (Kenya) were 
transferred on April 1 from the control and direction of the British 
Foreign Office. They henceforth came under the responsibility of the 
Colonial Office. In time, the juridical fiction which had existed to 
the effect that because Buganda was a Protectorate, it was not a British 
possession, and the British King therefore managed only Buganda's 
1 foreign relations--this fiction soon died. With the transfer came a 
1Henri Rolin, Le Droit de l'Uganda (Bruxelles: ~tablissements 
" Emile Bruyland, 1910), p. 94. 
The fiction was reborn as a grievance expressed by the Baganda 
in 1953 in connection with the Kabaka Crisis. In the official papers 
dealing with the Crisis, the transfer is referred to as having taken 
place in 1902, presumably because the Uganda Order in Council of 1902 
provided that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 would apply to Uganda 
as if the latter were a British Colony or possession. See GB, CO, 
Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal ••• , pp. 26-27, 29-32, 34-35, 39-40, 
44-46. 
The transfer actually took place on April 1, 1905. Thomas and 
Scott, p. 41; Ingham, The Making ••. , p. 86; GB, CO, Uganda. Report 
for .•. 1958, p. 139. 
The official reason for the transfer was that control of 
affairs by the Foreign Office had been only a temporary arrangement 
until immediate boundary questions could be settled with foreign powers. 
See GB, CO, Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal ••. , pp. 29-30. Evidence 
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more active interest in the development of the economic possibilities of 
the two territories than had been evidenced by the Foreign Office. 
Economic stagnation came to an end and the period of business began, 
1 
according to one observer of the day. 
Conclusions 
The assumption of control over Uganda's affairs by the Colonial 
Office brought to a close the early period of Uganda's literate history. 
It is an appropriate point at which to pause and make a brief assessment. 
What forces had injected themselves from outside onto the changing 
traditional African polities of the region? What had been the effect of 
these alien influences on the indigenous political scene as of 1905? 
What were the prospects for the future, viewed from that year? 
The narrative of events up to 1905 lends some preliminary weight 
to the proposition that the nature and the course of the change wrought 
in Uganda by European contact was largely conditioned by the identity of 
the Europeans who entered and who stayed in the region in the early era, 
and by the order in which the different agents of contact--explorers, 
missionaries, traders, administrators--arrived. 
Four developments, stemming from various forces and events, were 
especially significant to the future. The first was the mere 
that this may have indeed been 
Salisbury's letter of February 
Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston 
the general policy appears in Lord 
18, 1897, to Sir Harry Johnston, cited by 
.• p. 276. 
1E. H. M. Leggett, "The Economic Development of British East 
Africa and Uganda," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, LXIII 
(February, 1915), 212. 
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establishment of pax Britannica in the area which had come under British 
administration by 1905--an area about half of modern Uganda. A relative 
political stability replaced the previous intertribal and intratribal 
wars, raids, and violence which had characterized the social situation 
before and for a number of years after the arrival of the Europeans in 
the region. Conditions therefore favored the indigenous population's 
increased attention to peaceful pursuits during the decades to come. 
Another consequence of the interaction of the traditional tribal 
polities with the different agents of Western contact was very important 
in setting future patterns. The mid-nineteenth century rise in 
political strength of the Kingdom of Buganda was greatly furthered, 
while at the same time Bunyoro's fortunes fell. In return for the loss 
of some of its sovereignty, the Kingdom of Buganda had been accorded a 
special and privileged position by the 1900 Agreement. The Baganda 
system was internally weakened somewhat by the lesser concentration of 
political authority with the ascendancy of an oligarchy, but on the 
other hand it was very soon to be reinforced economically by the 
production of cotton. Unquestionably the Baganda constituted by far the 
pre-eminent tribe in all respects in 1905. In addition, they had already 
proved they could adapt to pressures for change without losing their 
strong, traditionally-based identity as a tribal nation. 
A third product of the preceding two or three decades was the 
new kind of social division of political importance which had been 
introduced--that arising from the rivalry between the adherents of the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic faiths, a rivalry which had already begun 
1 its spread into other parts of the Protectorate. 
The last of the four significant developments was the partial 
44 
elimination in one respect, and the reduction in another, of the future 
2 possibility of large-scale alien settlement in Uganda. 
1
rhe Catholic version of the rivalry in the early years is now 
available in a book written by a Mill Hill Fathers' missionary and 
received subsequent to the completion of the above historical account. 
It is H. P. Gale, Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers (London: Macmillan 
and Co. Limited, 1959), pp. 1-334. 
2It was eliminated in one respect with the transfer of the 
Eastern Province, an area climatically and otherwise attractive to 
European settlers. It was reduced with the introduction of cotton seed 
(and the completion of the railway to the Lake), since this increased 
the chances that Uganda could become financially self-sufficient without 
white settlers. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Uganda is a country about the size of the United Kingdom or 
Ghana, situated on a plateau inland from the coast of East Africa. Its 
inhabitants number close to six million, and most are Africans of 
diverse tribes. 
A knowledge of these and other facts concerning the physical and 
social environment of the Protectorate aids in an understanding of the 
more dynamic forces of change. In the following pages attention is 
given first to some of the geographical features of Uganda. They are 
nonhuman conditions of the social situation, are usually more constant 
in nature, and include the topography, size, climate, and vegetation of 
the territory. 
In the subsequent discussion of the social environment, 
demographic data--drawn of necessity primarily from the post-1945 period 
--is provided as background for the study. A few remarks are advanced 
on the social relationships existing in the relatively undefined, 
undeveloped, and unintegrated Protectorate of 1905. The description of 
the social situation for 1945 is deferred until a later chapter (VIII), 
by which point the other major forces will have been treated. 
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I. THE GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES 1 
Extending from Ethiopia to the Cape Province in South Africa 
there is a vast tableland. Part of it, rising gradually from the coast, 
is known as the East African plateau. The plateau is split in a 
striking manner by the eastern and western arms of a Y-shaped system of 
fissures called the Rift Valley. The eastern arm follows a fairly 
straight line from Lake Nyasa in the south to Lake Rudolf in the north 
and then on to the Red Sea. The western arm likewise leaves the base of 
the Y at Lake Nyasa. It veers northwest to Lake Tanganyika and then 
proceeds in a northerly direction to give a home in its low-lying 
terrain to Lakes Kivu, Edward, and Albert. The Rift Valley's branches 
are geological fault-lines which convey the effect of two great troughs 
scored across the highlands, emanating from Lake Nyasa in the south. 
The Valley's sections are flanked by escarpment walls rising in some 
places high above the plateau through which the cuts pass. 
The Topography and Size of the Protectorate 
The area between the eastern and the western arms of the Rift 
Valley is, as it were, like a huge elongated saucer placed some 4,000 
1sources for this section were: [Great Britain, Colonial 
Office,] East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, Cmd. 9475 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), pp. 8-9, 262 (cited 
hereafter as GB, CO, East Africa Royal Commission ..• ); V. C. R. Ford, 
The Trade of Lake Victoria: A Geographical Study (East African Studies, 
No. 3; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955), 
pp. 1-6, 10-ll;[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for the 
Year 1958 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), pp. 134-135; 
Stanley H. Beaver and L. Dudley Stamp, Africa, Part II of A Regional 
Geography (The University Geographical Series; London: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1952), pp. 147-161; H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 112-113. 
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feet above sea level. The southern part of the saucer is the plateau of 
western Tanganyika. The northern part is known as the Lake Victoria 
plateau. The lake itself has a maximum depth of only 270 feet and 
represents merely the gathering ground for water in the lowest level of 
the plateau. 
The Protectorate of Uganda occupies most of the northern area of 
the Lake Victoria plateau. It does not quite extend to the eastern Rift 
Valley, stopping at the highland belt bordering the fissure. The 
dominant landmark in that area is the gigantic mass of Mount Elgon, 
astride the Uganda-Kenya border, reaching to over 14,000 feet. 
In the opposite direction the Protectorate takes in portions of 
the western branch of the Rift Valley as the boundary runs north through 
Lakes Edward and Albert. Directly on a line between the two lakes is 
the Ruwenzori massif rising to heights of more than 16,000 feet. The 
border between Uganda and the Belgian Congo follows this north-south 
range of mountains instead of the Rift Valley line just to the west of 
the Ruwenzori, 
The Equator cuts across Lake Victoria along its northern shores. 
Although some of Uganda is below the line, in the form of the northern 
half of the Lake and the land stretching to its west about 150 miles, 
most of the territory lies to the north of the Equator. The Nile drains 
from Lake Victoria at Jinja toward the north into the vast marshy 
backwaters of Lake Kyoga, then flows northwest to roar down the 
Murchison Falls, and on into the northern end of shallow Lake Albert. 
It exits very shortly, again northward, on its course toward the Sudan 
and Egypt. 
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To conclude a description of the territory's physical features, 
the southern half is more hilly whereas the country to the north tends 
to be more open and rolling in character. 
In size Uganda measures 93,981 square miles, which is about 
equivalent to the area of the United Kingdom, Western Germany, Ghana, or 
the state of Oregon. The figure includes 13,689 square miles of open 
water. The balance--80,292, equal to the extent of the Sultanate of 
Oman, or the state of Minnesota--includes in turn some 5,670 square 
miles of swamp. The Protectorate is roughly a little more than 300 
miles from north to south and a little less than that figure from east 
to west. 
Climate and Vegetation 
Rainfall is the climatic feature of overriding importance, its 
distribution influencing to a marked degree the economy of the various 
regions around the Lake. 
Two factors appear to be paramount in the distribution of 
rainfall. The first is the movement of what is called the intertro.pical 
convergence zone, which refers to the area in the air where the 
southeast monsoon and the north and northeast air currents meet. The 
former is often moist and unstable, while the currents from the desert 
areas in the north are dry and more stable. The second factor, which 
gives rise to unstable conditions in the air masses passing over the 
region, consists of the large water surfaces represented by the lakes 
and the many swamps of the area. From them there is considerable 
evaporation, and the moisture drawn up into the atmosphere often is 
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returned as rain to the earth in the same region. (This is known as the 
convectional type of rainfall.) 
The pattern resulting from these forces of weather is one of 
heavy rainfall--from 50 to 60 inches annually--along the wet lake fringe, 
meaning for Uganda the western and northern shores of Lake Victoria. A 
somewhat dryer belt with about 40 inches extends from northern Busoga 
west and then south through most of Buganda into Ankole. In both cases 
the rain comes throughout the year with usually only a slight seasonal 
variation, two peaks occurring soon after the equinoxes. Seasonal 
variation is more pronounced in north Uganda. With a few exceptions, 
notably arid Karamoja in the northeast, the greater part of Uganda has a 
good prospect of obtaining at least 30 inches of annual rainfall. In 
this regard it is fairly well favored for agricultural production. 
The mean maximum and minimum temperatures at a weather station 
(Entebbe) situated in the zone bordering Lake Victoria are recorded as 
about 78 and 63 degrees Fahrenheit respectively. The soil in the zone 
is a fairly heavy loam; and vegetation passes from the thick rain forest 
in the low swampy valleys, through tall elephant grass (savannah) on the 
hill flanks, to forest again on the hill tops where they occur. But 
most of the area is extensively occupied, and the characteristic feature 
is the plantain garden. 
In the drier belt the gap between the maximum and minimum 
temperatures is some few degrees wider, 1 the soil is lighter and more 
1In the southwest both temperature figures drop five degrees or 
more compared to those for the Lake station; and in the north the 
maximum increases some six degrees. 
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sandy, and the vegetation is short grass savannah and acacia thorn bush. 
In summary, the combination of the altitude and the territory's 
location on the Equator results in an absence of extremes of heat; 
vegetation reflects the moderate temperatures, varying with the level of 
. 1 
rainfall and the type and fertil1ty of soils. The tribes most favored 
by soil and rainfall conditions have been the Baganda, Basoga, Bagisu, 
and Iteso. Least favored have been the peoples in Karamoja in Uganda's 
arid northeast. As is shown later, these variations have influenced the 
extent of economic development and, in turn, social development and 
political change in the different areas. 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL SITUATION 
Uganda as a unit in 1905 could scarcely be said to have had a 
social situation, being as it was a new, still expanding entity, whose 
various constituent groups had few and often no links with each other. 
It is, therefore, not possible to make a worthwhile analysis of that 
force as of the beginning of the period under review. Further, an 
analysis of the 1945 social situation must await the conclusions yet to 
be presented about the other forces shaping change. In light of these 
inhibiting factors, the procedure adopted here is as follows. 
As general background for the study as a whole certain 
1The most fertile soils apparently are the red earths on the 
hill flanks, especially in Buganda and Busoga, and the often sandy swamp 
fringe soils in various areas. As for general fertility, contrary to a 
widespread belief that tropical soils are inexhaustible, those of East 
Africa like most others of the tropical world are by nature relatively 
poor, unproductive, and easily leached. 
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demographic material, primarily from 1948, is provided for limited 
aspects of the social environment. It deals with the racial and ethnic 
diversity of the peoples of Uganda--with the questions of size and 
general characteristics of the groups finally included in the 
Protectorate. Some general remarks are then made about the social 
relationships existing at the time around 1905. 
The Three Racial Communities1 
The first professionally directed census in Uganda was carried 
out in 1948. Population figures for that year, and the census estimates 
for certain previous years, are provided in the table which follows. 
1Except as otherwise indicated, the terms race and racial are 
used in this study in a nontechnical sense simply as a means of 
distinguishing certain broad human groupings which are notably different 
from each other in their physical characteristics. 
The term ethnic is used to refer to less extensive groupings 
which exist within a race, setting one group off from the other by 
differences in physical characteristics. 
The term community is used loosely to designate that group of 
people specified by the modifying adjective. 
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TABLE 1. - Population of Uganda, 1911-1948, by racea 
Census Year 
Race 1911 1921 1931 1948 
Europeans -b 1,300 2,000 3,400 
Asians and Others _b 5,600 15,200c 37,500d 
Africans 2,840,000 3,160,000 3,536,300 4,917,600 
Total b 3,166,800 3,553,500 4,958,500 
&Sources: Uganda Protectorate, East African Statistical 
Department--Uganda Unit, 1958 Statistical Abstract (Entebbe, Uganda: 
Government Printer, [1959]), p. 6 (cited hereafter as UP, EASD, 1958 
Statistical Abstract); J. E. Goldthorpe, "The African Population of East 
Africa: A Summary of Past and Present Trends," Appendix VII of East 
Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, [Great Britain, Colonial 
Office,] Cmd. 9475 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), 
pp. 467-468. 
It seems probable that at least the 1911 count was badly in 
error, underestimating the population considerably, according to the 
latter source. Both the 1921 and the 1931 Censuses were carried out--
and even more the 1911--without professional statistical planning and 
may not be comparable to the 1948 figures. With further regard to the 
1931 figure, Rudolf Province, with a population variously estimated at 
25,000 and 150,000, was transferred to Kenya in 1926. 
More exact data than given above were not available for the 
1911 and 1921 totals for the African population. Otherwise, figures 
were rounded off to the nearest 100. 
bNo estimates available. 
cMade up of 13,000 Indo-Pakistani; 1,000 Goans; 500 Arabs; and 
600 Others. 
~de up of 33,800 Indo-Pakistani; 1,400 Goans; 1,500 Arabs; 
and 800 Others. 
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It is of interest to note that the non-African populations grew--
by immigration--at a rate far exceeding the African population. However, 
the percentage of non-Africans to Africans in Uganda remained very small 
indeed, rising from two tenths of one per cent in 1921 to only eight 
tenths of one per cent in 1948. 
The country was, then, overwhelmingly African in composition of 
population--over ninety-nine per cent--throughout the period of the 
study, 1905 to 1945. 
1 The Non-African Population 
A few additional facts about the European and Asian communities 
throw light on the role they played during the four decades under 
review. The data is necessarily taken from the 1948 census. 
Of the 3,400 Europeans in Uganda when the census was taken in 
February 1948, eighty per cent were British-born. European, then, means 
in effect British in Uganda. Only nine per cent of the total had been 
born in Uganda, and this bears out other evidence indicating that the 
European community in the territory was an extremely transient one. The 
number permanently settled has been estimated at being no more than one 
hundred in 1948. The explanation largely lies in the occupations 
pursued by the Europeans in the territory. Of the approximately 3,400 
in the Protectorate, some 754 were Government officials, 528 were 
missionaries, 637 were housewives, and 535 were children. The 
1The main source used for the section on the non-African popula-
tion was J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala, 
Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 1958), pp. 130-137 
for the Europeans, and pp. 114-125 for the Asians. 
Government officials, incidentally, were filling all the top posts in 
every department of the government in 1948. 
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The Asian community in Uganda, as in the other two East African 
territories of Kenya and Tanganyika, has been a community in only the 
very limited sense of being considered and treated as such by non-Asians. 
In reality the Asians, some of whom return to their land of origin in 
their old age, are divisible into three general groups--the Arabs, the 
Goans, and the Indians. The first and last groups have been in turn far 
from homogeneous, and this is especially significant for the much larger 
Indian group. 
The Arabs in the Protectorate, like the other non-Africans of 
different origins, were also relative newcomers. They have been engaged 
primarily in commercial activities. 
The Goans in Uganda, or their parents, have come from 
Portuguese Goa, and most of them have been Roman Catholics as well as 
Portuguese in national status. They have been a closely-knit ethnic 
group, tending to concentrate on clerical positions of responsibility as 
their occupational role, especially staffing such posts in Government 
and at banks. 
The last of the general groups making up the Asian community are 
the Indians, who in 1948 amounted to ninety per cent of those left after 
subtracting the Africans and Europeans from Uganda's total population. 
The Indians' only claim to likeness has been their common origin in the 
Indian subcontinent (excluding Goa). Otherwise, there have existed 
differences of religion, language, and area of origin within the 
subcontinent. (Since World War II a further distinction has been added 
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with the creation of two separate national entities--India and Pakistan.) 
In Uganda most of the Indians--this term will be used in lieu of 
Indo-Pakistanis--in 1948 were Hindus, but these were further divided by 
caste and language differences. The Hindus numbered about 20,000 out of 
the total of 34,000 Indians. Muslims numbered some 11,000. The Muslims 
have been separated by sect, Suni and Shia being the two broad 
distinctions. The Shia predominated in 1948 with some 8,000 believers, 
and of these over 6,000 were of the Shia Ismailia Khoja group whose 
spiritual leader, the Imam, has been His Highness the Aga Khan. 
Viewed as a whole, the Indians in Uganda concentrated on two 
types of industry. Over half of the gainfully occupied in 1948 were 
d . d 1 hi . f . 1 engage 1n commerce an a most t rty per cent 1n manu actur1ng. 
2 The African Peoples 
In the narrative of the region's primitive history in Chapter I, 
mention was made of the migrations which brought African peoples of 
1 UP, EASD, 1958 Statistical Abstract, p. 7. When listed by type 
of Occupation instead of by type of Industry, the percentages of 
gainfully occupied in commerce and manufacturing apparently drops 
somewhat. See p. 8 of same publication. 
2The problems of nomenclature for African tribes are illustrated 
by the fact that Buganda is the place name of the largest Kingdom in 
Uganda, its people in plurality are the Baganda, yet one member of the 
tribe is a Muganda, the language is Luganda, and the most common form for 
the modifying adjective is Kiganda. Accepted by many anthropologists is 
the use of merely the stem--"Ganda" in this case--for all but the place 
name. Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and 
Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People 
(Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [1956]), p. 1. 
However, the practice is not viewed with sympathy or much 
understanding by the people to whom it is applied. In this study the 
various different correct prefixes are used except in the instance of 
the modifying adjective. Here, since in some languages there is more 
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different ethnic origins to what is now known as Uganda. The introduc-
tion of British administration stabilized a situation which up to that 
time had been fluid. Conquest and mass tribal movements ceased. 
Boundaries became fixed, and tribes found themselves allocated to 
particular areas. 
Pertinent to the question of policy and political change is a 
knowledge of which tribes were large and which were small, as well as an 
appreciation of the relative size of the more inclusive groupings of 
similar tribes. Further, there is a need to gain an understanding of 
how the tribal groupings and the tribes differed in general 
characteristics, the relationships among them, and certain general 
aspects of the total social environment. To these subjects the 
than one prefix for the adjectival, in lieu of the linguistically 
correct form there is employed either the place name or the plural 
personal form applicable to the tribe as a whole--for example, the 
Buganda political system or the Baganda political system. 
A list of the terms for some of the tribes, together with the 
stems commonly utilized in anthropological writings, is as follows: 
Persons 
Plural Singular Place Language ~ 
Acholi Acholi Acholi Acholi Acholi 
Baganda Muganda Buganda Luganda Ganda 
Bagisu Mugisu Bugisu Lugisu Gisu 
Bakiga Mukiga Kigezi Lukiga Kiga 
Banyankole Munyankole Ankole Runyankole Nkole 
Bahima Muhima Hima 
Bairu Mwiru Iru 
Banyoro Munyoro Bunyoro Lunyoro Nyoro 
Basoga Musoga Busoga Lusoga Soga 
Batoro Mutoro Toro Lutoro Toro 
Iteso Etesot Teso Ate so Teso 
Karamojong Karamojong Karamoja Karamojong Karamojong 
Lango Lango Lango Lango Lango 
Lugbara Lug bar a Lug bar a Lugbara 
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following comments are directed. 
The distribution of the diverse tribes throughout the territory 
in 1931 and 1948 is shown in the table in Appendix I. The figures 
indicate that there was no fundamental change between 1931 and 1948 in 
the proportionate sizes of the major tribal groups. For example, in 
1931 the Bantu tribes comprised sixty-fiYe per cent of all Africans in 
Uganda compared to sixty-five per cent for 1948; the figures for the 
Nilo-Hamitics were fifteen and fourteen respectively; and those for the 
Nilotic tribes were twelve and thirteen per cent in 1931 and 1948 
respectively, 
Of the individual tribes, the Baganda led with almost twice as 
many in numbers as any other tribe and in 1948 constituted seventeen per 
cent (17%) of the total African population of the Protectorate. The 
other tribes exceeding 200,000 in that year were, with their 
percentages of total population, for the rest of the Bantu group--the 
Basoga (9%), the Banyankole (8%), the immigrant Banyaruanda (6%), the 
Bakiga (6%), and the Bagisu (5%); for the Nilo-Hamitic group--the Iteso 
(10%); for the Nilotic group--the Lango (5%), and the Acholi (4%). 
Neither of the Sudanic tribes totaled 200,000 by 1948. 
What of the general characteristics distinguishing the major 
groups and the larger tribes within the groups? For the broader 
divisions, distinctions are possible on racial or ethnic lines and on 
linguistic and other cultural lines. Rarely, however, can all three 
criteria be applied consistently; the accepted terminology represents 
primarily just that--it is the one commonly accepted. 
58 
As regards racial differences, the great bulk of Uganda's Bantu 
peoples are believed to be the product of three strains--the aboriginal, 
the Negroid, and the Hamitic. The region of East Africa was first 
inhabited, according to present speculations, by yellow-skinned 
aboriginal hunters and food gatherers. The area was then invaded by a 
Negroid race, perhaps originally from western Asia. Many millenia later 
there came waves of conquering proto-Hamites. These were a light-colored 
people of Caucasian origin. They mixed with the indigenous Negroid 
1 
peoples and produced the linguistic grouping known as the Bantu, More 
recently Hamitic tribes of pastoralists intruded into the region, 
sometimes being absorbed as in the case of the Baganda Bantu, sometimes 
remaining aloof in a position of dominance as in the instance of the 
2 Bahima, the upper-caste group of Ankole, 
The Bantu were, however, confined largely to the southern part 
of Uganda. Into northern Uganda came tribes from the northern Sudan. 
They were Negroid tribes which had already been Hamiticized, and they 
have been called the Nilotics. 
The third major grouping, which came into the northeast of 
Uganda within the past two centuries, were half Hamiticized. They were 
in effect Nilotics with a stronger infusion of the Hamitic strain, and 
they have been designated as the Nilo-Hamitics. 
1 The Baganda's tongue, Luganda, is somewhat of an oddity in this 
grouping. Goldthorpe, Outlines ••• , p. 37. 
2The Banyankole of Ankole, a Bantu people because of their 
language, have been made up of the immigrant Bahima ruling caste and the 
far more numerous indigenous Bairu serf class. 
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In addition to the racial variations, the three broad groups are 
territorially distinguishable, although there are a few minor exceptions 
such as the Nilotic Badama in the southeast. In general, the Bantu have 
occupied the area south of a line running from Mount Elgon west through 
Lake Kyoga to the northern tip of Lake Albert; that is, roughly a 
somewhat larger southern half of the Protectorate. The Nilo-Hamitic 
tribes have settled in the northeast. The Nilotic tribes have clustered 
in the north and northwest. And the small Sudanic group has stabilized 
itself in the extreme northwest. There has been no widespread 
territorial fusing of tribes, although since the 1920's there have been 
increasing individual migrations into the areas of other tribes--notably 
into Buganda--for temporary and sometimes permanent employment, 
From traditional to modern times cattle have played an important 
part in the everyday lives of many of the tribes. This has been 
particularly notable in the case of the small Bahima ethnic minority 
among the Bantu, But the majority of the Bantu have combined agriculture 
with the keeping of livestock. The Nilo-Hamitics, as might be expected 
by reason of their strong Hamitic strain, have been predominantly 
pastoralists, With settled administration in the past forty years some 
of these tribes--the Iteso, for example, but not the Karamojong--have 
turned to cultivation of the land also, while retaining the possession 
of cattle as the primary value, The Nilotics, although originally 
herdsmen too, have taken more to agriculture; they still keep cattle but 
it is not so important in their lives as with the Nilo-Hamitics. 
All three major groups--Bantu, Nilo-Hamitic, and Nilotic--when 
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compared with modern Western society have exhibited a strong emphasis on 
1 the extended family and the clan. There are deep feelings of loyalty 
h i 1 . 2 d . 11 f h 'b h . to t ese soc a un1ts, an 1n a o t e tr1 es some aut or1ty centers 
in their heads. In the case of the Nilotic tribes, the lineage or clan 
heads given most authority were usually of aristocratic lineages, 
although this is more true in the Acholi and Alur areas than in Lango. 
With the Nilo-Hamitic peoples the family and clan authority was usually 
more than balanced by an age-set (age-grade) organization. With the 
Bantu tribes the practice varied greatly. The Bagisu had an age-set 
organization. The Bakiga at the opposite geographical corner depended 
completely on family and clan authority for their tenuous social system. 
The Bahima aristocrats ruled Ankole and the Babito royal clan provided 
the dynasty for Bunyoro and Toro. A number of aristocratic clans with 
3 
royal lineages ruled Busoga in a series of separate chiefdoms. In 
Buganda, loyalty to the Kabaka took second place to no other and his 
authority was absolute, there being no sizeable aristocratic blood group 
in that Kingdom. 
In terms of values in social and political life, the Nilo-Hamitic 
Karamojong and Iteso were apparently the most egalitarian, along with the 
1Particularly helpful in the preceding discussion of the three 
major groups was GB, CO, East Africa Royal Commission ..• , pp. 11-13. 
2Though much less deep with the Baganda than with other Bantu 
and non-Bantu in Uganda. L. P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth 
Century (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1934), p. 275. 
3Goldthorpe, Outlines ••• , pp. 35-39; Lord Hailey, Native 
Administration in the British African Territories, Part I: East Africa: 
Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika([Great Britatn,]Colonial Office; London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 4. 
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1 
Bantu Bagisu, Next on a postulated scale from egalitarian to 
rigidly-stratified would probably come the Nilotic Lango, the Sudanic 
Lugbara, and the Bantu Bakiga, Bakonjo, and Baamba; here age played a 
deciding role in selection of leaders, who still, however, were 
restricted in permanent authority. The Acholi would follow, for 
aristocratic clans provided a measure of permanent leadership through 
royal lineages for different separate territorial sections of the tribe. 
The same outlines, but with somewhat greater authority, were found in 
the systems of the Alur and the Basoga. With each of the foregoing 
1As have most others, Fallers has drawn a basic distinction 
along the lines of the major Bantu, Nilotic, and Nilo-Hamitic groups in 
terms of their respective kinds of social structure and value system. 
The Bantu peoples of Uganda--most of them, he has written--traditionally 
had political systems of the centralized state type. The "core feature" 
was rulership, and with it went a substantiaL degree of social 
stratification, in some places on caste lines and in others on class 
lines. With the Nilotic peoples, on the other hand, unilineal descent 
structured social relations; and with the Nilo-Hamitics, age-grading 
also played a central role. With both these latter peoples, the kin 
group--large and small--was on the order of a company of equals, and 
there were no great differences in power and status as there were with 
the Bantu. Fallers has gone on to mention those tribes in the various 
major groups which are, he has implied, exceptions which prove the 
validity of the group stereotypes. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 23-25. 
The description of the major groups in the text above has not 
followed Fallers' general approach. It is felt that although the varia-
tions among the non-Bantu tribes--especially the Alur--are limited 
enough to represent exceptions to a rule, the same is not true with 
respect to the Bantu tribes. The social structure and the value system 
of the Bantu exceptions Fallers mentioned--the Bakonjo, the Baamba, the 
Bakiga, and the Bagisu, all with differing types of segmentary as con-
trasted to centralized societies--were more like the Nilotic than they 
were like the rest of the Bantu tribes. Additionally, they represent a 
significant portion of the Bantu population in Uganda--just under 
one quarter of it, and in numbers almost as large as the Baganda. 
Because of this, the description in the text has not used the approach 
of a Bantu stereotype vis-a-vis the rest of the major groups in the 
description of social structure and values. 
A further possibility is to use the more specific delineation 
adopted by Fallers and others when the Bantu peoples with centralized, 
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stages, social stratification sharpened, territorial political organiza-
tion expanded, and with it administrative centralization increased. 
The category next in order in the range of Uganda social and 
political life, after the Basoga example of political authority, was the 
tribal kingdom. It represented a further expansion of the territorial 
organization to cover a whole tribe effectively instead of just a part 
of it. In one of the Kingdoms--Buganda--social stratification was not 
measurably greater than with the Alur or the Basoga, for although the 
differentiations in Buganda were more numerous and highly structured, 
they were less rigid in view of the greater social and political mobil-
ity. In three of the Kingdoms--Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole--there was, 
however, a definite further depreciation of the egalitarian value. 
Granted, a commoner in the three Kingdoms mentioned had no more nor less 
rights than a commoner in the Alur or Acholi systems. But more impor-
tant, ascribed social stratification did increase with the passage on 
the continuum from Buganda to the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Toro, for the 
latter had their Bahima privileged groups in addition to the royal 
Babito clan. 
At the apex or extreme end of the scale came the Kingdom of 
Ankole, with its rigid caste division between, on the one hand, the 
Bahima pastoralist overlords with a Mugabe (King) at their head and, on 
the other hand, the Bairu serfs. There was no room for egalitarianism 
state-type political systems are distinguished from the remaining Bantu 
as the Inter-Lacustrine Bantu. In Uganda this group would include the 
Baganda, Banyoro, Batoro, Banyankole, and Basoga. Fallers, Bantu 
Bureaucracy, pp. 23, 25, 233; Thomas and Scott, p. 90. However, the 
differences between the Inter-Lacustrine Bantu are also not inconsider-
able. 
1 in the composite Ankole social structure. 
These are some of the differences between the various Uganda 
2 tribes, differences in certain crucial social aspects which are of 
profound significance to the Uganda situation, inhibiting as they have 
a ready and common understanding among the peoples. 
Relationships in the Social Situation 
Such were the peoples of Uganda as it later took more definite 
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territorial shape. What were their relationships to each other in 1905? 
At least one thing is certain. With the notable exception of 
the Baganda, who then roved widely as traders, different African groups 
had very little contact with many of the other African peoples who were 
then in the Protectorate or later brought within it. Regular, pervasive 
links were practically nonexistent with distant tribes, and were even 
quite minimal with neighboring tribes. Contact was often limited to 
raiding in the case of those tribes as yet not brought under British 
rule. 
The European community was of course quite well integrated in 
terms of communication among its members, but communication with the 
African population decreased rapidly as distance from Kampala increased .. 
lFor a more structured approach to the question of the relation 
between primitive social and political systems and values, see S. N. 
Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Preliminary Comparative 
Analysis," American Anthropologist, LXI (April, 1959), 202-218. 
2The preceding presentation is based on impressions gained from 
wide reading about the various tribes. It does not derive from a de-
tailed study, but there is no reason to believe it is grossly inaccurate. 
More detailed attention, grounded on specialized study of certain of the 
tribes, is given to the question of tribal political systems in 
Chapter Ill. 
64 
The latter would be true also of the Asian community, which in addition 
would have had fewer bonds uniting it as a group. 
As of 1905 most of the African population were engaged in one 
form or another of subsistence economic activity. They practiced 
shifting cultivation or pursued a pastoral existence or combined both. 
Whichever it was, life was precarious for the mass of people, and men 
depended heavily upon kin or local relationships of the community type 
1 to survive. Some tribes were better off than others in a material 
sense--for example, the well-clothed and well-fed Baganda were in con-
trast to the unclothed Nilotics whose natural environment was less 
beneficent. These differences presumably were reflected in a correspond-
ing sense of difference in status, at least on the part of the tribes 
2 
which were better off. 
As might be expected, the greatest concentrations of population 
tended to exist in the more fertile areas. These commenced at Mount 
Elgon and then proceeded in a rather wide·sweep southwest through what 
was later Mbale District, then through Busoga and on to the shores of 
Lake Victoria in Buganda. The favored zone with fairly dense settlement 
1There may have been egalitarianism in some of the tribes, but 
there was little individualism. See GB, CO, East Africa Royal 
Commission ••• , pp. 13-14. 
2All Africans must have regarded the British administrators as 
possessing a considerably higher station in life. How the Asian stood 
in relation to the African is not known. Presumably his status was 
above most Africans and below that of the Europeans. 
For an early view of the Indians who, under the direction of the 
English, were regarded as the indispensable civilizers of East Africa in 
their role of subordinate labor endowed with both brain and brawn, see 
Herbert Samuel, "The Uganda of Today," Journal of the Society of Arts, 
LI (March, 1903), 395. 
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continued around the Lake, becoming narrower and less concentrated in 
population as it went south. Other notable areas of greater numbers of 
people occurred in the extreme southwest of the Protectorate in Kigezi 
and western Ankole, as well as in the western part of the West Nile 
District. These latter two incidences of density are believed to have 
resulted not from pronounced soil fertility but rather from population 
pressure in adjoining areas outside of Uganda. 
Exact data are not available for as early as 1905, but there was 
no great change from 1931 to 1948 in the situation described above. 1 It 
should, however, be mentioned that it was not until the 1920's or so that 
there began the considerable migrations--to Buganda especially--of Afri-
cans from other parts of Uganda and from outside the Protectorate. As 
regards large urban settlements, there were none in 1905, the peoples of 
some tribes preferring to cluster in small villages and those of other 
tribes to group within larger areas in the pattern of individual home-
steads, each with its fairly extensive plot of cultivable garden land. 
It was remarked a little earlier that the one exception to the 
lack of links among the various African tribes was in the case of the 
roving Baganda traders. It is appropriate to close the discussion of 
certain aspects of the social situation with this feature, for it is 
another illustration of the tribe's pre-eminent position. 
It was the Baganda who attracted attention during the first 
decade of the century as the great travelers of the day. With pax 
Britannica, and impelled at times by the need to pay their newly imposed 
hut tax or just a desire to acquire wealth, many Baganda had taken to the 
lsee maps of population density in Thomas and Scott, p. 272; and 
UP, EASD, 1958 Statistical Abstract, p. 11. 
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road by 1905 according to reports of contemporary accounts. Some 
Baganda even organized large caravans to the Congo. Baganda were to be 
found not only in every important trading center in and around the 
Protectorate but even in isolated sections of remote districts, as for 
example as far north as the Sudan border. 
What had happened in effect was that not only had the Baganda 
developed new wants--education was one--but they had discovered new ways 
to satisfy both the new and the old wants. Very shortly--right after 
1905--the Baganda were to cease their trekking for the most part, for an 
easier way to acquire the means to satisfy the wants developed right at 
1 
their doorstep--the cultivation of cotton. The impending development 
was to be just another manifestation of the place the Baganda occupied 
in the social situation. For various reasons--its energizing status 
system, its administrative organization, its earlier experience with 
Europeans--Buganda was already well ahead of the other tribal areas in 
terms of adaptation to modern ways. The Kingdom was ready to step along 
the road to economic predominance to complement the lead already achieved 
in the political field. That Europeans in Uganda compared the Baganda 
favorably, in glowing terms, to all other tribes, is now a legendary 
fact. 
1P. G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labour, ed. W. Elkan (East 
African Studies, No. 10; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of 
Social Research, 1957), p. 7. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
British policy as one of five major forces shaping political 
change in Uganda can be assessed only after some knowledge has been 
gained of the nature of the other major forces. One of these, the 
traditional African political systems, is a force especially relevant to 
the kind of change on which the problem is focused--that in the 
political institutions for governing the African population at both the 
tribal and the territorial levels. For, as briefly indicated in the 
Introduction at the beginning of the study, varying British policies had 
varying effects upon traditional tribal political institutions; and the 
consequences were in turn of significance to the question of political 
change in the Protectorate's central, territorial institutions. These 
effects and consequences are considered for the years 1905-1945 in 
Part II. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The general purpose of the present chapter is to provide 
documented descriptions and analyses of the traditional political 
structures of certain Uganda tribes, with particular reference to their 
existence or nonexistence as tribal systems at the beginning of the 
period under review. The questions to which the discussion has been 
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directed are several. Did a particular tribe have a tribal political 
system prior to British rule, that is, a system encompassing the whole 
tribe? If so, was it in existence as a traditional system in the early 
years of the 1905-1945 period? If it was, how might the system be 
characterized in comparison with other of the systems, in terms of 
factors significant to political solidarity and to the system's strength 
with regard to natural and human resources? And lastly, if there was no 
tribal political system for a tribe in the days prior to British rule, 
or if a traditional system for the tribe no longer existed in 1905, had 
a new system been introduced as a consequence of British rule? 
The answers to the above questions serve two immediate purposes. 
They indicate the constitution of the force designated as the 
traditional African political systems. That is, by examining the 
traditional polities of the time, they show which of Uganda's main tribes 
had traditional tribal political ~ystems around 1905 and which did not, 
and they give some idea of the characteristics and relative importance 
of the systems which were in existence. Secondly, the findings throw 
early light on a major aspect of the problem and thesis of the study--
the role of British policy in shaping political change in traditional 
institutions. 
The answers also provide necessary summaries and conclusions 
about the variant traditional political structures in Uganda, which are 
later drawn upon at appropriate points throughout Part II. Together 
with the documented descriptive data, they serve additionally as the 
bases for certain hypotheses advanced at the end of the study. 
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The Survey's Scope and Sources 
In making the selection of tribes for the review of traditional 
political institutions, three criteria were employed to narrow down the 
choice. Of some thirty-two tribes in the Protectorate with populations 
1 
exceeding about 2,000 according to the 1948 Census, all those under 
100,000 were excluded from consideration. 2 The two other criteria were 
that the tribes selected be indigenous to Uganda, and that each 
constitute a majority of the African population in a present-day (1960) 
3 District of Uganda. Both of the latter criteria excluded the 
4 Banyaruanda. The twelve Uganda tribes left in the group selected for 
1
see Appendix I for 1931 and 1948 Census data. 
2Thirteen remained. Of those excluded by this criterion, eight 
numbered between 50,000 and 100,000; eleven had populations ranging from 
about 2,000 to 50,000. J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African 
Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 
1958), p. 36. There were also an indeterminate number of smaller tribes. 
3The present-day administrative boundaries were used because, if 
the 1948 boundaries had been used, the existence of the over-large Mbale 
District would have resulted in the exclusion of the Bagisu. The Bagisu 
have constituted a populous tribe, favorably endowed with resources, and 
their exclusion would be unrealistic. In any event, they were for some 
time separately administered within the Mbale District. Additional 
recognition of their importance was given in 1954 with the establishment 
of a full-fledged Bugisu District. See Appendix V. 
The criterion that the tribe constitute a majority of the 
African population in a present-day District, as well as the one 
requiring a tribal population of lOO,OOO,excludes from any consideration 
one of Uganda's fifteen Districts--Bukedi, with its conglomeration of 
smaller tribes. All other Districts--Buganda's three plus eleven more--
are covered in part or in whole by the twelve tribes selected. 
4The exclusion is also appropriate since the practice of many 
of the tribe has been to migrate into Uganda only for temporary 
employment. 
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review were, in order of their size in 1948, the following: the Baganda, 
Iteso, Basoga, Banyankole, Bakiga, Lango, Bagisu, Acholi, Lugbara, 
Banyoro, Batoro, and the Karamojong. 1 
Seven of the tribes are Bantu--the Baganda, Basoga, Banyankole, 
Bakiga, Bagisu, Banyoro, and Batoro--and constituted just over half of 
the total African population in 1948. The five other tribes numbered 
one quarter of the African population and were divided as follows: 
Nilo-Hamitic--the Iteso and Karamojong; Nilotic--the Lango and Acholi; 
and Sudanic--the Lugbara. The first two non-Bantu groups each accounted 
for about one tenth of Uganda's total of Africans in 1948. 
Equal attention is not given to all the tribes selected. The 
procedure adopted is to present both a description and an analysis of 
the traditional political system of one of the tribes--the Nilotic 
Acholi--as a type of illustrative case study. For the other tribe 
selected for special attention--the Bantu Baganda--the descriptive data 
is held to a minimum. The ten remaining "major" tribes are covered in 
briefer reviews of their most distinguishing features. 
With regard to the validity of the data and the conclusions, 
because there are still significant gaps in the source material 
concerning most of the twelve ethnic groups, the analyses must be 
considered as tentative and provisional. Also, the research on the 
1All except the Karamojong also exceeded 100,000 in number in 
1931. (The nonprofessional 1931 census may well have underestimated the 
elusive Karamojong Cluster or perhaps did not define it as broadly as did 
the 1948 Census.) 
In 1931 there were no other tribes--including the Banyaruanda--
numbering more than 100,000. 
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systems varied considerably in intensiveness. Only in the case of the 
Acholi system were all readily available sources consulted, studied, and 
carefully analyzed, with the results set forth on paper in much greater 
detail than is provided here. 1 Although a good deal of source material 
was checked for the analysis of the Baganda, it represents in no sense a 
definitive study in scope or depth. 
For the ten other tribes, the Lango system was the only one 
specially and quite thoroughly analyzed, although the source data was 
limited. In the case of the Banyankole there was available much more 
extensive research data personally collected on that tribe in connection 
with another project, carried out in Uganda. However, full analysis of 
the Banyankole material has not yet been undertaken, and the coverage 
given to the tribe's system here is rudimentary in nature. Treatment of 
the eight remaining tribes was likewise restricted to that necessary to 
indicate the most significant similarities and dissimilarities in 
relation to the other systems. 
2 The Analytical Approach 
The experimental approach which has been worked out for the 
study calls for the examination of the traditional polities with regard 
1c. H. Walter Howe, "The Acholi Political Systems," Boston, 
October 1959, pp. 1-114. (Typewritten.) 
2see Appendix IV for a more detailed statement, which deals with 
some of the theoretical problems faced in the formulation of the experi-
mental approach and which furnishes more extensive definitions of terms 
and categories. 
The approach was originally developed in 1957 as an analytical 
tool for this study. It has undergone four revisions. A later appraisal 
of its use here will doubtless dictate additional changes. 
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to a number of aspects relating to political solidarity, resources, and 
adaptability. Using the same approach for different systems facilitates 
comparisons. 
Aspects of political solidarity. Twelve questions are posed 
bearing on political solidarity. The first group of six deals with 
political authority. What was the degree of territorial centralization 
of political authority--was it unitary, federal, or confederate? What 
was the system's degree of sovereignty--was it a sovereign political 
system, a semi-sovereign political system, or a dependent political 
system? What was the degree of concentration of political authority, 
other than territorial, in the political system--was political authority 
concentrated or was it diffused? What was the scope of activity of 
political authority in the political system--was it extensive, moderate, 
or limited? What was the source of the members' belief in the 
legitimacy of political authority in the system--was it charisma, 
1 tradition, or reason? What was the extent of legitimacy accorded by 
the members to the holders of political authority--was it marked, 
moderate, or minimum? 
1
ro put this another way: if the members of a political system 
believed that those exercising political authority had a good claim to 
such authority--that is, if the members accorded legitimacy to the 
holders of political authority--then why did they? was it because they 
believed the leader was entitled to exercise authority because of his 
personal sanctity (charisma)? Was it, on the other hand, because they 
believed in the sanctity of a political order which had been handed down 
from the past (tradition), and in accordance with which the holders of 
authority were acting? Or was it because the system of political 
authority was regarded as a good one since it worked well to achieve 
other ends and values of the members (reason)? 
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The next three questions are concerned with the membership of 
the political unit. What was the extent and closeness of common ties of 
the total membership of the political unit--were the members, for 
example, all of the same tribe; or were they merely of the same culture; 
or were they just commonly residing together? Of the groups in a 
political unit, what type was the largest, politically dominant group--
was it a lineage, clan, tribe, race, class, or political party; or was 
there perhaps a plurality of larger groups which were politically 
dominant? What was the degree of political mobility of the members of 
the political unit--was the system in this respect closed, was it a 
mixed open and closed system, or was it open? 
Two questions relate to conflict in the political system, 
especially conflict for the resolution of which there existed inadequate 
institutional mechanisms. What was the degree of politically significant 
institutional conflict in the system--was it minimum, moderate, or 
marked? What was the degree of perceived conflict between sections of 
the membership of the unit--was it minimum, moderate, or marked? 
The last question to be asked as pertinent to political 
solidarity relates to leadership. What was the incidence of leadership--
was it persistent, was it occasional, or was the system generally 
characterized by weak leadership? 
Answers to the above questions make it possible to describe a 
political system briefly in terms which not only provide clues to the 
system's strength and weakness in the sense of cohesiveness in specific 
situations, but which also facilitate comparisons of different systems. 
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With regard to comparisons, certain assumptions are made 
concerning the characteristics the strongest kind of traditional system 
would have had and those which the weakest kind of system would have 
had. As indicated later, the assumptions are limited in their 
applicability, being confined to propositions about the combination of 
all the characteristics as stated in the models; that is, they extend to 
generalized assumptions about the operation of each of the individual 
characteristics only where it is accompanied by the others with which it 
is listed in the same model. 
A very strong tribal political system--in the sense of political 
1 
solidarity--would have been characterized by a unitary structure, and 
political authority would have also been otherwise concentrated. It 
would have been a sovereign political system. The activities in life 
which were subject to political authority would have been extensive in 
scope. The source of legitimacy for political authority would have been 
charisma. The members of the political unit would have had a strong 
conviction that the holders of authority had a good claim to its 
exercise--that is, the extent of legitimacy of political authority would 
have been marked. As regards membership, the members would all have 
been of the same tribe, and the largest, politically dominant group 
would have been one of the several clans. It would have been a closed 
system in terms of political mobility. With respect to conflict, there 
1This characteristic would be a factor contributing to 
solidarity, for example, because centralization ordinarily brings in-
creased political organization, coordination, and cohesiveness which 
adds to the potentiality of a system to act as a force shaping political 
change (according to its own conceptions of what is desirable). 
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would have been a minimum of both institutional conflict and membership 
conflict. Lastly, the incidence of leadership would have been 
persistent. 
At the other extreme, a very weak tribal traditional system 
would have been characterized by a confederate structure, with political 
authority also otherwise diffused. The system would have been dependent. 
The scope of activity of political authority would have been limited. 
Members would have based their belief in political authority's legitimacy 
not on charisma or tradition but on the system's value as a means to 
other goals, that is, on reason. Legitimacy accorded to political 
authority would have been minimum in extent. As for membership, common 
ties of all members would have been no closer than mere residence in the 
same area. There would have been a plurality of larger groups which 
were politically dominant. The system would have been an open one in 
respect to political mobility. Both institutional conflict and conflict 
between sections of the membership would have been marked. Leadership 
would have been weak. 
The above represent, then, the two extremes of systems in terms 
of possibilities for strength or weakness with respect to political 
. 1 
sol1darity. None of the Uganda tribal polities conformed in all 
1strength or weakness with respect to political solidarity refers 
to the presence or absence of political organization, of coordination, 
of cohesiveness, of ability to have acted as a unit effectively and 
quickly and decisively. Solidarity of a traditional political system is 
more specifically defined as the unity enabling such a system to express 
its opinions, manifest its strength, or exert its influence as one. 
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1 
respects to either of the polar models. Jn theory, it might be possible 
and desirable to estimate the relation of one traditional system's 
general, inherent political solidarity to that of another on some sort 
2 
of absolute scale ranging from the strongest type to the weakest. In 
practice, however, this is not feasible for several reasons. 
Even assuming sufficient data were available about a system and 
its operation to make reliable judgments of which of its individual 
characteristics contributed to its solidarity and which detracted from 
it, the problem of how important each characteristic was in relation to 
the others is not readily susceptible to generalized weighting. The 
possibilities for deviations from the combinations of characteristics 
set forth above in the models of the strongest and weakest systems are 
too numerous to anticipate. A characteristic which constituted an 
attribute of strength for the strongest type of system might, when 
combined with a deviation in one of the other characteristics of the 
3 
model, operate to detract from political solidarity. Further, a 
1However, the pre-British [1877] Baganda traditional political 
system came very close to the model of a very strong system. 
2Another approach would be to classify by kind of political 
systems and list them in order of strength, as for example, segmentary, 
chiefdom, monarchy. See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: 
A Preliminary Comparative Analysis," American Anthropologist, LXI 
(April, 1959), 202-214. 
3For example, a system with a unitary political structure which 
had been imposed on several previously semi-sovereign or sovereign 
political units, against the preferences of the differing peoples for 
individual territorial autonomy, would also no doubt be characterized by 
a lessened extent of legitimacy accorded to the holders of authority in 
the new system. The unitary system might operate, in fact, so to 
minimize legitimacy as thereby to detract more from solidarity than the 
system's greater centralization contributed to it. In such a case, a 
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political system which exhibited many but not all of the attributes of 
solidarity might well lead from strength in many situations. On the 
other hand, in a rarer situation--perhaps crucial to the system's 
survival--the solidarity might well prove to be illusionary if the 
particular situation struck, so to speak, at the system's Achilles heel. 
Because of the above reasons, generalized assessments of the 
political solidarity of traditional tribal political systems are avoided 
in the study. Comments are limited primarily to the following: 
comparisons of factors of strength or weakness pertaining to solidarity, 
as these may relate to one system at different points in time or to more 
than one system at the same approximate time; and restricted discussions 
of solidarity with respect to specific situations. 
A system's resources. The strength of a political system is 
also affected by the extent of its natural and human resources. 
Obviously tiny cohesive Monaco would not be as strong as would be the 
huge though much less coordinated British Commonwealth, if both political 
units were attacked with equal force by the same power. In comparing 
the resources of one system to another, unless all systems in the world 
are being considered, it is preferable to make judgments in relation to 
the other systems in the group under special study. Therefore, the 
intention is to let the tribal system most favored as regards resources 
and that most unfavored serve as the polar positions on the scale of 
confederate system where legitimacy was marked could well be stronger in 
terms of political solidarity than a unitary system where legitimacy was 
minimum. 
measurement for all the twelve tribal systems selected. 
In making these estimates, the concern is with the systems as 
they existed around 1905. 1 Resources are viewed in terms primarily of 
the size of the tribal population and the area of its jurisdiction. 2 
Data for population in 1905 are not available, and it is necessary to 
use figures for 1931. As for the relative size of the areas of the 
different tribal systems, the more recent administrative boundaries 
within Uganda reflect these fairly well. 
Some secondary consideration is given to resources in terms of 
the skills of the population as well as the soil fertility and other 
3 
natural endowments. 
The political system most favored in the territory in 1905 was 
that of the Baganda. Its population was almost one fifth of the total 
African population, the next largest tribe being the Iteso with just 
4 
over one tenth. Its area, excluding open water, amounted to about 
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17,000 square miles, the next largest tribal area being that of Karamoja 
1The 1905 date is merely a convenient approximate one, as it is 
the beginning of the period under review. The concern is with the state 
at about that time of the political systems then under British rule and 
with the state of the other systems at the points later when they came 
under rule. 
2Although there is an inconsistency in taking the tribe's 
population in Uganda rather than the African population in the area over 
which the tribe's political system had jurisdiction, the former is re-
garded as more significant in terms of strength of resources of the 
political system and therefore as the more sensible figure to use. 
3Not included for consideration are goods possessed, notably 
cattle, as data just are not available. 
4As previously indicated, population figures are calculated 
from the 1931 Census data. See Appendix I. 
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measuring about 11,000 square miles. 1 A large portion of Uganda's zone 
of especially fertile soil and favorable climatic conditions lay within 
Buganda along the shore of Lake Victoria. Further, the Baganda people 
were unquestionably the most advanced of the tribes in the Protectorate 
in terms of skills which were of value under the conditions of pax 
Britannica. The political system of the Baganda was, then, decidedly 
pre-eminent as regards resources. 
The least favored political system in respect to human and 
natural resources was that of the Karamojong. 2 Despite the fact that 
the territory of their District was as large as the entire Eastern 
Province consisting of four Districts, it was the least well endowed 
with regard to climatic conditions. Coupled with the disadvantage of an 
arid environment were the minimal human resources. The Karamojong were 
the fewest in number of the twelve tribes, representing less than two 
per cent of the total population. They were also the least advanced--
and still are--of all the peoples, their skills in raiding failing to 
contribute to their political strength in view of the British determina-
tion to establish and maintain law and order. 
Unfortunately for the simplicity of the task the remainder of 
the tribes do not group themselves as regards resources into two clearly 
differentiated categories of favored and unfavored. The gap between the 
Baganda and the next favored tribes is quite great, the political system 
1Area figures are as of the end of 1957. Uganda Protectorate, 
East African Statistical Department--Uganda Unit, 1958 Statistical 
Abstract (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, [1959]), p. 1. Cited 
hereafter as UP, EASD, 1958 Statistical Abstract. 
2More precisely, the Karamojong Cluster. 
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of Buganda being almost twice as favored in resources as the next most 
favored. Therefore, it is necessary roughly to classify the 
possibilities into systems (in the group under consideration) with 
extensive, moderate, or only limited resources. 
Compared to the extensive resources of the Baganda, only two of 
the other tribes--the Basoga and the Iteso--could be described as 
moderately favored in resources in the early days. Though the area of 
the Basoga was small (4,000 square miles), a large portion was fertile 
and received a good deal of rain. The people numbered slightly more 
than half of the Baganda, and they were almost as skilled as the latter. 
The Iteso can likewise be considered as having had a moderate extent of 
resources in traditional times--they numbered more than the Basoga and 
their area was larger, but their cultivating conditions were not as 
favorable as those of the Basoga, nor were the Iteso as skilled. 
All other tribes remaining of the group of twelve, when related 
to the very favored Baganda, the moderately favored Basoga and Iteso, 
and the very unfavored Karamojong, could be described as coming within 
the latter category of possessing limited resources. However, a number, 
though in the limited resources class, were somewhat better off than the 
Karamojong. These were the Banyoro, Banyankole, Acholi, Batoro, Lango, 
and the Bagisu. After them came the 
and the Lugbara, whose resources as 
British assumption of rule might be 
those of the Karamojong. 1 
lMore detailed discussion of 
appropriate section of Appendix IV. 
remaining two tribes, the Bakiga 
traditional systems at the time of 
described as almost as minimal as 
tribal resources is provided in the 
It acknowledges that where the 
81 
It must be re-emphasized that these estimates are extremely 
approximate and are not based on any detailed analyses of productive 
capacities or like factors. However, it is certain that the resources 
of the political system of the Baganda were as far in excess of those of 
the other systems as has been indicated. It is this highly pertinent 
fact which is brought out by the attempt to estimate the relative 
resource position of all systems in the approximate sense. 
Adaptability of systems to change. The third phase of analysis, 
to be applied only to the Acholi and Baganda, concerns the judgment of 
whether a particular traditional system possessed qualities of 
1 
adaptability to certain inevitable Western-type demands for change. 
The questions to be asked in this respect are related to three 
such demands for change. What degree of adaptability to demands for 
individual economic opportunity was there in the system--was the 
traditional system already free of restrictions on individual economic 
activity; or, were there restrictions but also ways by which the system 
could easily adapt to the demands for individual opportunity; or, were 
there restrictions and also no mechanisms by which the system could 
adapt to the demands? What degree of adaptability was there to demands 
resource position of one or more systems assumes a unique and special 
importance in a political situation, it would be advisable to re-examine 
the rankings to see if one of the resource factors was disproportionately 
significant in the situation. No such problems arose in this study. 
1This step in the analysis would not be taken if the study were 
restricted merely to a moment in time, that is, to an inquiry into a 
single event or situation. 
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for political equality by all men--was the system already characterized 
by political equality; or, was there political inequality but ready 
means for the system's adaption to the demands; or, was there political 
inequality and no adaptive mechanisms? What degree of adaptability was 
there to demands for an increase in the general welfare and political 
prestige of the unit--was the system already organized to meet these 
demands; or, was it capable of being organized easily for the purpose; 
or, was it not susceptible of organization to meet such demands without 
such fundamental changes as to render the system no longer the same, 
that is, no longer the traditional political system. 
Summary. To summarize, the aim is first to describe the 
traditional polities; and to do this in terms of aspects which would 
provide clues to a political system's strength in the sense of 
solidarity. Secondly, it is the intention to include a statement of the 
resource positions of the various tribes as related to the range of 
those of all tribes in the group. The last phase of the analysis, 
restricted to Acholi and Buganda, entails conclusions about the probable 
adaptability of the systems to certain Western-type demands for change. 
Excepting the estimates of resources, which are based partially 
on statistical data, none of the answers can be arrived at through 
mathematical, quantitative measurement. The questions are in each case 
primarily guidelines for the inquiry, ensuring that the more significant 
subjects are explored and that this is done to the extent feasible in 
the same way for each political system, thereby facilitating comparisons. 
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II. THE TRADITIONAL ACHOLI POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The consideration of the Acholi traditional political system is 
organized as follows. The traditional history and some aspects of the 
environment are briefly set forth. The traditional society is discussed 
with the aim of providing a summary portrayal of the total social scene 
of the era. The traditional political system is then described by the 
provision of answers to the questions listed in the preceding section 
dealing with the analytical approach. 
In Chapter VI, which deals with the British policy of direct 
rule within the larger topic of methods of native administration, some 
of the specific forces of change which operated to exert pressures on 
the traditional Acholi system are set forth, their effects on the system 
are discussed, and brief consideration is given to the new system which 
had replaced the old by 1945. 
There is no full-scale published study of the Acholi, past or 
1 present, and the following analysis must be regarded as provisional. 
1The basic reference used was Audrey Butt's description of the 
Acholi contained in her 1952 ethnographic survey of the Nilotes, one of 
a series prepared under the auspices of the International African 
Institute. Audrey Butt, The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and 
Uganda, Part IV of East Central Africa, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, 
ed. Daryll Forde (London: International African Institute, 1952), pp. 
81-91. Her Acholi bibliography is provided on pp. 186-188. (The aim of 
the Institute's surveys has been to present a concise and accurate 
account of the existent knowledge of the tribal groups. Audrey Butt's 
bibliography indicates the breadth of coverage of material then avail-
able. It includes works in Italian, French, and German.) 
The 1952 publication was supplemented by material subsequently 
written, particularly by F. K. Girling and R. M. Bere. Bere served for 
a number of years as a District Officer in the Protectorate Government, 
and later as Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province. It is a 
1953 memorandum prepared by Bere for the East Africa Royal Commission 
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The Early History and Environment 
For an idea of the origins of the Acholi, reliance must be 
placed on the myths and traditions of the Nilotic peoples themselves. 
These constitute the sole source. Crazzolara has fitted the accounts of 
oral tradition together and presented his version of the saga of the 
1 
migrations from the north of the Luo group of Nilotic tribes. 
The Acholi evidently have not related themselves as definitely 
with other Nilotic tribal groups as has Crazzolara in his necessarily 
(1953-1955) which has been used to augment Butt's survey. R. M. Bere, 
''Memorandum for the Royal Cormnission, Northern Province, Uganda," Gulu, 
Uganda, February 6, 1953. (Mimeographed.) Specific page citations are 
not available from notes on this short memorandum. (Over the years Bere 
has contributed a number of articles to the Uganda Journal. These will 
not be cited, as the data in them has been covered by Miss Butt.) 
F. K. Girling carried out anthropological field research on the 
Acholi in 1949-50. His work has been viewed as generally sound. Two 
persons well-qualified to judge were queried and expressed this opinion. 
Unfortunately, it has not yet been published. Only a brief typescript 
was available, but it proved the most useful single source of data on 
the traditional Acholi political order. F. K. Girling, "The Traditional 
Social and Political Order of the Acholi of Uganda" (typescript on file 
in the Library of the East African Institute of Social Research, Kampala, 
Uganda, [19537)), pp. 1-7. (Because this reference was only seven pages, 
citations to page numbers are not provided in succeeding footnotes.) It 
would appear that the typescript was most probably a closely-typed 
version of the full text of his dissertation's Chapter VIII, "A 
Systematic Picture of the Traditional Social and Political Order," pp. 
307-323. The dissertation, "Social Organization of a People of Uganda," 
was approved in 1953 by Exeter College, Oxford University. See James S. 
Coleman, "Research on Africa in European Centers," African Studies 
Bulletin, II (August, 1959), 19. 
Another intensive field study has been carried out more recently 
by an American anthropologist, Paula Hirsch Foster, and is currently 
being written up. It is expected that her work will represent a major 
contribution to the knowledge of these people, and when it is possible 
to utilize this and Girling's work in full, the analysis of the Acholi 
could be revised in a more precise manner. 
1 Butt, pp. 23-24. 
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. l hypothetical interpretation of traditional h1story. But they have 
recognized a Luo origin, 2 and in this connection Audrey Butt's 
presentation of the relation of the East African ethnic groups to each 
other is relevant. Under the general head of East African Culture Type, 
she has listed three main categories--Nilotes, Nilo-Hamites, and Other 
Cultures. The Nilotes have been divided into two groups--the 
Luo-speaking group and the Dinka-Nuer group. The Luo-speaking group she 
has indicated as consisting of the Shilluk, Anuak, Acholi, Lango, and 
3 Luo. The Acholi can be described therefore as one of the five 
4 Luo-speaking peoples in the Nilotic East African Culture Type. 
On the arrival of the Luo-speaking Acholi in Uganda--and the 
date though unknown was probably at least prior to 1800--they found 
5 
others already settled there. In time the different peoples assimilated 
and shared one culture. 
1This may be partly explainable by the Acholi traditions indi-
cating that an indigenous people inhabited the area prior to the arrival 
of the aristocratic ruling element from the north. Girling. 
2Butt, p. 25. 
3Butt, pp. 6, 15, 42. The Acholi have had close relations and 
contact in the past with their neighbor tribes--the Lango, the Alur, and 
the Madi. The Lango are believed to have adopted the Acholi language and 
much of the Luo culture. For this reason they are classified with the 
Acholi despite their probable original Nilo-Hamitic affinity to the 
Karamojong and Iteso group. See also Aidan w. Southall, Alur Society: 
A Stud in Processes and T es of Domination (Cambridge, England: W. 
Heffer & Sons Limited, [1956 ), p. 4. 
4see also J. H. Driberg, "The Lango District, Uganda 
Protectorate," Geographical Journal, LVIII (August, 1921), 119. 
5Girling. As regards the date 1800, Girling has stated there 
was evidence of continuity of traditional political authority for at 
least one hundred years in Acholi. 
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There were intermittent contacts with Arab traders and slavers 
and with explorers and administrators, but the first regular contact 
with Europeans came with the establishment of British administration in 
1 
1911-1912 in the form of government by the Uganda Protectorate. This 
was considerably later than in most other areas of Uganda, and the effect 
was to be clearly evidenced by the middle of the present century. 
In addition to the Acholi inhabiting the district by that name 
in northern Uganda, there have been Acholi also across the border in the 
Sudan. The total number of Acholi in Uganda and the Sudan has been 
variously estimated at figures ranging from 180,000 to 340,000, and 
2 Crazzolara set it at 215,655. The total number of Acholi within Uganda 
alone has been given as 209,161, or 4.2 per cent of the Protectorate's 
African population at the time of the 1948 Census. But all of these did 
not reside in the Acholi district. The population of the Acholi 
district of Uganda was 215,566 in 1948; of this figure 202,212 were 
Acholi, 6,673 were Lango, and the remainder were from other tribes. 3 
1Bere; [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 
1912-13, Cd. 7050-28 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914), p. 
26; H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1935), pp. 470-471, 475; Lord Hailey, Native Administration in 
the British African Territories, Part I: East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, 
Tanganyika ([Great Britain,] Colonial Office; London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1950), p. 61; A. B. Adimola, "The Lamogi Rebellion 
1911-12," Uganda Journal, XVIII (September, 1954), 167-169; Kenneth 
Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1958), pp. 25-29. 
2 Butt, p. 6. 
3East African Statistical Department, African Population of 
Uganda: Geographical and Tribal Studies (revised; Nairobi, Kenya: East 
African Statistical Department, 1953), pp. 4, 34. Cited hereafter as 
EASD, African Population .... 
The size of the present-day Acholi district of Uganda is about 
11,000 square miles, roughly the equivalent of Albania, Belgium, or 
Haiti. The area is almost all between 2,500 and 5,000 feet above sea 
level. It is rolling savannah country with numerous watercourses and 
1 
swamps but little in the way of forests. Mean maximum temperatures 
recorded at the Gulu weather station have varied from 80 to 90 degrees 
Fahrenheit depending on the month of the year. Corresponding figures 
for night temperatures were between 61 and 64 degrees. Mean annual 
2 
rainfall has been approximately 60 inches. 
The Traditional Society 
Butt has cited Crazz.olara as having maintained that the Acholi 
3 
consisted of various tribal groups with several chiefdoms. Just what 
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he meant by different tribal groups is not known. Girling has advanced 
the view that there were originally several ethnic groups but that they 
0 4 have been assimilated into "Acholi" socLety. Mukherjee has written 
that according to a survey in 1949-50 conducted by Girling, different 
Acholi clans traced their descent from various other tribes--the Luo, 
Karamojong, Lango, Madi, Bari, and so forth. Mukherjee has concluded 
that these various peoples settled in one region and in the course of 
lButt, p. 81; Thomas and Scott, pp. 468, 473-474. 
2UP, EASD, 1958 Statistical Abstract, pp. 2, 3. 
3 Butt, p. 81. 
4Girling. 
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time spoke the same language, evolved a common culture, and regarded 
themselves as Acholi. 1 Most of the "royal" lineages or clans providing 
2 
the traditional rwodi (chiefs) have claimed Luo origin, although a few 
have indicated their Lango and Madi descent. 3 
Pending the publication of other evidence, for purposes of the 
analysis of the traditional society at the time of British administrative 
contact, it will be assumed that the Acholi in what is now Uganda 
constituted a relatively homogenous people, speaking the same language, 
with significant uniformities of culture and physical type, and living 
4 
under the same ecological conditions. 
Although hunting and fighting were the chief male preoccupations, 
the Acholi were primarily a cultivating, not a pastoral people. Cattle 
had some social and economic value. The extent of such an emphasis in 
Acholi culture is not clear, Girling having given it a more prominent 
5 
role than Butt's survey. According to the latter, sheep seem to have 
figured more than cattle in bride-wealth payments, and rarely were cows 
6 
used for this crucial social custom. But Girling has written only of 
cattle as bride-wealth, and also as one means of compensation between 
1Ramakrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of Uganda: A Study in 
Acculturation (Berlin: Academie-Verlag, 1956), p. 73. 
2Mukherjee, p. 74. 
3southall, Alur Society, p. 189. 
4Girling. 
5see also Adimola, Uganda Journal, XVIII, 169. 
6 Butt, pp. 32, 34, 35, 85. 
1 
communities for homicide. 
Children were highly valued, as were women. "The main, or 
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indeed the only, purpose of existence for an Acholi man and woman was to 
2 
produce offspring." Women were a scarce commodity; they were wealth, 
and it was their possession, rather than a higher standard of living, 
which implied social status. 
A Supreme Being was worshipped and strange happenings were 
attributed to him. There were also spirits, residing in streams, hills, 
and other natural features, and these had to be reckoned with as active 
forces for good or evil. Ancestor spirits were similarly regarded. The 
Acholi versions of witchdoctor and sorcerer were part of their culture. 
The most important magical personage was apparently the rain-maker, who 
3 had to be descended on both sides from rain-making lineages. 
Social relations can be summarized as being governed in two 
4 
ways. Blood relationship through the father was important in the 
smaller spheres where both commoner and aristocratic lineages settled 
their own internal differences, using hereditarily chosen leaders 
advised by hereditarily chosen counselors. Often similarly settled were 
differences at the next higher level, which can be called the clan 
level, or more properly the clan-section level. (For, by the time of 
1 Girling. 
2Girling. 
3Butt, pp. 86-90. For further information on Rubanga, the 
creator deity, see also Southall, Alur Society, pp. 371-372. 
4There also may have been an age-class system. Butt, pp. 84, 
86. 
British contact clans were territorially dispersed and lacked an 
acknowledged head of the entire clan. 1) Authority at the lowest, 
"household" level was patriarchal. 2 
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But social relations were also affected by the allegiance which 
different commoner lineage or clan segments paid in practice to the 
various aristocratic chiefs. Such chiefs--rwot in singular and rwodi in 
plural--gathered around them "communities" of their own kin and of 
commoners. (Jago was the title given to the head of a community.) A 
man or community so desiring could change allegiance to another chief by 
moving from the old area to a new location. These aristocratic chiefdoms 
headed by~ provided the second general means for settling disputes, 
in this case between different communities. 
The chiefdoms varied in size and of course in importance; some 
3 
were independent and some were in turn subordinate to other chiefdoms. 
There was no procedure for settlement of differences between major 
chiefdoms, except as warring and peacemaking may be considered a 
procedure. Girling has written that Acholi society was really set off 
1Mukherjee, p. 75. 
2Girling. Mukherjee (pp. 73-75) has placed a somewhat heavier 
stress on clan and lineage authority, and especially on earlier terri-
torial settlement on those bases, than is supported by other evidence. 
3Girling has referred to a heptarchy of chieftainships making up 
Acholi society, so apparently he meant there were seven chiefdoms with 
rwodi of outstanding importance. Girling. 
Mukherjee has written that a 1949-50 survey by Girling showed 
that of about one thousand Acholi clans or basic lineages, there were 
only forty to fifty which were "royal" and provided rwodi. Mukherjee, 
p. 74. 
Bere has written that there were several hundred "communities" 
grouped under about thirty-five politically independent rwodi. Bere. 
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politically from neighboring tribes by the relations of intermittent 
friendship between the chiefdoms--he has called them "consociations"--
on the one hand, and the relations of irregular hostility between Acholi 
chiefdoms and the neighboring tribes on the other hand. Some of the 
leading Acholi chiefs claimed a tenuous dynastic connection with the 
Babito rulers of Bunyoro. Suzerainty was acknowledged in certain cases, 
though even here it was in a very limited form. 
The Acholi society was delimited from neighboring tribal 
societies by common cultural factors--language, myth, traditions, 
customs, marriage, and a common territory with similar ecological 
conditions. 1 
From this synopsis of Acholi in pre-European times, it can be 
seen that it was an agriculturally based, socially stratified society. 
There was a developed allocation of political authority within defined 
areas of the society's total region of occupation, but there was little 
political cohesiveness for the whole. 
The Traditional Political System 
Having framed the background, an analysis can be undertaken of 
the political system of the traditional era with special reference to 
certain aspects relating particularly to solidarity, but also to its 
1Girling is the primary source for the preceding five paragraphs. 
This and subsequent references are to the only piece of Girling's own 
writings which was available--the short typescript (entitled "The 
Traditional Social and Political Order of the Acholi of Uganda") 
previously cited in full at the beginning of the chapter's discussion of 
the Acholi, (There it was explained that in view of the typescript's 
brevity, page references in Girling citations--as also in the Bere 
citations--would not be provided.) 
1 
resources and its adaptability to likely future forces of change. 
Traditional political authority. In discussing first some of 
the different characteristics of political authority, its nature, and 
its distribution in Acholi, the question of the degree of territorial 
centralization is the initial one to be posed. 
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The Acholi political system met--albeit barely--the criteria of 
a confederate system. Political units cooperated sporadically in one of 
the two usual spheres of common action--relations with units outside the 
system. Apparently, decisions taken in such instances were accepted as 
binding (authoritative) by those people to whom they were intended to 
2 
apply, the members of the cooperating political units. However, the 
traditional Acholi political order, having no common system of law or 
administration, was one of the weaker types of confederate polity. It 
did not provide mechanisms for the settlement of inter-unit differences, 
3 
the other of the two usual spheres of common action. 
1There is insufficient space to provide illustrative data about 
the traditional Acholi political system to support fully the particular 
choices of the descriptive terms under each major aspect for which a 
question is asked. A more detailed presentation concerning the Acholi 
is provided in Howe, "The Acholi Political Systems," pp. 8-44. 
2This statement of cooperation assumes that inferences drawn 
from Girling's data are correct. Support comes from a perceptive 
article by an official who described the indigenous Acholi administrative 
organization as quite "primitive. Independent village communities were 
the rule, and combination under popular war leaders was only temporarily 
effected in times of hostilities." E. Dauncey Tongue, "The Contact of 
Races in Uganda," British Journal of Psychology, XXV (January, 1935), 358. 
3The conclusion that the Acholi political system was not only 
confederate, but a weak version of this least centralized of the three 
possibilities, raises the question of when does a political system 
itself cease to be a political system. The one absolute prerequisite of 
a political system in the context of territorial centralization is that 
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Another aspect of political authority is its degree of 
sovereignty. The Acholi traditional political system was a sovereign 
system, since it was not subordinate in any consequential respect to any 
other political system. 1 
there exist activities or mechanisms for authoritative decisions. The 
latter two words constitute the key. There must be~ decisions, in 
some sphere or spheres of activity, which are authoritative, which are 
accepted as binding by those to whom they are intended to apply. And 
the area of authority must extend beyond one mere component political 
unit of the society before the society as a whole can be said to possess 
a political system of its own, as contrasted to there being political 
systems for its separate component parts. 
Using the traditional Acholi society as an example, it did have 
a political system because apparently two or more of its various 
political units combined, evidently when the occasion required, to 
resist attacks from and launch attacks against neighboring tribes of 
distinct societies. But as this was the only sphere characterized by 
decisions which were authoritative for more than one political unit, 
the traditional Acholi political system barely met the requirements for 
a system. 
If in a society there are no decisions taken in any sphere which 
are authoritative for more than one political unit, then that society 
cannot be said to have a political system. Its territorial segments 
might well have political systems. If these take the same general form, 
then the society can be described as having a particular type of 
political system characteristic of its various territorial segments. 
One view is that the important system to study in "stateless" 
societies is not so much that of the whole society but rather that of 
the largest politically integrated units. Robert A. LeVine, "Problems 
in the Study of Stateless Societies" (Central States Anthropological 
Society Meetings, 1959), pp. 1, 4. (Duplicated.) Because of a similar 
conclusion reached independently, the traditional chiefdom political 
systems have been given a measure of attention later on, but the test of 
significance to the problem necessarily restricts analysis at this lower 
level. 
1If the Acholi political system as a whole was a sovereign 
system, what about its component parts? They were also sovereign. That 
they could be, at the same time as the system as a whole was also 
sovereign, is explained by the sporadic nature of the cooperation between 
the territorially-defined political units--the chiefdoms. The 
cooperation was, it can be assumed, undertaken only when a part or all 
of Acholi was threatened by outside attack; or when there was a desire 
by more than one chiefdom to mount an attack against a neighboring 
tribe. Only at these intermittent intervals was a measure of sovereignty 
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In addition to having a low degree of territorial centralization 
as indicated above, political authority in the tribal system was also 
otherwise diffused, and in several ways. 
Authority was shared between chiefdoms in instances of 
cooperative action by them. The rwodi of the respective chiefdoms no 
doubt came to their decisions jointly. But the rwodi themselves were by 
no means completely free agents. For, authority was also diffused 
within the different chiefdoms. There the posts of primary importance 
in the society were the hereditary rwot, rain-maker, and Father of the 
Soil. Their spheres of action seemed to have rested on original powers 
and responsibilities. In addition, there were war leaders. But the war 
leaders were appointed and not hereditary, and they were likewise quite 
subject to the direction of other holders of authority. 
As regards the three types of hereditary leaders, the Father of 
the Soil, as head of all commoner lineages in the chiefdom, obviously 
exerted a considerable political influence. The rain-maker occupied a 
ritual--not a political--office. The functions of the~ seem to have 
been primarily in the judicial and military fields. In the former he 
given up to accomplish the objective immediately in sight. As soon as 
the matter was terminated, the cooperating chiefdoms regained their 
individual full sovereign status. The custom of cooperation in military 
matters where non-Acholi were involved was sufficiently acknowledged to 
warrant classification of the system as confederate; but because the 
custom was invoked only irregularly and arrangements were only temporary, 
it is more correct to define both the whole Acholi political system and 
that of the chiefdoms as sovereign rather than forcing on the latter the 
inappropriate label of semi-sovereign. It might be added that the 
constituent parts of the chiefdoms, the "coDDilUnities," could be regarded 
as semi-sovereign political systems, subordinate in some consequential 
matters to the sovereign chiefdoms. 
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acted not as a judge but as an arbiter. In both spheres of activity, he 
was advised by a body of hereditary counselors. One fundamental check 
on the use of his authority was the practice, common to many such 
societies, whereby those who did not wish to accept his authority left 
the group and joined kin settled in other chiefdoms. 1 The practical 
basis for the political strength of the rwot is elucidated by Girling's 
statement that a rwot 
was able to impose his authority by virtue of his leadership 
of the largest and most homogeneous grouping within the unit: the 
aristocratic lineage. Also, by his hospitality he won support from 
his own people and from men of other groups who would join him in 
expectation of cattle or wives.2 
Political authority in Acholi traditional society was thus 
diffused, because in addition to being shared between chiefdoms in 
instances of their cooperation for military purposes, it was also rather 
spread out within each chiefdom. The institution of the ~ did, 
however, lend itself to a potential increase in concentration of 
political authority, for the holder was also on occasion the rain-maker 
or the war leader, or perhaps all three. 
What was the scope of activity of political authority--the 
spheres of activity recognized as subject to authoritative decisions--
at the societal level in traditional Acholi? It was limited. It 
extended only to the sphere of occasional common military action. 
1The several checks on the authority of a rwot--by his 
counselors, clan elders, clan war leaders, influential individuals, and 
his people en masse at meetings--have been documented in an actual 
historical incident. Adimola, Uganda Journal, XVIII, 173-175. 
2Girling. 
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What was the source of legitimacy of political authority in the 
system? The positions of rwot and of his counselors were all filled on 
the basis of quite specific hereditary qualifications. Traditional 
customs laid down the manner in which the institutions and office-holders 
would function. The rain-maker's source of legitimacy deriving from 
tradition was outweighed by his additional qualities of charisma, 
possessing as he did in the minds of the people certain magical powers. 
When the rwot was also a rain-maker, which he frequently was, the 
powers of the rain-maker were apparently the main source of authority of 
1 the rwot. Yet probably the sum total of the tradition-based authority 
of the rwot plus the traditional aspects of the rain-maker's authority 
was larger, though this is impossible to substantiate. 
The war leaders, proving themselves by exceptional heroism, were 
of course charismatic leaders. Though rarely was a~ also the war 
leader, this was a possibility, 2 and in times of war charisma would no 
doubt have been the predominant soun>e of authority for a rwot 
war leader. 
From these and other details the conclusion to be reached about 
Acholi's basis for legitimacy of political authority is that it was 
first and foremost tradition, but that there were institutions of a 
ritual or less political nature which were strongly steeped in charisma. 
When these, as positions held by individuals, were combined with the 
political post of rwot, then the latter would derive political authority 
1 Butt, p. 83. 
2 . Butt, p. 83, Girling. 
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from charisma as well. The extent of charisma would vary depending on 
the institutions which were combined and other factors in the situation, 
as for example whether it was a time of war or peace. Acholi political 
authority was then derived from tradition, with easy avenues of change 
to charisma as another basis for legitimacy. 1 
What was the extent of legitimacy of the traditional political 
system? It may be inferred that it was minimum for the tribal political 
system--and for the same reasons as rendered the system a weak confederate 
system. 
Looking at the several aspects of political authority in 
traditional Acholi, it can be concluded the most important characteristic 
was that pertaining to the degree of territorial centralization. Because 
the political system for the Acholi tribe taken as a whole was a weak 
confederate structure, contributing to the minimum legitimacy accorded 
to tribal political authority, this more than anything resulted in a 
2 
weakness of tribal-wide political authority. 
The political systems of the chiefdoms constituting the parts of 
the larger total Acholi political system have not been analyzed above in 
1The analysis is in part based on Max Weber, From Max Weber: 
Essavs in Sociology, trans., ed., and with introduction by H. H. Gerth 
and C. Wright Mills (A Galaxy Book; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1958), p 0 251. 
2Both an explanation and expression of the weakness of political 
authority may be found in Butt's description of the character of the 
Nilotic peoples. They have been characterized as individualistic, 
truculent, self-reliant, aggressive, independent, aloof, hardy, 
rebellious, and "extremely conservative in their aversion from innova-
tion and interference," with an attitude of "touchiness, pride, and 
reckless disobedience" towards any possibly coercive authority. Butt, 
p. 41. 
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detail. But they had almost the same characteristics as the total tribal 
system, though in somewhat different degrees. (The chiefdoms were less 
1 
weak with respect to political authority within their systems. ) 
Membership aspects. Having concluded that political authority 
was on the whole weak in the tribal political system of the Acholi, what 
can be said about the membership of the system which would point to 
further factors affecting solidarity? 
The traditional Acholi political system had for its membership 
people who were of the same tribe. The system therefore gained some 
solidarity by reason of these common ties of the total membership. 
Which type of group in Acholi can be said to have been 
politically dominant; that is, if there was an unequal distribution of 
political rights or political influence among different of the largest 
scale membership groups of the Acholi, which was favored? The important 
point inferred from the sources is that in traditional times there was 
no wide distinction as regards political rights despite the existence of 
both aristocratic and commoner lineages. The groups which could be 
conceived as dominant, in terms of influence exerted from time to time, 
were the chiefdoms which were the strongest. This fact underscores the 
confederate nature of the political system. 
1Butt has concluded that the traditional Acholi fall within that 
group of Nilotic tribes in which there was "personal political authority 
and a centralized office or offices about which the sentiments, values 
and allegiance of the people revolve." Her reference was obviously to 
the chiefdoms. Butt, p. 180. In an ordering of Nilotic tribes accord-
ing to greatest degree of centralization [of the larger political units 
within a tribe}, she placed the Acholi as less centralized than the 
Shilluk and Anuak and more centralized than the Lango, Luo, Dinka, and 
Nuer. Butt, p. 181. See also Driberg, Geographical Journal, LVIII, 
120. 
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One additional aspect of membership remains to be discussed--the 
degree of political mobility of the members. To what extent was it 
possible for any individual member of the political system to rise to a 
position of influence and authority? The answer lies in the 
prerequisites for attaining positions of political authority. In almost 
all cases such positions were hereditary. In some instances the 
succession was quite specifically defined, such as the post of rwot. 
There it was the youngest son of the issue of the previous rwot and his 
main wife. The previous ~ also had been the head of a particular 
aristocratic lineage of a particular aristocratic clan, a position 
likewise occupied by his successor. 
The Father of the Soil was chosen in a generally similar 
hereditary fashion. In turn, the potentially political rain-makers had 
to be descended from rain-making families; but they were not otherwise 
specifically designated by birth. 
In fact, at all levels there appeared to be no positions of 
political authority and influence--actual or potential--which were not 
restricted by qualifications of birth, with one exception. That was the 
war leader, chosen by recognized standards of achievement and 
performance applicable to his field of activity. Since he rarely 
occupied a position of significant political authority by reason ofthis 
function alone, the Acholi political system can be said to have been a 
closed political system in terms of political mobility. Because the 
traditional Acholi social system lacked--as far as can be determined--
any strong forces for social change or pressures for greater political 
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equality of opportunity, the closed nature of the system did not 
militate against solidarity; it did not weaken the system but rather was 
1 
one of its few factors of strength. 
Reviewing the aspects of membership of the political system 
which have been dealt with, traditional Acholi gained solidarity from 
its tribal membership, was characterized by weakness in view of its 
plurality of dominant groups, and yet derived strength from the fact it 
was a closed political system. 
Conflict in the system. Turning to the subject of conflict in 
the political system, what was the degree of institutional and perceived 
membership conflict, especially that for the resolution of which there 
existed no adequate institutional mechanisms? 
As regards the field of institutional conflict, it was marked by 
what Girling has described as the "irreconcilable" nature of the 
relations between the chiefdoms. He has stated that the chiefdoms 
derived their internal individual forms from the external opposition of 
like groups, and they depended on conditions of mutual hostility for the 
existence of their political organizations. Although hostility toward 
other tribes occasioned cooperation between chiefdoms, it is obvious 
that the opposition of chiefdoms toward each other was seriously 
1The strength flowed from the greater cohesion which, it is 
assumed, usually derives from a closed system, where this feature is 
legitimated. In Acholi the closed nature of the system was also subject 
to fewer threats, since political participation in decisions was allowed 
to all Acholi directly or through their representatives. The people 
could ventilate their grievances. These remarks apply both to the 
system as a whole and to the political systems of the chiefdoms. 
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1 distunbing to the operation of the Acholi political system as a whole. 
There were no effective mechanisms for resolution of differences between 
chiefdoms. 2 For this reason, the system can be classified as marked in 
extent of institutional conflict, a serious factor of weakness. Within 
the chiefdoms, there was apparently no crucial institutional conflict. 
Both the tribal and chiefdom political systems in traditional 
times can be described as minimum in extent of membership conflict. The 
ground for the determination is that there were no politically 
significant conflicts between membership groups of which the group 
members were ~; or if there were, there existed mechanisms for the 
generally nonviolent resolution of such conflicts. 3 This situation gave 
4 
the political system a measure of strength. 
1An example of conflicts between chiefdoms has been provided by 
Adimola in his historical account of the Lamogi Rebellion, 1911-1912. 
It also may be concluded from the same source that the advent into 
Acholi of non-European traders prior to 1900, and the subsequent intro-
duction of firearms, did not fundamentally alter the Acholi political 
system of traditional times. It resulted in an increase in tempo and 
intensity of conflict between political units. Adimola, Uganda Journal, 
XVIII, 167-169. 
2Girling. 
3It might be maintained that the conflicts between the chiefdoms 
could be regarded as conflicts between membership groups. Yet these 
were primarily conflicts between political institutions. That they were 
not membership conflicts in essence is demonstrated by the ability of 
members of chiefdoms to cooperate in common action not infrequently, a 
situation which would seem to have been difficult if the state of 
affairs were one of basic hostility between members as contrasted to 
chiefdoms as institutions. 
~ut it should be stressed that there were potential membership 
conflicts inherent in the system, conflicts of which there was no 
awareness among the Acholi because of their culturally isolated system 
of values. The most obvious example is the commoner-aristocrat 
dichotomy. 
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The incidence of leadership. How did traditional Acholi fare as 
regards leadership? 
There was no tradition of leadership of all the Acholi by one 
person except perhaps far in the past, and in fact there is no firm 
evidence to suggest that there was any actual incidence of such 
1 leadership. The pre-British Acholi political system can thus be 
described as weak in leadership. As for the chiefdoms, they appear to 
have had only occasional incidence of leadership; that is, evidently 
only on occasion was there a leader of a chiefdom who could be said to 
have served particularly to unify the political system of the chiefdom 
in terms of its members' values, the institutions, and political 
authority in general. 
Characteristics of the system relating to solidarity. To review 
the conclusions up to this point, in terms of political authority the 
tribal political system of the Acholi was of the weak, confederate type; 
authority was also otherwise diffused; the system was sovereign; the 
scope of activities was limited; the source of legitimacy was primarily 
tradition; and legitimacy was minimum, Considered together these 
characteristics resulted in a notable weakness of political authority, 
primarily attributable to the system's pronounced confederate nature. 
The factors of strength were to be found in rather doubtful possibilities 
of greater cooperation between chiefdoms or the emergence of one chiefdom 
in a position of tribal leadership. They were also to be found, one step 
1There exists a report of a legend that originally--long, long 
ago--there was one E!!2l for all Acholi. D. 0. Ocheng, "Land Tenure in 
Acholi," Uganda Journal, XIX (March, 1955), 57-61. 
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removed from the tribal level, in the more realistic possibilities of an 
increase in concentration of political authority within chiefdoms and in 
a shift from tradition to charisma as the predominant source of 
legitimacy. Such developments would be mirrored in a similar develop-
ment of lesser intensity at the tribal political system level of 
. 1 
analys1s. 
In terms of membership, the solidarity of the Acholi political 
system was weakened by the plurality of dominant groups, but it was 
strengthened by the system's tribal membership and "closed" character-
istics. (The closed nature was, however, potentially a source of 
weakness.) 
As regards conflict, the tribal political system's cohesiveness 
was greatly weakened by the marked institutional conflict. Its minimum 
membership conflict constituted an element of strength. The latter was 
in any event a mixed blessing, since an increase of awareness could well 
result in marked membership conflict instead. 
The system's position with respect to leadership was notably 
weak. 
1
rt is well to reiterate that the analysis pertains to Acholi in 
the years just before regularized alien contact and British rule. There 
is no assumption that the political system was previously static. There 
is the slight evidence, mentioned in the previous footnote, that in much 
earlier times it was a unitary and authority-concentrated system. The 
legend, allegedly believed by all clans, tells of one rwot for Acholi 
originally. It is held that disputes over succession caused splits in 
authority by clans, with a separate ~ for each. In time different 
sections of a clan settled in different places, and authority in these 
territorial clan segments is inferred to have been exercised by the 
elders of the clan sections. Authority over land, for example, reportedly 
passed in this way from tribal~ to clan~ to clan-section elders. 
Such is the explanation derived from oral traditional history, according 
to one uncorroborated source. Ocheng, Uganda Journal, XIX, 57-61. 
1~ 
From the recapitulation the paucity of the possible sources of 
solidarity has become clearer. They were the system's sovereign nature; 
its legitimacy based on tradition (as contrasted to a possible basis for 
legitimacy in reason); its tribal membership (as compared to the 
possibility of common membership ties being only those of mutual 
residence); and two other characteristics of doubtful continuing value--
its closed nature as regards political mobility, and its minimum 
1 
membership conflict. 
Such were the more significant characteristics of the traditional 
Acholi political system at the tribal level as they related to its 
strength in the sense of political solidarity. Although they point to a 
general weakness in this regard, compared to the Buganda traditional 
system to be discussed later, summary judgments or assessments cannot be 
made except with reference to specific situations. An example of such a 
situation, dealt with in Chapter VI, is the advent of British rule, with 
its direct rule native administration policy for Acholi. 
To turn briefly from the total tribal political system to the 
systems of the constituent chiefdoms, the conclusion is that the sources 
2 
of solidarity for the chiefdom political systems were also few, but not 
~hen the characteristic of sovereignty is eliminated as a 
consequence of the advent of British rule, the tribal political system 
is left with only two--out of the possible twelve--more certain sources 
of strength in the sense of solidarity: legitimacy was derived from 
tradition; and the system's membership was tribal. In the context of the 
total view of the traditional Acholi system, the characteristic of 
sovereignty would seem, however, to have contributed little to the 
system's strength. 
2As regards institutional conflict, however, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the chiefdoms experienced the conflict Fallers 
has described in his Busoga study: namely, the marked conflict between 
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so much so as they were for the system of the total tribe. 
The natural and human resources. Having concluded that the 
tribal system was characterized by a number of elements detracting from 
political solidarity, what may be said of the resources of the system? 
The Acholi tribe was favored with only limited resources 
compared to the Baganda's very favored resource position and the even 
more limited resources of the Karamojong. The number of Acholi--using 
the 1931 Census data--amounted to about four per cent of the total 
African population of Uganda as contrasted to two per cent for the 
Karamojong and almost twenty per cent for the Baganda. The Acholi 
people's skills were limited (in the modern sense). Although almost two 
thirds the size of Buganda, the Acholi political system's area was not 
nearly so favorable to cultivation as was a good part of Buganda. In 
comparison with their neighbors, the Acholi were about on a par with the 
Lango and Banyoro as regards resources, and were more favored than 
either the Lugbara to their west or the Karamojong to their east. But 
in relation to the Baganda, and even to the Basoga and the Iteso, the 
Acholi were not well off. 
Adaptability to certain demands for change. It is now in order 
to consider some aspects of the system which are more precisely relevant 
to pressures of change. The questions to be asked are directed to the 
lineage and state institutions; between the "structurally antagonistic" 
heirarchical, centralized state and the corporate lineage organization; 
between the patrilineal descent system and that of patron-clientship. 
Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict 
in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge, 
England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [1956}), pp. 16, 126-127, 230-232. 
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political system's adaptability to demands for individual economic 
opportunity, political equality, and increased general welfare and 
political prestige of the political unit. These are all demands which 
arise in varying degrees as a result of contact with the West, if they 
were not already existing in the traditional culture. 
In determining whether the Acholi political system was poten-
tially inhibitive to economic individualism--for this is the essence of 
the first category of demands for change--the inquiry must ascertain 
whether political authority at any level significantly operated so as to 
restrict possible future individual economic opportunity. At the 
societal level the Acholi political system did not contain features of 
this order. At the chiefdom level there was apparently no appreciable 
political authority over economic activities. Men from other chiefdoms 
might voluntarily join a particular !!21 in expectation of cattle and 
wives. Land allocation--a vital economic function in terms of more 
modern conditions--was handled at the "co111111unity" or the next lower 
level, Both the coiiiiiiUllity and the homestead were cooperative units for 
certain agricultural activities, and cattle for bride-price was held in 
1 
common to some extent by the coiiiiiiUllity. These facts would tend to 
point to a possible restriction of individual economic activity by the 
political authorities at these two lever levels of political units, But 
other data presented by Girling emphasizes also the right of men to move 
and fails to contradict the reasonable assumption of availability of 
1Girling. 
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1 
excess land to all. Also, a family's rights to land cultivated near 
the village were absolutely secure. There was scope for individualism. 
The political system of the Acholi can then be described as 
somewhat restrictive, yet adaptable to the possible demand for increased 
individual economic activity. 2 
With regard to an inevitable Western-type demand for political 
equality, the issue here is twofold. Excluding the actual holders of 
3 
authority, were the adult males by and large politically equal? And 
secondly, if not, was the system adaptable to a possible demand for 
political equality? 
Because there was in fact a distinction in political status 
between aristocrats and commoners, it is assumed pending clarification 
from further studies that in traditional Acholi there was not political 
equality in the broad sense of the term. But was the traditional system 
adaptable to such a demand? The affirmative answer rests on the 
existence of institutions available to the commoners which seemed 
ready-made for an increase in their influence. The most important of 
course was that of Father of the Soil, head of the commoner lineages in 
1Girling. 
2That the political system--in this case political authority in 
the political systems at the different levels--was adaptable does not 
mean that the Acholi society could or would easily accede to demands for 
economic individualism. Other social factors might stand in the way. 
But these are more properly considered under the discussion of sociologi-
cal aspects of Western economic impact. They are concerned most 
particularly with such questions as the nature and strength of obliga-
tions to kin other than immediate family. 
3These are the members of the political systems of primary 
political concern. 
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a chiefdom. Another institution was. that of main or "state" wife of the 
rwot; a gradual rise in her status would bring with it a rise in general 
commoner status by virtue of her function as a symbol for the commoner 
lineages. Successive filling of the positions of rain-maker and war 
leader by commoners, as opposed to aristocrats or the rwot himself, 
could act in the same fashion to lessen distinctions. For these reasons, 
the Acholi traditional political system can be described as a system 
characterized by political inequality, yet adaptable to a demand for 
political equality. 
Was the traditional political system inherently adaptable to 
possible future demands for increases in general welfare and in 
political prestige of the society? Or, to put it another way, was it in 
pre-British days organized to meet such demands, and if not, was it or 
was it not susceptible to the necessary organization? 
As regards general welfare the answer is that the society was 
organized already for this purpose, though at the lower community and 
household levels of political units and not at the higher chiefdom and 
societal levels. For political prestige, organization existed primarily 
at the chiefdom level. Could the sporadic cooperation of the chiefdoms 
in actions against their neighbor tribes have developed both into a more 
regular cooperation, and in fields other than just the military? Since 
Girling seems to have been of divided mind about this, it is considered 
that the possibility of closer and more regularized association between 
the chiefdoms should not be ruled out. On the basis of this and the 
other general source material, the Acholi political system can be 
designated, though in a highly provisional manner, as an organizable 
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political system for the stated purposes. 
The traditional order was, then, not ready-made to deal with the 
three Western-type demands discussed in the preceding paragraphs. For, 
it was restrictive of individual economic activities, there existed 
political inequality, and the political system was not organized at the 
societal level nor to some extent at lower levels. However, the system 
1 
was inherently adaptable to these demands. 
The traditional political system in summary. From the preceding 
analysis it may be stated in summary that the tribal political system of 
the Acholi was characterized by a paucity of sources of political 
solidarity, which was especially compromised by the system's weak 
confederate nature; and that, further, the resources of the Acholi tribal 
entity were limited compared to those of certain other tribes in Uganda. 
On the other hand, the system was so structured as to indicate an 
appreciable degree of probable adaptability to certain inevitable 
Western-type demands for change. 
1
whether inherent adaptability would prove to be actual 
adaptability would depend upon the particular situation as it developed. 
For example, in the instance of Acholi, although the system was poten-
tially adaptable to demands for increased general welfare and political 
prestige, since it was organizable along lines of a strengthened con-
federation, actual developments took a contrasting trend as a result of 
policies which were successively adopted in the first half of the 
century. 
It would be logical to ask why some of the forces of change 
should be considered at one stage of the analysis more or less in a 
vacuum, conclusions reached, and then these conclusions revised as the 
result of the introduction of new data. There are two advantages in 
such a procedure. The first is the increased understanding which 
derives from the realization that it was primarily one or more new 
factors which were most important in shaping developments, and only 
secondarily certain other new factors. The second advantage is the 
possible gain in additional theoretical insights resulting from the 
hypothetical introduction of certain demands for change while excluding 
others until a later stage. 
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In comparison to the tribal political system, the political 
systems of the chiefdoms which formed the constituent political units of 
the tribal system were somewhat--though not a great deal--better off 
than the tribal system in sources of solidarity. 1 The chiefdom systems 
were even more adaptable to Western-type demands for change than the 
total Acholi system. (In terms of resources, the chiefdom systems were 
of course not comparable to the total system.) 
III. OTHER NON-BANTU POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
At the beginning of the chapter twelve tribes in Uganda were 
selected from the many tribes of the Protectorate as being more per-
tinent to the study. Seven were Bantu tribes and five were non-Bantu. 
Two of the latter were Nilo-Hamitic, two Nilotic, and one Sudanic. 
One of the Nilotic tribes was the Acholi, which has just been 
considered in some detail. The other Nilotic tribe was the Lango. Its 
political system is discussed briefly below. Following that, the one 
Sudanic and the two Nilo-Hamitic tribes are given limited consideration. 
2 
The Traditional System of the Nilotic Lango 
The people of Uganda known as the Lango have exhibited charac-
teristics of both the Nilotic and the Nilo-Hamitic groups of tribes, and 
1southall has written that the Acholi chiefdoms seem to have 
been less highly developed than those of the Alur. The latter, he con-
cluded, were at the bottom of the range of segmentary states, having the 
more advanced characteristics of such states only in embryonic form. 
Southall, Alur Society, p. 252. 
2The description of the Lango system is based on a review of a 
number of sources but represents by no means an exhaustive study. The 
main source was Butt, pp. 7, 15, 35, 41-42, 92-108, 179-181. Other 
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there is some controversy regarding with which group the Lango should be 
classified. General practice has been to include them with the Nilotic 
peoples because of their use of the Luo language. 
Principal features of the system. In terms of political 
structure the Lango shared some of the characteristics of both of the 
major tribal groupings mentioned above. 
Like the Nilotic Acholi, villages were headed by a ~; and 
several villages often joined together under one leader (styled a ~) 
into what can be called a chiefdom. 
1 
In contrast to the Acholi where the ~ and rwodi evidently 
were posts filled primarily on a hereditary basis, in Lango success as a 
war leader was the most important prerequisite of office. This was 
especially true of the posts of rwodi. The Lango chiefdoms were also 
much less permanent associations than those of the Acholi. The tribal 
social structure was more egalitarian, having no aristocratic-commoner 
distinction, and in this respect was similar to the Nilo-Hamitic. 
Another likeness to the latter group was the existence of an 
age-set system. Though predominantly nonpolitical, being limited in its 
sphere of activity primarily to rain-making, the age-set system operated 
indirectly to produce one of the elements of a tribal political system. 
For, during the age-set ceremonies every few years there was a complete 
sources are indicated in the fuller treatment of the 1905 and 1945 Lango 
political systems provided at the end of Appendix IV. 
1 These are the plural forms for ~ and rwot. 
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suspension of the recurrent hostilities between different Lango 
political units, The practice, with its regulations for harsh sanction 
1 
against infractors, constituted a tribal political mechanism. 
In addition, in times of hostilities with other tribes, two or 
more chiefdoms would often join forces in a temporary military combina-
2 
tion under a particularly successful war leader. 
Conclusions. The Lango tribal political system was like the 
Acholi in its very weak confederate nature and its otherwise diffused 
political authority. The main differences were the Lango predominance 
of charismatic qualities as the preferred characteristics of leaders, 
and the more open nature of the system as regards political mobility. 
On the whole, the tribal system did not, however, differ markedly from 
that of the Acholi in paucity of sources of political solidarity. 
As indicated in the discussion of tribal resources at the 
beginning of the chapter, Lango's resources were limited in comparison 
to the greater resources of some of the other tribes in the group of 
twelve. (The Lango numbered some 176,000 in 1931 and constituted five 
per cent of Uganda's total African population both in that year and in 
1948.) 
3 The Political Structure of the Sudanic Lugbara 
The Lugbara are known as a Sudanic people. They numbered about 
1 Butt, p. 97. 
2He was given a particular designation--~ lwak. 
3The source for the comments on the Lugbara was John Middleton, 
"The Political System of the Lugbara of the Nile-Congo Divide," Tribes 
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139,000 in Uganda in 1931, with others in the Congo. In 1948 there were 
some 183,000 in Uganda and 58,000 in the Belgian Congo. 
In traditional times the tribe was divided into what will be 
termed "tribal sections." These were territorially delineated groupings--
sixty or more in number--and each had for its core a particular section 
of a clan. The tribal sections were in turn made up of smaller terri-
torial political divisions, "clan sections," which had in each case a 
major lineage as a core. l Non-kin were attached to these units. 
There were mechanisms, albeit very limited, for the settlement 
of disputes within tribal sections. The sections and their constituent 
units had hereditarily chosen elders, some of whom could impose ritual 
sanctions; but there were no Lugbara political posts which corresponded 
to the Acholi or Lango rwodi. The political systems of these social 
units--the tribal sections--can be said to have been very rudimentary, 
yet they did exist as definable systems at that level. 
There were, however, no mechanisms for bringing fighting between 
2 
tribal sections to a close, nor were there apparently any other 
political activities or mechanisms or practices at the tribal level. 
There were no instances of authoritative decisions--even of cooperative 
Without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems, ed. John 
Middleton and David Tait (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 
203-229. 
1Middleton, in lieu of "tribal sections," has used the designa-
tion "tribes"; he has called the "clan sections" of a tribe "major 
sections." His terminology has been altered--perhaps incorrectly with 
respect to the use of "clan sections"--to reduce confusion, for the 
Lugbara as a whole are more generally regarded as a tribe. 
2Middleton, "The Political System . . . , " in Tribes Without 
Rulers, pp. 208, 224. 
action--encompassing more than one of the tribal sections on anything 
approaching a regularized basis. The Lugbara, therefore, did not 
possess a political system for the tribe in the sense of the term 
"political system" as defined in this study. They did, however, con-
stitute a society with, in their own eyes, a single social system. 1 
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In addition to having no tribal political system, the resources 
of the Lugbara were very limited. 
Political Aspects of the Nilo-Hamitic Tribal Societies 
There are two Nilo-Hamitic tribes in Uganda to be considered--
the Iteso; and the Karamojong. The Iteso are by far of greater sig-
nificance. More attention is given below to them than to some other 
tribes because they were the second most populous tribe in the 1948 
Census; and because they provide a good example of a tribe which was 
given an alien, non-traditional political system at a very early date. 
2 The Iteso. According to tradition, different sections of the 
Iteso tribe migrated to their present general location in Uganda in 
stages some 250 to 300 years ago. They came from the region of the 
foothills of the escarpment of the Rift Valley on the Protectorate's 
extreme east. In the same area there still reside the Karamojong, with 
whom the Iteso are considered to have been closely related. Not only 
Rulers, 
1Middleton, "The Political System .. 
pp. 204, 218, 227-228. 
" 0 ' 
in Tribes Without 
2The main sources for the information concerning the Iteso were 
J~ C. D. Lawrance, The Iteso: Fifty Years of Change in a Nilo-Hamitic 
Tribe of Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 1-22, 54-
55, 64-79; and Pamela Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, The Central 
Nilo-Hamites, Part VII of East Central Africa, Ethnographic Survey of 
Africa, ed. Daryll Forde (London: International African Institute, 
1953), pp. 9-15, 17-22, 25-27. 
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has there been a marked linguistic affinity, but the traditional social 
organization of the Iteso was similar in many ways to that of their 
current eastern neighbors. 1 
The pre-1900 Iteso perhaps did not constitute a tribe. Although 
other peoples referred to them as the Bakedi or the Bateso, they did not 
2 give themselves the tribal name of the Iteso until later. Prior to the 
twentieth century there was no unity; there was no tribal political 
system. It is not known whether the Iteso peoples considered themselves 
a society, with or without a social system, distinct from other peoples. 
They did, however, speak a common language, though with dialect differ-
ences. 
. 3 Below the total tr1bal level, two lower levels of defined 
territorial units did exist in traditional times. One was political, 
and one was not. The former was the~· a local settlement consisting 
of members of diverse clans. It has been compared to a parish in size. 
Its leaders were varied and their authority was limited. A political 
system existed at the etem level. 
The other unit was larger and more inclusive; it was what will 
1Pamela Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, pp. 14, 26; Lawrance, The 
Iteso •.. , p. 17; A. C. A. Wright, Review of The Iteso: Fifty Years of 
Change in a Nilo-Hamitic Tribe of Uganda, by J. C. D. Lawrance, Uganda 
Journal, XXII (March, 1958), 89-90. 
2 Lawrance, The Iteso 
0 0 • ' 
pp. 3-5, 55; Pamela Gulliver and 
P. H. Gulliver, p. 11. 
3 In the strict sense the adjective tribal should perhaps not be 
used at all for the pre-1900 period to refer to the various peoples who 
later came to call themselves the Iteso, but common sense dictates its 
use. 
1 be termed the tribal section (einere, singular; ineresinei, plural). 
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There were three or four major units of this type. They were distinct 
one from the other territorially and sometimes likewise historically by 
reason of different dates of migration to the region. Also, the dialects 
spoken in the ineresinei sometimes varied. There were, however, no 
activities or mechanisms for authoritative decisions at the level of the 
tribal section. 2 It did not, therefore, possess a political system. 
Age-set systems were important in the social system, but 
initiation ceremonies were not coordinated throughout the tribe or even 
3 
within a tribal section. Clans fragmented into sub-clans and all were 
designated by the same term (ateker, singular; atekerin, plural), 
exogamy applying only to the smaller atekerin. But these social units 
were primarily ritual in function, and were rarely grouped to form the 
4 bulk of a territorially defined area. 
In 1899 with the agreement of the British authorities, "General" 
Semei Kakunguru--a Muganda--entered the area of Teso with Baganda forces 
1others have translated the term as "division" or "district" of 
the tribe. Lawrance, The Iteso ., p. 70. 
2Lawrance, The Iteso 
. . . ' pp. 68-71. 
3Pamela Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, pp. 25-26. 
4The ateker was a group hard to classify and few writers have 
been satisfied with the designation of it as a clan or sub-clan. It 
was, according to Lawrance, a division of society consisting of several 
extended families [presumably related to each other]. The larger units, 
he wrote, were not exogamous; there was no claim of descent from a 
common ancestor; and there was no common totem. However, the smaller 
units apparently possessed these characteristics. Lawrance has also 
stated that by derivation the word means a state of amity or alliance. 
Lawrance, The Iteso ..• , pp. 55-59. 
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and established a system of heirarchical administration along the lines 
of that of Buganda. Counties were delineated and these were divided up 
into smaller administrative areas. Baganda civil agents were put in 
charge. Kakunguru went off to the south and the Baganda he left behind 
"extorted and plundered without hindrance."1 As a result the British 
Administration in Uganda took over in 1904. The District was formally 
constituted as the Teso District in 1912. It is with the situation as 
it existed in 1905 that this study is now particularly interested. 
By 1905 the freebooter-type of Muganda civil agent had been 
replaced by more reliable Baganda. But the system of administration was 
not altered, and Kakunguru had done a thorough job. When he left in 
1904, after another short period of personal supervision at the request 
of the British authorities, the new form of political structure was well 
established, and ordered government had brought peace to the region. In 
the process, however, he had suppressed most of the indigenous social 
institutions, and in time these were lost. The age-set initiations were 
forbidden, for example, and the age-set quickly became a thing of the 
past. The atekerin (clan units) were not accorded any recognition. 
2 Even the~ was disregarded until later years. 
To summarize, not only was there no traditional tribal system in 
the pre-1900 era, but the changes wrought by 1912--even by 1905--had 
assigned to obscurity what there had existed in terms of traditional 
1 Lawrance, The Iteso .•. , p. 20. 
2For further details in connection with this and the preceding 
paragraph, see Lawrance, The Iteso ••. , pp. 19-22, 73; Pamela Gulliver 
and P. H. Gulliver, pp. 14-15, 17-18; F. Burke, "The New Role of the 
Chief in Uganda," Journal of African Administration, X (July, 1958), 
154-155. 
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political authority at the local level. Teso's resources were, however, 
moderate compared to Buganda's extensive resources and Karamoja's very 
limited resources. 
The Karamojong. Although it is commonly done and the official 
1948 Census figures usually follow the practice, the 108,000 Africans 
treated below are somewhat imprecisely referred to as the Karamojong 
throughout this study. For they are not now in fact all Karamojong but 
represent a cluster of tribes, the majority of which are closely related. 
Of these, the three most numerous are the Karamojong proper (56,000 
population); the Dodoth (20,000); and the Jie (18,000). 1 However, 
because the Karamojong tribe proper has been regarded traditionally as 
the original founding unit and the Jie and Dodoth and others as later 
offshoots of it, and because of the Census grouping, the Cluster is 
considered as a single ethnic Karamojong grouping. 2 
The Karamojong Cluster early in the twentieth century may be 
described as very likely having no sense of social unity or solidarity, 
even if just the three major constituent groups are included and the 
smaller groups excluded. In effect, the Cluster had no one, inclusive 
3 political system. 
1The others included in the Census figures are the Tobur {5,000), 
the Tepeth (4,000), and three or more smaller groups. In addition to 
the 1948 Census data in EASD, African Population ••. , pp. 40-41, see 
also Goldthorpe, Outlines .•• , p. 38; Lawrance, The Iteso ••. , p. 7; 
and Pamela Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, pp. 29, 95-97. 
2If considered separately, the smallness in size of the three 
major tribes of the Cluster would exclude them from the group of main 
tribes of Uganda. 
3Most important, the Jie seceded from the Karamojong by force 
some 200 years ago and relations since have always been hostile. At no 
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Also, its natural and human resources, compared to the other 
main tribal groups in Uganda, were very limited. 
IV. THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE BAGANDA 
In considering the Baganda and their political system as a 
factor shaping political change in Uganda from 1905 to 1945, it is 
particularly important to understand their earlier history. Super-
ficially, what the Kingdom's political system amounted to in 1905 was a 
far cry from previous days. Fundamentally, this was not the case, and 
the traditional nature of political authority remained unaltered although 
1 the allocation of authority was in some ways drastically recast. 
Attention is given below to a description of the political 
time after the initial splitting off did the three tribes act together, 
nor did they even share any common ceremony. 
With regard to the three tribes separately, each might perhaps 
be described at the advent of British rule as having a tribal political 
system by reason of the existence of tribal ritual ceremonies involving 
authoritative decisions. But such political systems, if they did in 
fact exist, were notably lacking in characteristics of solidarity. 
As for still lower-level political units, each tribe was divided 
into tribal sections (or districts). The tribal sections with their 
respective political systems evidently were the units for the organiza-
tion of warfare and defense. 
Also within the tribes there were the institutions of clan and 
age-set, but these were social institutions; they did not constitute 
political institutions each with a mutually exclusive territorial base. 
See Pamela Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, pp. 11, 28-29, 40, 47-
48, 50-51. 
British civil administration evidently took over in 1914 with 
the withdrawal of a military garrison. Thomas and Scott, p. 450. 
1Independently, Wrigley used the same modifier when he wrote 
recently that the structure of the state had "been very drastically 
altered." He added that an oligarchy replaced the earlier despotism. 
C. C. Wrigley, "The Christian Revolution in Buganda," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, II (October, 1959), 45. 
120 
system as it is reported to have existed at the time of the arrival of 
the first Christian missionaries in the latter half of the 1870's, or 
more precisely, as of about 1877. The adapted system which functioned 
in 1905 is then analyzed. 
1 The System of the Late 1870's 
Historical studies place the origin of Buganda's monarchic 
political system in the fifteenth century, the probable date for the 
2 founding of the royal dynasty. But the Baganda, like other peoples, 
have their own myths and legends of their past, and these are often of 
practical political significance. 3 
The legendary history. 4 The Baganda consider that some thousand 
years ago their first Kabaka (King) came from the northeast. He was 
descended from the gods, and his name was Kintu. From him the royal 
1The basic source, used as such by every student of the Baganda, 
is John Roscoe, The Baganda: An Account of Their Native Customs and 
Beliefs (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1911), pp. 1-525. Much of 
Roscoe's data about the traditional, pre-European, nineteenth century 
Baganda came directly from the Katikiro, Apolo Kagwa, or through his 
good offices (see p. xi). Sir Apolo furnished certain "corrections" 
with his work, Sir Apolo Kagwa, The Customs of the Baganda, trans. 
Ernest B. Kalibala, ed. May Mandelbaum Edel (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1934), pp. 1-199. 
Other sources are indicated in the succeeding footnotes. 
2Roland Oliver, "The Royal Tombs of Buganda," Uganda Journal, 
XXIII (September, 1959), 133. 
3An excellent discussion in general terms of the value and 
significance of a tribe's traditional history has appeared in A. W. 
Southall, "Alur Tradition and Its Historical Significance," Uganda 
Journal, XVIII (September, 1954), 138-139, 164-165. 
4see Chapter I for the less mythological version. 
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family of Buganda has traced its line down to the present time some 
thirty-three generations later. 
Kintu found people of different clans in the area, and he com-
1 
menced to bring these under his control, welding them into a nation. 
Each successive Kabaka took as his clan totem that of his mother--not 
his father--and in this way various of the clans were able to claim a 
ruler as one of their number. 2 By the 1870's Buganda had been brought 
by Kabaka Suna and his successor, Mutesa I, to the level of a highly 
organized, heirarchical state. 3 
The political system. When the first missionaries arrived in 
1877, Buganda was a sovereign state, subordinate to none, Political 
1That there were clans before Kabakas is generally recognized. 
A. B. Mukwaya, Land Tenure in Buganda: Present Day Tendencies (East 
African Studies, No. 1, East African Institute of Social Research; 
Kampala, Uganda: The Eagle Press, 1953), p. 7; Wrigley, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, II, 34-36; L. A. Fallers, "Ideology and 
Culture in Uganda Nationalism" ([paper read at the} Southwestern 
Anthropological Association Meeting, April 25, 1959), p. 3 (duplicated); 
L. P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century (London: George 
Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1934), pp. 162-164. 
2Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 
Some sources have indicated there 
all descendants of the Kabaka's. 
Mair has written that the 
that there was no royal clan. He 
An African People ••. , p. 180. 
pp. 233 and 236 especially. 
82-83, 136-137, 173-185, 186-187. 
was also a "royal clan" consisting of 
Kabaka took his mother's totem; and 
was the head of all the clans. Mair, 
See also Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, 
3Mutesa instituted a standing army. A permanent General was in 
charge, Styled the Mujasi, he was responsible to the Katikiro and 
through him to the Kabaka. Roscoe, The Baganda, p. 2. 
With the militarization went "a partial substitution of 
clientship for kinship as the basis of social organization. , . " 
C. C. Wrigley, "Buganda: An Outline Economic History," Economic History 
Review, X (August, 1957), 71. 
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authority was concentrated territorially and otherwise. Most important 
in this respect was the absolute power wielded by the Kabaka, subject to 
1 
minimal checks. His Kingdom was divided territorially into adminis-
trative areas called~ (counties), and these in turn were less 
exactly subdivided. But the Baganda chiefs who ruled over the sazas 
ruled in the Kabaka's name. The posts were not hereditary posts--with 
2 
minor exceptions --and the holders were appointed by the Kabaka at his 
will and served at his pleasure. Most of the time they were required by 
the Kabaka to reside at his carefully laid out capital, where they 
maintained large establishments. Collectively they constituted a sort 
of permanent council (the Lukiko) which gave advice when asked, and 
before which appeal cases were heard. The ~ chiefs were dismissed, 
transferred, or promoted as the Kabaka saw fit, as were the lower 
ranking chiefs and almost every other official in the Kingdom. 3 
1see, for example, Kagwa, The Customs . , ., pp. 82-84; Fallers, 
"Ideology ••• ," p. 3; L.A. Fallers, "Despotism, Status Culture and 
Social Mobility in an African Kingdom," Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, II (October, 1959), 20. 
Mair believed Roscoe underemphasized the extent of the checks 
which, she has maintained, existed with respect to the abuse of the 
arbitrary power of the Kabaka and the senior chiefs. Mair, An African 
People ••. , pp. xiii-xiv. 
Other writers, however, tend to bear out Roscoe. There were, 
for example, customs and practices which reduced the possibility of the 
Kabaka's being overthrown by rival claimants to the throne. Roscoe, The 
Baganda, pp. 85, 187-188; Wrigley, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, II, 36; C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptain 
Soudan (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882), I, 200. 
In addition, he was the acknowledged head of all the clans. 
Fallers, Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 19. The clans 
were, therefore, not an independent political force. 
2Two of the exceptions were the large estates ruled over by the 
Queen and by the King's Mother (the Namasole). Roscoe, The Baganda, 
pp. 236-237. 
3Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 12-14, 232-241, 247-257, 258-260; 
123 
The range of activities over which political authority was 
exercised was considerable for that region. The Kabaka, or his officials 
in his name, exercised full judicial functions; 1 taxes were collected on 
an extensive and regular basis; roads were constructed and maintained by 
the administration; and for this and other public purposes labor was 
2 
conscripted according to fairly well-defined procedures. The respon-
sibility for warfare and for defense of the realm lay with the royal 
person and his chief officials. 3 (Of the latter, the Katikiro {Prime 
Minister] was the most powerful, but he served more as the Kabaka's 
chief advisor, judge, and administrator. 4) 
The legitimacy accorded to the Kabaka by his people could 
5 
scareely have been greater in extent. As a descendant of Kintu and the 
gods, he was considered to possess superhuman qualities of a charismatic 
6 
nature. As the rightful successor in a long dynastic line, he was 
Kagwa, The Customs •.. , pp. 77-78, 170-172; Fallers, "Ideology 
p. 3; Mair, An African People .• , pp. 160-163, 174-177. 
lKagwa, The Customs • ., pp. 128-133, 171. 
2Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 200-201, 238-267; Mair, An African 
People .•. , pp. 131-133, 196-198. 
3In writing of the organization of this activity, Fallers has 
stressed that its primary aim was offense--expansion and plunder. 
Fallers, "Ideology . . • , " p. 3. 
II 
. ' 
4ae was in no sense comparable to the prime minister of a con-
stitutional monarch. The Kabaka disregarded advice which was contrary 
to his own wishes. Roscoe, The Baganda, p. 232. 
Mair has implied that the Katikiro's position served as a con-
siderable check. Mair, An African People •.. , pp. 180-182. Other 
sources do not support this inference. 
5The country and the people belonged to him. His welfare was 
deemed essential. To be without a Kabaka was in itself considered 
disastrous. Mair, An African People •.. , pp. 179, 241-242. 
60ne writer has advanced the contention that the Kabaka was 
accorded the full measure of the sanctity which derived from the rich 
and strong tradition of the Kingdom. 1 There was no group among the 
Baganda who felt otherwise about this. His legitimacy as an absolute 
2 
ruler was not questioned, nor was that of the chiefs he appointed as 
long as they remained in office. 3 
Political authority in Buganda in the late 1870's was, then, 
remarkably concentrated and pronounced, 4 and it rested firmly in 
5 tradition. 
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considered a god by his people. H. P. Gale, ·~utesa I--Was He a God?: 
The Enigma of Kiganda Paganism," Uganda Journal, XX (March, 1956), 72-87. 
Another writer has characterized the Kabaka as "prospectively supernat-
ural." John V. Taylor, The Growth of the Church in Buganda (World 
Mission Studies; London: SCM Press Ltd, 1958), p. 211. 
1For an account of the traditional history of each of the kings, 
see Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 214-231; and Kagwa, The Customs ••. , 
pp. 18-66. 
2The Kabaka could alter established tradition. "He was . . . 
above the gods." Wrigley, CoiJll)arative Studies in Society and History, 
II, 39; Taylor, The Growth •.• , pp. 20-21. 
3Royal drums with long traditional histories and each with 
prescribed functions and related rituals were among the many symbols 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the Kabaka. There were complex ceremonies 
at the time of a Kabaka's death and the accession of his successor. 
Elaborate reed temples were constructed to honor the dead rulers, whose 
ghosts were equal to gods. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 25-28, 103-114, 
190-200, 283. 
4 Wrigley, Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 37; 
Mair, An African People ., p. 159. 
5"Revolutions • were extremely difficult to effect in 
Kiganda society, for there were few sources of authority which were not 
subject to the Kabaka's control. Clan and lineages had little power as 
against the Kabaka •••. " D. A. Low, Religion and Society in Buganda, 
1875-1900 (East African Studies, No. 8; Kampala, Uganda: East African 
Institute of Social Research, [1957]), p. 8. 
Another writer has implied greater insecurity of the Kabaka's 
position. Taylor, The Growth ... , pp. 23-24. See also Fallers, Bantu 
Bureaucracy, p. 233. 
125 
With regard to the membership of the political system, Buganda's 
population was overwhelmingly Baganda, there being no notable ethnic 
minorities. 1 Nor was there any single large dominant group within the 
tribe, or series of groups. 2 If any distinctive group existed it was 
3 the chiefs and other leading officials taken as a class, since not 
unnaturally there was a tendency for them to advance the interests of 
their kin. 4 However, advancement in position, although assisted by the 
attributes of wealth and family, was on the basis of merit in the eyes 
of the Kabaka. To the ruler merit meant a combination of ability 
successfully to administer a part of the Kingdom or discharge a certain 
function, together with unquestioned loyalty to himself. 5 And the 
Kabaka had a wide field of recruits from which to choose, drawn from all 
6 
walks of life. 
lThe population included some members of neighboring 
capbttred in warfare and raids, Roscoe, The Baganda, p. 14. 
also a sprinkling of other strangers. 
tribes, 
There was 
2The one inviolable 1Q¥alty was as a Muganda to the Kabaka and 
Buganda. No other links--clan, family, chief--were inviolable. There 
were no age-sets. There were no very distinct local loyalties. Low, 
Religion .•• , pp. 4, 9; Mair, An African People ••. , pp. 69, 241. 
The clans were sufficiently numerous--as well as being dispersed 
throughout the population--as to preclude one or more becoming very 
important. Mair, An African People •.• , pp. 34, 154. For a list of 
clans, see Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 138-140. 
3 Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 12-13, 86, 246; Fallers, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, II, 12, 22-24, 26-28. 
4Mair, An African People ..• , p. 34. 
5Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 13-14, 247; Fallers, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, II, 21. 
6Young boys from every part of the Kingdom were sent to the 
court to serve as pages. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 245-246, 269. There 
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It is obvious that the membership characteristics discussed 
above were, like those relating to political authority, factors contrib-
uting to the solidarity of the Kingdom, as were the individual inci-
dences of leadership provided by Kabaka Suna and Kabaka Mutesa I. Also, 
as might be gathered from the preceding description, there were no 
institutional or membership conflicts detracting from the Kingdom's 
1 
unity. (In addition, the political system of Buganda was well endowed 
2 
with natural and human resources compared to the rest of the region. ) 
The Adapted Political System of 1905 
The history of Uganda's events and developments which occurred 
from the time of Stanley's visit in 1875 to the year 1905 has been 
was always the hope for them and their sponsors that they could win the 
ruler's notice and favor. Low, Religion • . . , p. 6; Fallers, "Ideology 
.•. ," pp. 3, 7; Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 73; Taylor, The 
Growth . • . , pp. 22-23. 
However, because the Kabaka was quick to voice displeasure and 
to express it in action most dire for any member of his royal household, 
some chiefs were hesitant to send their own sons. Fallers, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, II, 22. Often they sent promising boys 
from peasant families who had already shown their merit, usually in 
service in the chief's own establishment at the capital or in his area 
of administration. For, there was in Buganda a system of clientage, 
chiefs gathering around them a group of personal followers. Low, 
Religion ... , p. 5. See also Mair, An African People .•• , pp. 60-
61, 141, 173; Taylor, The Growth ... , p. 23. 
1This was generally true during a Kabaka's reign. However, 
although the rules for choosing successors on the death of a Kabaka 
usually were sufficient to resolve conflicts by different claimants, on 
rare occasions a civil war of short duration but considerable severity 
might break out. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 346-347. See also Fallers, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 17. 
2But not nearly so much as it was to be, absolutely and 
relatively, by 1905. 
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furnished in Chapter I. 
Two principal developments. For Buganda, two points seem to 
stand out above all others, and it is well to cite them before proceed-
ing to an analysis of the adapted traditional system. The first relates 
to the change brought by the missionaries; the second to the change 
wrought by Johnston's 1900 Agreement with the Baganda chiefs, acting as 
they were for the infant Kabaka and the people. 
The Christian missionaries came to Buganda first and foremost to 
bring their religious teachings to the Kingdom's people. In the last 
analysis, they met with unusual success. As so ably concluded by D. A. 
Low in his excellent study of the 1875-1900 period, 
. . . there were good reasons within the historical and cultural 
setting within Buganda why Christianity should have gained an entry; 
having entered, it spread in a manner that was partly consistent 
with the traditional framework and partly extended beyond it: 
Christianity in Buganda then arose out of the traditional, there-
after revolted against it, subsequently gained control of it, and 
so became reincorporated with it. Control of the traditional 
political order by the Christians gave them great power; the only 
road to office and place for anyone else, lay through joining one 
of the Christian parties. Christianity, therefore, became the 
religion of the Baganda, and for the most part the only politically 
recognised religion (even though a majority of the tribe, though 
not an overwhelming majority, remained unconverted). It was not 
the religion of a small outcast clique: nor was it divorced from 
the tribe; it was part of it. And not the least important result 
was that the missionaries, and the Churches, became involved, not 
merely with the political and social order within Buganda, but--
the C.M.S. and the Anglican Church more particularly--in the 
relations between the Baganda and the British Protectorate 
administration.! 
The second major historical consequence of the three decades 
preceding 1905 was the Agreement of 1900. The Kabakaship lost in 
1Low, Religion •.. , p. 16. Italics not in the original; 
underscoring added. 
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assigned powers but gained in status and prestige in relation to 
traditional authorities of other tribes. 
The infant Kabaka lost his traditional absolute right over 
1 
allocation of land. The chiefs and many notables gained freehold title 
to large areas of land, a right they had not previously enjoyed. 2 The 
centralized direction of Buganda's political affairs by one person, 
inviolable and absolute, was replaced by an. oligarchy of chiefs led by 
3 
one or more of their own group. 
Despite these changes, Buganda's political system remained 
distinctly and quite completely its own--an adaptation of the 
traditional, 4 and not a new structure imposed by an alien power. 
1
"Theoretically, the whole country and all that was in it was 
not only subject to the king's authority but actually belonged to 
him. . " Mair, An African People . . . , p. 159. 
2Power over land, delegated by the Kabaka, was the supreme 
attribute of chieftainship. It created the patron and client relation-
ship between chief and peasant. Complete British power over land was 
unthinkable. The chiefs insisted on retaining some control. Roland 
Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston & the Scramble for Africa (London: Chatto 
& Windus, 1957), p. 301. 
In this way about 9,000 square miles (known as mailo land) was 
distributed to individual Baganda, the remaining 8,300 square miles of 
waste and uncultivated land and of forest passing to the British 
Government as Crown Land. H. B. Thomas and A. E. Spencer, A History of 
Uganda Land and Surveys and of the Uganda Land and Survey Department 
(Entebbe, Uganda: Government Press, 1938), p. 63. For traditional and 
modern systems of land tenure in Buganda, see Mukwaya, pp. 1-79. 
3oliver has written that the British confirmed in their posi-
tions the natural Baganda leaders "thrown up" by the political and 
social revolution, and provided "them with conditions of peace and 
economic progress such as it seldom falls to the lot of revolutionaries 
to enjoy." Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), p. 194. 
4Fallers, Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 27, 
29. 
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Political authority. What were the characteristics of political 
authority evident in the 1905 political system of the Kingdom? 
The degree of territorial centralization remained unitary, as it 
was in the system under Mutesa I. The only change was a formalization 
first, of the Kingdom's internal administrative boundaries; and 
secondly, of the chiefs' responsibility to their Kabaka and Katikiro, 
and in some matters to the British authorities. There was no new 
permanent delegation of political authority of any kind to territorial 
units within the Kingdom. 
How had Buganda's sovereignty been affected? The Agreement of 
1900--and in fact the earlier Agreements also--transformed the Kingdom's 
status to that of a semi-sovereign political system. Buganda became 
subordinate in certain consequential respects to a territorially more 
inclusive political system; yet Buganda exercised a rightful claim to 
1 independence in other consequential matters. 
To what extent had the degree of concentration of political 
authority--other than on a territorial basis--undergone a change? The 
"Kabaka's autocratic powers were substantially reduced, and the mystique 
which had surrounded him was notably attenuated. • . . The Kabaka lost 
1The Agreement provided that the Kabaka had to take the advice 
of the British administration. In fact this was rarely pressed in the 
first three decades; the Kabaka "thus continued to exercise real and 
wide authority over his people." Fallers, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, II, 14. 
Also, the Baganda version was--and continues to be--that Mutesa, 
as head of a progressive and vigorous country, invited the Europeans to 
come and teach the Baganda what they could about modern and Christian 
ways so the Baganda could absorb these useful elements of European 
culture into their own way of life. They have held that that arrange-
ment was a voluntary one, if not between equals, then approaching such a 
relationship. Fallers, "Ideology ••• ," pp. 6-8. 
• 
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1 his arbitnary power over life and death. . . 
" He lost authority over 
land. Because he was an infant, exercise of the rest of Kabaka Daudi 
Chwa's authority was in full measure in the hands of the Regents and the 
senior chiefs--a considerable diffusion of authority compared to earlier 
2 years. Also, supervision over certain matters of considerable impor-
tance--assessment and collection of taxes--rested no longer with the 
Kabaka, and not even with his Ministers, but rather with the Protectorate 
Administration. These changes all lessened the degree of concentration 
of political authority. 
Yet could it be described as diffused? When compared to the 
possibilities, this hardly seems a plausible conclusion. In other 
tribes there were instances of division of authority over diverse 
political activities; and there were examples of diffusion of authority 
also among numbers of individuals within separate political institu-
tions. The former occurred to a slight degree in Buganda prior to 1905, 
but not appreciably. The latter also occurred, but the locus of 
political authority in the last analysis shifted perhaps rather more 
from the Kabaka to his Prime Minister-Regent than from the Kabaka to an 
3 
oligarchy of chiefs. Political authority in Buganda was less 
1Low, Religion ., p. 9. 
2There is evidence of occasional regencies in earlier times, 
however, though the inference is that they were short and infrequent. 
Roscoe, The Baganda, p. 232. 
3The chiefs were told by the British authorities that they 
should not spend so much time in the capital and that their proper 
place was supervising tax collection and other duties in their own 
areas; the Regents agreed. [Great Britain, Foreign Office,] General 
Report on the Uganda Protectorate for the Year Ending March 31, 1904, 
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concentrated in 1905 than in 1875; but it was still quite concentrated 
and certainly could not be described as diffused in a total view of the 
situation. 
What about the scope of activities over which political authority 
in the system exercised jurisdiction? Did it expand or contract? If 
anything, it expanded. The Baganda officials lost some of their 
functions--a very few--to British control; but the British authorities 
at the same time gave them additional tasks to perform in relation to 
1 their people. 
Had there been a change in the nature of the source of legit-
imacy for political authority since the late 1870's? The answer is in 
the affirmative, for the infancy of the Kabaka precluded his taking an 
active part in the affairs of state. The main wellspring of charismatic 
sanction for political authority was not making its contribution to the 
legitimacy of political authority, and those exercising authority had to 
rely primarily on tradition to justify their actions. 2 
Although tradition was not as powerful a basis for legitimacy as 
charisma and tradition combined, it was nevertheless still of sufficient 
strength in the case of Buganda to support an assumption, in the form of 
Africa series, No. 12 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1904), 
p. 3. Cited hereafter as GB, FO, General Report on the Uganda 
Protectorate . . . 1904. 
1rt was through the new corps of Baganda chiefs that cotton pro-
duction was initially introduced and organized. Wrigley, Economic 
History Review, X, 74-76. 
2rn an article received subsequent to the formulation of the 
above conclusion, Wrigley has written that the oligarchs themselves 
"were aware that their own power was not fully legitimate in the eyes of 
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a conclusion, that the extent of legitimacy accorded to the holders of 
political authority at the time was considerable. 1 The assumption in 
more specific terms is that the great majority of the members of the 
political system (the Baganda) were convinced that the men holding 
office had a good claim to the exercise of authority. 2 
Membership in the political unit of Buganda. What can be said 
about the membership of the political system? Had it changed since the 
late 1870's? 
It had changed in one significant respect. The assistance 
Buganda rendered to the British military forces in the 1890's brought as 
a reward increases in the territory of the political unit, notably with 
3 the handing over to the Kingdom of certain sections of Bunyoro. These 
the people. 
II, 46. 
" Wrigley, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
1It might be described as moderate, in contrast to the m1n1mum 
legitimacy accorded holders of political authority in traditional 
Acholi, or as compared to the marked legitimacy characterizing the 1877 
Baganda political system. 
2This assumption is in contrast to the other possibilities, 
which have been ruled out as unreasonable alternatives: that the extent 
of legitimacy was marked in that the great majority of the Baganda held 
an intense conviction that all of those holding office had a good (or 
the best possible) claim to the authority they were exercising; or that 
the extent of legitimacy was minimum, in that only a few members held 
the belief in the good claim to authority of the holders of office, or a 
majority of members held such a belief but it bordered on the ambivalent, 
or that a majority held the belief but only with respect to a few of 
those holding office, or for some other reason along the same lines. 
See Appendix IV. 
3other peoples brought in less unwillingly were the Basese, 
Bakoki, Bavuma, and Banabwera, totaling some 24,000 in 1931. Thomas 
and Scott, p. 87. 
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latter, which came to be known as the Mubende District of Buganda, were 
1 populated almost entirely by Banyoro. Just how many is not known, but 
it was probably no less than 100,000. 2 
The Banyoro in Mubende District were members of the political 
system of Buganda, since they were resident within the political unit 
delineated by the Kingdom's boundaries and since they were subject to 
the political authority of the Baganda administrators. They constituted 
a sizeable body. The closeness and extent of common ties of the total 
membership of Buganda's political system was, therefore, no longer that 
deriving from a common tribal membership. The political system of the 
Baganda, with its new ethnic minavity of the Banyoro, had changed into 
one where the common ties were only so close and extensive as stemmed 
from a common culture--for the Baganda and the Banyoro did share the 
3 
same culture. The ties were not as weak as they might have been, 
however, if they had been limited to those deriving only from common 
residence. 
The addition of other peoples to the Kingdom brought another 
change in the characteristics of the political system. In the earlier 
lThomas and Scott, p. 433. 
2This estimate is based on the following figures. The 1931 
population of the Banyoro in Uganda was 239,000; of Bunyoro District--
115,000; of Mubende District--156,000. The population fell after 1931. 
In 1948 all Banyoro in the Protectorate totaled only 181,000. Bunyoro 
District's African population was 108,000, and Banyoro constituted 74 
per cent of this. Banyoro in Mubende District numbered 59,000 out of a 
total District population of about 85,000 in 1950, or just over 70 per 
cent. EASD, African Population .•• , p. 19. For 1931 figures of 
population by Districts, see Thomas and Scott, p. 503. 
3see definition of culture in this context in Appendix IV. 
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system there had been no one large group which was clearly politically 
dominant, although a chiefly, privileged class exerted more political 
influence than any other possible grouping. In the new 1905 system 
there was one largest, politically dominant group: the Baganda as a 
tribe, in relation to the non-Baganda Africans subject to political 
authority. The distinction in political status was great, although few 
details are available. It was best exemplified by the absolute exclu-
sion from office of anyone born of a "foreign" (non-Muganda) parent--
Baganda appointed to posts in the Kingdom had to swear loyalty to the 
Kabaka in a public ceremony, and one prerequisite of the declaration was 
a recital of the appointee's Baganda ancestors. If the Kabaka took a 
non-Muganda woman as one of his wives--and it was almost an impossibil-
ity because of existent customs--her children would be excluded from 
1 
the throne. 
Although there was, therefore, a closed situation as regards 
political mobility for the non-Baganda members of the political system, 
2 
the system remained an open one in this respect for the Baganda. For 
them, recruitment to office was still based on achieved as opposed to 
1If he married a Muganda from one of a few specified clans, any 
children of the marriage were, incidentally, also debarred from succes-
sion to the throne. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 86, 137, 186-187. 
2social mobility in traditional times largely was synonymous 
with political mobility. Appointment as a chief brought control over 
land and people and thus wealth and additional prestige. Dismissal 
often resulted in the loss of all of these. After the 1900 Agreement 
possession of land was separated from political office; social mobility 
was less open. Mair, An African People •.. , p. 198. 
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ascribed qualities. 1 The political system can be characterized, then, 
as a mixture of the open and the closed with reference to political 
mobility. 
Conflict in the political system. Although within the political 
system of 1905 there were numerous potential institutional conflicts, 2 
3 there was only one major conflict actually present in the system. This 
was the institutional conflict which stemmed from the earlier religious 
rivalry for political power between the Protestants and the Catholics--
and to a lesser extent the Muslims. Although there had been various 
arrangements negotiated for the division of official posts in the 
Buganda political heirarchy and these and the provisions of the 1900 
Agreement tended to keep the conflict within nonviolent bounds, it was 
1This conclusion is based on assumptions which seem reasonable 
to infer from general data. One is that there was a tendency to less of 
an open and more of a closed system, since the Kabaka was no longer an 
effective leader exercising his impartial judgment of respective merits 
of candidates; also the chiefs were in a position to make appointments 
the Kabaka formerly made, and they would naturally favor their kin. 
This tendency toward less political mobility was no doubt balanced by a 
British stress on merit. Mair, An African People .•• , p. 198. 
2The potential conflicts were in the social institutions of 
kinship versus merit systems, and clan heads' versus chiefs' rights to 
land; and in the political institutions of the Kabaka, his Ministers, 
and the Lukiko consisting mostly of the chiefs. Mechanisms for resolving 
differences between these latter institutions did not exist, for 
conflict had not arisen. 
There was also a potential conflict with British authority, but 
this was not an internal matter for the Baganda political system--it 
later came to be so in one respect--but rather a question of the system 
in its relation to other systems. 
One conflict which had developed after the late 1870's was 
already resolved. The conflict of Christianity with the traditional 
system was settled when the former became incorporated into the latter. 
Low, Religion •.. , p. 16. 
3The Lukiko served as a means "for the prevention of abuse and 
1 by no means resolved as of 1905. 
What was the position in the system as regards unresolvable 
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conflict between membership groups? Had such conflicts increased from 
their minimum level in the late 1870's? As just indicated, one new 
conflict had arisen and in the earlier days was a source of great 
trouble--the rivalries between adherents of the newly introduced 
religious faiths. But the differences between the membership groups 
were not unresolvable; there existed political institutions as 
2 
mechanisms to settle disputes between adherents of the different faiths. 
Potentially, other membership conflicts had been introduced into 
the political system; actually, however, they remained minimum. It 
might perhaps seem, for example, that the addition to the political 
unit's membership of sizeable groups of different ethnic backgrounds 
would have produced membership conflict, especially when the largest 
such group was incorporated as a result of armed "conflict," and could 
be presumed to be unwilling increments to Buganda's expanded political 
the redress of grievances," meeting weekly, with questions discussed in 
public session. J. Hayes Sadler, "Present-Day Administration in 
Uganda," Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, XXXVI (1904-1905), 
p. 71. 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1904-5, 
Cd. 2684-13 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), p. 21. 
Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1904-5. 
"· .• a cleavage which still tends to sway the course of native 
politics. "--Thomas and Scott, p. 331. 
2rhough there were secular institutions to resolve such member-
ship conflict, those institutions by their very nature could not resolve 
the institutional conflict between the religious bodies--the churches--
as contrasted to their memberships. 
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system, Such a situation did undoubtedly produce hostility. But it did 
not result in conflict, There was not present the prerequisite of 
awareness; that is, the Banyoro were not aware of the conflict in the 
sense that they did not visualize alternative possibilities to the 
status quo. They did not conceive at that time--they did some years 
later--that they were being denied rights to which they were entitled, 
In effect, they accepted the situation as a natural one resulting from 
1 
warfare. 
For these reasons, membership conflict in the political system 
as of 1905 may be described as minimum in extent, 
Leadership. Was the political system characterized by leader-
ship of a pronounced measure, such as had been provided by Kabaka 
Mutesa I? In the years since Mutesa there had been weak leadership in 
terms of its calibre--Mwanga notably. The situation was not changed by 
1905 as regards the Kabakaship. 
By the end of the 1890's, however, there had come to the fore a 
2 Muganda who had been a page at Mutesa's court and who had proved 
himself in the turbulent years of Mwanga's reign. His name was Apolo 
3 Kagwa. As of 1905 the Kingdom was firmly led by Kagwa in his position 
as Katikiro and as one of the three Regents acting for the Kabaka. In 
this dual capacity, and particularly in light of the shift in power from 
1The prerequisite of awareness, and the indebtedness of the 
above discussion to Coser, Lasswell, and Coleman, is set forth in 
Appendix IV in the section dealing with membership conflict. 
2Kagwa, The Customs ... , p. 56, 
3 Low, Religion . . . ' p. 13. 
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the Kahaka to the chiefs, Apolo Kagwa held extensive political authority 
by the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century. He was 
clearly demonstrating that he had unusual leadership qualities and that 
2 he intended to develop them to the full. 
In some respects, then, although Buganda in 1905 was not as 
strongly led as under Mutesa I, it was nevertheless much more strongly 
and persistently led by Katikiro Kagwa than it had been during the 
interim years after Mwanga's succession. 
The solidarity factors in the 1905 system. What conclusions may 
be reached about the system as regards the relation of its character-
istics to the question of solidarity? 
In the field of political authority, the system gained solidarity 
from the fact that it was a unitary one. Although not to the extent 
that it had been some three decades earlier, authority was also other-
wise concentrated, and this was a further source of cohesiveness. In 
3 
relation to the other possibilities, the system's semi-sovereign nature 
1The group of new chiefs, who provided effective leadership at 
the lower levels, has been described as follows: "This remarkable group 
of Ganda chiefs, literate, ambitious, young in years but old in 
political experience, linked to Europe by their ideology .... " 
Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 74. 
2An interesting and slightly different slant on Apolo Kagwa has 
appeared in an article received subsequent to the preparation of the 
above section. See Wrigley, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
II, 41, 43, 45. 
3The possibilities referred to in the succeeding paragraphs, 
where particular characteristics are discussed, relate to the alternative 
categorizations posed in the chapter's earlier listing of the questions 
to be asked. For example, in the instance at hand the possibilities 
given were a sovereign system, a semi-sovereign system, and a dependent 
system. 
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neither contributed to nor detracted from its solidarity appreciably; 
and the same can be said of its moderate scope of activity, its 
traditional basis for the legitimacy of political authority, and the 
moderate extent of the legitimacy accorded to the latter. However, 
except for the traditional basis of legitimacy, all of these character-
istics were factors operating to give the Baganda traditional system a 
notably greater measure of cohesiveness than that of the Acholi. 
With respect to the membership characteristics, the system was 
perhaps somewhat less cohesive than that of the late 1870's, because all 
of its members had only common cultural ties instead of the earlier 
common tribal ties; but the ties of culture were closer than another 
possibility--common ties restricted to those of just residence in the 
same area. Given the system's multi-tribal composition, a slight source 
of solidarity may have derived from the fact that the largest group which 
was politically dominant was one tribe (the Baganda) within the 
political unit as contrasted to the possibility of a dominant class 
whose members were of different tribes. But the tenuousness of the 
latter conclusion renders it discountable. 
The change of the system to one which was both open and closed 
in respect to political mobility most likely had no particular effect 
with regard to solidarity, if those to whom the system was closed 
accepted the situation, as has been assumed in the previous discussion. 
In relation to the possibilities, the moderate extent of 
institutional conflict neither contributed to nor detracted from the 
system's cohesiveness in great measure. On the other hand, the minimum 
of membership conflict represented a factor for solidarity, as did also 
the incidence of outstanding leadership in the few years preceding 1905. 
In summary, those characteristics which are considered to have 
contributed to the cohesiveness of the system to a marked degree were as 
follows: its unitary nature; the concentration of authority on other 
lines also; and its minimum of membership conflict. The factors 
detracting appreciably from the system's solidarity appear to have been 
none, in relation to the possibilities. And when compared to the 
traditional Acholi political system, described earlier in the chapter, 
the Baganda system stands out as much more favorably endowed with 
factors contributing to cohesiveness and much stronger in this sense. 
Assessments of actual strength in terms of political solidarity, whether 
related to the possibilities for such strength or to other political 
1 
systems, cannot be made except with reference to specific situations. 
At this stage of the analysis, however, the important thing is the 
description of the characteristics outlined above. 
Strength in resources. Was Buganda strong in regard to natural 
and human resources in 1905 in relation to the group of twelve main 
Uganda tribes considered in the survey? It was noted in an earlier 
1A system's characteristics may be compared also to those at a 
prior time. For example, the 1905 Baganda system may be related to that 
of the late 1870's, as follows: the system's transformation during the 
years from 1877 to 1905 into a semi-sovereign instead of a sovereign 
system; the temporary removal of charisma from the scene as a source of 
legitimacy for political authority; the reduction in extent of 
legitimacy accorded to authority, from marked to moderate; and an 
increase in degree of institutional conflict from minimum to moderate. 
All of these developments constituted factors detracting from political 
solidarity in 1905 compared to their effects in 1877. 
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section of the chapter that the Kingdom was well endowed in resources. 
Further, it was estimated that Buganda could be considered as having had 
extensive resources in relation, for example, to the limited resources 
of Karamoja and the moderate resources' position of the Basoga and the 
Iteso peoples. 
It is considered advantageous to digress here to point up the 
relation between the factors of strength in the sense of political 
solidarity and those of strength in the sense of resources, and to 
provide an illustration of the importance of changes in each of them. 
A detailed analysis of the twelve tribal political systems as they 
existed in the late 1870's is not being made in this study, but the 
following points are worth noting. With regard to resources, between 
1877 and 1905 the number of sazas (counties) of the Kingdom of Buganda 
doubled, and with the expansion came an increase in population. 2 
Although the extent of the latter is not known, it is known that much of 
1Roscoe has described first-hand Buganda's favored natural 
resources in those days, noting that the plantains "grow" so freely that 
the women need work very little to feed their families. Roscoe, The 
Baganda, PP• 4-6. For the Baganda's advanced skills in hand indu~ies 
and in trade, see Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 365-414, 452-457. 
Johnston declared in 1902: "In politeness, quickness of 
intelligence, and appreciation of beauty, they are the Japanese of 
Africa." Sir Harry Johnston, "The Uganda Protectorate, Ruwenzori, and 
the Semliki Forest," Geographical Journal, XIX (January, 1902), 21. 
2Roscoe has written that it "[was} said" in Buganda that the 
civil wars and famine after Mutesa's death reduced a Baganda population 
of three million to one half of that, and that sleeping sickness brought 
it down further to two thirds of the latter figure. Roscoe, The Baganda, 
p. 6. 
Wrigley has estimated the population at half a million in the 
early nineteenth century. Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 71. 
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Buganda's new territory and population came from Bunyoro. Therefore, it 
is considered not unreasonable to assume that in 1877 Bunyoro had been 
1 
not far behind Buganda in resources, if at all. Compared to other 
tribes, both Kingdoms could be regarded as having possessed extensive 
resources in 1877. 2 As for the factors of solidarity of the two 
political systems, these were probably largely the same in Bunyoro in 
3 those times as in Buganda, 
But if the two political systems were roughly equivalent--and 
both no doubt were at the top of the scale in terms of political power 
in relation to other systems in the region at the time--if this was the 
situation in 1877, what was it in 1905? How did they compare some thirty 
years later? Buganda's resources had increased and Buganda remained at 
the top of the resource scale for the twelve tribes in the group chosen. 
Bunyoro, however, dropped absolutely and relatively in resources, to 
join the other systems far down the scale with relatively limited 
resources. Also, in terms of factors of political solidarity, Bunyoro's 
system after the lapse of the three decades was characterized by fewer 
of these, or the factors by 1905 contributed in smaller measure to 
1For the extent to which the Bunyoro of 1890 included what is 
now northern Buganda, see Ann Evans Larimore, The Alien Town: Patterns 
of Settlement in Busoga, Uganda, Department of Geography Research Paper, 
No. 55, University of Chicago (Chicago: By the author, 1959), Plate X, 
p. 164. 
others 
2
certain areas were 
likewise to Bunyoro. 
also tributary to Buganda, and presumably 
Roscoe, The Baganda, p. 234. 
3Roscoe has written that the Banyoro were for long "stronger and 
more numerous" than the Baganda; that gradually the Baganda position 
strengthened; and that when the British came, both powers were about 
evenly matched and were the dominant powers in the Lake region. Roscoe, 
The Baganda, p. 346. 
143 
cohesiveness. (This is indicated briefly later.) 
The example illustrates the wide range within which changes in 
relative political power among the tribes took place as a consequence of 
absolute and relative changes in the two sets of factors affecting 
resources and solidarity. 
Adaptability to expected demands for change. To return to the 
discussion of Buganda's political system in 1905, could it be expected 
that it would be able to adapt to certain kinds of change most likely to 
be introduced as a result of Western contact? 
Would it prove adaptable to probable demands for individual 
economic opportunity? The answer is yes, largely because the 1900 
Agreement had rendered the political system already adaptable in con-
siderable measure. Traditional political restrictions on land had been 
changed; the Kabaka's powers in this regard were much limited; chiefs 
in large numbers were given freehold title to some 8,000 square miles; 
land thus was available for purchase and transfer and individual 
development. Granted, there were still certain other political 
restrictions on individual economic activity, as for example the 
obligation of peasants to render tribute in unspecified amounts to 
landlords and chiefs. Yet these restrictions were minor. On the whole, 
the system can be described as one with some political restrictions on 
individual economic activity but at the same time generally adaptable to 
1 the demand for such activity. 
1There was traditionally no communal regulation of agriculture. 
Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 73. 
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was the system characterized by political inequality of its 
adult members, and if so, was it adaptable to a demand for political 
equality by those who did not possess equal rights? There was political 
inequality, those with unequal rights being the Banyoro and other 
non-Baganda living in Buganda; and the system of 1905 was not adaptable. 
Institutions did not at that time exist whereby a demand by resident 
Banyoro for equal rights could be expected to be resolved through 
accepted political procedures. Not only were there no provisions of any 
moment for non-Baganda representation in the political system, but there 
were no provisions for any regular kind of representation of even the 
Baganda peasants. (The Lukiko had no peasant representation at the 
time.) 
Was the system adaptable to demands for an increase in the 
general welfare and the political prestige of Buganda? It was not only 
adaptable. It was already organized politically to meet such demands. 
In summary, the political system in 1905 was adaptable or 
adapted in two respects and not adaptable in another. 
Conclusions. On the basis of the preceding analysis, what 
conclusions can be reached about the Buganda Kingdom's political system 
in 1905? 
First, it can be confirmed that it remained in fact a traditional 
political system. This generally accepted judgment has been put 
particularly well by Fallers: 
Thus it happened that a new set of chiefs, committed to Christianity 
and progress, came to power at a time when the fundamentals of the 
relationship between the British and the Baganda were being worked 
out. Because they had been recruited from traditional sources and 
because the traditional system provided for recruitment through 
achievement, they did not look upon themselves as revolutionaries 
in the sense of basically altering political arrangements; rather 
they were Christianizing and improving a King and a kingdom to 
which they remained intensely loyal.l 
The numerous changes had not altered the traditional nature of the 
system's political authority. The traditional system continued in 
existence, in a modified, reconstituted form. 2 
Secondly, the Kingdom's system in 1905 may be described as 
characterized by a number of factors contributing appreciably to 
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political solidarity and none detracting notably from strength in this 
sense; as possessing extensive resources compared to the other eleven 
main tribes of the Protectorate; and as probably adaptable to two of 
three Western-type demands for change. The further conclusion is that 
in all but perhaps the latter respect in some cases, the Kingdom of 
Buganda was in a much better political position than the other tribes 
discussed so far, and especially compared to that tribe which has also 
been given extended treatment--the Acholi. 
Whether the Baganda system would in fact act as a strong system 
in shaping political change in Uganda in 1905-1945 would depend of 
course upon the particular situation--on the circumstances of the latter 
as they related to the varying aspects of Buganda's system. Attention 
is briefly directed to certain of these matters later in the study. For 
the time being the purpose has been served--to provide a description of 
1Fallers, "Ideology .•• ," p. 8. 
2see Low, Religion •.• , pp. 9, 11-12, 16; Jules Leclercq, Aux 
Sources du Nil par le Chemin de Fer de l'Ouganda (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et 
Cie, 1913), p. 178. 
--
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the political system of the Kingdom of Buganda in 1905, together with an 
analysis of the factors pertinent to the questions of strength in the 
sense of political solidarity and in the sense of resources, and 
pertinent to the system's probable adaptability. 
V. OTHER BANTU POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
Of the twelve tribes selected as the major tribes of Uganda, 
seven were Bantu. The political system of one of these, the Baganda, 
has been described and analyzed in the preceding section. The remaining 
six tribes are given cursory treatment below, first the systems of the 
three smaller tribes with single rulers--the Banyoro, Batoro, and 
Banyankole--and then the political structures of the Basoga, Bagisu, 
and Bakiga. 
The Three Smaller Kingdoms 
In addition to the Baganda, three trib~s in Uganda have had 
political systems with a single ruler at the head. All three differed 
from Buganda as of 1905 in a number of respects but most of all perhaps 
in their considerably less favored position with regard to natural and 
human resources. Certain other prominent dissimilarities are touched 
upon in the discussion which follows. 
The system in Bunyoro. From the historical account in Chapter I 
several pertinent facts may be stressed: the considerable political 
strength of the empire of Bunyoro-Kitara in the early nineteenth century; 
1 
the luckless opposition later of Kabarega, its Mukama (King), to the 
lThe British Government has officially termed Bunyoro, Toro, and 
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British and their Baganda allies; and the eventual capture and exile of 
Kabarega at the end of the century, with the concurrent loss of a good 
deal of the Kingdom's territory to Buganda. 
Kabarega's successor as head of the reduced Bunyoro realm 
occupied the position for only two years. In 1902 he was deposed by the 
Protectorate Government for "incompetence." Another of Kabarega 1 s sons, 
Andereya Duhaga II, succeeded in 1902. 1 By 1905 no Agreement had been 
made between the Protectorate Government and Bunyoro as had been done in 
2 the case of the other Kingdoms. Bunyoro was, therefore, in a com-
pletely dependent relation to the Protectorate at that time. In 
addition to the deposition of the Mukama in 1902, other evidence points 
to Bunyoro's absence of autonomy and the close direction in the early 
3 
years of the Kingdom's affairs by British administrative officers. 
However, except for the lack of autonomy there was a considerable 
Ankole "Kingdoms" like Buganda. But whereas the latter's Kabaka has 
been officially referred to as "King," the traditional titles of the 
heads of the three smaller Kingdoms have continued to be officially 
translated into English as "Ruler." Although the difference in nomen-
clature is significantly indicative of the different statuses of the 
Kingdoms, the heads of all the Kingdoms are referred to as Kings in this 
study for purposes of simplifying the terminology. 
1uganda Protectorate, The Handbook of Uganda, by H. R. Wallis 
(second edition; London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1920), p. 116. 
Cited hereafter as UP, The Handbook ., 1920. 
2The Agreement with Bunyoro did not come until 1933. Hailey, 
Native Administration ••. , Part I, 1950, p. 46. 
3GB, FO, General Report on the Uganda Protectorate .•• 1904, 
p. 7; Sadler, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, XXXVI, 71; 
GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1904-5, p. 21; [Great Britain, Colonial 
Office,] Uganda Protectorate. Report for 1906-7, Cd. 3729-22 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1908), pp. 27, 31. 
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measure of solidarity in the political system. At the head of it in 
traditional times, and recognized also throughout subsequent years by 
the Banyoro as their supreme ruler, was the Mukama. He was considered 
as of different origin, as~ generis, born to rule by virtue of his 
descent from a very long line of previous rulers, the source of all 
political power, unique, absolutely superior, and in a sense divine. 
The Mukama ruled over three general classes of people: the 
members of his own small Babita clan, the royal dynasty; the Bahima 
cattle-keepers (called "Bahuma" in Bunyoro), who were not the ruling 
aristocracy in Bunyoro to the extent they were in Ankole but who were 
nevertheless regarded as superior to the Bairu; and the Bairu, the 
peasant agriculturalists. The order of status was as just given, and 
though lacking the features of a caste system, it was accepted as the 
1 
right and proper order by all. Commoners of ability could, however, 
rise to positions of considerable political authority under the ruler, 
but this did not alter their fundamentally lower social status. (The 
same situation was true of Tore. In Busoga, and even more in Buganda, 
there seems to have been a tendency for a rise in political position 
to have been accompanied by a greater increase in social status than in 
Bunyoro and Tore. In Ankole, the caste system barred both political and 
social 100bility upward for commoners--as well as intermarriage, which 
was not prohibited in the other political systems.) 2 
1The source for the previous two paragraphs was J. H. M. Beattie, 
"Rituals of Nyoro Kingship," Africa, XXIX (April, 1959), 135-137. His 
is the most reliable work on the Banyoro. 
2Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 23-24. 
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On the basis of very limited study, it would appear that the 
political system of the Banyoro in 1905 might be described as somewhat 
less characterized by factors contributing to political solidarity 
compared to Buganda, its highly dependent nature constituting the chief 
reason for the difference. Yet the Bunyoro system was characterized by 
appreciably more such factors than was that of the traditional Acholi. 
Bunyoro's resources in 1905 were only limited in extent when 
considered beside those of Buganda. 
As a further conclusion, it seems reasonable to assume that 
there still existed in 1905 the traditional political system of the 
Banyoro. 
The system in Toro. The ruler of Toro in the nineteenth century 
was a member of the Babito royal clan of Bunyoro, having broken away in 
revolt from the latter Kingdom. Toro was characterized by the same 
ethnic and class distinctions as was Bunyoro. 
In political authority the Toro ruler, in contrast to the Mukama 
of Bunyoro, was in those early times merely the leader of a Confederacy 
of Toro chiefs. The British agreement with Toro in 1894 amounted to the 
recognition of that state of political affairs. As for the 1900 Agree-
ment, it was between the Protectorate Government on the one hand and, on 
the other hand, the Mukama of Toro and the five chiefs of the Confed-
eracy. The Mukama, Kasagama, was recognized as supreme over these 
chiefs as well as over certain others whose area was brought within the 
Kingdom. However, the chiefs named in the Agreement retained the right 
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1 to nominate their successors. The arrangement appears to have had some 
of the marks of a federal form of government. 
Although the Agreement was not specific regarding the powers of 
the Toro officials in relation to the Protectorate Government, an 
authoritative source has concluded as follows: 
In Ankole and Toro at all events the original conception seems to 
have been of a system of rule which left the detailed control of 
native affairs largely to the head of the Ruling House and his 
appointed agents, under the general guidance of the officers of 
the Protectorate Government.2 
In the event, it appears that Protectorate officers were not reticent 
about intervening when they felt it desirable. As regards the division 
of political authority between the Mukama and the major chiefs, the 
latter's right to administer their own areas without interference from 
the Mukama was upheld in the years preceding 1905. 3 
Pending a more detailed analysis, the Toro political system in 
1905--which included the Bakonjo and Baamba peoples also--could be 
described in the following terms. Although it had a greater measure of 
sovereignty than Bunyoro or Acholi by reason of its 1900 Agreement 
(though less than Buganda), it was more significantly characterized by a 
lesser concentration of political authority than Bunyoro's system yet a 
greater concentration than Acholi 1 s traditional system. 
1Hailey, Native Administration ., Part I, 1950, p. 47. 
2Hailey, Native Administration ., Part I, 1950, p. 56. See 
also A. B. Lloyd, In Dwarf Land and Cannibal Country (London: T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1907), p. 148. 
3[Great Britain, Foreign Office,} General Report on the Uganda 
Protectorate for the Year Ending March 31, 1903, Africa series, No. 15 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1903), p. 20. 
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With regard to Toro's resources, they were limited compared to 
Buganda's extensive resources. 
As a further conclusion, it is assumed that the political system 
f th B t i 1905 . ff d. . 1 1 o e a oro n was 1n e ect a tra 1t1ona system. 
The system in Ankole, It is believed Ankole's political system 
had its origins about five centuries ago, when there came into existence 
2 
a small kingdom called Nkore. By 1898 the Kingdom had expanded con-
siderably, under forceful rulers, to about one half of its size today. 
The remaining enlargement was brought about with British help, primarily 
3 in the three years from 1898 up to the Ankole Agreement of 1901. 
There were two features which especially distinguished the 
Kingdom of Ankole from those of Bunyoro and Toro. In Ankole there were 
1The assumption that the system was a traditional one in 1905 is 
arguable, but it would seem that more than sufficient qualities of the 
earlier system had been handed down from the past for it to have re-
tained its predominantly traditional flavor. 
2This consisted of what in more modern times has become the 
county of Isingiro in the Kingdom of Ankole in western Uganda. 
3The description and analysis of the Banyankole political 
history and system have been based on a wide range of materials and on 
previous though yet uncompleted study of this particular people. Some 
of the more important sources have been as follows, in alphabetical 
order by author: Hailey, Native Administration •.. , Part I, 1950, pp. 
48-49, 56; Kenneth Ingham, "Some Aspects of the History of Western 
Uganda," Uganda Journal, XXI (September, 1957), 131-149; H. F. Morris, 
"The Making of Ankole," Uganda Journal, XXI (March, 1957), 1-15; K. 
Oberg, "The Kingdom of Ankole in Uganda," African Political Systems, ed, 
M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London: Oxford University Press, 
1940), pp. 121-162; Roland Oliver, "Ancient Capital Sites of Ankole," 
Uganda Journal, XXIII (March, 1959), 51-63; John Roscoe, The Banyankole 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1923), pp. 1-177; F. 
Lukyn Williams, "Early Explorers in Ankole," Uganda Journal, II 
(January, 1935), 196-208; F. Lukyn Williams, ·~uwa Mbaguta, Nganzi of 
Ankole," Uganda Journal, X (September, 1946), 124-135. 
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only two ethnically different groups--the Bahima pastoralists and the 
Bairu serfs; there was no additional Babito royal clan. Secondly, the 
distinction between Ankole's two groups was one of caste, not one of 
class as was the case in the other two Kingdoms. The Bahima did not 
intermarry with the Bairu; they kept quite aloof. 
Politically the Bahima were the ruling, aristocratic element; 
1 the Bairu were the ruled, the commoners. Although there is some 
evidence--inconclusive, however--that Bairu could rise to become chiefs, 
generally this would have been the exception. 
One clan of the Bahima--the Bahinda clan--provided the ruler of 
all. He was called the Mugabe (King). Although he was absolute in his 
power over the Bairu, and in theory also over the Bahima, he appears in 
fact to have been less of an absolute ruler than the Kabaka of Buganda 
or the Mukama of Bunyoro, yet more so than the Mukama of Toro. The 
reason lay in the relationship of clientship between the Mugabe and his 
1No firm figures on the relative populations of the two ethnic 
groups have come to light, but the following estimates for the breakdown 
of the African population of the Ankole District are logically deducible 
from data supplied in available sources. 
In 1931 the Bahima numbered about 25,000 and the Bairu some ten 
times that figure--perhaps as much as 254,000. In 1948 the Bahima 
totaled only about 24,000, while the Bairu had increased to 308,000, 
there being some 69,000 other non-Banyankole Africans residing within 
the District. 
It should be reiterated that the above data only relate to Bahima 
and Bairu resident within Ankole District. They totaled 332,000 
Banyankole in 1948. But there were 56,000 other Banyankole living else-
where in Uganda, all but about 1,000 of whom were reported as living in 
Buganda. 
Sources: Thomas and Scott, p. 503; J. W. Purseglove, "Shifting 
Cultivation in the Western Province, Uganda" (unpublished paper by the 
Agricultural Officer, Kigezi District, Kabale, Uganda, October 16, 
1951), p. 2 (mimeographed); EASD, African Population ... , pp. 3, 4, 7, 
15, 17, 33. 
Another source has estimated that the Bahima, before the British 
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Bahima followers. They were cattle-owning freemen; he was their leader, 
with obligations to fulfill to them. 
The Ankole Agreement of 1901 recognized the Mugabe as supreme 
over ten chiefs. The latter also signed the Agreement; and they retained 
the right to nominate their successors. Because of the presence during 
those years--and many years after--of a very strong personality in the 
post of Enganzi (Prime Minister), there appears to have been greater 
authority at the center and less with the chiefs than in the case of 
Toro. 
From 1901 to 1905 the political system of Ankole enjoyed a 
quality of semi-sovereignty comparable to Taro's. However, in 1905 
Sub-Commissioner Galt was murdered and the consequences were great for 
the Kingdom. The Agreement was suspended. (It was reinstated only in 
1912.) In addition, a heavy collective fine was imposed on the people. 
Ankole assumed a decidedly dependent relationship to the Protectorate 
Government. 
In summary, as of the suspension of the Agreement in 1905, the 
Ankole system was on a par with Bunyoro and Acholi in its lack of 
sovereignty; but it was characterized by less concentration of political 
authority than Bunyoro's system though significantly with more than that 
of Taro's or Acholi's. Compared to Buganda, the Kingdom's resources were 
limited. 
As a further conclusion, it is assumed that the political system 
of the Banyankole in 1905 was a traditional system. 
came, numbered only 10,000. Kalervo Oberg, "Analysis of the Bahima 
Marriage Ceremony," Africa, XIX (April, 1949), 107. 
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Political Structures in the Remaining Tribes 
Of the three other main tribes of Uganda--the Basoga, the 
Bagisu, and the Bakiga--the Basoga are given somewhat more attention 
below, for they were the third largest tribal group in the Protectorate. 
Coming after the Baganda and the Iteso, they constituted about one tenth 
1 
of Uganda's total African population. 
The Basoga. As of the middle of the nineteenth century the 
Basoga people were organized into chiefdoms of varying sizes. 2 The 
chiefs of the northern political units generally were influenced by the 
Kingdom of Bunyoro, and dynastic links with the latter's rulers were 
claimed. Of the smaller southern chiefdoms, many were tributary to 
Buganda. 
Under the 1900 Agreement between the British authorities and 
Buganda, the latter gave up all claim to the area of Busoga, which was 
then brought under direct British administration. 3 Before considering 
1rn 1931. 
2Fallers has referred to them as "kingdoms" and as "states," 
each with its own "ruler," whose sons and brothers he has called 
"princes." Goldthorpe has called the largest scale territorial polit-
ical units "princedoms." Cox, a British administrative officer with 
long experience in the area, has criticized the use of such terms to 
describe what were actually much less grandiose units, in his view. 
The great majority of writers--past and current--have referred to the 
heads of the units as chiefs, and this is the term adopted above, along 
with chiefdoms for the territorial units. 
See Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 12, 16, 44, 126-127; 
Goldthorpe, Outlines •.• , p. 37; T. R. F. Cox, Review of Bantu 
Bureaucracy, by L.A. Fallers, Uganda Journal, XXII (March, 1958), 88; 
Colonel Henry Edward Colvile, The Land of the Nile Springs (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1895), pp. 32-33; Mukherjee, p. 70. 
3
nistrict headquarters were established at !ganga in 1900 and 
moved to Jinja in 1901. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 38, 41-42. 
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the political system as of 1905, the first year of the period under 
review, it is necessary to describe briefly the political structures of 
the earlier tribal society. 
The District now known as Busoga comprises a territory of some 
3,700 square miles, excluding open water. As indicated above, in the 
traditional era of the late nineteenth century the region was divided 
into numerous chiefdoms. Just how many is not clearly set forth in the 
sources. From the material in Fallers' book, Bantu Bureaucracy, it 
appears that there were seven larger chiefdoms occupying well over 
two-thirds of the north and east of the area, with a presumably small 
number of chiefdoms intermingled. In the southwest there were perhaps 
1 
a dozen tiny chiefdoms, three of which were larger than the others. 
The political structure of all of these units--large and small--
was fundamentally similar. There was an aristocratic lineage from which 
the chief was chosen. The "dynastic" lineages in some of the chiefdoms 
were qu~te distinct from those in others. In a number of the more 
important chiefdoms, however, they were interrelated. In these cases 
the lineages stemmed from the same Bush-Buck (Baisengobi) clan, known in 
Bunyoro as the royal Babito clan. 
The aristocratic chief in Busoga served as the central symbol of 
his political unit, the great majority of the members of which were of 
commoner status. The chiefdoms were organized territorially much like 
1Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 26-27. Cox has maintained that 
at that time the people were divided "into not less than fifty-two major 
clans, each acting more or less independently of the others and each 
having its ups and downs in the scale of power." Cox, Uganda Journal, 
XXII, 88. 
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Buganda, except of course on a greatly smaller scale. Territorial 
subdivisions in a chiefdom were administered by lesser chiefs. Some-
times these were close male relatives of the senior chief, but usually 
they were commoners chosen by him for their ability. There was a 
commoner who acted as the chief's principal adviser and head of the 
administrative heirarchy. 
The chiefdoms of Busoga differed quite basically from the 
Kingdom of Buganda in other ways--not only in size but also in their 
political systems. For the commoner chiefs who headed the territorial 
subdivisions were in a considerably more powerful position in relation 
to the head of the chiefdom than were the Baganda ~ chiefs to the 
Kabaka. They may be regarded as constituting a small group of powerful 
clients of a patron quite dependent on their cooperation. With the more 
prominent of the chief's close lineage relatives, they shared in 
corporate decisions involving the administration of the chiefdom. They 
also had a voice in the choice of a successor when a new chief had to be 
selected. In fac~ their voice was often deciding, for they had practical 
control of the military, judicial, and tribute-gathering organization of 
the chiefdom. 
The other element in the structure which served to limit the 
chief's political authority was his own lineage. There he was but as one 
among a company of equals. In fact, the threat of usurption by his 
close male lineage relatives was so endemic that the chief used his 
commoner client-chiefs to keep in check possible claimants to his 
1 
chiefly office. 
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The political system generally characterizing each of the Basoga 
chiefdoms may be summarized as follows. It was somewhat--though not 
strongly--centralized territorially. It was headed by a chief chosen on 
hereditary grounds from an aristocratic lineage. It was administered by 
a predominantly commoner heirarchy of chiefs selected for their ability 
and exercising an appreciable voice in decisions affecting the entire 
political unit. And it was troubled by claims which the chief's close 
male kin could make as his lineage equals, both on the chief in the 
execution of his duties and on the office of chiefship itself. 2 
. 3 Assuming the Basoga constituted a soc1ety, was there a polit-
ical system for the entire tribe, as distinct from and inclusive of the 
systems for the chiefdoms? The evidence is conflicting, but when 
weighed it does not seem to support the existence of such a system. 
There were clan links between many of the aristocratic chiefs, but not 
1The source for the preceding four paragraphs was Fallers, ~ 
Bureaucracy, pp. 25-27, 30, 32-33, 35, 37, 126-128, 133-144, 231-235. 
2Fallers has set forth the latter as a basic institutional con-
flict between the institutions of lineage and state in the society of 
the Basoga. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 16-17, 231, 247. In a 
discussion of Fallers' book, another writer has maintained the conflict 
was not of relevance because the lineages had no important political 
function. Phyllis Kaberry, "Primitive States," British Journal of 
Sociology, VIII (September, 1957), pp. 229-230. 
3In the sense of the term as broadly defined in Appendix II, the 
Basoga did constitute a society. Except for a difference in dialects 
between the north and south, the region was culturally similar. And at 
least two of the larger chiefdoms straddled the dividing line between 
the dialects. Fallers, using a more restricted definition, had come to 
the opposite conclusion. See Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 12, 21, 
25, 27, 30, 35, 247, 249; Larimore, pp. 163-165. 
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between the great majority of them. There is limited indication of 
action in concert in time of common danger, but it is insufficient in 
view of the more authoritative support for the position that there was 
no measure of political unity. In summary, there appears to have been 
no incidence of even occasional and sporadic authoritative decisions on 
1 
a tribal level. 
If there was no political system on the tribal level before the 
British authorities took over in 1900, one was soon provided by the 
Protectorate Administration. Details are not clear for the period of 
the first decade, which was one of great change and flux for Basoga 
especially. It would seem that for the first five years the British 
authorities ruled the Basoga as best they could using the hereditary 
chiefs of the different traditional political units. But the situation 
came close to chaos. There was a famine in Busoga in 1899-1900. In 
1902 the sleeping sickness epidemic commenced to take its large toll of 
the people of this tribe, and in the latter half of the decade the 
heavily populated region on the shores of Lake Victoria had to be 
evacuated inland, involving the resettlement of many Basoga. And 
further, in 1908 there was another famine. 2 
In the midst of these calamities and probably activated by them, 
1Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 12, 21, 25, 27, 247-248; [Great 
Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report by the Governor on a Tour 
Through the Eastern Province, Cd. 4524 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1909), p. 6. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. Report by the 
Governor on ••• Eastern Province. 
2Thomas and Scott, p. 438. 
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1 
the British authorities brought into Busoga in 1905 or a little later 
the Muganda general, Semei Kakunguru. The task he was given was a 
familiar one to him--to mold a new political system for the Basoga along 
the lines of that in Buganda. 
Kakunguru acted as the "paramount chief" of the Busoga District, 
serving as the head of the informal council of Basoga chiefs. To advise 
the latter, other Baganda were brought in. The District was divided 
into counties and sub-counties, and the Luganda terms for these adminis-
trative areas were used. The areas which were delineated followed on 
the whole the lines of the traditional chiefdoms, the larger ones 
2 becoming counties, the smaller on~ sub-counties or parts of them. 
What may be concluded about the Basoga's political system at the 
beginning of the period under review in this study? Since the date of 
the arrival of Kakunguru is not certain, and in view also of the dis-
rupted conditions of the District, it is of more value to consider the 
political system of the District as of about 1910 instead of 1905. 
Was it traditional? In a number of ways it was, for its 
territorial divisions broadly reflected those of earlier times, and its 
1Fallers has given the date as 1906; the Sofers have written 
that it was in 1905; Ingham's book states it was 1908. Fallers, Bantu 
Bureaucracy, p. 146; Cyril Safer and Rhona Safer, Jinja Transformed: A 
Social Survey of a Multi-Racial Township (East African Studies, No. 4; 
Kampala, Uganda; East African Institute of Social Research, 1955), p. 
12; Ingham, The Making ... , p. 118. 
2 Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 144-154; Larimore, pp. 177-181; 
UP, The Handbook •.. , 1920, p. 48; [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] 
Correspondence Relating to Famine in the Busoga District of Uganda, Cd. 
4358 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1908), p. 11; Thomas and 
Scott, p. 435. 
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chiefs were by and large the same. Yet in three highly important re-
spects it was a very new system. The political authority of the chiefs 
was strengthened compared to the authority they had held in the past, 
and their increased authority was backed up not only by the Protectorate's 
Baganda Agents but also by the British officials stationed in the Dis-
trict. Secondly, in addition to the counties and sub-counties which were 
delineated, there were also formed lower "parish" level units for which 
1 there was no precedent in the traditional systems. And thirdly, there 
was a wholly non-traditional central political organization for the entire 
tribe, including a kind of council of the Basoga chiefs. These, espe-
cially the latter, represented changes which were so new and different 
and so fundamental as to render the political system of the Busoga Dis-
trict in the 1905-1910 period not a traditional system but a new system, 
though with some traditional aspects. 
Busoga resources were, however, moderate compared to Buganda's 
extensive resources and Karamoja's very limited resources. 
The Bagisu. The Bagisu tribe consider that they and certain 
other tribes of the area, including the Sebei, are descended from a 
common ancestor, Muntu, the first man to live on Mount Elgon. Masaba 
2 
was in turn the founder specifically of the Bagisu tribe. 
In traditional times the tribe came to be divided into three 
tribal sections, each said to be descended from one of Masaba's sons and 
each speaking a different but mutually intelligible dialect. The tribal 
sections subdivided into kin groups. These occupied territorial units 
lFallers, Bantu Bureacracy, p. 146. 
2Except as otherwise noted, the source for the discussion of the 
Bagisu has been J. S. La Fontaine, The Gisu of Uganda, Part X of East 
Central Africa, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde (London: 
International African Institute, 1959), pp. 9-12, 16-18, 23-26, 29-32, 42. 
with clearly defined boundaries. Such units may be referred to as 
1 
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districts. There were twenty-three districts, varying in size from six 
to twenty square miles and containing upwards of one thousand male 
members. Further subdivisions along kin lines were grouped in village 
clusters, which in turn were subdivided also on kin lines by villages 
made up of related lineages. 2 
The village was the smallest political unit in the traditional 
system. There was an elected head of the kin group which made up the 
village. He was a leader, not a ruler; an arbitrator, not a judge. He 
acted for the village in matters involving other villages. 
The village cluster had no formally recognized leader; the head 
was whoever could assume the position of most influence in the cluster, 
usually the head of one of the more powerful or senior villages. 
Although there were mechanisms for settling disputes within a village 
cluster, it was not uncommon for villages within a cluster to be on 
opposing sides in warfare. 
1Not to be confused with the Protectorate's territorial adminis-
trative unit of District. See Appendix V for the history of the Bugisu 
District as such an administrative unit. 
2La Fontaine has called the latter lineages "minimal lineage 
segments." Although they did not constitute a compact local group, 
living in different neighborhoods in the village area, their importance 
stemmed from two things: they were exogamous, the usual characteristics 
of clans, and lineages of higher order were not; and it was the minimal 
lineage that governed the rights over land, which was very highly valued 
by the Bagisu. 
The various minimal lineage segments constituted a "minor lineage 
segment," with the village as its territorial area. Several minor 
lineage segments with their villages comprised a "major lineage segment," 
with a village cluster as its territory. Some of these combined into a 
"maximal lineage segment" with a district as its territorial basis. It 
is evidently the latter which are generally and somewhat inaccurately 
referred to in much of the literature as clans. Land was not held 
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Just as villages were associated in village clusters, the latter 
were grouped into districts. But here political unity was quite rare, 
and there was no organized leadership for the district. There were also 
other short term alliances of larger combinations than the village 
cluster, but these apparently were not based on the district. Nor were 
they based on the larger, dialectal unit of the tribal section, of which 
there were three for the Bagisu as previously indicated. 
It is evident that not only was there no tribal political system 
for the Bagisu, there was not even a common political system for the 
tribe's three tribal sections. In addition, authority on the levels 
below this was quite diffused. 
The British authorities sent Kakunguru to the Bugisu region in 
1 1900 to pacify the area. In about 1905 the country came under the 
effective administrative control of Baganda Agents employed by the 
Protectorate Government and supervised by British officers. Fighting 
continued until 1910. The first Bagisu chiefs were appointed at the 
lower levels in 1913. 
In conclusion, as of 1905 there was no traditional tribal 
2 
political system for the whole of the Bagisu, nor had there been one. 
communally by these units. La Fontaine, pp. 18, 25. 
1Thomas and Scott have cited 1904 and 1906 and La Fontaine has 
given the year as 1905. Thomas and Scott, p. 443; La Fontaine, p. 12. 
2see also J. B. Purvis, Through Uganda to Mount Elgon (London: 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 272-274, 336; GB, CO, Uganda. Report by the 
Governor on • , • Eastern Province, pp. 11-12. 
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1 
The Bagisu were being ruled in accord with a completely alien system. 
Additionally, the resources of the Bagisu in that time were limited 
compared to Buganda. 2 
The Bakiga. 3 The Bakiga of southwest Uganda were almost 
identical with the Bairu in Ankole, having the same language and a 
profoundly similar culture. But whereas the Bairu in traditional times 
were dominated politically and socially by Bahima overlords, the Bakiga 
were not. They were a fiercely independent, egalitarian people, with no 
class differentiation. 
Their social and political structure appears to have been much 
like that of the Bagisu at Uganda's eastern extremity. The household 
1Jean Sackur (believed probably to be the same person as J. S. 
La Fontaine), writing of the period after the Bagisu began to fill 
responsible chiefs' posts, looked at the changes as follows: "The new 
pyramidal structure under the District Commissioner did not destroy 
indigenous groupings and loyalties, but transformed them into effective 
political units which had been unable to exist under the old system." 
Jean Sackur, "Struggle for Power in Bugisu," The [London} Times British 
Colonies Review, No. 34 (Second Quarter, 1959), 23. It is the view ad-
vanced in this study that such a process is not the same as the survival 
of a tribal political system; it represented instead the introduction of 
a decidedly new system which incorporated many traditional elements, 
thereby facilitating its later legitimization. 
2Although the Bagisu occupied a fertile area, the latter was 
less than half the size of Teso or Busoga; and the Bagisu in 1931 
numbered only half of the population of each of these two peoples, whose 
resource positions have been assessed as moderate compared to the 
limited resources of the Bagisu. 
3Except where otherwise noted, the source for the discussion of 
the Bakiga has been May Mandelbaum Edel, The Chiga of Western Uganda 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 2-4, 8-9, 12, 14, 16-18, 
20-24, 27-28, 108-109, 117, 125-126, 148-157. The research for the book 
was carried out in 1932-1933. A review of it by the other anthropol-
ogist who has carried out field work among the Bakiga (after World War 
II) corroborates the general accuracy of Edel's book. P. W. E. Baxter, 
Review of The Chiga of Western Uganda, by May M. Edel, Uganda Journal, 
XXII (September, 1958), 193-196. 
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consisted of an extended patriarchal family. A group of related house-
holds formed the first level of a series of lineage levels, each larger 
l lineage unit consisting of several of the next smaller groups. 
Apparently there were about four of these levels, the top one constitut-
ing a major segment of a clan. There were some thirty-odd Bakiga clans. 
The clans were exogamous, independent units. They were in turn 
severally grouped into larger non-exogamous tribal sections, which 
claimed a common origin, common ancestor, and a common totem. But 
neither they nor the clans had any leaders or forms of authority. The 
only authority was that of the elders of the lineages at the lower 
levels, and their authority was quite limited. In brief, it amounted to 
the settlement of disputes by respected men of the community, if and 
when they were asked to arbitrate by the parties to the dispute. 
Although to their neighbors and to themselves the Bakiga con-
stituted a distinct people, they were an actively disunited people, 
There was a considerable amount of interclan feuding and fighting, As 
inferred above, there was no political organization of any kind to deal 
with this or other activities on a tribal level. There was, in fact, no 
organized political unity at any territorial level. Such joint action 
as there occurred was structured on lineage lines, not on spatial lines. 
Though the two often coincided, there was no concept of territorial 
units. 
In conclusion, the Bakiga in traditional times had no tribal 
1Edel has not given separate terms to each level, but presumably 
an order of ranking similar to La Fontaine's for the Bagisu could be 
used. 
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political system, and not even political systems based on the tribal 
sections or the clans. 
Kigezi, the District where the Bakiga are located, came under 
formal British rule early in 1912 after the adjustment of the boundary 
with the Belgians in 1911. The previous few years were disturbed ones 
for the region, for a powerful spirit cult--the Nyabingi cult--was 
nascent among the people. Originally directed against the rulers of 
Ruanda to the south, the cult took an anti-European turn, and it was not 
1 
until the early 1920's that it was quite thoroughly stamped out. 
Although manifestations of the Nyabingi cult assumed a political form 
and structure, it was a temporary phenomenon. 
In conclusion, the Bakiga, whose resources in 1911 were almost 
as limited as those of Karamoja, had no tribal political system from 
traditional times, and factors making for political solidarity were 
otherwise also at a minimum. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion of the traditional political systems has been a 
long one. Before summarizing the findings presented in the chapter, two 
matters which have not been covered must be mentioned. They are not 
without importance, but they have had to be excluded as being outside 
the broad framework of the study. 
The first is the natural historical evolution of the traditional 
systems. Mukherjee, for example, has maintained that with a few minor 
lrn addition to Edel, see also Thomas and Scott, pp. 461-462; 
and UP, The Handbook ... , 1920, pp. 94, 252. 
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exceptions, the tribal societies of Uganda had already developed into 
states, or were well on the way in the process of so developing. He 
believed that at the time of the advent of the British, the changes 
toward a higher form of organization had or were taking place within the 
societies. Further, according to Mukherjee, if left to themselves the 
societies would have "progressed" from despotic rule. The latter would 
have been "burst asunder" by the social and political tensions resulting 
from such rule. Mukherjee has concluded that this normal course of 
development was checked by the British, and that it was not necessary 
for the British to remake the tribal structures as some writers have 
1 
claimed. 
No ef.:fiort has been made to prove or disprove Mukherjee's 
thesis, 2 for the question of the direction of the evolution of traditional 
tribal societies is not a part of this study, which does not lose by its 
. i 3 om~ss on. For the study here is not concerned with whether the 
traditional systems were good or bad in the value sense, either in-
. 4 herently or as they acted as forces promot1ng or opposing "progress." 
1Mukherjee, pp. 72, 88, 106, 125. 
2Mukherjee's strong personal bias is clearly 
his work--"the polluted atmosphere of colonial rule" 
--and renders suspect much of the study he has made. 
evident throughout 
is just one example 
Mukherjee, p. 17. 
3rn the case of the two tribes given most attention--the Acholi 
and the Baganda--some consideration was indirectly given to the matter 
of evolutionary direction in the discussions of the systems' adaptabil-
ity. 
4see Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa 
(Northwestern University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 54-55; James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Nigeria" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953), p. 28. 
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The concern is only with whether they existed in the years around 1905, 
and if so, what their characteristics were in terms of factors relevant 
to their political solidarity and resources. 
The second matter which has not been covered is perhaps more 
serious. It relates to values also, but in a different sense. 
It is considered a truism to say that the political system of a 
people reflects the values and the personality traits of the people, and 
that the political system--and the social system--condition the values 
and the personality characteristics of the people. But which is the 
more important; which is the stronger of the two elements in different 
societies? On the basis of impressions gained from the literature, it 
would seem that the political system of the Baganda tended more to mold 
the people than the other way around. In contrast, the values and the 
temperament of the Lango and of the Bakiga appear to have largely 
determined the nature of their political structures. These are inter-
esting hypotheses to test, but the task must be set aside. The concern 
here is with the concrete political systems which provide an instrument 
for tribal political action. To the extent the systems and the action 
are indicative of values and valued personality-types, the analysis may 
throw light on these subjects. It does not deal with them otherwise. 
Summary 
In presenting the findings of the chapter, the twelve main 
tribes are considered below in their order of analysis, by major group-
ing. By way of preface it may be recalled that the chapter has been 
directed to certain questions. Did the tribes have tribal political 
systems prior to British rule? If a tribe did have such a system, 
encompassing the whole tribe, was it in existence as a traditional 
1 
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system in the early years of the 1905-1945 period? If so, what factors 
significant to political solidarity characterized the system, and what 
was its position with regard to resources compared to the other tribes? 
And lastly, had new political systems been introduced as of about 1905 
for any of the tribes as a consequence of British rule? The answers to 
these questions follow, except that for the most part it has not been 
2 feasible to list the solidarity factors over again. Instead, it has 
1A traditional system is viewed as one, the essential features 
of which have been handed down to the members in appreciable measure 
from their predecessors. See Appendix II. 
To be traditional the system need not have been handed down com-
pletely intact from the far distant past. The term has been used more 
loosely, in a generally descriptive and non-definitive sense, to convey 
the idea of a system which has exhibited an appreciable measure of con-
sistency with the essential features of the system which existed a 
generation ago, the latter being recognized in its day as providing an 
appreciable measure of continuity with what had in turn gone before. 
The term has been used in the historical and existential, and not neces-
sarily normative, sense. 
Its intended lack of precision militates against attempts to 
estimate how far back there would have to be continuity in order for a 
system to qualify as traditional, or for how long a period a new, 
non-traditional system would have to exhibit continuity before it could 
be described as traditional. It is assumed, however, for this study that 
such continuity would have to stretch back at least to the years immedi-
ately preceding British rule for a political system to qualify as 
traditional in succeeding decades up to 1945. 
No detailed criteria were established to determine whether the 
systems existing around 1905 were still traditional. The judgments were 
common sense ones, based on generalized assessments of whether the tra-
ditional tribal systems had been only adapted and remained basically tra-
ditional in nature, or whether the modifications were so great as to 
constitute new systems. Fortunately, there were no borderline cases. 
The evidence in all instances seemed quite clear, although the conclu-
sions for the three smaller Kingdoms were necessarily presented as 
assumptions in view of the lack of depth in the analyses of these systems. 
2These are provided in Table 11 in Appendix IV. 
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been necessary to indicate in general terms only their incidence or lack 
thereof. 
Of the five non-Bantu tribes, constituting about one quarter of 
the Protectorate's population, two were Nilotic, two were Nilo-Hamitic, 
and one was Sudanic. 
The Nilotic Acholi were considered in detail. The following 
conclusions were reached, with reference to the situation existing at 
the advent of British rule in Acholi in 1911. The tribe had a tribal 
political system. It was a traditional system. But, in contrast to 
Buganda's system, it was characterized by a paucity of factors contrib-
uting to political solidarity, and especially detracting from solidarity 
was the Acholi system's weak confederate nature. In addition, its 
resources were limited in relation to Buganda's extensive resources. On 
the other hand, the system was so structured as to indicate an 
appreciable degree of probable adaptability to certain inevitable 
Western-type demands for change. 
The analysis of the Nilotic Lango was based on a fairly complete 
study of available literature, but the latter was limited. The conclu-
sions for the Lango related also to 1911 and turned out to be identical 
with those for the Acholi. The tribe had a tribal political system. It 
was a traditional system. It had few sources of political solidarity, 
being also of a weak confederate nature. It was limited in resources. 
Like the Acholi and Lango, the Lugbara tribe in northwest Uganda 
did not come under British rule until the second decade of the century. 
Yet in contrast, the tribe had no tribal political system--there was an 
absence of authoritative decisions encompassing more than one of the 
tribal sections. The Lugbara's resources were very limited. 
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The Iteso, one of the two Nilo-Hamitic tribes, was analyzed less 
thoroughly than the Acholi and Lango but on the basis of more extensive 
studies. The finding was that the Iteso had no tribal political system 
in traditional times. Not only was that the case, but what traditional 
political systems did exist at levels less inclusive than those of the 
tribe had been largely obliterated by the new political system. The new 
system was introduced by the Muganda, General Kakunguru, prior to 1905. 
Acting for the British, he used the Buganda political system as a model 
for application in Teso. With regard to resources, Teso's were moderate 
compared to Buganda's extensive resources and Karamoja's very limited 
ones. 
The other Nilo-Hamitic tribe was more precisely a tribal cluster 
--the Karamojong. A cursory analysis produced a judgment that the 
following assumptions could reasonably be advanced. The Karamojong 
Cluster had no political system for the cluster as a whole. The re-
sources of the Karamojong were the least of those of the twelve main 
tribes. 
Of the seven Bantu tribes, constituting about one half of 
Uganda's population, detailed attention was given to the generally 
pre-eminent Baganda. Consideration of the three smaller Kingdoms and of 
the other three tribes was more limited. 
After a description of the most significant features of the 
traditional system in the late 1870's and following brief reference to 
intervening historical changes, it was concluded that the political 
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system of the Baganda in 1905 was a traditional tribal political system. 
That it was tribal there was no doubt. That it was traditional repre-
sents a common sense evaluation of the source data, corroborated by 
recognized authorities in the field. As regards those of the system's 
characteristics which represented the most significant factors contrib-
uting to political solidarity, they were as follows: its unitary nature; 
the concentration of authority on other lines also; and the system's 
minimum membership conflict. There appear to have been no factors 
operating appreciably to detract from solidarity. When compared with 
the traditional Acholi political system, that of Buganda stood out as 
much more favorably endowed both with attributes of political solidarity 
and with natural and human resources. It was, however, probably 
adaptable to only two of the three Western-type demands for change which 
were postulated. 
Treatment of the three smaller Kingdoms was much less intensive. 
In the case of Bunyoro and Toro the sources were especially limited, but 
there seemed sufficient evidence to phrase the conclusions in the form 
of reasonable assumptions. 
The assumptions were advanced that in Bunyoro in 1905 there was 
a tribal political system; it was a traditional system; it was somewhat 
less characterized by factors contributing to political solidarity 
compared to Buganda's system, yet by appreciably more such factors than 
that of traditional Acholi; and its resources were limited. 
The assumptions advanced with regard to the Toro system were 
that there was a tribal system in 1905; it was a traditional system; in 
172 
factors of solidarity it was not as well off, so to speak, as Bunyoro's 
system but had more attributes of cohesiveness than did that of Acholi; 
and its resources were limited. 
Though not intensive itself, the analysis of the Ankole polit-
ical system was made from a fairly extensive body of source materials. 
The conclusions thus lay frankly somewhere between assumptions and well 
documented findings. One was that the political system of the 
Banyankole people was a tribal one in 1905. It was likewise a tradi-
tional system. It had several attributes of political solidarity as did 
Bunyoro, but they were different in kind; in such factors the system in 
Ankole was somewhat better off than Taro's and considerably more so than 
Acholi's. But Ankole's resources, like all of those of the four systems 
just cited, were limited in extent compared to Buganda's. 
Of the three remaining tribes, the Basoga were given more 
detailed consideration and the sources were excellent. The Bagisu and 
Bakiga were both accorded cursory treatment, but the sources were quite 
adequate. 
The findings for the Basoga were that the tribe had no tribal 
political system in traditional times; that as of about 1910 there was 
operating in Busoga what was in effect a new, non-traditional political 
system for the tribe; and that Busoga's resources were moderate as 
contrasted to the limited resources of certain other tribes and the 
extensive resources of Buganda. 
Notwithstanding considerable variations in traditional political 
structure, the conclusions with respect to the Bagisu were precisely the 
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same as for the Basoga with one exception. Bugisu's resources were 
estimated to have been limited instead of moderate. 
Like the Basoga and Bagisu, the Bakiga were found to have no 
tribal political system at the time of the advent of British rule (in 
1911). The resources of Kigezi were limited. 
Conclusions 
The general aim of the study is the analysis of British policy 
as one of the major forces shaping political change in 1905-1945. This 
chapter has sought to describe one of the other major forces--the 
traditional African political systems--as it existed in the early part 
of that period. It has also incidentally provided examples of the 
effect of British policy on political institutions at the tribal, local 
level--one of the levels of political change to which the thesis of the 
study is directed. 
The traditional systems at the beginning of the four decades. 
Did the traditional tribal systems in Uganda as of about 1905 constitute 
a force, individually or collectively, which was of political signifi-
cance? The survey of the political structures of the twelve main 
indigenous tribes makes possible certain conclusions about the composi-
tion and nature of the force in this respect. 
Of the five non-Bantu tribes, representing one quarter of the 
territory's population, 1 toward the end of the century's first decade 
iwhere not otherwise indicated, the population data in the 
following paragraphs are derived from the 1948 Census, but the 1931 
Census figures add up to the same results. As already explained, no 
earlier reliable statistics are available. 
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only the two Nilotic tribes had political systems operating which were 
both tribal and traditional. These were the systems of the Acholi and 
the Lango, who had not yet come under British rule. Their systems, on 
the basis of careful analyses, were characterized both by limited 
resources and by a paucity of attributes of political solidarity. It 
would not appear, therefore, that they could have represented an 
important element in the force discussed in this chapter--the tradi-
tional African 
for the Acholi 
political systems. And as is shown later in more detail 
1 
system, they were in fact replaced by new systems as an 
almost direct consequence of the policy of native administration pursued 
by the British authorities in those areas. 
What about the Bantu tribes? Did their systems, embracing about 
one half of the Africans in Uganda, represent at that time a significant 
element in the force considered here? 
Of the seven Bantu tribes, only four had political systems 
operating in 1905 which were both tribal and traditional. These were 
the four Kingdoms. But of the four, the systems of the three smaller 
Kingdoms all possessed limited resources compared to those of Buganda. 
With respect to attributes of political solidarity, the three systems 
were notably deficient when related to the Baganda system, but they were 
characterized by more factors contributing to solidarity than was the 
traditional Acholi system. These facts point to the conclusion that 
though these three systems constituted elements making up the major 
force under review, they were generally far from strong elements 
1chapter VI. For the Lango system, see the last section of 
Appendix IV. 
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compared to Buganda. Whether they would actually prove to be weak 
political systems would, of course, depend on the particular situations 
with which they were faced in the years to come, and more specifically, 
upon the interaction of the situations with the individual factors 
affecting the systems' solidarity. In the event, these systems did 
1 
prove to be weak, though not as weak as the Acholi system. 
The Baganda political system in 1905 was also both tribal and 
traditional, In contrast to the systems of the other Kingdoms, it was 
characterized by significant attributes of political solidarity and by 
extensive resources. Its people, for example, represented about 
one fifth of the total African population in the territory according to 
the 1931 Census, and this compared to a roughly equivalent number of 
Africans covered by the systems ·of the three smaller Kingdoms. 
The force of the African traditional political systems in the 
early years of the four decades under review comprised, then, first and 
foremost the tribal political system of the Baganda. It also included 
the progressively less significant elements represented by the systems 
of the three other Kingdoms and those of the two Nilotic tribes; and the 
latter in any event were to be subsequently displaced. To what extent 
the four Kingdom systems, especially that of Buganda, would operate as a 
significant force in actual political situations would depend upon the 
1since only the Acholi and Baganda systems have been dealt with 
intensively, conclusions about the other systems are not categorical but 
rather are tentative. For some of the relevant discussions of the three 
Kingdoms, see appropriate sections in those parts of Chapter VI which 
deal with the direct rule areas and with the measures to develop local 
councils, as well as the section at the end of Chapter. VII concerned 
with African attitudes toward the central institutions. 
circumstances of the situations, particularly as these related to the 
systems' various characteristics affecting political solidarity. 
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British policy's early effect on tribal institutions. In 
addition to the above conclusions about the composition and general 
nature of the force, others which bear directly on the thesis can be 
drawn from the chapter's findings. For, evidence was advanced to show 
that even as of the beginning of the 1905-1945 period, British native 
administration policy had already operated as an important force shaping 
extensive political change in the tribal institutions in certain of the 
local areas. 
More specifically, British policy in Teso resulted in the almost 
complete obliteration of traditional political institutions, by reason 
of the imposition of the Baganda type of political system on the Iteso, 
first by Kakunguru and later by British authorities working through 
Baganda Agents. 
The same process occurred with regard to the Basoga, except that 
a greater proportion of the traditional structure survived. Some of it, 
however, did not. More important, in a number of essential respects 
Busoga acquired a new political system; institutional change as a result 
of British policy was on the whole very marked. 
Developments in the case of the Bagisu were about midway in 
degree, though not necessarily in kind, between those affecting the 
political structures of the Iteso and the Basoga. With the Bagisu 
their traditional political institutions were not obliterated, but on 
the other hand they were not utilized to the extent those of the Basoga 
were, partly because they did not lend themselves to extensive 
utilization under the alien Baganda model. 
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There were, then, three tribes, constituting one quarter of the 
territory's population, which by 1905 had already experienced funda-
mental change in their political institutions as a result of British 
policy. 
In addition, there were five other tribes--the Bakiga, the 
Karamojong, the Acholi, the Lango, and the Lugbara--which were not under 
British rule as of 1905 but which, when they came under British adminis-
tration during the second decade, were also to experience far-reaching 
change in their traditional political institutions. The changes were to 
vary in dates and in degree, but in all cases they were to amount to 
fundamental institutional changes. 
The development is given more attention later in the study. 1 
Suffice it to say that these tribes, together with the three mentioned 
above, represented about forty-five per cent of the Protectorate's 1931 
African population. Change in political institutions at the local, 
tribal level as a consequence of British policy can thus be seen as 
widespread. 
As for the other main tribes--those of the four Kingdoms--
evidence has likewise been presented of the changes which were wrought 
by British policy, and in the case of Buganda also by missionaries, up 
to the middle of the first decade of this century. Although the changes 
1In Chapter VI especially. 
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in the Kingdoms' political institutions were not insignificant, they 
were not so fundamental or widespread as to render the 1905 systems new, 
non-traditional systems. The Kingdom systems remained essentially 
traditional political systems. 
CHAPTER IV 
ALIEN CONTACT AND INFLUENCE 
The European missionaries and trading interests played a large 
part in molding the story of Uganda up to 1905. These and other new 
alien agents of contact entering upon the scene exerted a continued 
influence, directly and more often indirectly, on political developments 
1 in the Protectorate during the next four decades. 
The manifestations of the impact which all non-indigenous, 
non-official elements have had on the territory make up the variable 
2 force designated as alien contact and influence. 
I. THE GENERAL APPROACH TO THE FORCE 
In addition to being viewed as one of the major forces with a 
role in political change, alien contact and influence is also considered 
1 In contrast to the preceding treatment of the traditional 
systems, coverage of the force of alien contact and influence is not 
confined to the time around 1905 but is of the entire period up to 1945. 
2British policy is considered sufficiently important to be 
isolated as a separate major variable. However, it is impossible to 
exclude all mention of policy in a consideration of the force of alien 
contact and influence. Although policy rarely was the initiator of the 
manifestations which are mentioned below, it usually sooner or later 
affected their course, at times fundamentally. Where such was the case, 
policy is made a part of the discussion. In the next chapter the dis-
tinctive role of Uganda's economic and social development policies in 
conditioning the impact of alien contact and influence is analyzed. 
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as especially conditioning another of the forces--the social situation 
1 
and social change. The interest of the chapter is in describing and 
analyzing the nature of the force of alien contact and influence so that 
the conclusions may be used in the explanation of both its direct role 
in political institutional change and its indirect role, the latter 
operating through its effects on the social situation. 
As regards the force's indirect role, it is not feasible to 
examine the social situation at more than one point in time during the 
2 
forty year period. This is done only as of the end of 1944--in Part II 
after the description of the various British policies. The consequences 
of alien contact and influence for the social situation are given 
attention at that stage. Conclusions about the composite role of the 
force in political change are similarly deferred, although some of its 
direct and indirect effects are briefly sketched at the end of the 
chapter to furnish a preliminary idea of the material's relevance to the 
study's problem and thesis. 
Like the other major forces, alien contact and influence 
represents very much of a variable force. It may vary in a number of 
ways; and it is just certain of these variations--between Buganda on the 
one hand and many of the direct rule areas on the other--which prove to 
be significant to the question of political institutional change. 
Contact may, for example, be of long duration in one area and of short 
1It is held that the latter force is conditioned by all four 
other forces. In the Uganda study this is especially relevant in the 
case of alien contact and influence. 
2
chapter VIII. 
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duration in another. The intensity of the contact and influence may 
differ considerably by area. Influence may be of one kind or content in 
one area and of another kind elsewhere, depending on the identity of the 
agents of contact. These are several of the considerations which have 
governed the analysis of source material. 
The manifestations of alien contact and influence are taken up 
according to their content, that is, economic, sociological, religious, 
1 psychological, and lastly, a range of political aspects. 
II. ECONOMIC CONTACT AND INFLUENCE 
The most important direct agents of alien economic contact and 
influence in Uganda, following the completion of the Uganda Railway to 
Lake Victoria in 1902, were the Asian traders, European companies, and 
British administrators. The main features which resulted from the 
diverse contacts and influences were the shift from the subsistence to a 
money econo~, the growth of a wage labor force, economic individualism, 
and the rise of a new middle class. Some were pronounced; and equally 
important, in 1944 some features were still in an embryonic state of 
evolution. The variations between areas of Uganda in the degree to 
which certain of the new features manifested themselves up to 1945 were 
also of especial consequence. 
1The division is roughly the same as that proposed by James S. 
Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science 
Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 411-412. 
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The Agents and Duration of Contact and Influence 
The completion of the Uganda Railway to Lake Victoria in 1902 
1 
made feasible the later development of a cash crop economy in Uganda. 
It also brought to the territory Indians, supplemented in later years by 
other Asians. 2 They contributed immeasurably to the economic growth of 
3 
the country as artisans and more especially as small and large traders. 
In the latter activities, however, and in their economic role as 
marketers and ginners of cotton, the Asians gained a reputation for 
4 
sharp practices, and this was heightened by the knowledge of the large 
profits accumulated by many of them. 
European commercial interests, small by comparison, were 
especially evident in the financial sphere. The Uganda Company was the 
outstanding European enterprise, having been closely associated with the 
Church Missionary Society in the early years. One of its original 
missionary employees, Mr. Borup, had initiated and organized the first 
plantings of cotton, and the result of that activity proved spectacular 
5 
for Uganda. 
1George Wilson, "The Progress of the Uganda Protectorate," 
Journal of the Society of Arts, LV (February, 1907), 286. 
2stephen Morris, "Indians in East Africa: A Study in a Plural 
Society," British Journal of Sociology, VII (September, 1956), 195. 
3 Cyril Ehrlich, "Cotton and the Uganda Economy, 1903-1909," 
Uganda Journal, XXI (September, 1957), 162, 174-175. 
4sir Robert T. Coryndon, "Uganda," United Empire, XI (June, 1920), 
299. 
5cyril Ehrlich, The Uganda Company, Limited: The First Fifty 
~(Kampala, Uganda: The Uganda Company Ltd, 1953), pp. 4-19; Sir 
Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life (London: Sampson Low, 
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The British administrators were the most important agents of 
economic contact and influence in the Protectorate, largely because of 
the authority they could wield and because of the way they chose to 
exercise it. All manner of efforts were expended to stimulate cash crop 
production, and the results were phenomenal. When crop quality declined 
so as to threaten sales abroad, the Protectorate authorities stepped in 
with decisive measures to regulate the industries. In the fields of 
labor and land policy, government decisions constituted the major single 
economic influence and directed the economy into definite channels. 
Particularly significant was the pressure which the appropriate admin-
istrative officers brought to bear in Buganda to see that legislation 
was passed and enforced which prevented the development of an explosive 
agrarian situation such as has plagued much of Latin America. 1 In 
Buganda the tenants were given opportunity, because of the absence of 
oppressive landlordism, to participate if they cared in the economic 
gains to be reaped from cotton production. Many did care, and many were 
able to acquire land of their own through their productive efforts. 
Main Features of the Contact and Influence 
The agents of alien economic contact and influence--the Asian 
traders, the European companies, and additionally the British adminis-
trators--these agents in their interaction with the African peoples and 
Marston & Co., Ltd., [1946]), p. 146. For the crucial cooperating role 
of the Baganda chiefs, see C. C. Wrigley, "Buganda: An Outline Economic 
History," Economic History Review, X (August, 1957), 75. 
1chester Bowles, "Cry for Land in South America," The New York 
Times Magazine, November 22, 1959, pp. 11, 39-40. 
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with the total Uganda situation were instrumental in shaping Uganda's 
prewar economy along certain lines. 
First, there was a definite shift to a money economy in the 
sense that money came to be accepted fully as a medium of exchange. The 
subsistence economy was, however, not replaced; rather, the cash crop 
economy was added to it. Also, few Africans up to 1945 had become a 
part of the total modern money economy of the territory. Part of the 
explanation lay in the almost complete absence of Africans from the 
Protectorate's trade and finance activities after 1905. 1 These were 
operated exclusively by non-Africans. African participation in the 
2 
economy was limited almost entirely to the growing of the cash crops. 
Further, the participation of Africans in cash crop cultivation 
varied widely from one area of the country to another. It was greatest 
3 in Buganda, followed by Busoga. Because of coffee production, it was 
also fairly high in Bugisu in the years after 1921. Other areas were 
progressively less involved in cash crop production. 
Roughly the same order can be applied for the degree of accept-
ance of the value of economic individualism, although other factors 
1It was pointed out at the end of Chapter II that shortly after 
1905 the Baganda who had operated widely throughout the Protectorate as 
traders ceased their activities. 
2 S. Joshua L. Zake, Reform in Uganda (n.p.: Sapoba Bookshop 
Press, [1954]), p. 5; Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 77; Y. K. 
Lule, "Africans in Trade: Gradual Formation of a Middle Class," The 
(London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 3s:-
3see "Uganda Is History: The Long Road to Self Government' II ~ 
[London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 7. (This 
issue of the Review was specially designated Uganda Number.) 
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entered into this matter such as the extent of individualism in general 
in the particular traditional society and the kind and intensity of 
religious conversion. On the whole, the force of the idea of economic 
individualism as a guide to behavior had not by 1945 made a deep and 
pervasive impression on Africans in Uganda in the face of strong 
traditional orientations to kin or other groups. 
Likewise, a sizeable middle class had not yet materialized, 
certainly not as an easily identifiable class. 1 
Various factors--the peasant cash crop nature of the economy, 
2 the availability of African labor from outside the Protectorate, and 
Government policy--contributed to the restriction of the indigenous wage 
labor force to small proportions. 3 
In conclusion, it can be said that largely as the result of the 
influence of the agents of economic contact on the varying Uganda 
situations, there existed in East Africa at the beginning of 1945 a 
relatively prosperous colonial territory, 4 whose indigenous peoples were 
lJohn H. Dean, "Land Use and Settlement Patterns in the Uganda 
Protectorate with Special Reference to Stability and Change in African 
Societies" (Joint Conference on Problems of Area Research in Contempo-
rary Africa--Princeton University; Washington: National Research 
Council, 1953), pp. 10-11 (mimeographed); H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, 
Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 288. 
2 For a comprehensive treatment of African immigrant labor in 
Buganda, see Audrey I. Richards (ed.), Economic Development and Tribal 
Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda (Cambridge, England: W. 
Heffer & Sons, Ltd., [1954]), pp. 1-301. 
3 P. G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labour, ed. W. Elkan (East 
African Studies, No. 10; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of 
Social Research, 1957), pp. 12, 14-15, 18, 31-32, 63-64, 66, 67. 
4For example, from exports of 54 bales of cotton valued at 236 
pounds sterling in the fiscal year 1904-1905, there was an increase to 
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--with variations from region to region--sharing in the profits of the 
cash crop economy. To an almost complete extent, however, the Africans 
of Uganda were not by that time participating in the economy outside of 
the producing stage of the economic process. For this and other 
reasons, the usual features of a modern economy were not present in an 
advanced form. The transition to a money economy was not a thorough one 
as yet; there was no sizeable wage labor force; and economic individual-
ism was in 1945 still not a generally prevalent guideline for African 
behavior. 
III. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CONTACT AND INFLUENCE 
It is the intention in the section which follows to view alien 
contact and influence in terms of those sociological aspects which are 
especially significant and which are not treated elsewhere. More 
specifically, the subjects to be considered are Western education, 
social mobility, and modern urbanization together with other 
anti-traditional elements of influence. These are all features of alien 
1 
contact; that is, they are results or consequences. 
253,000 bales valued at 2,823,000 pounds sterling in 1935. Ehrlich, The 
Uganda Company ••• , pp. 56-57. 
As for the Protectorate's budget, it was balanced for the first 
time in 1915-1916 without a grant from the British Treasury. Revenues 
rose from 287,000 pounds sterling in that year to 1,567,000 in 1935, and 
expenditures rose accordingly. The latter expanded further from 
1,420,000 pounds sterling in 1935 to 2,598,000 in 1944, and revenues 
kept pace. Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), pp. 158, 212-214. 
1rn the discussion of the sociological features of contact and 
influence, the agents of contact are not given first-order attention but 
rather are considered under each of the main sociological aspects or 
features. 
187 
Western Education 
In considering Western education as a sociological feature of 
alien contact and influence, what is desired is a knowledge of the 
content of the Western education which was introduced in Uganda, and 
also an idea of how widely, and variantly, it was disseminated among the 
African population of the territory. 
As a result of contact and influence by missionaries, later 
assisted by the Protectorate Government, Western education came to be 
valued very highly by the Africans in th~ territory. 1 What they wanted 
was the type of education which was also more highly valued in England--
the academically oriented, literary kind of curriculum as contrasted to 
the technical, vocational, industrial kind of training. Because the 
missions ran the schools, and because they also favored the former 
emphasis in education, the Africans got what they wanted--in content, 
though not in quantity. 
The Government, however, along with ~ther non-Africans in the 
2 
country, was persuaded that there should be a greater emphasis on 
1L. P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century (London: 
George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1934), pp. 69-70. 
2The Uganda Development Commission of 1920, with an unofficial 
majority, declared its opposition to extensive literary education for 
the native population. It did not want, it wrote, a body of 
half-educated natives. The Commission also stressed the need for strict 
discipline in all schools. Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda 
Development Commission, 1920 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 
1920), pp. 34-35. 
The report is unparalleled in the history of the Protectorate 
for its settler-type orientation on all subjects relating to the African 
population. The Commission was appointed in 1919 by Governor Coryndon 
and consisted of three officials and five unofficials, two of the latter 
being Asians. The five were nominated by the following bodies: the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Ginners' Association, the Government, the 
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1 technical training. With this in view, the first official assumption 
of direct operating responsibilities for education took the form of 
technical instruction. The Government's primary attention continued 
over most of the years to be focused along such lines. The principal 
exception was the official sponsorship and control of Makerere College, 
which in 1929 divested itself of its industrial-vocational training 
programs. Only some ten years later, however, was there a serious move 
to organize a curriculum at Makerere along fully academic, 
university-level lines, closely corresponding to that offered in 
2 England. This was sparked by Governor Mitchell. 
Despite the official interest in vocational institutions, the 
number of pupils in the "literary" mission schools was greatly in excess 
of those receiving predominantly technical training. In addition, 
except to reduce the ecclesiastical-missionary as contrasted to the 
educational-missionary type of influence on mission school policies and 
practices, the Government left the curriculum alone and furthered 
Planters' Association, and the Indian Association. Of the sixty-four 
witnesses heard, only five were "natives." See pp. 5, 6, and 55 of the 
referenced report. 
lE. Dauncey Tongue, "The Contact of Races in Uganda," British 
Journal of Psychology, XXV (January, 1935), 362; Ingham, The 
Making •.• , p. 201. 
2Figures on the distribution of Makerere students by major 
courses of study, pointing up the changes in the curriculum over the 
1922-1945 period, are available in the following publications: U~anda 
Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 1932 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 115; Uganda Protectorate, Blue 
Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 1938 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government 
Printer, 1939), p. 128 (cited hereafter as UP, Blue Book for •.. 1938); 
Uganda Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 1945 
(Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1947), p. 125 (cited hereafter as 
UP, Blue Book for ... 1945). 
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1 
expansion by increased government grants-in-aid. Educational content 
in Uganda's schools was, then, predominantly literary in the years up to 
1945. 
How widely was the new, formalized education disseminated during 
the period among the African population, which amounted to 3,500,000 
according to the 1931 Census and 4,900,000 by the 1948 Census? The 
position in 1945 was about what it was in the previous two decades, and 
in Buganda in 1945 somewhat under one-half of the African children of 
school age were attending school. In the remainder of Uganda the 1945 
proportion was one-third or under, as is shown in Table 2 below. The 
less favored position in the areas outside of Buganda was a politically 
important ingredient in the territory's evolving social situation, as 
was the general distribution of facilities between primary and higher 
levels of education and the latter's variation by area. 
Very few Africans were educated above the level of primary 
schools. Despite the increased tempo of development during World War 
II, the number of the Protectorate's senior secondary schools had been 
2 
raised by 1945 to only six from its 1939 total of two. As for 
post-secondary education, for many years Makerere College was in effect 
1sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: Hutchinson, 
1954), pp. 180-183; John V. Taylor, The Growth of the Church in Buganda 
(World Mission Studies; London: SCM Press Ltd, 1958), pp. 95-96, 158; 
F. Rowling, Uganda and Its People (Little Books for Africa Series; 
London: The Sheldon Press, 1928), pp. 25, 27. 
2The number was nine in 1946. [Great Britain,] Colonial Office, 
Annual Report on Uganda for the Year 1946 (London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1948), pp. 53, 56. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Annual 
Report on Uganda ••• 1946. 
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TABLE 2. - Percentage of African school age children attending school 
in Uganda, by province, in selected years from 1925 to 1945a 
Year Buganda Eastern Western Northern 
1925 35 33 26 28 
1930 40 32 34 29 
1935 49 27 38 20 
1938 50 35 39 22 
1945 45 32 28b b 
aPercentages have been rounded off. Sources for the data 
were: Uganda Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 
1926 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 88; Uganda 
Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 193C 
(Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, n.d,), p. 117; Uganda Pro-
tectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 1935 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, 1936), p. 148; UP, Blue Book for ••. 
1938, p. 138; UP, Blue Book for ••. 1945, p. 137. 
bThe Northern Province had been merged with the Western 
Province. The figure for the latter probably was about 40 per cent. 
1 
merely a senior secondary school. By World War II it was offering a 
few courses at various undergraduate, university levels. Yet the 
enrollment remained extremely limited, From 1930 to 1945 the total 
annual enrollment of students at Makerere from all territories stayed 
2 between one hundred and two hundred. Uganda's share during the earlier 
of these years was about three quarters of the total, and almost all of 
1Ingham, The Making ••. , pp. 200-201. A "senior secondary 
school" corresponded to the American "senior high school." 
2The highest figure, in fact, was 172 in 1945. UP, Blue Book 
for , .. 1945, p. 125. 
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the territory's students came from Buganda. This is shown in Table 3 
below, which furnishes data on total entries per decade. 
TABLE 3. - Baganda entries to Makerere College, 1922-1949a 
Item 1922-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949b 
All Entries 286 507 522 
Total Entries from Uganda 284 390 243 
Total Baganda Entries 223 259 130 
Percentage of Baganda to 
All Entries 78 51 25 
Percentage of Baganda to 
Total Entries from Uganda 79 67 54 
aThe source indicated that total entries for the period 1922-
1953 included three students who entered the College for the second 
time. It may be assumed, therefore, that otherwise the figures for each 
decade covered in the table count each student only once. There are no 
available data showing the length of time the entrants pursued their 
studies at Makerere. 
The percentage figures have been rounded off from those in the 
source, which was as follows: J. E. Goldthorpe and Margaret Macpherson, 
"Makerere College and Its Old Students," ZAIRE, XII (4, 1958), 356 
(Tables I and II). (Abstract [Reprint].)--
bLater figures are available from the same source for the short 
period 1950-1953. They are, in the same order as shown in the table 
from top to bottom, as follows: 385; 120; 61; 16; and 51. Goldthorpe 
and Macpherson, ZAIRE, XII, 356. 
As the years progressed, Uganda's share fell to about half of 
the total, and the proportion of Baganda students to those of other 
1 
tribes from the Protectorate fell to about the same degree. A rough 
1The percentage of Baganda in regular secondary schools most 
probably was of a similar magnitude and exhibited a corresponding trend, 
calculation indicates that during the period 1930-1945, Uganda was 
sending no more than .00005 of its African population to Makerere and 
1 perhaps as little as .00002 in some years. 
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Two other points of considerable sociological significance must 
be given brief mention. The first concerns the absence of a common 
language. Luganda had been widely used in the first years. Its 
adoption as a lingua franca for the Protectorate had been furthered by 
the service of Baganda in government and missions throughout the 
territory. In the late 1920's, much to the chagrin of practically 
everyone except himself, Governor Gowers tried to introduce Swahili in 
place of Luganda. By the early 1930's this had proved a failure. 
Instead of returning to Luganda, the other areas of Uganda each increas-
ingly adopted the languages of the tribe of the district for use in 
2 
schools, missions, and so forth. By 1945 there was no one language 
which was an effective means of communication between the peoples of the 
Protectorate. English appeared to be the language which would be 
developed for that purpose, but it was as yet spoken by only a tiny 
minority. 
for from the beginning educational facilities were largely concentrated 
within the Kingdom. It was only in the later years that the other 
provinces began to make some progress in this field. 
1The percentages of .005 and .002 were obtained by using the 
1931 and 1945 census figures and conservatively estimating an annual 
range of Uganda students at Makerere from 100-150, working from the 
figures provided in Table 3 for total entries of Uganda students over 
longer spans of time. Also, it is known that Uganda entrants--new 
students--numbered only 30 to 35 a year in the late 1930's and 15 to 20 
in the early 1940's. Goldthorpe and Macpherson, ZAIRE, XII, 351. 
2Philip Mitchell, p. 173; Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 163-165. 
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The other point concerns the effect which the assignment of 
educational responsibility to the missions had on the formation of 
significant, Protectorate-wide groupings. The Protestant and Roman 
Catholic missions operated in the educational field to socialize two 
quite distinct groups of Africans within each tribe, and the educational 
activities of the missions were much more important in this result than 
were the religious activities. 
Social Mobility 
Alien contact and influence affected another sociological aspect 
of traditional African society--its social mobility, which here refers 
to individual opportunities to enhance social status, and to the inci-
dence of movements in a society up and down the ladder of social 
distinction and prestige. 
In Buganda, varied alien influences operated to bring about a 
change in valued goals and ways of achieving the goals. The interaction 
of the different elements in the changed situation first led to a 
restriction of the previously high degree of social mobility. Although 
by 1945 there was still not a full return to the extent of social 
mobility of the traditional era, there had occurred a broadening of 
1 f d f . 1 opportunity fol owing the irst perio o restr1ction. 
One qualification needs to be added, and it reflects a rather 
strange development. Education during the first years had been the 
prerequisite for positions in the Buganda political system, positions 
1see, for example, Audrey Richards, "The Tribal Kingdoms of 
Uganda," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 
1955), 11. 
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1 
which conferred high social and political status. In time, as the 
standard of education in Uganda was raised, those who could avail 
themselves of more advanced training found they were excluded from the 
Buganda political system and thus from posts of high status. This 
happened because the recruitment to the more senior posts in the 
Kingdom's administrative organization was from the ranks of junior 
chiefs; and the Baganda with the new higher educational qualifications 
were unwilling to commence their career at the junior level. Their 
avenue of social mobility had to be found elsewhere. It was through the 
lower-grade Protectorate Government administrative and technical 
positions. The fact that these latter positions fulfilled the great 
portion of the status desires of educated Baganda, together with the 
fact that the number of men trained to the post-secondary level was 
quite small, reduced the social discontent from this quarter to limited 
proportions, though it was potentially of greater magnitude. 2 
In the non-Buganda parts of the Protectorate there was a 
similar but less pronounced shift in valued ends and means. However, 
the opportunities for education and thus for individual attainment of 
1Rowling, p. 24. 
2The above remarks are based on a study of a number of sources, 
including E. M. K. Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African (Africa's Own 
Library, No. 14; London: United Society for Christian Literature, 1945), 
pp. 52, 56, 59-61; E. M. K. Mulira, Troubled Uganda (Colonial Contro-
versy Series, No. 6; London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1950), pp. 30-33, 
43; A. B. Mukwaya, Land Tenure in Buganda: Present Day Tendencies (East 
African Studies, No. 1, East African Institute of Social Research; 
Kampala, Uganda: The Eagle Press, 1953), pp. 36-37; J. E. Goldthorpe, 
"An African Elite: A Sample Survey of Fifty-two Former Students of 
Makerere College in East Africa," British Journal of Sociology, VI 
(March, 1955), 32-34. 
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the newer combination of objectives were very limited in the less central 
areas. A development which balanced the paucity of educational facili-
ties was the British policy--in full swing as of 1943 after an interim 
period--to discontinue using traditional status and position as one of 
the bases for selection of chiefs in those areas where hereditary 
considerations had been important. Official positions for Africans were 
1 
thus opened to all, regardless of birth. Education was the new major 
requirement. The limited school places, however, usually went to sons 
of those with established positions who had the wealth to pay the fees. 
On the whole, it is open to doubt whether social mobility increased or 
decreased in the non-Buganda areas in the 1900-1945 period. It probably 
remained static in degree, though its situational context had changed 
greatly. 
Ur9anization and Other Anti-Traditional 
Features of Contact 
Among many of the features which have often accompanied alien 
contact and influence in African territories, there are several which 
have had one thing in common--the undermining of traditional social 
institutions and values. Of these a few are mentioned so·that their 
consequences for the total social situation can later be taken into 
account. 
The first, urbanization, refers to the growth of modern-type 
towns composed of heterogeneous population elements of different 
1Traditionally,. in many tribes only certain political posts--
such as the war leader--were filled according to the appropriate kind of 
individual ability. For the British practice, with limited exceptions, 
of selecting chiefs on "merit," see Chapter VI, pp. 371-373, and 
pp. 310-311 and 384-385. 
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1 
cultures and of varying classes. For several reasons the phenomenon of 
urbanization, as defined, did not occur with respect to the Africans in 
the territory to any considerable extent in the 1900-1945 period. A 
recent study indicates that one of the most important may have been the 
2 
strongly held traditional preference for dispersed settlement. Though 
there was of course a tendency toward African urban concentration, and 
with it the usual pressures on traditional institutions and values, on 
the whole the incidence of urbanization was limited to laborers coming 
3 to the urban area from some distance for only temporary employment. 
1The term urbanization is used here in the sense of the modern, 
new type of heterogeneous town as contrasted to the old towns before 
Western contact, which were both parochial and distinctive in culture. 
See Daniel F. McCall, "Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa," Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII (March, 
1955), 151. (The referenced issue of the Annals, cited also later in 
Part II in connection with Kenneth Robinson's article on "Colonial 
Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Tropical Africa," was 
devoted to developments concerned with that continent. Entitled 
Contemporary Africa: Trends and Issues, the contributions were edited by 
William 0. Brown.) 
For the generalized effects of urbanization as an 
anti-traditional factor, see also Coleman, American Political Science 
Review, XLVIII, 411. 
2Ann Evans Larimore, The Alien Town: Patterns of Settlement in 
Busoga, Uganda, Department of Geography Research Paper, No. 55, Univer-
sity of Chicago (Chicago: By the author, 1959), pp. 194, 201. Of 
course, the fact that Uganda's economy has been largely based on peasant 
production of cash crops instead of on concentrated industrial opera-
tions such as mining has had a great deal to do with the small extent of 
urbanization. But this by no means provides the whole answer. 
For a discussion of the relation between degree of role differ-
entiation and cultural values regarding urban concentration, see Aidan 
Southall, "An Operational Theory of Role," Human Relations, XII (No. 1, 
1959), 28-33. 
3Qne scholar has pointed out that Baganda chiefs, who formerly 
resided at the capital, were made to reside in their respective admin-
istrative areas. The result was a dispersal of the capital's population 
of 77,000. Buganda was a less urban society in 1940 than in the late 
1890's. Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 78. 
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Urbanization was not a significant general factor in the evolving social 
situation of the Protectorate up to 1945. 1 
Another feature which often results from alien contact and 
influence and which must be assessed for Uganda is the generalized 
weakening of traditional ties of kinship. 2 Various forces for individ-
ualism, especially economic and religious forces, did in fact cause a 
loosening of the communal and collectivistic bonds of the older times. 
Some of the influences, on both the Bantu and Nilotic tribes in Uganda, 
were enumerated in 1935 as follows: 
The Government treats him [the African} as an individual property 
owner, tax payer, or malefactor; the planter and the commercial, 
as an individual labourer, producer, or customer; the missionary, 
as an individual soul, to be saved independently of the family or 
community of which he forms an integral part. By all of these he 
is expected to show an independence of judgment and action, and 
to assume a personal responsibility, for which he has no training 
either by heredity or environment •••• He has lost his customary 
bearings, and has not yet been able to pick up new ones.3 
Although there is no available study of the process of the 
weakening of kin ties by alien forces in Uganda which estimates the 
extent of the process in 1945 or any other year, there have been a 
1uganda's urbanization, though limited, was however to prove 
indirectly a significant specific factor in the events of early 1945, 
which were in part touched off by a strike of low-income "urban" 
Africans in Kampala. See the discussion of the 1944 social situation 
and pressures for change in Chapter VIII. 
2 Though specifically referring to the Ngoni in Tanganyika, 
Gulliver's characterization of the contrasting European and African 
family types is excellent as of more general application. See P. H. 
Gulliver, Labour Migration in a Rural Economy: A Study of the Ngoni and 
Ndendeuli of Southern Tanganyika (East African Studies, No. 6; Kampala, 
Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955), p. 37. 
3Tongue, British Journal of Psychology, XXV, 357. 
198 
number of statements describing the phenomena both by reference to cases 
1 
and in generalizations. The evidence appears to dictate the tentative 
conclusion that the process had not gone anywhere near as far as was 
often commonly thought, and that ties especially with kin remained 
fairly strong in 1945. 
While kinship ties suffered only moderately in the process of 
social change, two other traditional social institutions were weakened 
to some extent by the forces of alien contact, although more so by 
British native administration policy. The first was the traditional 
societal entity of the village or local territorial community. Loyalty 
to a local chief usually provided the social cohesion of the territorial 
2 groups. These bonds of commonality very largely gradually fell away. 
The other institution was the traditional judicial system. Systems 
varied greatly from tribe to tribe, but with the coming of British 
administration the older ways of settling disputes were altered, some 
greatly and some not so much at first. Also, British law, as applied, 
often placed different values on actions from those assigned by 
traditional custom. 
Although the general view expressed in the sources is that the 
weakening of traditional institutions and values was not compensated for 
1For the disruptive effect of alien forces on, for example, the 
social institution of bride-wealth, see Hair, An African People •.• , 
pp. 69-70, 100, 275; Tongue, British Journal of Psychology, XXV, 361; 
Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African, pp. 57-58; Taylor, The Growth •.• , 
pp. 176-177. 
2Mair, An African People ••• , p. 276. In Buganda the primary 
cause was perhaps the new land system and the forces of economic indi-
vidualism. In the north in Acholi, for example, ties to the chiefdoms 
were weakened mostly by British policy. 
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by new ones, some new organizations were formed which were cooperative 
or communal and yet which were not traditionally derived. The total 
effect of these new organizations on the 1944 social situation was, 
however, minor. 
Summary 
To summarize the conclusions reached so far with respect to the 
sociological aspects of alien contact and influence, in the last years 
up to 1945 school facilities were available in Uganda for less than half 
of the school age population. The great majority of those receiving 
education were in primary schools and many obtained no more than two 
years of instruction. Places in secondary schools were extremely 
limited. Post-secondary education was miniscule, African university 
graduates in Uganda were practically nonexistent. 
As to content of education, it was literary at the lower levels 
and became less academic and more technical and professional at the 
upper levels. With the taking over by the Government from the missions 
of greater responsibilities for education, there was a move toward 
secularization. But there was no real decrease in the social divisions 
which had grown up in all tribes between Protestants and Roman Catholics 
as a consequence of rival evangelism, strongly reinforced by the two 
separate school structures paralleling the religious faiths. 
A policy of increased African say in education was announced but 
unimplemented by 1945. Likewise, little progress had been made in 
cultivating English as a lingua franca to bridge the communication voids 
between tribes and races. 
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Of the different African groups in the Protectorate, the Baganda 
were far ahead of the other tribes in numbers educated at all levels, 
and especially at the higher levels. Also, the need to pay school fees 
resulted in a preponderance of students who came from more privileged 
families, groups, or classes in the various tribal societies. 
Alien contact and influence occasioned other sociological 
effects. The change in valued ends and means placed the traditional 
expression of social mobility into a new context. In Buganda, oppor-
tunities to advance in social status declined and then again broadened, 
although in time the more educated Baganda found a rise in status 
through the Baganda political heirarchy was in practice denied to them, 
and they had to be content with status deriving from central government 
employment. In the rest of the areas of the Protectorate social 
mobility remained at probably the same degree as in traditional times, 
despite the greatly changed situation. 
There were additional features, of an anti-traditional nature, 
resulting from alien contact and influence. Some represented more 
change than others. In the latter category, modern urbanization did not 
occur in Uganda in notable extent; loosened kin ties were evident but 
were not a pervasively marked characteristic of the African societies of 
the period; and the new social organizations which were formed appeared 
to be of minor consequence at the end of 1944. As to the 
antictraditional features reflecting greater change, in which inciden-
tally alien contact and influence played a lesser role than British 
native administration policy, one was the demise of loyalties to the 
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smaller, local territorial social entities of the past. The other was 
the gradual and partial replacement of traditional judicial institutions 
and "laws" by those evolved by the British as an empirical, pragmatic 
synthesis of the old tribal and the new Western. 
The various sociological features of alien contact and influence 
which have been described--Western education, social mobility, and 
urbanization and other anti-traditional features--had important conse-
quences in the parts they played in the shaping of the total evolving 
social situation and thus of political change. There were in the 
features elements which were dynamic to the social situation and 
stimulative to social and political change. But there were also 
elements which acted to preclude certain types of pressures for change 
and limit the extent of others. 
IV. RELIGIOUS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FEATURES OF CONTACT 
In considering religious and then psychological features of 
alien influence and contact, the concern is with those aspects which 
were most meaningful for political change and for social change of 
political importance. 
Christian Evangelization 
The four main religious forces in Uganda from the year 1879 were 
the traditional religions, commonly referred to as paganism, the 
Protestant and the Catholic faiths, and Islam. The Christian religions 
became overwhelmingly dominant for a number of reasons, most of which 
have been indicated at various points earlier in the study. They 
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constituted a powerful force for change. One of the ways they brought 
about change was through education. Second, also dealt with in the 
discussion of sociological aspects of alien contact, was their social-
ization of two distinct groups (Protestant and Catholic) throughout 
Uganda, groups which came to constitute political divisions in some 
areas. 
Other manifestations of the influence of Christian missionaries 
must be given brief attention, but first an idea of the extent of the 
conversions to Christianity is in order. Table 4 below provides some 
figures. Two things stand out: the large number of conversions for the 
Protectorate as a whole; and the particularly high proportion of 
1 Christian Africans in Buganda. 
As regards the latter, Roland Oliver, who has written the 
authoritative study of missionary influence in East Africa, has stated 
that the 1911 proportion of Christians in Buganda "cannot have been 
approached in any other tribe in East Africa." He went on to add that 
it 
must be explained by the fact that in Buganda the establishment 
of European government marked only the final stage of a political 
and social revolution in which Christianity had played from the 
first a prominent part ...• In the remaining districts of the 
Protectorate the revolution which gave Christianity its opportunity 
was that set in motion by the European government itself, though 
even here the figure of 140,000 Christians, out of an approximate 
total of 2,000,000 is high enough to suggest that the employment 
1Attention must be drawn to the fact that the figures relate to 
Africans in Buganda, not to Baganda. However, it may be assumed that 
the great majority of the African Christians in Buganda were Baganda, 
since most other Africans within the Kingdom were temporary laborers 
from the poorer areas, which were characterized also by less alien 
contact. 
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TABLE 4. - Number of Protestants and Catholics in African population of 
Uganda, 1911-1946a 
Religious 
Denomination 
Catholics: 
In Buganda 
In All of Uganda 
Protestants: 
In Buganda 
In All of Uganda 
Total Christians: 
In Buganda 
In All of Uganda 
Total Africans: 
In Buganda 
In All of Uganda 
1911 
155 
127 
282 
422 
660 
2,840 
Numbers in Thousands 
1914 1931 1938 
225 407 477 
203 392 300 
428 777 
3,536 
1946 
[ 461] b 
861 
[375]b 
573 
[ 846] b 
1,424 
[1,250]b 
3,931 
aDuring this period Catholic and Protestant for all practical 
purposes referred to Roman Catholic and Anglican respectively. 
Blanks indicate data were not available. 
The source for the 1911 figures was Roland Oliver, The Mission-
ary Factor in East Africa (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), pp. 
193-194, citing the 1911 Census. Figures for Christians outside of 
Buganda were not broken down by denominations. 
The source for the 1931 figures was Thomas and Scott, p. 327, 
citing the 1931 Census. It was added that the Christians in Buganda 
represented 58.4 per cent of that Kingdom's population. 
Excepting the bracketed 1946 data, the source for the religious 
breakdowns for 1914, 1938, and 1946 were calculated from Oliver, The 
Missionary Factor •.. , pp. 234, 236. The 1946 figure for total 
Africans in Uganda was an official estimate, described as probably low, 
in GB, CO, Annual Report on Uganda ..• 1946, p. 9. 
bData for 1946 were not available for Buganda, and the bracketed 
figures were official estimates for 1945. These also indicated the 
following: Moslems, 135,000; Pagans, 278,000. Uganda Protectorate, 
Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western 
Province, for the Period 1939-1946 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 
1949), p. 13. Cited hereafter as UP, Annual [Provincial) Reports 
..• 1939-1946. 
of Baganda in the extension of administration to other tribes, 
though it came later to be resented by the peoples concerned, 
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did much in the early stages to smooth the progress of Christianity 
through Baganda evangelists and to disguise the connection of the 
movement with its European originators.l 
The importance of the conversions was greatly heightened by the 
exclusively dominant position which Christianity assumed, politically 
and socially. 2 In Buganda the Christians acquired complete control of 
the political system, and this brought the religion into undisputed 
0 3 
soc1al pre-eminence. The superiority of Buganda and of the Baganda in 
relation to the rest of the country, together with support given by 
British authorities, caused the high status accorded Christianity to be 
passed on to and accepted by the other tribes as a fact. Granted, there 
remained throughout all the period an undercurrent of paganism, occa-
sionally expressed in open form of one kind or another. But the pagans 
as well as the Muslims were of no social or political account when set 
4 
against the powerful Christians. 
The situation as described above makes all the more important 
the manifestations which the contact and influence of Christian 
1oliver, The Missionary Factor ..• , p. 194. For the role of 
the Baganda evangelists, see also pp. 182-183; and Taylor, The Growth 
0 0 ., pp. 63-64. 
2For some of the factors which, however, slowed the growth of 
the Anglican Church, see Taylor, The Growth •.. , pp. 71, 79-80. 
3n. A. Low, Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875-1900 (East 
African Studies, No. 8; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of 
Social Research, [1957]), pp. 9-11, 16; Oliver, The Missionary Factor 
..• , p. 289; Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African, p. 63. 
4J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala, 
Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 1958), pp. 200-201, 
203-206; Taylor, The Growth ••. , pp. 190-191, 207, 211-212. 
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missionaries occasioned. These may be restricted here to two major 
topics, one dealing with the very general question of the Africanization1 
of the churches and related matters, and the other with the Christian 
idea of human equality. 
The policy of the Anglican Church Missionary Society was to 
Africanize the native church at all lower and middle levels very 
rapidly. As for the direction at the top, the European missionaries 
were not of one mind. Bishop Tucker in the early years strongly favored 
more African say in the major policy decisions, but the bulk of the 
missionaries disagreed and were able to prevent Tucker's plan from being 
2 
carried. However, over the years, although the Europeans retained 
control at the senior levels, they gradually withdrew from evangelistic 
work into educational work. 3 Later the educational missionary staff was 
increasingly divorced from the direction of the senior ecclesiastical 
authorities. 
But in the minds of the Africans the increasing educational work 
of the missions identified the latter even more closely with the Govern-
ment than they had been in the past. It became urgent for the missions 
4 
to place Africans in more responsible positions. This was not easy for 
the Anglicans. The very early policy of rapidly making the church an 
1 The term Africanization is used here as the most appropriate, 
despite the fact that it did not come into vogue until after World War 
II. 
2 Taylor, The Growth .•. , pp. 71, 78, 82-88; Oliver, The 
Missionary Factor ... , pp. 218-221. 
3Taylor, The Growth ••• , pp. 91-96. 
4oliver, The Missionary Factor . . . , pp. 284-287. 
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indigenous one caused priorities to be given to training large numbers 
of Africans to serve as clergy at the parish level. The results were a 
lowering of standards for such appointments, and the failure to provide 
facilities for training equivalent to that received abroad by the 
European missionaries. 1 
The Roman Catholic Church used another approach. It insisted on 
training for its African priests which was as long and as demanding as 
that for European priests. The result was a much slower rate of 
Africanization. But once the indigenous products began to come forth 
from the seminaries, they were the equivalent of their foreign-born 
colleagues in all respects but color. (They were also treated as such, 
which cannot be said for the situation in the Anglican Church.) The 
first African Bishop in the Protectorate was a Roman Catholic, appointed 
in 1939. An indigenous Anglican Bishop was not appointed until 1947, 
and he was only an Assistant Bishop. 2 This is not meant to imply that 
there were fewer European Catholic missionaries than Anglican and that 
there was thus more African direction of the Catholic Church in Uganda. 
In fact, there were many more European Catholic missionaries than 
3 Anglican. But the point is that there were Africans who were the 
equals of the European priests in the Catholic church and this was not 
the case in the Anglican. 4 
. . . ' 
!Taylor, The Growth .. ,, p. 10; Oliver, The Missionary Factor 
pp. 139-140. 
~ulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 28. 
3see, for example, Taylor, The Growth ••• , pp. 92-93. 
4oliver, The Missionary Factor . . . ' p. 283. 
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One of the consequences of the retention of control of church 
affairs by European missionaries of the Church Missionary Society was a 
separatist movement which later became the African Greek Orthodox 
Church. Another was the potentially separatist movement known as the 
Balokole (The Saved Ones), which was, however, kept within the church as 
a revivalist movement. 1 The Catholics were not troubled by similar 
developments. 
What was the significance of these developments to change, 
especially political change? The answer is to be found in a considera-
tion of the other major manifestation of Christian evangelization--the 
preaching of the individualistic idea of the supreme value of the person 
2 
and the equality of all in the sight of God. How extensively was the 
idea communicated; what was its impact in practice? These are important 
questions in any study dealing with change, especially change in 
political institutions. 3 
It must be assumed that there was an extremely wide opportunity 
for the idea to be disseminated. Christianity, as already pointed out, 
lone authority has attributed the absence of a split here to 
certain characteristics of the Baganda, among whom the movement received 
most support. He has held that the Baganda had a deep aversion 
generally to schism; and that their instinct was one for coherence and 
order, Taylor, The Growth .•. , pp. 98-99. For a description of the 
movement, see pp. 102-104, 226. 
2Powesland, p. 12. 
3The "individualistic" as contrasted to the "equality" expres-
sion of the Christian concept had consequences of economic and socio-
logical importance. These have been noted in preceding sections, 
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1 
was the socially approved religion. Of equal importance was the 
missions' almost complete control of all educational facilities. 
Throughout the entire period, despite some change as a result of 
government policy in the late 1930's, the evangelical purpose and flavor 
of mission education remained strong. Religious indoctrination and 
2 
education continued to be synonymous. 
Just to what extent the one particular idea of equality was 
advanced in these most propitious circumstances for propaganda is not 
known. That some of the indigenous peoples were strongly imbued with it 
is clear from the rise of the separatist and the revivalist movements 
mentioned above; these were both protests against the idea of European 
3 
superiority. 
On the whole, however, it is believed that even if the idea of 
equality was widely taught, it was either taught in conjunction with an 
equal-but-different concept, or its effects were minimized by other 
factors. One of these was the heirarchical nature of authority in both 
the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches. There, superior-inferior 
relationships were clear. They corresponded in kind to many of the 
social and political relationships which were part and parcel of the 
1J. B. Purvis, Through Uganda to Mount Elgon (London: T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1909), pp. 199-200; Taylor, The Growth •.• , p. 177. 
2c. w. Hattersley, Uganda by Pen and Camera (Philadelphia: The 
Union Press, 1907), pp. 75-76; Goldthorpe, Outlines .•. , p. 211. 
3John V. Taylor, Processes of Growth in an African Church 
(International Missionary Council Research Pamphlets, No. 6; London: 
SCM Press Ltd., 1958), pp. 12-13, 15-17. 
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traditional ~ystems of the four Kingdoms. l Thus they were not strange. 
Another factor was the paternalistic attitude of Anglican 
European missionary staff and of government officials. Their actions 
and their general way of life contradicted any idea of their equality 
with their fellow African Christians. 2 (This was not true of the 
Catholic priests, who lived simple, self-denying lives. 3) 
The conclusion to be reached from the evidence is that although 
the Christian missionaries, as agents of contact, presumably taught the 
politically explosive doctrine of human equality and equal rights, for 
various reasons its consequences in terms of social and political change 
were very limited in contrast to the possibilities. 
The Psychological Reaction 
What was the psychological reaction to alien contact and 
influence? There is sufficient general evidence to indicate only the 
very broad lines of one aspect--that dealing with the relationships of 
inferiority and superiority. 4 
That there was a definite reaction to presumptions by Europeans 
. 5 
of superiority, especially among the Baganda, 1s clear. There is no 
lTaylor, Processes of Growth 
2Taylor, Processes of Growth 
.• pp. 13-15. 
., pp. 12-17;Bell, pp. 194-195. 
3 w. J. Ansorge, Under the African Sun (New York: Longmans, Green, 
and Co., 1899), p. 133; Oliver, The Missionary Factor ..• , p. 242. 
4some further observations of a psychological nature concerning 
the various tribes have been made in Taylor, The Growth .•. ; see, for 
example, p. 142. 
5Taylor, The Growth .•. , pp. 98, 146-147, 220-222; George W. 
Shepherd, Jr., They Wait in Darkness (New York: The John Day Company, 
1955), p. 84. 
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evidence to indicate that it was at all substantial elsewhere in the 
1905-1945 period. Nowhere was it a source of deep and widespread 
resentment, except perhaps in Buganda in the last two or three years 
before 1945. Two factors may explain this. They are advanced in the 
nature of speculations. One was the pride of the Baganda in their own 
culture and past, and their readiness to learn from the Europeans all of 
the best that these products of Western civilization had to pass on. 1 
The other was the generally less racially oriented legislation and 
atmosphere in Uganda compared to Kenya, for example. Racial discrimina-
tion in Uganda was less acutely a conscious element, 2 
There was a still different type of superior-inferior psycho-
logical feeling very evident in Uganda. It was the Baganda conviction 
of their greatly higher status and worth compared to the other tribes, 
especially those in the north. To what extent the many expressions of 
3 this were resented by the other tribes is not known, But it is clear 
that the actions and the attitudes of the British officials and other 
alien agents of contact, operating as they did to favor the development 
of the Baganda, heightened the conviction of that tribe of its 
lc. C. Wrigley, "The Christian Revolution in Buganda," Compara-
tive Studies in Society and History, II (October, 1959), 46; L. A. 
Fallers, "Despotism, Status Culture and Social Mobility in an African 
Kingdom," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (October, 1959), 
29. 
2Goldthorpe, Outlines 
. . . ' pp. 252-277, especially p. 260. 
3Fallers has inferred that the non-Bantu peoples, from their 
different value-orientations, have in turn looked down on the Bantu. 
Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict 
in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge, 
England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [1956]), p. 25. 
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superiority to Africans in less developed areas. 
V. THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONTACT 
Obviously the most political of all the aspects of alien contact 
and influence is that which related to British policy. But to the 
extent possible this has been excepted from the force considered in the 
chapter and is accorded separate treatment in Part II. 
Here the intention is now to extract out of the previous 
discussion what constitutes a listing of the economic, sociological, 
religious, and psychological aspects of contact which seem of particular 
political significance. It is done first with regard to the features of 
contact which bear indirectly on political change by reason of their 
consequences for the social situation. Then considered are the more 
direct effects of alien contact on political change. 
Consequences of Contact for the Social Situation 
One of the five major forces shaping political change is the 
social situation, and it includes the extent of the drives for social 
change existing in the situation. Both the social situation and its 
pressures for change are viewed as conditioned by the other four forces. 
The role of alien contact and influence is especially important in this 
connection. 
The manifestations of alien contact and influence pertinent to 
the social situation and social change are analyzed later and may be 
merely listed here. 
The economic features were the development of the peasant-based 
cash crop economy, together with its implications for the composition 
and roles of the non-African communities, for the level of social 
1 discontent, and for the extent of what some have called detribaliza-
tion. 
The sociological manifestations were the extremely high value 
which Western education assumed in the African value systems, yet the 
limited extent to which it reached the indigenous population both in 
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quantity and in level. Other consequences were the socialization of two 
Uganda-wide groups in each part of the country as a result of the 
Protestant-Catholic dichotomy; the absence of a lingua franca; changes 
in the determinants but not in the degree of social mobility; and the 
generally limited extent of anti-traditional features of contact such as 
urbanization. 
The principal result of alien contact of a religious nature was 
Christian evangelization, with its individualistic orientation and its 
concept of human equality before God. The latter was restricted in 
social impact. 
Psychological effects were evident, but they were apparently 
limited mostly to the Baganda. Even here there was a high degree of 
rationalization of everyday proofs of European superiority in relation-
ships. 
An especially significant development for the social situation 
characterized all of these general kinds of alien contact and influence--
lAlthough there have been some ill effects from cash crop 
production, according to one informed observer the development brought 
great material benefits generally to native producers. John H. Dean, 
p. 15. 
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economic, sociological, religious, and psychological. It was the 
immense variation by area, and more pertinently by tribe, in the 
duration and intensity of the contact and influence. In practically 
every feature and manifestation these were greater in the case of the 
Baganda, decreasing with their neighbor Bantu tribes, and then further 
1 declining as the distance from Buganda's capital lengthened. To 
mention the two most important features, Buganda was the early leader in 
cash crop production and in education. The lead was progressively 
widened over almost all tribes. 2 The position of the Baganda among the 
other tribes, in the total context of the social situation, loomed even 
larger in proportion in 1945 than it had in 1905. 3 
Alien Contact's Direct Role in Political Change 
It is not possible, without anticipating much of the material 
yet to be presented in Part II, to furnish at this stage an analysis in 
depth of the part played more directly by the force of alien contact and 
influence in political change in Uganda in 1905-1945. However, it is 
1see Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa 
(Northwestern University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 57; Edward H. Winter, Bwamba: A Structural-Func-
tional Analysis of a Patrilineal Society (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer 
& Sons Limited, [1956}), pp. 4, 7, 228, 232-233, 237. 
2The slow start of other areas was largely a consequence of lack 
of transport facilities, especially roads. [Great Britain, Colonial 
Office,] Uganda. Report for 1907-8, Cd. 4448-9 (London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1909), pp. 4-5, 7. 
3For example, an Advisory Council on Education established in 
1925 had representatives of Government and of the Missions. The only 
Africans were representatives of the Kabaka, Ingham, The Making ••• , 
p. 162. 
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desirable briefly to sketch the outlines of the force's consequences to 
point up the relevance of the findings of the chapter to the problem and 
thesis as stated in the Introduction. 
The role of alien contact and influence as a force positively 
activating generalized political change was a minor one. In one sense 
the force might, therefore, be described as insignificant. However, in 
that it did not result in a pronounced measure of certain phenomena in 
relation to the possibilities, it was a force which significantly 
operated to preclude the rise of pressures for political change and thus 
to limit the probability of change. It produced neither an agricultural 
nor a large wage earning "proletariat" with a deep sense of grievance. 
It created neither a recognizable prosperous middle class desirous of 
gaining more power nor a collectively disgruntled educated African 
elite. Nor did it contribute to the rise of nativistic movements, 
largely because of the determination of the Baganda to preserve their 
own culture while absorbing new learning. 1 
What of alien contact and influence as a force conditioning 
political change of a specific kind--change in the institutions for 
governing the African population at the tribal and territorial levels? 
Except as it acted in the above negative sense to preclude certain 
political pressures for change, alien contact had no appreciable direct 
effect on change in the central institutions of the Protectorate. It 
1These were all distinctly possible consequences of the impact 
of alien contact and influence. They have actually occurred in other 
African territories. James S. Coleman, American Political Science 
Review, XLVIII, 410-412. 
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was a different matter, however, with the political institutions at the 
tribal level. 
One feature of alien contact was found throughout most of the 
local areas of the Protectorate. This was an innovation in an aspect of 
traditional political institutions--the creation of a new set of 
membership groups, namely, those based on religious divisions. In 
Buganda the development occurred prior to 1905, in most other areas 
after. In Buganda and some other places, the divisions were of direct 
and appreciable political significance; in a few places religious groups 
1 
were not identified with political alignments. 
The force of alien contact and influence otherwise played very 
different--and because of this, highly significant--roles in the two 
generally variant areas of the country, which may be called the direct 
2 
rule and the indirect rule areas. In the latter area, meaning in 
Buganda, alien contact and influence was assimilated and absorbed by the 
1For example, it has been reported that Busoga and Teso never 
suffered from religious-political "distemper" between World War I and a 
time toward the end of World War II, as did the rest of the Eastern 
Province. UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports .•• 1939-1946, p. 38. 
Another source has stated that religion as a political force 
slipped into the background in Buganda soon after 1900. Ingham, The 
Making ..• , pp. 122-123. Other evidence tends to contradict the 
statement. A Muganda who has been perhaps the oft-times leading African 
intellectual of the Protectorate wrote in 1945 that the Christian 
religion had split the society of Buganda "to an unfortunate degree." 
He added that "hostility and jealousy, political and social, grew 
between the sects and one man hates another as if they were enemies." 
Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African, .p. 52. At the same time, Mulira 
was also warm in the praise of Christianity's benefits (p. 63). 
2The three 
not decidedly so. 
Chapter VI. 
smaller Kingdoms and Busoga were directly ruled but 
The distinctions are set forth in more detail in 
216 
1 political system and by the people. The results represented an 
adaptation. There was no loss of the identity of the people as a whole, 
that is, as a nation--for this is what they in effect considered 
themselves. The numerous consequences for Buganda served to strengthen 
the Kingdom's position absolutely and relatively in the Protectorate 
much more than to weaken it. 
In the direct rule areas the features of alien contact and 
influence were far less pronounced. Their effects were also quite in 
contrast. Economic change, Western education, and Christianity acted 
much more in the manner of disruptive forces; they were hardly at all 
assimilated by the existing cultures as they were in Buganda. Though 
much less so than British policy, they contributed to fundamental and 
widespread change in political institutions. 
These three features of alien contact had another effect by 
reason of their limited duration and intensity, compared to that in 
Buganda. Because they were later in coming to the areas of more direct 
rule, and because the features were less widespread and intensive in 
incidence, the peoples there were not as well equipped to understand the 
nature and purpose of the new alien political institutions which they 
had been given and by which they were governed at the local level. 
Because they were poorly equipped in this way, the inhabitants of the 
decidedly direct rule areas were hardly in a position to appreciate the 
1For a Muganda's view of the desirability of this method, see 
Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African, pp. 53-54; for a somewhat earlier 
similar expression of opinion by a discerning British official, see 
Tongue, British Journal of Psychology, XXV, 364. 
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value of the institutions. It follows logically that one of the main 
reasons--if not the principal one--why the new political institutions in 
the more direct rule areas were not accorded any noticeable legitimacy 
was because the extent of alien contact and influence had been so very 
restricted compared to Buganda. The point is considered further at 
later stages of the study, where certain exceptions to the above 
generalizations are taken into account. 
Conclusions 
There was, then, a situation whereby a greater extent of alien 
contact and influence resulted in Buganda in a gain in that tribe's 
attributes of political strength, and no appreciable loss of legitimacy 
by its political system in the 1905-1945 period; whereas in the areas of 
quite direct rule, for very different reasons the much more limited 
extent of alien contact and influence served to undermine traditional 
political authority among the peoples, and yet on the other hand it was 
insufficient to facilitate the legitimization of their new political 
systems. 
The very different reasons for the contrasting results related 
to variations in the nature of the traditional political systems and in 
British policy. The latter is discussed in Part II. The former was 
treated in the last chapter. There the Buganda traditional political 
system was found to be favorably endowed with both. attributes of 
political solidarity and with resources, as well as adaptable in large 
measure--in fact already much adapted by 1905. This explains to a 
considerable degree the results of alien contact and influence in 
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Buganda. 
The political systems of the tribes in the direct rule area, 
such as the Acholi, Lango, Iteso, Bagisu, and Bakiga--these, on the 
other hand, were found to be either nonexistent as tribal traditional 
political systems, or to have had political systems which were 
characterized by a paucity of resources and of factors contributing to 
political solidarity. Alien contact and influence, though much more 
limited than in Buganda, had less to oppose it; therefore it was more 
disruptive. What adaptability the weakly organized tribal political 
systems had did not prove to be instrumental in their survival for, as 
is shown later, it was British policy which brought about their dis-
1 placement. And Chapter III has already illustrated how British native 
administration policy introduced an entirely new, non-traditional 
political system for the Iteso and the Bagisu. 
1The effects of British policy on the Acholi political system are 
discussed in Chapter VI. The Lango traditional system's displacement is 
analyzed in the material at the end of Appendix IV. 
PART II 
BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN UGANDA, 1905-1945 
CAAPnRV 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
At the beginning of the study five major variable forces shaping 
political change in Africa were distinguished--the traditional African 
political systems, the policies of the colonial powers, alien contact 
and influence, events and issues, and the social situation and social 
change. The problem and thesis were focused on the role of the second 
force in Uganda during the forty years prior to 1945, as it interacted 
with the other forces to shape political change in the governmental 
institutions at the central and local levels. 
As background to Part II's description of British policy as a 
major variable force and the review of policy's interaction with the 
other forces, Part I dealt with several of the elements in the situa-
tion. A chronicle of the more important events up to 1905 was first 
provided. The physical factors of the environment and some of the 
characteristics of the embryonic social situation were set down in the 
second chapter. Chapter III rendered a lengthy but nevertheless summary 
account of the complex nature of the traditional African polities, 
showing which of these existed as traditional systems and therefore as 
elements of that major variable force at the beginning of the 1905-1945 
period. The final topic considered in Part I was the force designated 
as alien contact and influence, as it manifested itself up to 1945. 
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The conclusions reached in various sections of Part I are 
incorporated at appropriate points in Part II. 
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The consideration of British policy in Uganda which now follows 
is divided into four principal subjects. The first, discussed in this 
chapter, is concerned with policies relating to economic and social 
development. Next to be given attention are the methods of native 
administration used by the British authorities in Uganda--a question 
particularly crucial to the entire study. Following the discussion of 
the governmental institutions at the local, tribal level, the Protector-
ate's central governmental institutions are treated. Part II concludes 
with a review of the interaction of British policy with the four other 
major forces. 
I. PROLOGUE 
With regard to policies affecting economic and social develop-
ment, some of these were more important than others; some related 
directly and some only indirectly to political change. Those which have 
been chosen for consideration are the vital land policies, certain 
policies on agriculture and labor, and policies on social services, 
especially education. One of the primary aims of the chapter is to show 
how most of these policies played a major role in shaping the force of 
alien contact and influence, in this way operating generally to limit 
pressures for social and political change in the Protectorate while at 
the same time furthering different rates of economic and social develop-
ment in different parts of Uganda. 
Before proceeding with the land policies, a few points should be 
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mentioned to provide perspective for the succeeding sections dealing 
with the economic and social policies. 
During the period before World War II all of the colonial powers 
in Africa considered self-government for their colonies a remote 
possibility. 1 Great Britain was, then, no exception in expecting that 
there was plenty of time to develop the British territories economically 
and socially to prepare their peoples for greater autonomy. 
The general guide lines for development were provided by the 
2 dual mandate concept, which by the end of World war I had evolved into 
1The generalized statements about colonial policies elsewhere 
in Africa, which follow here and in the introductory sections of the 
next two chapters, derive from cumulative study. Two competent works, 
of contrasting scope but both of which have proved invaluable as 
survey-type sources, are the following: Lord Hailey, An African Survey, 
Revised, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), Chapters V, VI, 
and VIII; and Kenneth Robinson, "Colonial Issues and Policies with 
Special Reference to Tropical Africa," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 84-94. A partic-
ularly discerning book, limited to British territories, is Sir Andrew 
Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Northwestern University 
African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), 
especially pp. 30-31 and 34-35, which deal with pre-1945 policies. 
2The idea of the dual mandate derived from the concept of trust 
as successively elaborated by Burke, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Joseph 
Chamberlain. Rita Hinden, Empire and After: A Study of British Imperial 
Attitudes (London: Essential Books Limited, 1949), pp. 38-40, 73-74. It 
was more definitively phrased by Lugard, who stated the idea at an early 
date in the following words: "the development of the tropics, with a view 
both to the good of the natives inhabiting those countries, and also to 
the increasing wants of European nations as far as raw materials for 
manufactures were concerned." In George Wilson, "The Progress of the 
Uganda Protectorate," Journal of the Society of Arts, LV (February, 
1907), 298. Lugard's views were set forth during the discussion 
following the reading of Wilson's paper at the January 15, 1907, meeting 
of the Society's Colonial Section. 
See also Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office (New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc, 1956), pp. 109-110; P. G. Powesland, 
Economic Policy and Labour, ed. W. Elkan (East African Studies, No. 10; 
Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957), p. 15; 
John Taylor, Christianity and Politics in Africa (London: Penguin Books, 
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a policy of trusteeship. The difference in the latter was that it 
concentrated somewhat more on the welfare of the indigenous peoples and 
less on their contribution to the world at large or to non-indigenous 
resident communities. The shift in emphasis was, however, a fairly 
gradual one. Its speed was somewhat greater in those territories where 
there was no large non-African--especially European--settler community. 
1 It was noticeably slow where such immigrant vested interests existed. 
2 Uganda was in the former category, and some of the reasons are ex-
plained in the discussion of land policies. 
In the British territories--and presumably also in the colonies 
of other powers--there were two pre-conditions, however, to any social 
or economic development. Political stability had to be maintained, that 
is, law and order; and, in effect all development had to be financed 
from the territory's own revenues. 3 
With regard to these two prerequisites, Uganda had started out 
its history as a British Protectorate very badly. In addition to the 
need for numerous "punitive expeditions" to establish order even as late 
as the second decade of the twentieth century, the administration of the 
1957), pp. 92-93. 
1For example, in Kenya. Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 
1956, p. 192; Cohen, pp. 21-22. 
2Powesland, pp. 38-39, 46. 
3Hailey, An African Survev. Revised, 1956, p. 202; Cohen, pp. 
16-17. Aid from the mother country was limited. See the discussion of 
the Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1940 in the chapter's later 
section dealing with social services in general, where the 1929 Act is 
also mentioned. 
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territory in earlier years had represented a continual annual drain on 
the British Treasury. For the financial years following the Sudanese 
Mutiny in 1897 and 1898, this reached 339,000 and 397,000 pounds 
sterling respectively. By 1905 it had dropped to 140,000 pounds 
sterling. It was not possible to discontinue grants-in-aid until the 
year 1915-1916. 1 
It is reasonable to assume that the whole question of social 
development was one which the government necessarily had to defer in the 
early years, given the limitations set by policy. The urgent require-
ment was the development of the Protectorate's resources so that the 
British Treasury--and therefore the British taxpayer "at home"--would 
not have to pay for Uganda's normal expenses of administration. One 
reason the British Government went .ahead with the controversial and 
costly plan to build the Uganda Railway late in the 1890's was the hope 
it would enable Uganda to pay its own way. And this is what it did in 
the course of the decade after 1905. 
The other drain on Uganda's resources was occasioned by the 
sleeping sickness epidemic, which broke out shortly after 1900 and was 
not brought under fairly complete control until 1920. Money which might 
otherwise have been spent on more roads to open up additional 
cotton-growing areas had to be spent on health measures, including 
2 
evacuation and resettlement of thousands of people. 
lKenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), pp. 86, 115, 158. 
2rngham, The Making .•• pp. 127-130. 
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It is perhaps clear from the above that Uganda was not in a good 
position during the first years of the period to carry out much in the 
way of development of social services. Only later was this possible. 
The first concern was with production of anything which would bring the 
territory revenue. 
With reference to land policies, certain points brought out in 
other connections in Part I may be restated. Although cotton production 
would no doubt have been developed in any event, the land tenure system 
in Buganda which was introduced by the Agreement of 1900 considerably 
facilitated the growth of the cultivation of this cash crop, and later 
of coffee. Cotton and coffee production increased the value of land to 
1 
the individual Muganda who held title to it. Also, land continued to 
be accorded a special political significance from earlier traditional 
times. Land was, therefore, not only a question vital to the urgently 
needed economic development, it was also of marked political importance 
to the Baganda. Their feelings on the matter later spread to other 
tribes. 
II. THE LAND POLICIES 
Of the early British policies which proved important in shaping 
Uganda's political future, one of unusual significance was the 
1see, for example, J. E. Goldthorpe, "An African Elite: A Sample 
Survey of Fifty-two Former Students of Makerere College in East Africa," 
British Journal of Sociology, VI (March, 1955), 36; Lord Hailey, Native 
Administration in the British African Territories, Part I: East Africa: 
Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika ([Great Britain,] Colonial Office; London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 7. 
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non-alienation of land policy. It set the stage for future political 
developments in Uganda in a way which was crucial. Yet once it was 
finalized, thereby excluding other possibilities, the policy was taken 
for granted and tended to be forgotten as a major factor in subsequent 
live political events. Except as it was revived in connection with 
periodic fears of federation of East Africa, which are briefly docu-
1 
mented later, the policy assumed the character of a silent immovable 
force in the situation. This was enhanced by its negative statement--
land in Uganda was not to be sold to non-Africans. The chief conse-
quence was the effective discouragement of a large settler element with 
vested interests. Certain special problems and the intensification of 
others, usually occasioned by the pressure of such an alien element, 
were thus excluded from the Uganda scene. 
It would perhaps suffice to write that the Secretary of State 
declared the above policy as a temporary measure late in 1915, and that 
it was never changed. However, the history of the policy provides an 
excellent illustration of the diversity of the elements, within and 
without the Protectorate, which molded vital decisions affecting the 
territory. A feel for the general policy process in the Protectorate is 
considered a positive aid to the proper understanding of British policy 
in Uganda as one of the five major forces of the analysis. To contribute 
to that understanding, the non-alienation of land policy is singled out 
for more detailed attention. 
Afterward, the second major land policy--the compulsory 
lin Chapter VII. 
227 
acquisition of land for public purposes--is examined. By 1944 the 
latter policy had flared up in Buganda as a decisive and far from silent 
political issue. 
The Non-Alienation of Land Policy 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the non-alienation of land 
policy as it evolved, certain figures, though summarizing the situation 
at the end of the period under review and therefore anticipating the 
conclusions, will help to underscore the significance of the policy 
which kept almost all of Uganda's land for its native African popula-
tion. 
The total area of Uganda has been officially recorded as 
amounting to 93,981 square miles, 13,689 of this being open water. A 
few years ago the balance--80,292 square miles, including 5,670 miles 
of swamp--was divided as indicated in Table 5 below. 
TABLE 5. - Division of land in Uganda, by nature of allotment, 1953a 
Nature of Allotment 
Land Allotted to Individual Africans under: 
Buganda Agreement 
Ankole and Toro Agreements 
Eastern Province special grants 
Total 
Crown Land in Eastern, Northern, and Western 
Provinces for African Use and Benefit: 
Crown Land in Buganda 
Land Owned or Occupied by Non-Indigenous Population: 
Buganda 
Eastern Province 
Western and Northern Provinces 
Total 
Grand Total 
Square Miles 
9,003 
710 
25 
9,738 
62,087 
7,943 
349 
71 
1~ 
524 
80,292 
aSource: [Great Britain,] Colonial Office, Report on Uganda 
for the Year 1953 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), 
p. 40. Data for the year 1945 were not available, but an indication 
of how little the situation changed since 1935 can be obtained from 
H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1935), p. 105. 
The history of the policy of non-alienation of land may be 
divided into three periods: the earlier events and circumstances, 1 
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1some preceded 1905. The land policy was a crucial one in 
several respects, and reference to certain developments prior to 1905 is 
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leading up to the 1915 declaration; the 1915-1921 period, during which 
the policy was to all events finalized; and the subsequent developments. 
The early vacillating policies. In the first years of British 
contact with Uganda before the turn of the century, there was no settled 
land policy at all, either for African or European land ownership or 
land use. 
By 1905 the situation had become clear in some ways. The 1900 
Agreement with Buganda had provided that freehold titles to all the 
occupied land, amounting to about half the land in the Kingdom, would be 
given to certain Baganda chiefs and other claimants; and that the 
balance of the land--"waste and uncultivated" was the phrase used--would 
be considered as Crown Land. 
Agreements in 1900 and 1901 with the Kingdoms of Toro and Ankole 
respectively provided for the grant of some of the occupied land there 
as private estates to the rulers and chiefs. Although the disposition 
of the rest of the occupied land in the two Kingdoms was not made clear 
for many years, it later came to be regarded as Crown Land, along with 
the originally specified Crown Land, which was waste and uncultivated. 
In the remainder of the Protectorate, all unoccupied land was 
likewise regarded as Crown Land as of 1902, by reason of an 1899 opinion 
solicited by the Foreign Office from the Law Officers of the Crown. It 
gave to the Protecting Power rights over all waste and uncultivated 
lands in areas inhabited by "savage" tribes lacking settled governments. 
A Uganda ordinance of 1922 cleared up the status of the land occupied by 
necessary to an adequate understanding of the shape it finally assumed. 
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natives but without any particular grant of title. This class of land 
officially became Crown Land by the 1922 ordinance, 
ment in practice fully recognized the rights of the 
though the Govern-
. 1 
occup1.ers. 
Given a situation where practically all the land was held either 
in freehold by natives or by the Government as Crown Land, what was the 
official policy on letting non-Africans acquire land, either from the 
African owners or from the Government; in other words, what was the 
Government's policy on alienation of land in the early years? 
Sir Harry Johnston, Uganda's Special Commissioner in 1900, was 
not in favor of alienating land to European settlers or to European 
2 
companies for plantation development. He preferred to try other ways 
3 first. By 1900 a few grants had already been given to missionaries and 
trading interests and these had been registered; but they were not 
extensive. And then Johnston issued a proclamation that no foreigner 
could acquire land from a native without the consent of the Protectorate 
1The following sources provided information for the preceding 
summary: H. B. Thomas and A. E. Spencer, A History of Uganda Land and 
Surveys and of the Uganda Land and Survey Department (Entebbe, Uganda: 
Government Press, 1938), pp. 45-55; Lord Hailey, African Survey (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 759-762. 
2Lugard, the other prominent British figure in Uganda's early 
years, very likely expected that there would be substantial grants of 
land to non-Africans so Uganda could make her contribution to world 
trade in accordance with the developing concept of the dual mandate. 
W. J. Ansorge, Under the African Sun (New York: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1899), p. 45; Ingham, The Making •.. , p. 105. Ingham's statement 
that Johnston also expected Uganda to develop through European planta-
tions is open to question. 
3Powesland, p. 15; Herbert Samuel, "The Uganda of Today," 
Journal of the Society of Arts, LI (March, 1903), 396-397. 
1 
administration. 
In instructions to Colonel Sadler, Johnston's successor as 
Commissioner, the Foreign Office did not echo Johnston's reserved 
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attitude toward white settlement. Sadler was informed that Johnston's 
report had described Uganda as a safe and inviting prospect for settle-
ment and investment by Britishers. It was the "earnest desire of His 
Majesty's Government" that capital and settlers be attracted to the 
Protectorates of East Africa [Kenya} and Uganda. The new Commissioner 
was told to spare no efforts to encourage them, yet to "make it clear to 
intending settlers and others that they must rely on their own efforts 
2 
and not on pecuniary support from the Administration." 
Did the new Commissioner prove to be in tune with his superiors 
in London? Apparently there was no divergence of view. Colonel Sadler 
did make clear that grants of lands must not interfere with native 
rights; also, that Uganda was not the place for settlers of the British 
farmer type--neither was the climate conducive nor was it advisable for 
white men to work side by side in the field with natives, presumably 
3 because white prestige would suffer. However, subject to these 
l[Great Britain, Foreign Office,} Preliminary Report by Her 
Majesty's Special Commissioner on the Protectorate of Uganda, Africa 
series, No. 6 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1900), p. 14. 
2[Great Britain, Foreign Office,} Instructions to Lieutenant-
Colonel J. H. Sadler on Appointment as His Majesty's Commissioner and 
Consul-General in the Uganda Protectorate, Africa series, No. 2 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), p. 1. See alsop. 3. The 
Foreign Office, fully anticipating an excess of expenses over revenue in 
Uganda for the first years, was careful not to add to the burden placed 
on the British Exchequer by encouraging other than responsible applicants. 
3[Great Britain, Foreign Office,} General Report on the Uganda 
Protectorate for the Year Ending March 31, 1904, Africa series, No. 12 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1904), p. 28 (cited hereafter 
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qualifications, the Commissioner in his public reports extolled Uganda 
as a land for white plantation-type settlers, who could make profits by 
supervising native labor in the production of cotton and coffee. There 
was no problem as to land, for it could be obtained in freehold for such 
purposes on favorable terms under the existing land regulations. 
According to Sadler, large tracts of fertile soil were just waiting to 
be cleared and planted; the people were there to work on it; and all 
that was needed was the energy and capital to open up the lands so they 
could furnish the British market with products which Britain was then 
as GB, FO, General Report on the Uganda Protectorate .•. 1904); [Great 
Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1904-5, Cd. 2684-13 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), p. 31 (cited hereafter 
as GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1904-5). The first report was signed by 
Sadler; the second was transmitted by him to Mr. Lyttelton [Colonial 
Secretary] on August 19, 1905. In the first it was stated that Uganda 
wouldn't be a white man's country since the climate was not conducive, 
especially to white labor outdoors, as it was in South Africa; and also, 
it was not advisable that whites should work in fields hand to hand with 
natives; but that European supervision and capital could help in devel-
opment. In the second it was again reiterated that Uganda was not 
really a good climate for settlers, and certainly not for white manual 
laborers, and that employment side by side with native labor would not 
be desirable. 
Why white manual laborers should not work along with natives was 
not explained, but the presumption of a fear on the part of officials 
that it would damage white prestige--and thus perhaps even British 
authority--is borne out by a statement a little later by the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Protectorate as follows: " ... among a people who 
are characteristically sensitive to class distinctions and prejudices 
and allow their fine discriminations to freely influence their conduct, 
I could foresee endless complications arising out of the presence of a 
white labouring class in the country." George Wilson, Journal of the 
Society of Arts, LV, 291. At the Society's meeting to which he de-
livered the above paper on January 15, 1907, Wilson was introduced by 
Lugard as an official who had spent some eighteen or nineteen years in 
Uganda, so that few men had more first-hand knowledge than Wilson (p. 
281). 
(In Wilson's remarks, by "a people" he was obviously referring to 
those Africans with whom the Protectorate had come in contact by that 
time and whose areas were known to be more fertile and thus objects for 
development--the Baganda, whose political heirarchy did indeed reflect 
such distinctions as he cited.) 
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importing from foreign countries. 1 
With the arrival in Uganda of the first Commissioner to be 
appointed after the transfer of Uganda's affairs from the Foreign Office 
to the Colonial Office in 1905, there was a decided shift in emphasis. 
The new man, Sir Hesketh Bell, given the title of Governor .in 1907, left 
2 
a deep mark on the Protectorate's early history. His tour was one of 
the examples of the leadership which could be exerted by a Governor of a 
territory who, if forceful, could make policy for the colony with little 
or no interference from London. Much impressed by the Baganda espe-
cially, he felt, according to a June 1906 diary entry, that "'every 
effort should be made to avoid the intrusion of alien interests in 
land'" and that what was needed was a wise and "'benevolent guardian-
3 
ship."' The following year he wrote in his diary, quoted in his 
published memoirs, as follows: 
"· .• I will do all I can to prevent the introduction of white 
'settlers' on any considerable scale. The settler would unsettle 
everything, and the policy of the administration would speedily 
find itself complicated by the conflicting interests of the black 
and the white. 
·~ganda, unlike British East Africa [Kenya], is emphatically a 
black man's country and European settlement is out of the question. 
Fear that their lands may be wrested from them is a terror to the 
1GB, FO, General Report on the Uganda Protectorate ... 1904, 
p. 28; J. Hayes Sadler, "Present-Day Administration in Uganda," Proceed-
ings of the Royal Colonial Institute, XXXVI (1904-1905), p. 80; GB, CO, 
Uganda. Report for 1904-5, p. 32. 
2From his book about his colonial experiences, the impression is 
gained of a fastidious, egotistical bachelor, ambitious, energetic, with 
a mind ranging broadly as well as into the future. Sir Hesketh Bell, 
Glimpses of a Governor's Life (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., 
[1946]), pp. 1-212. 
3 Bell, p. 122. See also Powesland, p. 17. 
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natives, and I feel sure that, in the days to come, the people of 
Uganda will increase to such an extent as to need the whole of the 
cultivable land in their country. Every one of my officers, to 
whom I have expressed these views, has heartily agreed with me. 
It goes without saying that the missionaries are all in favour of 
this policy. I can only hope that the men who may succeed me will 
follow the lines that we are now tracing and that there will be 
continuity of action. "1 
These were strong views, and there is little doubt but that he 
worked to see that they were accepted as official policy. Yet in a 
despatch, written to the Secretary of State in September 1908 after a 
tour of the Eastern Province and published in the following year, 
Governor Bell appears to have taken a more moderate, less adamant stand. 
He drew a distinction between settlers who performed manual labor and 
had little capital and planters with at least 1,500 pounds sterling of 
capital. Uganda was no place for the former but possibilities existed 
for the latter. He went so far as to suggest to prospective planters 
what they should do so they wouldn't become demoralized or discouraged 
2 
too easily. 
The apparent divergence in Bell's views may have reflected the 
difference between what he privately felt and what he thought should be 
said in public. It may have represented a difference in his opinion as 
to what was good for Buganda compared to what was all right for the 
Eastern Province. Or, it could have indicated a real distinction in his 
mind between, on the one hand, laboring settlers who, with or without 
1Bell, pp. 159-160. 
2[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report by the 
Governor on a Tour Through the Eastern Province, Cd. 4524 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1909), pp. 4-5. 
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their own farms, might undermine white prestige; and, on the other hand, 
the preferred smaller number of superintending planters, well supplied 
1 
with capital, whose style of living would enhance respect for Europeans. 
Whatever Governor Bell's qualifications to his anti-settler 
policy were, if any, circumstances were propitious to taking a line such 
as he formulated in 1906. Pressures on him to admit settlers evidently 
were very limited at the time. The superior climatic advantages and the 
availability of land in the neighboring territory, known since 1920 as 
2 Kenya, diverted most applicants from Uganda. Thus there was practi-
cally no demand for land in the Protectorate. In addition, that part of 
the original Uganda which was eminently suited to colonization by reason 
of its fertility, labor supply, and climate, had been given to Kenya in 
1902--it was Uganda's former Eastern Province, and included the Nandi 
1An official report, covering the year before, had made the same 
distinction, going on to say that "there appears to be no reason why 
'planters,' possessed of adequate capital, should not succeed as well in 
Uganda as they do in the West Indies, Burma, •..• " [Great Britain, 
Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1907-8, Cd. 4448-9 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1909), p. 34. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, 
Uganda. Report for 1907-8. 
As indicated in a previous footnote, George Wilson, Deputy 
Commissioner of the Protectorate under Bell in 1907, in a published talk 
in London seems to have been saying in a roundabout manner that with 
whites doing manual labor, high-status Baganda would treat them quite 
distinctly as inferiors, and this would lead to trouble. George Wilson, 
Journal of the Society of Arts, LV, 291. 
2GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1907-8, p. 8. A German scholar, in 
a discussion of the different directions taken by Uganda and Kenya, 
emphasized the latter's favorable Highlands' climate and its apparently 
sparser native population. Horst Brendel, Die Kolonisation Ugandas 
(Grossenhain: Georg Weigel, 1934), p. 94. (Brendel's work was a 
published dissertation, University of Leipzig.) 
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1 
and Mau Plateau. The transfer undoubtedly decreased the possibility of 
a strong settler influence on the Uganda Government of the early days 
and this contributed to the feasibility of Bell's policy. But even had 
there been a demand by Europeans for any considerable area of land, it 
would not have been possible at that time for the Protectorate to grant 
titles, since the surveying process had not advanced sufficiently to 
delineate available Crown Land. 2 
One more factor made it easier for Bell to discourage white 
settlers if he wished. The Uganda Government no longer had to search 
quite so hard outside of the territory for sources to spur economic 
development, in view of the remarkable progress already being made in 
the production of cotton. Bell had said that he wanted to concentrate 
on native cotton production, and during his term of office cotton became 
the leading cash crop for the peasant farmer. 3 
In the meantime there were certain developments in the legal 
sphere of land policy. The Land Transfer Ordinance, 1906, specified 
that land occupied or held in freehold by natives could not be trans-
ferred to a non-native unless the consent of the Governor had been 
1The Directory of East Africa, Uganda & Zanzibar (The Red Book, 
1909) (second edition; Mombasa, Kenya: Standard Printing & Publishing 
Works, 1909), pp. 31-32. 
2GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1907-8, p. 34. 
3Powesland, p. 17. Cotton exports rose from less than one per 
cent of the value of total exports in the first year of Bell's term, to 
thirty-five per cent in the third year, and to fifty-five per cent the 
year after Bell left Uganda. Cyril Ehrlich, The Uganda Company, 
Limited: The First Fifty Years (Kampala, Uganda: The Uganda Company Ltd, 
1953), p. 56. 
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obtained. 1 In the same year Judge William Morris Carter produced a 
report on land tenure in Buganda, and in September of the following year 
there followed another report by him dealing with certain areas outside 
Buganda. In addition, a committee on land tenure, of which Judge Carter 
was one of four official members, had been set up. In March 1907 it 
presented its recommendations to the Government. The 1907 Committee's 
views ranged over a number of aspects of land tenure. Although it is 
not clear from available sources whether the committee made definite 
proposals for legislation dealing with land alienation, it appears that 
the members favored an increase in settlement by European planters. The 
argument was that such settlement was needed by the Protectorate and was 
in the interests of Europeans and natives alike, To this end the 
Committee suggested ways in which the Protectorate's rights in land 
could be clarified so that the Government would know what land was at its 
2 disposal for settlers. 
The committee's particular recommendations in this matter for 
areas outside Buganda were not finally enacted as legislation. It can 
safely be assumed that the Committee's enthusiasm for settlement was not 
shared to the same extent by Governor Bell. As for Buganda, a compre-
hensive Land Law was passed in 1908 by the Buganda Kingdom's legislature, 
the Lukiko, receiving the necessary approval from the Governor and from 
the Regents on behalf of the child Kabaka. Although the law did clarify 
1Thomas and Scott, p. 108. Rather strangely, the 1906 law has 
not been mentioned in the appropriate chapter (Chapter XII) in Thomas 
and Spencer, previously cited. 
2Thomas and Spencer, pp. 52-54. 
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questions of ownership, and incidentally thereby contributed to the 
existing dissatisfaction of the Baganda clan heads (bataka) whose 
traditionally-derived rights to clan lands had thus again been passed 
over, the law did not reflect any official enthusiasm for alier.anion .. 
Just the contrary. Drafted by the Protectorate Crown Law Officers "in 
close consultation and agreement" with the Regents, 1 the 1908 Buganda 
Land Law was clear in this respect as regards ~ land, ("Maile" was 
the name given to the freehold grants of land to Baganda individuals 
made under the 1900 Agreement.) The law declared that an owner of mailo 
land was not permitted to transfer it by sale, or by lease of more than 
one year, to any non-native of the Protectorate, "except with the 
approval in writing of the Governor and the Lukiko."2 
During Bell's term as Governor the trend, then, was one of 
discouragement of alien settlement by one means or another. 
Bell's term was over in December 1909, and there followed a 
policy which proved more responsive to European interests. Several 
factors seemed to have altered to produce the change. One of these Bell 
himself had originated, but it developed after his departure in a manner 
3 
and with effects which he might well not have condoned. This was the 
kasanvu system for bolstering the supply of labor. It rendered all 
1Thomas and Spencer, p. 53. 
2Kingdom of Buganda, The Native Laws of Buganda in Force on the 
1st Day of January, 1957 (revised edition; n.p.: n.n., n.d. [printed by 
Uganda Argus, Limited, Kampala, Uganda]), p. 154. (In Luganda and 
English.) 
3 Bell, p. 122. 
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able-bodied men liable for a month's labor for the Government at its 
usual wage rates for labor. Anyone who could show that he was elsewhere 
permanently employed could be exempted. It was this provision which 
provided a new incentive for the Africans in Uganda to obtain employ-
ment, so that they could avoid the kasanvu obligation. The kasanvu 
system was in force for the period 1909 to 1922, and it meant that 
during that time "the labour market in Uganda was no longer open to the 
1 free play of supply and demand." 
Conditions were, thus, very favorable as regards the labor 
market for an expansion of the plantation interests by Europeans. The 
expansion occurred after Governor Bell's departure, and it was in full 
swing by 1913. The Kenya Highlands continued to be more attractive to 
applicants from outside East Africa, and the new planters' boom was 
restricted largely to Europeans already resident in the Protectorate. 
They consisted for the most part of men who knew the country intimately 
through service with the Government--presumably past and not current 
service. As soon as pieces of land in good areas became available as a 
result of the progress of the Survey Department in its operations, the 
land was taken up by the new class of planters, described by the Govern-
ment as "of a very desirable type." Although the procedure for the 
transfer of land from native to non-native hands was a complicated one, 
2 
and provided that title passed only if the land was actually developed, 
1Powesland, p. 18. 
2[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1910-11, 
Cd. 6007-8 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912), p. 21. 
considerable acreage seems to have been acquired by Europeans for 
1 plantations during this period. One could legitimately question the 
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ability of a Government to remain as a completely impartial protector of 
native land interests when former civil servants "of a very desirable 
type" were applying for permission to purchase, and when no doubt the 
civil servants in office were considering the same possibility as an 
alternative occupation then or in the days of retirement. 
An economic proof of the increased planter interest was the 
effect which the new demand for land had on its price. The African 
owners, especially the Baganda, quickly began to appreciate the 
supply-demand relationship of the situation, and the price rose in two 
years from four shillings an acre to some thirty shillings. 2 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1911-12, 
Cd. 6007-43 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1913), p. 21 
(cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1911-12); Powesland, p. 
19; Thomas and Spencer, p. 43. The first source stated, for example, 
that "the year has been remarkable for the great increase in the number 
of European plantations •... " 
Up to the time sales were suspended in 1916, Crown land disposed 
of by the Government to non-natives for agricultural purposes amounted 
to 115 square miles; mailo land sold by native owners (for the most part 
to non-natives) amounted to 118 square miles. Thomas and Scott, p. 105. 
From another source it may be inferred that the bulk of the latter--
probably slightly under 90 square miles--was sold in the period after 
April 1, 1911. [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 
1918-19, Cmd. 508-37 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), 
p. 10. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1918-19. 
(With reference to the last cited report, it and many of the 
earlier published official documents on Uganda issued by the British 
Government were designated by more than one series number. For an 
explanation of the procedure adopted in the footnoting of these reports 
see, in the Bibliography at the end of the study, the Note which pre-
cedes the listing of the official publications emanating from the 
Government of Great Britain.) 
2GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1911-12, p. 25; [Great Britain, 
Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1912-13, Cd. 7050-28 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914), p. 13; Ingham, The Making •.. , p. 
107. 
~1 
A force which had previously lent support to the planters' 
interests came into greater prominence early in the second decade of the 
century. Carter, who since his study of land tenure problems five years 
before had been knighted and made Chief Justice, was appointed in 1911 
as chairman of a committee which was to function as one of the major 
influences on land policy up until 1920. The committee, clearly dom-
inated by Sir William, made no bones about its belief that Uganda's 
1 future depended on the development of European estates. Its recom-
mendations were to this end. The committee also favored the granting of 
freehold estates to chiefs outside of Buganda. Official opinion 
generally went along with that of the committee. Up until the end of 
1915 the dissents by responsible officials were only two, and to all 
contemporary appearances they were of little ultimate weight. The first 
was that of the Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province, F. 
Spire, who wanted the land declared as Crown Land and then reserved for 
native use. The second dissent came from S. Simpson, Director of 
Agriculture from 1912 to 1928, who, when consulted i~ 1915 about the 
Eastern Province, said there was no future there for European estates. 
The situation toward the end of 1915 was as follows. There was 
an overwhelming official preference in Uganda for the view that planters 
should be encouraged and that efforts should be made to see that land 
was available for them, subject to certain safeguards for native 
limgham apparently has incorrectly inferred, by giving the dates 
of Bell's service in Uganda as 1905 to 1911 instead of 1906 to the end 
of 1909, that Carter's committee came out against Bell's policy while 
the latter was still Governor. Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 96, 280; 
Powesland, pp. 17, 19. 
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interests. Such was the tenor of the detailed recommendations of the 
Carter committee, approved by Governor Sir Frederick Jackson and trans-
mitted to the Secretary of State in 1915. 1 The change in Uganda policy 
was considerable from the days when Bell wrote of support from Protec-
torate officials for his policy and of the hope that his successors 
2 
would follow the same line. 
What was the position taken by the Colonial Office during these 
years? As far as can be ascertained, London's policy up to the end of 
1915 had been to give the colonies a free hand on these matters; there 
3 
was no initiative taken by the Colonial Office. 
London enunicates the policy, 1915-1921. Past experience 
undoubtedly led the Uganda Government and the planters' interests to 
expect routine approval of the Carter committee's 1915 policy views and 
recommendations. However, perhaps someone in the Colonial Office read 
the documents closely and came across Spire's statements. Perhaps 
Simpson's conviction that Uganda's future lay with peasant agriculture 
4 
was brought to the fore. Or, perhaps events somewhere else played a 
1The preceding two paragraphs are based on Thomas and Spencer, 
pp. 54-56; and Ingham, The Making ., pp. 95-96, 105. 
2Bell, pp. 159-160. 
3E. H. M. Leggett, "The Economic Development of British East 
Africa and Uganda," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, LXIII 
(February, 1915), 214. 
4Lord Hailey has written that the land decision "was largely 
influenced by the fact that with the expansion in the growth of cotton, 
economic development was being increasingly based on indigenous peasant 
cultivation." Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p. 724. 
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1 part. Whatever the specific process, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Bonar Law, gave the pro-planter groups in Uganda a scarcely 
pleasant pre-Christmas surprise. 
In a notice dated December 11, 1915, which was published in the 
Uganda Official Gazette of December 15, 1915, the Secretary of State 
directed that until the receipt of further instructions no more land--
either native-owned or Crown Land--was to be sold to non-natives. 2 For 
the Carter committee he had a further surprise. In his reply of 
January 13, 1916, the Secretary of State almost curtly rejected the 
committee's recommendations that estates be allotted to chiefs in the 
areas outside Buganda, questioning that such a course would be in the 
3 best interests of the areas' African population as a whole. 
The suspension of sales of land to non-natives was apparently 
meant to be only temporary, pending new legislation regulating such 
transfers. It continued to be possible for non-natives to lease land 
for up to ninety-nine years from African owners, subject to approval of 
the Governor. Even this did not prove easy, however. The Uganda 
Development Commission, a body with an unofficial non-native majority, 
voiced strong objection to the Government's policies and pressed for the 
reintroduction of freehold transfers as the prerequisite for the 
lingham has held it was the latter. Ingham, The Making . . . , 
p. 142. 
2The source for the dates is Thomas and Spencer, p. 57. Other 
sources, considered not as reliable in this respect, give the year as 
1916. K. Ingham, "Some Aspects of the History of Buganda," Uganda 
Journal, XX (March, 1956), 8; Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 142-143; 
Thomas and Scott, p. 105. 
3Thomas and Spencer, pp. 56-57. 
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territory's progress. The Commission was also highly critical both of 
Director of Agriculture Simpson because of his failure to identify 
himself with the interest of the planters and of the Government for 
permitting this state of affairs. 1 
During the five years after the abrupt suspension of all sales, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies began to give way before the 
Development Commission's type of pressure and additional arguments 
advanced by Chief Justice Carter, who served occasionally also as acting 
2 Governor and as Land Commissioner. The Colonial Secretary reluctantly 
agreed early in 1921 to the resumption of grants to non-natives of 
freehold land of both types--Crown Land ~nd native-owned. But when the 
Governor asked the Buganda Lukiko to prepare regulations for such 
transfers, the Lukiko in a resolution in November of 1921 expressed its 
opposition to any transfers of titles to mailo land from Baganda to 
non-natives. The Secretary of State's decision to permit permanent 
freehold alienations to non-natives was accordingly not put into effect. 3 
Two developments about that time dealt additional severe blows 
1GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1918-19, p. 10; [Great Britain,] 
Oversea Settlement Office, General Information As to the Uganda Protec-
torate (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), p. 16; Uganda 
Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, 1920), pp. 28-30, 35-36 (cited hereafter as 
UP, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920). 
2The strength of the planter influence around 1920, and Carter's 
role in this connection, is emphasized in "Uganda's History: The Long 
Road to Self Government," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, 
No. 20 \Winter, 1955), 7. 
3Thomas and Spencer, p. 57; Ingham, The Making .•• , pp. 143-
144. The Lukiko had no objection in principle to leases of land to 
non-natives; only to sales. 
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to the plantation industry in Uganda and in this way operated to reduce 
1 the pressure on officialdom to alienate land. One was the sharp slump 
in world prices for most primary products toward the end of 1921. 
European estates were hard hit, a large number going bankrupt. 
The other factor was that of labor. In October of 1921 the 
Buganda Lukiko had unanimously resolved that the kasanvu system of labor 
should no longer be enforced. About the same period the public in 
England became incensed over the famous Circulars of the Kenya Governor 
suggesting to his subordinates the use of compulsion to ensure that 
European settler farmers obtained their needed labor. The result was 
that Churchill's dictum that compulsion could be used only with the 
Colonial Secretary's approval forced the abolition of the kasanvu system 
in Uganda. The planters lost their cheaper supply of labor, contrib-
uting to the stagnation of the industry, To a large extent these events 
marked the turning point in the ascendancy of native coffee production, 
2 
which increasingly progressed thereafter, over non-native production. 
In such ways, at times precarious, was the 1915 temporary policy 
of non-alienation of land maintained in force and finally relieved from 
attack for a while by factors originating primarily outside of Uganda, 
Developments from 1922 to 1945. Although the participation of 
the plantation industry in the territory's economy rose again later, and 
fluctuated throughout the years, the basic official position regarding 
lsee especially [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] East Africa 
Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, Cmd, 9475 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1955), p. 17. 
2Powesland, pp. 32-33, 
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land alienation did not alter. It became clear that Uganda's economic 
future was bound up with peasant production and not with estate agri-
culture. Additionally, from Nigeria to Tanganyika and on to Uganda 
there had permeated the concept of Government's trusteeship of the land, 
primarily for the benefit of the native population. It was categori-
cally stated that there was no intention of reintroducing alienation of 
1 freehold land to non-natives. The only leases which were granted were 
of such land as was deemed clearly surplus to all native requirements. 
Leases continued to require the approval of the Governor, and in the 
case of Buganda, of the Lukiko as well. 
Some small holdings of alienated land reverted to the Government 
in the course of time. A considerable proportion of the early freehold 
grants to Europeans were purchased by Asians over the years, and a 
noticeable acreage was bought by Africans as it came on the market. But 
the main outlines of the policy stayed firm--non-alienation of land to 
1The official report for 1930 contained a statement that all 
Crown Land was regarded as held in trust for the tribes, and that only 
such land as was clearly surplus to all native requirements was con-
sidered available for leasing to non-natives. As for alienation of land 
by freehold transfers, "there is no intention of re-introducing this 
form of tenure unless in very exceptional circumstances." Land owned by 
natives could not be sold by them to non-natives. Leases of native-
owned land--presumably referring to Buganda--to non-natives required the 
consent both of the native government and the Governor, "due regard 
being paid to the interests of the cultivators [native tenants occupying 
the land]." [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1930, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1556 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1931), p. 36. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1930. 
Also, in 1924 the Protectorate Government had issued regulations 
to put a stop to a practice whereby a considerable amount of land was 
passing into non-native hands as a result of foreclosures. These had been 
previously effected through Protectorate courts, on land mortgaged by 
Baganda to obtain loans which they later were unable to repay. Raymond 
Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1928), I, 597. 
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Europeans or Asians except by consent of the Governor; and then usually 
only by lease, and in cases where there was no conflict with African 
1 interests. 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1923, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1220 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1924), p. 8; [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report 
for 1925, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1318 (London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1926), pp. 6, 8 (cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. 
Report for 1925); [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 
1929, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1486 (London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1930), p. 34; GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1930, p. 36; 
[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Annual Report on the Social and 
Economic Progress of the People of the Uganda Protectorate, 1931, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1601 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1932), pp. 24-25 (cited hereafter as GB, CO, Annual Report on 
Uganda Protectorate, 1931); [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] 
Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the 
Uganda Protectorate, 1936, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1810 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 44; [Great Britain, Colonial 
Office,] Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People 
of the Uganda Protectorate, 1937, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1860 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), pp. 11, 18; Uganda 
Protectorate, Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of 
Uganda, Ninth Session, October 31, 1929, p. 59; Uganda Protectorate, 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Third Session, November 14, 
1944, pp. 2-3; [Great Britain,] Colonial Office, An Economic Survey of 
the Colonial Territories, 1951, Vol. II: The East African Territories, 
Colonial No. 281-2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), p. 
80; Hailey, Native Administration ••. , Part I, 1950, p. 3; Thomas and 
Scott, p. 108; Thomas and Spencer, pp. 57-60; C. K. Meek, Land Law and 
Custom in the Colonies (second edition; London: Oxford University Press, 
1949), p. 133; Saben's Commercial Directory-and Handbook of Uganda, 
1950-51 (Kampala, Uganda: Saben & Co., Ltd., [1950]), p. 267; Powesland, 
p. 60. 
(With reference to the above citations to Legislative Council 
debates, see the Note which precedes their listing--along with other 
official publications issued by the Uganda Protectorate--in the Bib-
liography at the end of the study. In addition to explaining the method 
used here in citing debates in footnotes, the description of the 
successive elaboration of the Proceedings serves to point up the more 
limited role of the Legislative Council in the earlier era--most notably 
before 1939, when the official publications were not.issued as verbatim 
accounts but only as summaries of what took place in the Council.) 
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Summary. The history of the evolution of Uganda's 
non-alienation of land policy may be summarized as marked by an early 
period of vacillation, tending toward large-scale alienation to attract 
plantation-type European settlers; the temporary suspension of land 
alienations by the Colonial Office in 1915, and the decision late in 
1921 not to proceed with a plan to lift the suspension; and the harden-
ing of the non-alienation of land policy in the years which followed. 
Although it is not possible from the available evidence to come 
to definitive conclusions about the relative importance of the different 
factors influencing the course of land policy, a question in any event 
outside the scope of the study, the account has served to illustrate the 
multiplicity of the elements at work in the policy process in this 
instance. Within Uganda, for example, certain official personalities 
played key roles--Bell, Simpson, and Spire against alienation; and 
Carter notably for it, as spokesman for the non-official, non-African 
1 interests. The Buganda Lukiko, by its stand against alienations and 
against kasanvu labor which benefited planters, undoubtedly influenced 
the official decisions made in the Colonial Office. The latter source 
of policy was also affected on the kasanvu labor question by public 
opinion's reaction in the United Kingdom to the Kenya Circulars. Of 
early significance was the fact of Kenya's climate--more favorable to 
white settlement than Uganda's, and thus attracting more Europeans. And 
1rn an article which has briefly summarized the roles played by 
the different personalities and by events, a Land Officer--by name 
Allen--is mentioned along with Carter as supporting the planters. 
"Uganda's History ... ," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, 
No. 20, 7. 
~9 
general world events, in the form of declines in prices of plantation 
products, reduced pressures for alienation by dealing the industry in 
Uganda successive severe economic blows. These were some of the more 
important elements which interacted to mold the highly significant 
British policy of non-alienation of land in Uganda over the years. 
It is not intended that the above convey the impression that 
there remained no land issues to agitate Uganda after 1921. The 
Protectorate attempted to put to rest the irritating question of the 
claims of the Baganda bataka (clan heads) to lands which they maintained 
had been taken from them by the 1900 Agreement, but the issue continued 
1 to plague the Government in one form or another. The question of the 
Protectorate Government's rights to acquire land for public purposes, to 
be dealt with in the next section, was raised during the war and was a 
2 factor contributing to the 1945 disturbances. Although in both cases 
there was interwoven the fear of alienation of land to non-natives, the 
latter was a basically separate issue which, as this study shows, had in 
fact been long settled in favor of the indigenous population. For, the 
fact remained that for many years no appreciable land had been alienated. 
3 
No strong settler interest had materialized. Fears of alienation 
1sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: Hutchinson, 
1954), p. 148; Ingham, The Making •.. , pp. 145-147. 
2uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Disturbances Which Occurred in Uganda during January, 1945 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, 1945), p. 7; Colin Legum, Must We Lose 
Africa? (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1954), pp. 60, 63. 
3A contributing factor must have been the strict immigration 
control, reported in the mid-1930's. It was "in essence directed to the 
protection of the native population and against the establishment of a 
body of indigent non-natives." Thomas and Scott, p. 364. 
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remained unrealized. Yet they continued unabated, playing a part in the 
political history of Uganda which, as will be indicated later, was 
heightened periodically with talk of federation with Kenya. 
Land for Public Purposes--An Issue in the 1940's 
Of the other land policies of political significance, most 
important was that of the Protectorate Government directed to ensuring 
that land needed for "public purposes"--as contrasted to "public works" 
--was subject to compulsory acquisition. 1 Although the policy met rough 
2 
weather in several places in the Protectorate, this was especially 
pronounced in Buganda during the 1940's. It is the situation there at 
that time which is briefly narrated below, A strong interrelation with 
the non-alienation of land policy is evident. 
The 1900 Agreement limited the Protectorate Government's rights 
to acquire land from those with title to it as follows: 
Her Majesty's Government, however, reserves to itself the 
right to carry through or construct roads, railways, canals, 
telegraphs, or other useful public works, or to build military 
forts or works of defense on any property, public or private, with 
the condition that not more than 10 per centum of the property in 
question shall be taken up for these purposes without compensation, 
1The Protectorate Government's desire to have vested in it the 
subsoil mineral rights was another contentious question on occasion. 
Thomas and Spencer, pp. 102-109; Uganda Protectorate, Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Uganda during April, 1949 
(Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1950), p. 113 (cited hereafter as 
UP, Report of ••• Distunbances •.. 1949); Ramakrishna Mukherjee, The 
Problem of Uganda: A Study in Acculturation (Berlin: Academie-Verlag, 
1956), pp. 277-278. 
2
uganda Protectorate, Department of Agriculture, Agriculture in 
Uganda, ed. J. D. Tothill (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 34. 
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and that compensation shall be given for the disturbance of growing 
crops or of buildings.! 
When the central government wished to acquire land for the 
expansion of Makerere College and for setting up a cotton experimental 
station, two projects of primary benefit to the African population and 
to Buganda especially, there was insufficient legal authority to acquire 
2 the land compulsorily. The two projects did not come within the scope 
of the term "public works" which appeared in the 1900 Agreement. 
Departing from the usual procedure of negotiating through the 
Buganda Government, attempts were made to obtain the land by direct 
negotiation with the Baganda owners. The latter refused to sell. The 
British authorities then went to the Buganda authorities with a request 
that the Buganda Agreement be amended to permit the compulsory acquisi-
tion of land for public purposes, instead of merely for public works, so 
3 that the two projects might go forward. 
But circumstances were not propitious. For, as is explained 
4 later, when the Kabaka Daudi Chwa died in 1939 and was replaced by 
three Regents acting for the minor Kabaka Mutesa II, the chiefs split 
1The last paragraph of Article 15 of the Agreement. [Great 
Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal of Recogni-
tion from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, Cmd. 9028 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1953), p. 21. 
2uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, 
Eastern Province, Western Province, for the Period 1939-1946 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, 1949), p. 8. Cited hereafter as UP, Annual 
[Provincial] Reports •.. 1939-1946. 
3E. M. K. Mulira, Troubled Uganda (Colonial Controversy Series, 
No. 6; London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1950), pp. 24, 38. 
4rn Chapter VI. 
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into two major factions. One may be called the Kulubya-Nsibirwa 
faction, the other the Wamala faction. The marriage of the Kabaka's 
mother in 1941, in contravention of tradition, had forced Nsibirwa from 
office as Katikiro. He had been replaced by Wamala, but Kulubya had 
stayed on as Treasurer (Omuwanika). With the support of the Kabaka, who 
came of age in 1942, the efficient and experienced Kulubya had survived 
written allegations of abuse of authority leveled at him by fourteen 
l 
chiefs. 
The Kabaka and Kulubya lent the full weight of their support to 
the Protectorate's request that the 1900 Agreement be amended. As 
finally worked out, the amendment was to permit compensated but compul-
sory acquisition by the Kabaka of land for purposes beneficial to 
Buganda. However, Katikiro Wamala opposed the amendment very strongly 
when it was submitted to the Lukiko in 1944. It suffered a decisive 
2 3 defeat. The whole affair "caused great tension in the country." 
Wamala's popularity increased with the Baganda and fell to a new low 
4 
with the Protectorate Government. Popular support of the Kabaka and 
1Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 25, 35-36, 38. 
2Following the 1945 Disturbances, Nsibirwa replaced Wamala as 
Katikiro. Numbers of chiefs were dismissed, and in September Nsibirwa 
secured the passage of the Land Acquisition Act. The following morning 
he was assassinated. Later the Kabaka requested and obtained an amend-
ment to the law requiring Lukiko approval of any use of these powers. 
UP, Report of ••• Disturbances ••• 1949, p. 115; Ingham, The Making 
••• , pp. 226-227; A. B. Mukwaya, Land Tenure in Buganda: Present Day 
Tendencies (East African Studies, No. 1, East African Institute of 
Social Research; Kampala, Uganda: The Eagle Press, 1953), p. 20. 
3Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 38. 
~ulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 26. 
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Kulubya was considerably reduced, the latter's having already been at a 
1 low level. 
Why was this particular land question such a crucial and 
explosive one to so many Baganda? It may be recalled that the tangible 
and intangible value of land to the Baganda through all the years con-
tinued to be singularly high. There was a widespread fear of those 
opposing the amendment that the Kabaka could be and would be forced or 
"persuaded" by the British authorities to dispossess the Baganda of much 
more of their land than just that required for the two immediate 
2 projects. These fears were further fed in 1944, shortly after the 
Lukiko's rejection of the amendment, by the publication of a pamphlet 
3 
called Buganda Nyafa. Though quickly suppressed by the authorities, it 
had a very wide circulation. Among its general attacks on British rule 
was an especially virulent forecast that the Baganda would be deprived 
of their land and settled on European estates just as, it was alleged, 
the Africans in Kenya and South Africa had been. The pamphlet maintained 
that the trouble would be brought about by well-known, highly-placed 
Baganda, weak-hearted and willing to take bribes. 4 
The social fact that land was vital to the Baganda would have 
been sufficient in and of itself to have created a major issue of the 
question of additional powers to acquire land compulsorily, irrespective 
1rngham, The Making •• ,, p. 223. 
2Mukwaya, p. 20; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 42. 
3
"Buganda Our Mother." 
4rngham, The Making ,, p. 223; Mukherjee, pp. 35, 276-277. 
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of the goodness of the purpose. But it arose, as mentioned earlier, at 
a time when the Buganda political system was split into two camps, with 
the numerically more powerful "outs" in strong opposition to the smaller 
faction of "ins," the latter buttressed by and giving support to the 
1 distrusted British authorities. To have such an issue interjected into 
that particular political situation, with its other wartime social 
pressures, was like adding to the store of dynamite in an already 
dynamic Buganda situation, That this proved to be the case is shown 
2 later. At the present stage of the study it must suffice to have set 
forth the main details of the issue and the role of British policy in 
creating and intensifying it. 
III. AGRICULTURE AND LABOR POLICIES 
A number of British policies in Uganda pertaining to agriculture 
and labor, as well as those on education and other social services to be 
taken up in the next section, have been alluded to in the previous 
chapter's consideration of alien contact and influence or have just been 
discussed in the treatment of the land policies. The purpose now is to 
review the policies, providing brief descriptive and supporting data 
where this has not already been done. 
Development of a Peasant-Based Economy 
The main economic policy of the Protectorate was an agricultural 
lingham, The Making ... , p. 223; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 
25. The "ins" were regarded as British stooges. Legum, p. 62. 
2see the discussion of the pressures for social change at the 
end of Chapter VIII. 
255 
one, to which labor policies were tied, With a view to rendering the 
territory financially self-sufficient, it became the Uganda Government's 
policyiD stimulate production of cash crops. The essential points about 
the general policy for the study are two. After 1920, official policy 
and efforts were definitely directed to the development of a 
peasant-based economy, and relatively little attention was given to the 
smaller plantation sector of the primary products industry. (This was 
brought out in most of its aspects in the discussion of the 
non-alienation of land policy.) Secondly, the specific policies to 
increase production had varying effects for different areas of the 
Protectorate. 
In the years after 1904 the Uganda Government officially 
arranged for distribution of cotton seed, and its officers saw that 
chiefs persuaded their people to plant it. 1 When quality was seriously 
compromised by use of inferior seed from other sources and the resulting 
1908 crisis brought on the first drastic regulation of the cotton 
industry by the Government, administrative officers saw that chiefs 
ensured growers' compliance with orders to uproot old cotton plants, 
Instructions were backed up with threats of dismissal of uncooperative 
2 
chiefs. 
The Government controlled and directed the development of the 
economy in other varying ways and with varying results. The official 
lPhilip Mitchell, p. 98. 
2cyril Ehrlich, "Cotton and the Uganda Economy, 1903-1909," 
,::U:.:;g.:::a:!!n.::d:!!a'-7.J::::o~u7-rn=a;:.l, XXI (September, 1957), 162, 170-172; "Uganda's History 
••. ," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20, 7. 
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hut tax in the early days was recognized as a deliberate stimulus to the 
African to work for wages or to produce cash crops to pay the tax. 1 It 
differed, however, from area to area depending on the ability of a 
2 people to meet its demands. 
Difficulties at first impeded the achievement of the desired 
very rapid expansion of cultivation. In traditional times agricultural 
labor was considered in most tribes as a despised vocation for men. 
However, it gradually came to be accepted as somewhat respectable. In 
Buganda, this later again became a problem, as men would often not exert 
themselves to produce yet more cotton, especially with the weakening of 
the authority of the chiefs which ensued about that time. The situation 
was resolved by the Baganda by the use of African immigrant laborers 
from outlying parts of Uganda and from Ruanda-Urundi. 
In those areas of the Protectorate outside of Buganda where cash 
crop production was encouraged, the men's dislike for manual labor in 
the fields was apparently at times less easy to overcome. The Governor 
found it necessary in 1924 to send a circular to Provincial Commis-
sioners deprecating the excess zeal shown by many chiefs in their 
efforts to stimulate planting. Yet the success of the chiefs' efforts 
1[Great Britain, Foreign Office,] General Report on the Uganda 
Protectorate for the Year Ending March 31, 1903, Africa series, No. 15 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1903), p. 20; Caroline 
Kirkland, Some African Highways (Boston: Dana Estes & Company, 1908), 
p. 128; Hermann Norden, White and Black in East Africa (London: H. F. & 
G. Witherby, 1924), pp. 166, 266-268. 
2In addition, administrative officers were given, and they 
used, considerable discretion in waiving collection in cases of 
hardship. 
is evident from the fact that in 1914 cotton output in the Eastern 
1 Province outstripped that in Buganda. 
Another example of area variation in practices and in results 
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can be obtained from an account of the way the Government handled one of 
the many recurrent problems it faced regarding supply of labor. By 
order from London in 1921 the type of compulsory labor known in Uganda 
as the kasanvu system was abolished. At the same time, the Protectorate 
authorities had so successfully stimulated the production of cotton in 
Buganda and in the Eastern Province that much potential labor for 
Government works and for European plantations was otherwise occupied in 
these crucial central areas where the need for labor was greatest. 
Official and private employers began to recruit labor from the outlying 
districts of the territory. But in the meantime the Government had 
launched a campaign to encourage cotton production in all districts of 
the Protectorate, and this commenced to reduce the labor supply from the 
outlying areas also. In 1924 administrative officers were instructed to 
refrain from stimulating cotton production in the outer districts. 
Although the policy was officially reversed in the next year, the 
priority given to ensuring a labor supply for the central part of the 
2 territory did not take a back seat in practice until 1935. 
The result of the implementation by administrative officers of 
the above different course.s of action for different areas was, of 
1wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 59, 75-77; John Roscoe, 
"Uganda and Some of Its Problems," Journal of the African Society, XXII 
(January, 1923), 100. 
2Powesland, pp. 40-41, 44, 56. 
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course, that those areas which were already behind Buganda and Busoga in 
cotton cultivation were further delayed in their start on the road to 
development of their economic resources. The gap between the richer and 
the poorer areas was widened. 
As a consequence of early British policy, Buganda was different 
in another way and this in turn occasioned subsequent policy action. 
The 1900 Agreement introduced individual freehold ownership of land. 
Desire to own more or to acquire an initial small holding stimulated 
cotton production both by landowners and their tenants. However, after 
some years of increasingly extortionate treatment of tenants by land-
lords, the oligarchical Buganda Lukiko reluctantly responded to strong 
pressure from the Protectorate Government and enacted a land law in 
1927. Tenants were given security of tenure, and moderate, fixed, 
1 
annual rents were set. The result was an added spur to economic 
2 individualism of the tenants, and presumably also to cotton production. 
In the period up to 1945 the activities of the Government in the 
economic sphere were augmented. Experimental agricultural stations were 
established and staff was trained to instruct African farmers. Cotton, 
coffee, and tobacco were increasingly controlled by Government regula-
tions, including price-fixing and price-stabilization measures. 
lwrigley, Economic History Review, X, 75-76. 
2one deterrent remained for the tenants. They could not sell 
fixed improvements which they might make to the property they occupied, 
nor could they, of course, mortgage their tenancy land holdings. 
Landlords, including the newer ones, were also somewhat restricted in 
economic activities by the law. They could not evict tenants on their 
land to farm it on a large scale or to use it for other forms of e.nter-
prise. Mukwaya, pp. 73-76. Despite these drawbacks, the total effect 
of changes from the land system of traditional times was conducive to 
economic individualism in Buganda. 
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Repeated attempts were made by these measures to accomplish what appears 
to have been the two main objects: the increase of production and 
exports so that revenue and therefore social services could be 
increased; and the protection of the peasant producers from exploitation 
1 by those in the other phases of the cotton industry. 
As regards the former, the goal was achieved in that revenue 
rose steeply, and the Government was able to provide a narrow range of 
. 1 2 soc1a services. However, the productivity picture was not as bright 
as it might seem. Although production of cotton and later coffee rose 
sharply through the years, the equipment and techniques of agriculture 
had hardly altered, and none of the external trade was in African hands. 
According to one scholar, by 1939 expansion of the economy in Buganda, 
for example, had gone about as far as it could on the above existing 
lines. Also, the shift from the traditional to the modern economy was 
3 
much less advanced in many parts of the Protectorate than in others. 
With respect to the second objective, the protection of pro-
ducers, the efforts of the Government appear to have been often vitiated 
by other forces, especially the greater organization and political 
influence of those elements of the non-African communities which were 
1Because of a considerable drop in the cotton prices in 1941, 
the Government entered the market for the rest of the war as a 
large-scale buyer to ensure producers a fair price. Ingham, The Making 
..• , p. 217. 
2wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 78. 
See also Tables 6 and 7 and the discussion of social services 
later in the chapter. 
3wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 76, 78-79. See, in 
addition, S. Joshua L. Zake, Reform in Uganda (n,p.: Sapoba Bookshop 
Press, [1954]), p. 5. 
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directly involved. 1 The marketing and ~he processing of the cash crops 
was almost entirely in the hands of non-Africans, who operated these 
phases of the modern economy in such a manner as to divorce them quite 
completely from any involvement by Africans. Moreover, the Government 
made no move to bring about African participation. As regards this 
aspect of the economy, British policy was in practice one of support of 
2 the status quo. 
Attitude toward Labor 
What was the attitude of the British authorities in Uganda 
toward regular laborers? Why did such a small wage labor force grow up 
in the Protectorate? Some of the reasons for this have already been 
indicated, such as the development of a peasant cash crop agricultural 
system which tended both to reduce the number of plantations and to keep 
1
uganda Protectorate, ~P~r~o~c~e~e~d~i~n~g~s~o~f~t~h~e~L~e~g~i~s~l~a~t~i~v~e~C~o~u~n~c~~~·~l, 
Twentieth Session, November 28, 1940, pp. 22-23. Cited hereafter as UP, 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, November 28, 1940. 
2That British policy in this respect was "deliberate policy and 
not just lack of foresight" is the view expressed in Margaret Chave 
Fallers, Review of The Alien Town: Patterns of Settlement in Busoga, 
Uganda, by Ann Evans Larimore, Africa, XXX (January, 1960), 90. Mrs. 
Fallers went on to write: "Official policy in Uganda until after the 
Second World War emphasized for Africans the development of local 
government and of peasant-grown cash crops. It was considered that 
peasant agriculture promoted stability and security for the country, as 
indeed it has. Central government, urban administration, and trade were 
seen as the tasks of the Europeans and Indians." 
(Mrs. Fallers is the wife of Lloyd A. Fallers, author of~ 
Bureaucracy and other works dealing with Uganda. Where only the surname 
Fallers appears in this study in the shortened-form second or later 
references in a chapter, it refers in every case to material written by 
Lloyd Fallers.) 
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labor occupied on the preferred peasant production. 
Another alleged reason for the small wage labor force is based 
on myth. Africans have been repeatedly criticized in the past for their 
lack of desire to work, and they have been characterized as lazy and 
indolent. The existence of this stereotype was reflected for a while in 
British policy. The feeling, supported by official statements at least 
through the mid-1920's, was that no sympathy would be given to those who 
refused to work, and that Africans could not be permitted to do nothing 
1 
and be of no use to themselves or the Protectorate. The feeling of the 
Europeans--official and unofficial of that era--represented a value 
placed on work as an end in itself; this was not a value esteemed either 
by African traditional societies or even by many literate societies. 
More material, additional reasons for the Africans' hesitancy to 
work as wage laborers are to be found first, in the low wage rates which 
offered insufficient incentives, and secondly, in various expressions and 
consequences of Government policy. As to the latter, in one vein, by the 
mid-1930's the Government had renounced all forms of official pressure 
on Africans to take employment. In a contrasting vein, another policy 
also failed to contribute to the growth of a wage labor force. That was 
the Government's hesitancy, in the face of employers' opposition, about 
forcing passage of remedial legislation favoring labor. 
The result of the interaction of these varying factors was a 
wage labor force in 1940 of only forty thousand, in private, non-native 
employment. The figure represented only one per cent of the population, 
1Brendel, p. 99; UP, Report of the Uganda Development Com-
mission, 1920, especially pp. 16-20. 
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and forty per cent of the wage force was concentrated on three planta-
tions in 1938. Adding to the above wage earners those employed by 
Government and African employers, excepting African farmers who absorbed 
an estimated 50,000 non-Baganda workers, the total employed population 
ran around 80,000-90,000, or only two per cent of Uganda's four million 
inhabitants. And many of these wage earners were not from the Protec-
torate but rather from Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian mandated territory to 
1 
the southwest. 
Sunnnary 
The discussion of agriculture and labor policies may now be 
summarized. Guided by the policy handed down from the British Lords of 
the Treasury, the Uganda Government aimed first at financial 
self-sufficiency. 2 Through its provision of transport facilities--roads 
and extensions of the Uganda Railway--and through the pressures it 
brought on the chiefs and the people, British policy was perhaps the 
major long-term factor in the spectacular increase of cotton and later 
of coffee production. After some vacci1ation, policy subsequent to 1920 
encouraged the development of a peasant-based economy in contrast to an 
immigrant plantation industry. 
Variations in policy for the different areas, especially in the 
policies on labor for agricultural production and on construction of 
1Powes1and, pp. 12, 14-15, 18, 31-32, 63-64, 66, 67; Uganda 
Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Second 
Session, March 29, 1943, pp. 3, 6-11. 
2uganda Protectorate, The Handbook of Uganda, by H. R. Wallis 
(second edition; London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1920), p. 237. 
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transport communication facilities, resulted in a concentration of 
economic (agricultural) development in Buganda and the neighboring areas 
of the Eastern Province. In contrast, in the other areas cash crop 
production was inhibited. For, these areas were used for many years as 
sources for labor in Buganda; and the absence of railroads or good roads 
to the outlying districts meant that crops could not be transported 
economically, therefore could not be produced. 
Uganda Government policy did nothing to encourage the growth of 
a large indigenous wage laboring force, and other factors also operated 
to discourage such a force. 
IV. POLICIES ON EDUCATION AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES 
In Chapter IV a number of conclusions were reached about 
education for Africans in Uganda from 1905 to 1945, It was generally 
very limited. Its scope at the secondary school level was minimal, at 
the higher level infinitesimal. The Baganda were much more favored than 
the rest of the tribes in past and current facilities. Because of 
mission orientations and control of curricula, and despite the Govern-
ment's preferences, educational content was predominantly literary and 
not technical. 
What was the role of British policy in these educational 
developments? What was the attitude of officialdom toward this and 
other social services? 
Before discussing the subject more specifically, certain earlier 
statements must be repeated. The broad, conditioning policy was that of 
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financial self-sufficiency. 1 The Protectorate's expenditures were not 
to exceed its revenues. Therefore, development of social services 
depended for all practical purposes upon development of the country's 
economy, though it was recognized that the former could also contribute 
to the latter. 
Educational Policies 
It was pointed out in Chapter IV that with all the tribes, 
Western education early became very much a determinant of social dis-
tinction as well as being the recognized prerequisite to chieftainship, 
wealth, and other valued goals. The British authorities contributed 
greatly to the new value orientation by increasingly deciding appoint-
ments and promotions of chiefs on the basis of merit, education being 
one of the prime tests of merit. To what extent, and how, did policy 
contribute to the attainment of the newly valued education? 
The changing roles of Government and the missions. The history 
of responsibility for education in Uganda is one of the steadily 
increased role of government from the time when it assumed none to the 
time when it assumed an appreciable measure of responsibility. 
The Protestant and Catholic missions in Uganda set up the first 
schools in the country. For many years it was they who made the maximum 
2 
contribution in the educational field. The Government in the first 
linconsequential exceptions were the grants from the Colonial 
Development Fund established by the British Government for all colonies 
by a 1929 Act of Parliament. See the mention of the 1929 Act at the end 
of this section. 
2The clear hope of the different religious bodies was that they 
would be training the future leaders of the country. Jules Leclercq, 
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years around the turn of the century assumed no responsibility for 
education. By 1908 it was making limited funds available for scholar-
ships. Those without the money to pay the school fees were thus given 
some chance of advancing to high positions by means of education. 
In 1920, presumably motivated by a concern over the failure of 
the mission schools to produce Africans with technical training, the 
Government decided that the "praiseworthy" mission efforts must be 
1 
supplemented. A technical school was founded in 1922 in Kampala on a 
hill called Makerere; grants to the missions were increased in that 
year. In 1924 a British educational expert from the Sudan, Mr. Eric 
Hussey, submitted a report on education in response to the Government's 
request. In the same year the Phelps Stokes Commission on education 
made available the results of its wider African survey, which included 
Uganda. 
These developments had a number of consequences. The expert 
from the Sudan became the first Director of Education in the Protec-
torate. With the full support of the Governor of the time, Sir Geoffrey 
Archer, the Makerere school was converted into a general training 
college. The Government worked with the missions on a scheme of mutual 
cooperation. The following year an Advisory Council was formed, with 
the Director of Education as Chairman and with members drawn from 
Aux Sources du Nil par le Chemin de Fer de l'Ouganda (Paris: 
Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1913), p. 163; John V. Taylor, The Growth of the 
Church in Buganda (World Mission Studies; London: SCM Press Ltd, 1958), 
p. 91. 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1920 
(April to December), Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1112 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922), pp. 13-14. 
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Government, the missions, and the African communities. 1 Subsidiary 
Councils were set up in the Provinces, and Boards were appointed in the 
Districts. A five-year scheme of educational expansion was adopted. 
Most important, it was officially reported that the educational activ-
ities of the missions had been brought under the supervision and control 
of the Education Department. In 1928 and 1929 Makerere facilities were 
freed for more professional training with the transfer of technical 
2 
education to the Kampala Technical College. 
Government control did not, however, mean the Government's 
operation of all the schools in the territory. Over ninety-five per 
cent of an estimated 300,000 pupils in the country were in schools run 
by the missions. To these the Government provided liberal grants, 
maintaining a limited measure of control through a system of inspectors. 3 
The policy aims of the new Education Department in 1924 provide 
an idea of the official concept of the Government's new role. The aims 
were: to control and coordinate all educational effort in the Protec-
torate; to standardize mission schools and assist them with government 
grants so that boys could be trained to the Makerere College entrance 
1Representatives of the latter were all non-Africans with the 
exception of those appointed by the Kabaka for Buganda. Ingham, ~ 
Making . . . , p. 162. 
2 The transfer, reported as having occurred in 1926, did not 
actually take place until two to three years later. GB, CO, Uganda. 
Report for 1925, pp. 11-12; Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 160-165; 
Uganda Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 1938 
(Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1939), p. 128 (cited hereafter 
as UP, Blue Book for . . . 1938). 
3F. Rawling, Uganda and Its People (Little Books for Africa 
Series; London: The Sheldon Press, 1928), pp. 25, 27. The estimate of 
300,000 apparently was a very rough one. 
1 
standard; to raise the standard of all schools, by training African 
teachers and by systematic inspections, until eventually Makerere 
2 College reached the status of a University College. 
267 
There is no question but that the missions had a difficult time 
adjusting to the Government's new interest in and interference with 
their educational programs. The most senior European leaders of the 
missions supported the new developments but had a hard time winning over 
their juniors of both races. For the past two decades and more the 
mission schools, especially the village schools, had constituted a prime 
mission function. More significantly, their purpose had been to 
initiate children into the local Christian community. It was far from 
easy for many to understand that the function of the schools was 
changing and had to change. For the new conception of the schools was 
as educational centers to initiate the children "into competitive 
3 bourgeoise Western society." 
It may have been the intention of the Government's first 
Education Director in 1924 to control, coordinate, and standardize the 
mission schools, but it was not the intention to take them over as a 
government responsibility nor even to direct them. It is doubtful 
whether there was in fact very much official "control," for from what 
1The "College" was at the time hardly more than a junior 
secondary ("junior high") school. 
2[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1924, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1280 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1926), p. 11. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 
1924. 
3Taylor, The Growth .•• , pp. 95-96, 158. 
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Sir Philip Mitchell has written it is apparent that the missions con-
tinued to make and implement policy for their schools more or less as 
they wished. Governor Mitchell in the second half of the 1930's was far 
from happy about the situation, objecting to some aspects of the 
missions' policy and practices. He carried out his determination to 
remove the schools from ecclesiastical authority. However, he still 
wanted the help of the missions, and he also did not favor a completely 
secular type of education. The solution was to make the schools more 
independent by creating Boards of Governors for them with officials 
1 included on the Boards, and by giving headmasters greater authority. 
These changes were accomplished only after some considerable 
negotiation with the missions and following the work of an African 
Education Committee, which served to give the Governor's views added 
weight. A new development of interest stemmed from the Committee's 
recommendation, supported by the Director of Education, that there 
should be a devolution of responsibility for primary education to Local 
Education Authorities, which would replace the existing District Boards 
2 
of Education. Two years after enabling legislation went through the 
Legislative Council mill in 1942, the new Authorities were set up, The 
Native Administrations and Native Governments in the territory were to 
supply the Local Education Authorities with some of the necessary funds, 
the greater amount coming direct from the central government. The aim 
was to increase the responsibility of the African local governments for 
1Philip Mitchell, pp. 180-183. 
2uP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, November 28, 1940, 
p. 35. 
269 
primary education and its development, simultaneously permitting greater 
African representation in local education affairs. 1 
During the period up to 1945, then, exclusive jurisdiction by 
the missions over education was replaced by appreciable responsibility 
on the Government's part, with the latter providing a greatly increased 
ratio of the funds and an appreciable amount of direction, the missions 
providing facilities and grant-aided staff, and the parents of children 
furnishing additional funds in the form of fees. Toward the end of the 
period the first steps were taken in a process of transferring some 
responsibility for primary education to local African governmental 
institutions. 
Leading educational questions. Three important questions which 
arose in the years before 1945 were those concerned with the general 
kind or content of education to be emphasized in Uganda, the develop-
mental priorities to be accorded to the different levels of education, 
and the language to be used as the medium of instruction. 
From the very beginning there was a marked difference of opinion 
between the elements in the Protectorate who favored a literary, 
academically-oriented type of education and those who preferred that it 
be technical or vocational, that is, practical. The earliest mission 
schools were definitely of the former persuasion. They made little or 
no attempt to relate the school curricula to life as known or lived by 
2 Africans in Uganda. The Government indirectly encouraged the 
1UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports ... 1939-1946, p. 92. 
2Taylor, The Growth ... , p. 93. 
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concentration on skill in reading and writing--or a high standard of 
literacy--by the preference which it showed to Africans with these 
qualifications when selecting men for appointments and promotions as 
chiefs or clerks. 
Government anxiety about the kind of education disseminated in 
mission schools was first evidenced in 1908, by which time the Protec-
torate was offering subsidies to missions which provided technical 
training in such skills as masonry and carpentry. Ten years later 
technical instruction was being given at most of the principal mission 
stations in the above two skills plus brick-making, boot-making, 
printing, tanning, agriculture, and others. The official view was that 
the industrial type of training served as "an excellent antidote to the 
conception entertained by the educated native that manual work is 
derogatory to his status." The official report added that "though 
clerks and interpreters are in constant demand by both Government 
Offices and commercial firms, it is important not to neglect the 
development of other talents and interests," and the missions should be 
1 given "the highest encouragement" to that end. 
As previously indicated in the discussion of the changing roles 
of the Government and the missions, the Protectorate took action early 
in the 1920's to see that more technical training was provided. The 
fact that the action was the Government's first direct venture into 
education bears out the importance attached to that form of training in 
the minds of officials. Technical training was strengthened in the 
l . GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1918-19, p. 12. 
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mid-1920's. But most significantly the academic, literary kind was at 
the same time given its first strong support from the Government, with 
the conversion of Makerere into a general training college in 1924 and 
the divorcing from it of technical education some four years later. 
Throughout the rest of the period, however, the over-all primary 
emphasis of the Protectorate's mission-based school system continued to 
be academic. The Government's concern about this was repeatedly ex-
pressed, and more agricultural and vocational training was repeatedly 
recommended and sometimes achieved. The concern remained. The follow-
ing is a typical example of the form the official worries took: 
In the more advanced primary school • . . the tendency is for 
the pupils to acquire a distaste for manual work, and there is 
a very grave danger, unless immediate action is taken, that a 
class of half-educated unemployables will be created; the 
nucleus of political and moral danger to the community.l 
Even as late as the end of World War II one highly placed official wrote 
in the same vein in an annual report for publication, adding that there 
must be a remodeling of the country's primary education so that it would 
2 lead naturally to apprenticeship in farming or a skilled trade. 
What was the actual position as regards numbers of students in 
the two contrasting courses of study at the post-primary level in the 
1905-1945 period? Certain data are available first for 1932. In that 
year the number of Africans from Uganda attending Makerere College was 
1GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1930, p. 33. For later similar 
statements, see E. Dauncey Tongue, "The Contact of Races in Uganda," 
British Journal of Psychology, XXV (January, 1935), 362; Ingham, The 
Making , .. , p. 201; Philip Mitchell, p. 180. 
2UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports 1939-1946, p. 51. 
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probably no more than 100. 1 Even assuming that all of these, no matter 
what their course of study, were receiving an academically oriented 
education, their number was still very small compared to a total of 522 
2 in technical schools. 
The conclusion is clearly that the Government's emphasis was 
definitely on the skilled labor type of advanced training. In addition, 
the Government continued to give considerable emphasis to technical 
training at advanced levels, although this policy began to be somewhat 
equalized with the impetus given by Governor Mitchell in 1938 to the 
3 literary type of education at Makerere. 
Since, with the later exception of Mitchell's views about 
Makerere, the data point to a general official preference for advanced 
education along technical lines and action by the Government to give 
expression to the preference, the situation in the field of mission 
1This is a rough estimate of the number of Uganda students in 
the total Makerere enrollment of 107 in 1932. Makerere at the time was 
at the most a senior secondary ("senior high") school, and more probably 
was still in the transition from a junior secondary school level. 
Ingham, The Making .•. , p. 202; UP, Blue Book for ... 1938, p. 128; 
personal letter from John E. Goldthorpe, Lecturer, Department of 
Sociology, Makerere College, Kampala, Uganda, July 18, 1959. 
2
uganda Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 
1932 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 123. 
3He was of the opinion that the African students at Makerere 
should be taught as future leaders; they should be given the best kind 
of academic education with the same content as that offered in England. 
[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Annual Report on the Social and 
Economic Progress of the People of the Uganda Protectorate, 1938, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1903 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1939), p. 50. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Annual Report on • 
Uganda Protectorate, 1938. 
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education must be reiterated to ensure a balanced picture of the question 
of content of education--literary or technical. Excepting subsidized 
special technical training schools, the enrollment of which was minute 
compared to the missions' total student enrollment, the missions' 
education was primarily academic-literary in content. Since non-mission 
schools were very rare in the period up to 1945, and in view of the 
increase of Government grants to missions from ~10,000 in 1925 to 
~173,000 in 1945, the dominant content of education in Uganda as a whole 
was of the literary kind, despite the wishes and efforts of the Govern-
1 
ment to the contrary. Significantly, there is no evidence that during 
the entire time was the Protectorate actually faced with the problem 
which had been repeatedly waved as a red flag--a large number of 
2 half-educated, unemployed malcontents. 
The second leading educational question in the Protectorate in 
the years after 1905 concerned the relative priorities which should be 
accorded to primary, secondary, and higher education in plans for 
expansion of education in general. 
The missions were always in favor of increased secondary 
education. 3 It was with a view to the creation of an upper, professional 
1The relatively small number of students receiving an academi-
cally oriented education at Makerere in the later years of the pre-1945 
period is somewhat compensated for by the increase in the number and 
standards of the missions' secondary schools in those years. [Great 
Britain,] Colonial Office, Annual Report on Uganda for the Year 1946 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), pp. 51-56. Cited 
hereafter as GB, CO, Annual Report on Uganda •.• 1946. 
2see, for example, Goldthorpe, British Journal of Sociology, VI, 
34. 
3Ingham, The Making •.• , p. 201. 
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class of Africans that the missions founded their boarding schools and 
modeled them on the English public schools with "houses" and other 
British institutions. The boarding schools served the intended purpose; 
and they became closely integrated with the small African elite of the 
1 Protectorate. 
In the first flush of the Government's embracing of responsibil-
ities for education in the 1920's, the official sights were set high. 
Makerere's conversion in 1924 to a general training college from a 
purely technical training school was seen as the first step in a program 
to raise the standards of schools in the country until Makerere could 
reach the status of a University College. For, before 1924, there had 
been no facilities in Uganda for higher education, and Africans desiring 
to supplement their mission education had to go abroad. 2 
After the initial strides in what was then only secondary 
education, more conservative opinion evidently took over. Throughout 
all the prewar years European commercial opinion was generally against 
much higher education as well as against the literary content. Sir 
Bernard Bourdillon, in his farewell address to the Legislative Council 
in 1935, declared a position which the unofficial Europeans must have 
been pleased to hear. The Governor said he wanted more elementary 
education; that it was easy to have too much secondary education; and 
that all education should be closely related to agriculture, the 
people's primary vocation. As a consequence of such views, up to 1937 
lTaylor, The Growth ... , p. 160. 
2GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1924, p. 11. 
1 Makerere did very little post-secondary work. 
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But Governor Mitchell took over from Bourdillon; and supported 
by the recommendations of the 1937 Earl de la Warr Commission, Sir 
Philip devoted his efforts to furthering secondary, and especially 
higher, education. It was his conviction that it was most vital to 
train a few broadly and well--a small aristocracy of culture--so that 
the people might have the advantage of leaders with more than just that 
small amount of education which was dangerous. Likewise, there was an 
urgent need for Africans with real professional qualifications to handle 
the multitude of modern problems. The Governor was convinced that there 
was no possibility whatsoever of Makerere being able to meet the need to 
train these future leaders, let alone glut the market (as many appar-
ently feared). Referring to statements in the press that the money 
might better be spent on economic development, Sir Philip reminded the 
audience to which he was speaking in May 1938 that most of the revenues 
of Uganda came from the Africans, and they did not doubt the propriety 
of the contemplated expenditure for Makerere's expansion; as for devel-
opment, the program was development, development of the country's 
2 
greatest resource--the people themselves, 
48-50. 
The war brought a considerable expansion in education along all 
1
rngham, The Making .•. , pp. 200-201. 
2 GB, CO, Annual Report on •.. Uganda Protectorate, 1938, pp. 
From his statement of reasons for the emphasis on secondary and 
higher education, coupled with his additional belief that Uganda's 
elementary education was too literary for the mass of pupils it served, 
the apparently logical conclusion is that the Governor's values were 
elitist. Philip Mitchell, p. 180. 
lines and levels from 1942 onwards, but primary education benefited 
1 
most, proportionately. 
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How were the developments over the years reflected by figures of 
relative enrollments in the various levels? It was previously stated 
that in 1932 the numbers of Africans attending Makerere from Uganda was 
probably no more than 100, compared to 522 enrolled in government and 
mission technical schools which are presumed to have been post-primary. 
Data on the total number of pupils enrolled in all schools at all levels 
in the Protectorate are not available for 1932, but in 1934 these num-
bered 242,199 out of a school-age population in the Protectorate of some 
2 
720,000. The conclusion is inescapable that the proportion of the 
children receiving an "advanced" degree of education was infinitesimal 
at that time. As shown in Chapter IV, the conclusion also holds for the 
rest of the period. For example, the increases in the number of 
Makerere students, including those from outside Uganda, though reflect-
ing considerable advance percentage-wise in the rise from 127 students 
in 1929 to 172 in 1945, 3 nevertheless still represented a very small 
number, both in absolute terms and when compared to assumed increased 
enrollments in primary schools in the Protectorate. 4 
1GB, CO, Annual Report on Uganda , •• 1946, p. 56. 
2The average number attending during the previous five years is 
reported to have been slightly higher. Thomas and Scott, p. 312. 
3uganda Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 
1945 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1947), p. 125. Cited here-
after as UP, Blue Book for ..• 1945. 
4see the discussion of Western education as a sociological 
aspect of contact and influence, in Chapter IV. 
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The fifty or so years since the establishment of the Protec-
torate can be summarized. The missions always pressed for more higher 
education for Africans. Other unofficials in the non-African communi-
ties quite consistently opposed it. The Government's attitude varied 
with the times: in the 1920's higher levels were somewhat favored over 
lower; there was then a reaction against post-primary education; this 
was reversed in the later 1930's; and primary education again gained the 
front seat during the war. The two significant periods of progress for 
higher levels of education for Africans were most likely attributable 
primarily to the Governors then in office, Archer and Mitchell respec-
tively. Both men were greatly aided--the former perhaps a bit pushed--
by Commissions from abroad whose recommendations for expansion carried 
considerable weight. 
The third important educational question in the period after 
1905 concerned what language would be used as a medium of instruction in 
the Protectorate's schools. This was an aspect of the wider problem of 
the choice of a lingua franca for the many-tongued peoples of the 
1 
territory, a matter which has received attention previously. Suffice 
it to state that Governor Gowers (1925-1932) was unable, in the face of 
other forces, to gain long-term acceptance of his policy favoring 
Swahili instead of Luganda as the dominant language both for educational 
and administrative purposes. In Buganda, Luganda continued to be used. 
In the schools outside of Buganda, the trend after 1930 was to the 
increased development and use of the different tribal languages. At the 
1see Chapter IV. 
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higher grades English was increasingly taught as a language and became 
the medium of instruction in all secondary schools with time. English 
1 
assumed its role as the language of the slowly evolving educated elite. 
The extent and distribution of school facilities. The growth of 
the Uganda Government's assumption of responsibility for education can 
be seen from the data in Table 6 below. Of especial interest are the 
jump in expenditure in the 1920's; the distinct leveling off of grants 
to the missions and of total expenditures in the first five years of the 
1930's; and the great increase after 1938. These variations exhibit 
trends which are similar, not surprisingly, to the changes of policy 
described in the preceding pages, as well as to the fluctuations in 
world economic prosperity. 
The limited extent of school facilities in 1945, despite the 
high rates of increase of expenditure during the war, can be illustrated 
in part by reference to subsequent developments. In 1950 the Government 
spent L624,000 on education, and five years after that it was up to the 
L4,000,000 mark, compared to the L291,000 expenditure in 1945. Data for 
total school enrollment are not available through 1945, but the other 
figures are sufficient to point up the slightness of the beginning that 
had been made in the field of education. There was, however, a good 
foundation on which to build, and the credit for this was largely the 
missions', with a good share accruing also to the Governor and the 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1927, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1392 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1928), p. 5; GB, CO, Uganda. Report for 1930, pp. 32-33; GB, CO, 
Annual Report on .•. Uganda Protectorate, 1931, p. 33; Philip Mitchell, 
p. 173; Ingham, The Making ..• , pp. 163-165. 
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TABLE 6. - Uganda Government expenditures on education in selected years 
from 1911 to 1945a 
Cost of all Cost of African 
Government Total Education as Education as 
Grants to Government Percentage of Percentage of 
Year Missions Expenditure Total Revenue Total Revenue 
1911/12 J, 1,000 
1916/17 1,000 
1920 5,000 
1925 J, 10,000 33,000 1. 70 
1926 21,000 3.07 
1930 33,000 70,000 4.67 
1934 34,000 4.76 
1935 80,000 5.03 4.46 
1938 53,000 6.10 5.34 
1940 165,000 
1945 173,000 291,000 8. 71 8.--
aFigures, which have been rounded off in the first two columns, 
were collected from various sources, and the yearly intervals were not 
always similar. Therefore, blanks indicate only absence of the data. 
Sources for the first, third, and fourth columns were: Uganda Protec-
torate, Blue Book for the Year Ended December 31st, 1926 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 88; Uganda Protectorate, Blue Book 
for the Year Ended December 31st, 1930 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government 
Printer, n.d.), pp. 116-117; Uganda Protectorate, Blue Book for the Year 
Ended December 31st, 1935 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1936), 
p. 148; UP, Blue Book for ... 1938, p. 138; UP, Blue Book for 
1945, p. 137. The source for the data in the second column was Uganda 
~ectorate, Education in Uganda, Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1958/59 
(Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1959), Table XVI. 
Director of Education in the mid-1920's and to Governor Mitchell in the 
late 1930's. 
The other question concerning education which is significant to 
the consideration of the total evolving social and political situation 
is the distribution of educational facilities throughout the territory. 
It is not possible to deal here with the subject of racial distribution, 
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except to mention that considering both the size of the different 
populations and the proportionate contributions of the racial communi-
ties, the non-Africans fared better than the Africans. 1 Some idea of 
the degree to which this was the case can be gained from the fourth 
column of figures in the preceding table. As for distribution of 
facilities by tribe, Buganda's favored position was documented in 
Chapter IV. There apparently was no clear Government policy on this 
particular development, and it must be assumed that considerations were 
quite completely pragmatic; that is, that facilities were located where 
the demand was most vocal, the resources greatest, and the advantages of 
centralized direction most readily realized. 
Summary. British policy with respect to education in Uganda may 
now be summarized. Western education, which came to be valued very 
highly by Africans in the Protectorate, during the early years was the 
preserve of the Anglican and Roman Catholic missions. The Government's 
first concrete assistance took the form of a few scholarships for 
promising students whose parents were unable to pay school fees. 
However, the officials soon began to become perturbed about the academic 
emphasis in mission education, and these worries caused the Government 
to assume its first direct responsibility for education in Uganda. In 
1922 it established a technical school in Kampala on Makerere Hill. 
Despite repeated official stress along this line, the grest mass of 
Uganda's pupils continued throughout the period to receive a literary 
· 
1uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 
Nineteenth Session, December 6, 1939, p. 27. Cited hereafter as UP, 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December 6, 1939. 
kind of education, for mission schools accommodated the bulk of the 
school population. 
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The Protectorate's education history was marked by two periods 
of expansion. The first was in the mid-twenties. Much larger 
grants-in-aid were henceforth given to the Missions. At the same time, 
the Department of Education assumed limited supervisory responsibilities 
for the territory's entire educational system. Establishment of a new 
technical training school in Kampala in 1929 permitted the sloughing off 
from the Makerere curriculum of such training courses as carpentry and 
mechanics and a reorientation toward an academically-biased 
higher-technical and lower-professional curriculum. 
The second period followed an era of depression-inspired 
quiescence, broken by Sir Philip Mitchell in the later 1930's. The 
Governor galvanized the necessary elements into action to expand 
secondary and higher education outward and upward. Makerere was 
reconstituted and endowed with resources to set it on the path toward 
status as a University College. For all of his admirable efforts, 
however, the results were not very visible for some years after, for 
total Makerere enrollment of students from Uganda plus other territories 
increased to only 172 in 1945 from 168 in 1938. In the field of primary 
education little was done, as the Governor felt the situation could 
wait, or rather would have to wait, until secondary and higher school 
needs could be attended to. 
Sir Philip effected another significant change in the entire 
system which was of marked consequence for elementary education. He 
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persuaded the missions to accept for their schools independent Boards of 
Governors with mission, official, and other representation included. 
The result was an increase in secularization, although it did not amount 
to complete secularization by any means, for mission influence remained 
strong. 
Two further developments of social and political significance 
came out of the 1905-1945 period. One was the absence of a consistent 
policy regarding which language should be furthered in Uganda as a 
lingua franca. Only at a later date did English become the apparent 
choice, and little progress had been realized in its use as a medium 
of instruction in the schools by the end of the war. 
The other historical fact, of notable pertinence to the terri-
tory's social and political situation in 1944 and later, was the 
decidedly favored position of the Baganda in educational facilities and 
attainment. Through the 1920's the Baganda almost monopolized available 
post-primary school places in the Protectorate. During the 1930's they 
accounted for more than two thirds of Uganda's enrollment .in Makerere 
and in the 1940's for over half. The percentage of Baganda in regular 
secondary schools most probably was of a similar magnitude and exhibited 
a corresponding trend, for from the beginning educational facilities 
were largely concentrated within the Kingdom. It was only in the later 
years that the other provinces began to make appreciable progress. If 
there was an official, conscious policy on territorial distribution of 
facilities, it was not discernible from the evidence available. Nor did 
there turn up any data which would indicate decided efforts to correct 
the disparity. 
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The situation at the beginning of 1945 was, then, one where 
roughly from one third to one half of the children in the territory had 
for some years been receiving a predominantly literary type of educa-
1 
tion, amounting to at least two years of primary; but where the number 
of pupils in secondary levels fell off very rapidly; and where probably 
less than one hundred Uganda students were enrolled annually in 
post-secondary work in the 1935-1945 period. British policy in Uganda 
was primarily responsible for the limited extent of education, but it 
was hampered by the requirement of "home" policy that the territory be 
financially self-sufficient. As for the literary content of most of the 
education, the missions were responsible, and official policy encour-
aging a more technical, vocational emphasis was unsuccessful in effect-
ing fundamental changes in mission curricula. 
Social Services in General 
2 
Other than education, the principal social service was health. 
Some indication of government policy as regards priorities for health, 
and for education as well, is provided in Table 7 below. Figures are 
for the year 1939, a year largely unaffected by the subsequent war-time 
dislocation of budgets. It is clear that expenditure on social services 
was not especially great in proportion to remaining disbursements. 
1rn 1945 the two-year primary schools numbered 450 and the 
"full" (six-year) schools totaled 119. Data on respective enrollment in 
these schools is not available. GB, CO, Annual Report on Uganda 
1946, p. 56. 
2For the low priority given to services to labor, see Powesland, 
pp. 65, 69; and footnote (a) to Table 7. 
TABLE 7. -Uganda Government expenditure in 1939, 
by major activitiesa 
Activity 
Agriculture 
Defense 
Educationb 
Forests 
Geology 
Medical 
Pensions and Gratuities 
Police 
Posts and Telegraphs 
Public Debt 
Public Worksc 
Veterinary 
War Expenditure--Civil 
A100unt 
l> 60,000 
80,000 
390,000 
20,000 
30,000 
190,000 
110,000 
80,000 
80,000 
150,000 
370,000 
30,000 
10,000 
asource: GB, CO, Annual Report on 
Uganda ••• 1946, p. 17. The figures have been 
rounded to the nearest ten thousand. Expendi-
tures under a heading of Labor did not occur 
until 1943. 
blncludes capital grant of '1>250,000 to 
Makerere College endowment. 
clncludes %.220,000 "Extraordinary" Public 
Works expenditure. 
An idea of the various sources of the funds for the Protec-
torate's revenues, and thus for its social services, is furnished in 
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Table 8 below. It is evident that although the non-African population 
in 1939 a100unted to less than one per cent of the total population, it 
contributed more than that proportion to the revenue. However, except-
ing that which may be inferred regarding educational facilities from 
Table 6, data is not available on what the non-African communities 
received in the way of Government services not received by the African 
TABLE 8. - Uganda Government revenue in 1939, by major sourcesa 
Source 
Customs and Excise 
Non-Native Poll Tax and Estate Duty 
Native Poll Taxes 
Cotton Tax 
Licenses 
Payments for Specific Services 
Posts and Telegraphs 
Amount 
'1.530,000 
40,000 
550,000 
70,000 
90,000 
130,000 
60,000 
aThe figures, which have been rounded to the nearest 
ten thousand, were obtained from GB, CO, Annual Report on 
Uganda •.. 1946, p. 16. The only item omitted was one 
amounting to '1.705 from Colonial Development and Welfare Grants. 
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1 population. The figures in Tables 6, 7, and 8 can, therefore, furnish 
only an impression of Government policy toward African social advance-
ment. They indicate that implementation of the policy was proceeding 
2 but that the results did not bulk large. 
1According to Table 6, the Protectorate's expenditure on educa-
tion of Africans, who comprised ninety-nine per cent of the population, 
represented 4.46 per cent of revenues in 1935, 5.34 per cent in 1938, 
and 8 per cent in 1945. The percentages for expenditure on non-African 
education during the same years may be calculated as respectively the 
following: .67; . 76; and • 71. 
Of interest is the view strongly expressed in 1939 by the Senior 
Unofficial (European) Member of Legislative Council that the provision 
in the budget for education of European and Asian children was too great 
both in proportion to their numbers and to the amount of taxes paid by 
these communities; he deplored increased funds for non-African education 
while there were still so many Africans who were illiterate. UP, 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December 6, 1939, p. 27. 
How typical such an expression of opinion was cannot be 
established without a full analysis of debates and other sources. 
2The rate of increase was often pronounced, mainly because of 
the low base point. 
That the range of social services was narrow in 1939 is further 
borne out by a statement by the Director of Education to the effect 
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What about the war years? It was the intention of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which superseded the very much more 
1 
restrictive 1929 Act of the British Parliament, that government--at 
that, given the rate of population growth and the rate of expansion of 
Uganda's education facilities, it would take over two hundred years 
before all school-age children could be enrolled. Uganda Protectorate, 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Nineteenth Session, December 7, 
1939, p. 74. Cited hereafter as UP, Proceedings of the Legislative 
Council, December 7, 1939. 
1Lord Hailey has written that the 1940 Act "greatly expanded the 
scope and spirit" of the Colonial Development Act of 1929, which "had 
been designed with the primary object of relieving unemployment in Great 
Britain." Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p. 1323. The 1929 
Act limited assistance to one million pounds sterling annually for all 
British colonial territories, African and others. Cohen, p. 17. 
What Uganda received up to 1940 is not known. As of March 1934 
grants from the Colonial Development Fund for the Protectorate had been 
"approved" for only some 17,000 pounds sterling, over two thirds of which 
was for a wireless and meteorological station to service the London-Cape 
Town air route. Thomas and Scott, p. 228. As of July 17, 1940, total 
assistance "recommended" in grants for Uganda--no loans were recommended 
--amounted to 259,729 pounds sterling, representing for the life of the 
Act one shilling and five pence per head of the estimated 1938 popula-
tion. [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Colonial Development Advisory 
Committee: Eleventh and Final Report Covering the Period lst April, 
1939-17th July, 1940, Cmd. 6298 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1941), p. 12. The above total figure of grants recommended from 
1929 to 1940 may have included the 100,000 pounds sterling contribution 
by the British Government toward the endowment fund of Makerere's Higher 
College, announced in April 1938, though conditional on the remainder of 
the sum proposed being provided from other sources. If such was the 
case, it appears that the money was actually voted later, under the 1940 
Act. Ingham, The Making ..• , p. 203; Philip Mitchell, p. 181. 
The 259,729 pounds sterling of total assistance "recommended" 
during the 1929-1940 period represented less than two per cent both of 
Uganda's total revenues and total expenditures during the years 1930-
1939, the latter figures amounting to approximately sixteen and fifteen 
million pounds sterling respectively. Ingham, The Making .•• , pp. 
188, 212. Even if all "recommended" grants were actually paid to Uganda 
during those years and even if the great majority were for social 
services--both of which propositions are of doubtful validity--the 
figure of two per cent is sufficient indication that assistance from the 
mother country was very limited, if not inconsequential. 
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1 home and in the colonies--should positively promote social welfare. To 
what extent was the policy actually implemented in Uganda? 
Some idea regarding the Protectorate Government's action in the 
very important field of education has been provided in the preceding 
section dealing with educational policy. Governor Dundas' policy was 
one of war-time economy, with the accuaulation of reserves for postwar 
2 development. 
As for the Government of the mother country, Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare grants from Great Britain were very limited, reportedly 
because of difficulties in obtaining staff and materials to carry out 
the approved schemes. Grants to Uganda for the five years from 1940 
through 1944 were, respectively, as follows: 1,460; 825; 825; 120; and 
120 pounds sterling. 3 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
After a period of vacillation, British land policy in Uganda, 
affected by the diverse elements bearing on its formulation, settled 
into one of non-alienation of land to non-Africans. The policy pre-
vented the growth of a large white settler community such as came to 
develop in Kenya. How did this and other economic and social policies 
1 See Cohen, p. 34; Powesland, pp. 72-73; James S. Coleman, 
Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1958), p. 231. 
2sir Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London: Macmillan & 
Co., Ltd., 1955), p. 215. 
3GB, CO, Annual Report on Uganda ••. 1946, p. 16. The grant 
in 1945 was 19,775 pounds sterling; that estimated for 1946 was 204,000. 
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considered in the chapter relate to the question of political change in 
the governmental institutions of the Protectorate? 
Some of them molded change more directly by fashioning the 
nature and strength of certain political groups in the territory or by 
intensifying political issues; some operated only indirectly, though 
significantly, by largely shaping the force of alien contact and in-
fluence in ways which limited social pressures for change. 
The non-alienation of land policy was a prime factor in the 
retention by the official British authorities of quite full political 
power. An appreciable increment of power was not exercised in Uganda 
after the 1920's by a non-African, unofficial community, as was the case 
in Kenya where the European settlers were given and retained "a very 
influential position."1 Although in the Protectorate's central govern-
mental institutions the influence of the European and Asian communities 
was much greater in the 1921-1945 period than that of the African 
2 peoples, the former's influence was minor in relation to that of the 
Protectorate Government when compared to the situation in Kenya, for 
example, In other words, a political change which took place in Kenya 
very significantly did not occur in Uganda, and the non-alienation of 
land policy was one important reason why it did not. 
The absence of large numbers of settlers also limited--in 
relation to the possibilities--the strength of the major force 
designated as alien contact and influence. Agents of contact were more 
1 Cohen, p. 21. 
Kenya was also applied 
Sir Andrew Cohen's conclusion with respect to 
to Northern Rhodesia. 
2see Chapter VII. 
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restricted in identity and forcefulness of influence. Alien contact and 
influence was correspondingly less of a force for political change in 
the governmental institutions at both the tribal and the central levels 
than it would have been had the policy been different. 1 
The Protectorate's policy of the compulsory acquisition of land 
for public purposes came into conflict with the Agreement of 1900 with 
Buganda and had developed into a vital political issue by 1944. As 
2 indicated later, its effect can be presumed to have been to solidify 
further the opposition of the Baganda to participation in the central 
governmental institution of the Legislative Council. With respect to 
the consequences for local political institutions of the policy and the 
resulting political issue, the following chapter explains how they 
accentuated some of the Buganda political system's few characteristics 
of weakness, and brought change in this regard. 
For a variety of reasons the policy of the Protectorate Govern-
ment was to push the development of the economy as a peasant-based cash 
crop economy in contrast to an immigrant, settler or plantation economy. 
The implications for political change were similar to those already 
outlined with respect to the non-alienation of land policy. In 
addition, the emphasis on peasant production, together with other labor 
policies deriving from varied pressures, kept down the size of the 
indigenous wage labor force in Uganda. One consequence was a lesser 
1That it could have developed differently should be clear from 
the more detailed description of the policy's evolution, which was 
presented early in the chapter. 
2see Chapter VII. 
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weight on the side of the scale containing elements contributing to 
social--and thus political--change; that is, a lesser weight than would 
have been the case had a large wage labor force developed in Uganda 
1 
through a different policy. 
Policies with respect to social services had similar effects. 
Four educational policies contributed to limiting social and political 
pressures. First, although the greatest part of education offered was 
literary and not technical and was therefore potentially more stimulat-
ing to change, the Government's assistance to the missions was not 
sufficient to permit expansion of their facilities to produce sizeable 
numbers of Africans with more than two years of schooling. Secondly, 
until the late 1930's policy concentrated on primary education to the 
exclusion of additions to the Protectorate's meager secondary school 
facilities. Thirdly, until the late 1930's the official preference as 
regards post-primary education was for technical and not academic 
1 In the conclusions to her full length study of the Baganda, 
Dr. Lucy Mair in 1934 held that certain British policies were mainly 
instrumental in Buganda's adaptation to change--in the Kingdom's 
incorporation of foreign elements as contrasted to being swamped by 
them; and in the transformation of Baganda native life while leaving it 
firmly rooted in tradition. The relevant policies cited by Mair were 
the non-alienation of land policy, the policy of encouragement of a 
peasant-based cash crop economy, and that of the discouragement of a 
large indigenous permanent wage labor force. L. P. Mair, An African 
People in the Twentieth Century (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 
1934), pp. 273-275. 
However, it should be noted that the view that migrant wage 
labor necessarily undermines traditional political authority ano social 
organization has been refuted as regards one African people by W. Watson 
in his Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy: A Study of the Mambwe People 
of Northern Rhodesia, according to the following reviews of the book: 
Peter C. W. Gutkind, Africa, XXIX (October, 1959), 424-425; and Phyllis 
Deane, Venture, XII (March, 1960), 11. 
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instruction. Fourthly, policy vacillated on the question of a lingua 
franca for the entire territory, with the result that there was none by 
1945. 
These education policies, together with the agricultural, labor, 
and non-alienation of land policies, collectively tended to keep down to 
a low level the usual dynamic elements in a social and political 
situation like that evolving in Uganda. Had other alternative policies 
been followed, various pressures would have materialized to exert a more 
1 
appreciable force for social and political change. 
A second significant consequence of the agricultural, labor, and 
social services' policies, as they operated positively, negatively, or 
passively, was to put Buganda further in the lead over the other areas. 
The strength of the Buganda political system as a force in the Protec-
torate's political situation was thereby augmented in this respect, 
absolutely and relatively in comparison with Uganda's other tribes. 
The above Uganda developments were practically all products 
generic to the force of alien contact and influence, as that force has 
been defined. But it is apparent that British economic and social 
policy in Uganda was the major factor shaping the manifestations of the 
1Alternative policies which were within the realm of possibility 
were several. African involvement in other than just the producing 
stage of the economy could have been promoted. An indigenous wage labor 
force could have been encouraged by the provision of housing and like 
facilities, with a corresponding cut in other public expenditures or an 
increase in taxes. Educational expenditure could have been increased 
and certain of the remaining budget items decreased accordingly. Ex-
pansion of primary education could have been limited to permit addi-
tional secondary and university educational output. At a much higher 
policy level, a program of aid from Great Britain could have replaced 
the quite rigid policy of financial self-sufficiency. 
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force of alien contact and influence, especially subsequent to the early 
years of the four decades. 
The interrelation of the various development policies with the 
Protectorate's more "political" policies which affected institutional 
change is analyzed later, as is the part they played in the interaction 
1 
of the five forces. 
1see especially Chapter VIII. 
CHAPTER VI 
METHODS OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATION 
The problem to which the study is directed is the assessment of 
the role of British policy as a force shaping political change in Uganda 
in 1905-1945. Particularly desired is knowledge of the importance of 
policy, compared to that of the other major variable forces, in deter-
mining the extent of political institutional change. 
The previous chapter showed how economic and social policies, 
directly and indirectly and through their effects on alien contact and 
influence, limited pressures which otherwise might have developed more 
forcefully to cause change. 
The discussion now turns to British policies for the administra-
tion of the African populations at the local, tribal level. The varied 
policies applied in Uganda bear directly on three statements in the 
thesis. In the Introduction it was suggested first, that in the areas 
of Uganda where British native administration policy was one of 
decidedly direct rule, change in the local political institutions was 
extensive, primarily because of the policy. Secondly, that in the area 
of indirect rule, change in traditional political institutions was 
relatively limited, and the indirect rule policy was one of two most 
important forces shaping that result. And thirdly, that in one respect 
the differing native administration policies operated with the same 
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effect--to limit the extent of political change in the Protectorate's 
central political institutions. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the 
general aspect of policy dealing with local administration of the 
indigenous peoples. The aim is to provide the material necessary for 
conclusions casting light on the subjects covered in the thesis; that 
is, on the extent of political change in tribal institutions in the 
different areas, on the role of policy in these changes, and on their 
consequences as regards political change in Uganda's central govern-
mental institutions. As to the role of policy, coverage is intended to 
be sufficiently inclusive to provide the appropriate documentation for 
the discussion in Chapter VIII of the interaction of policy with the 
other forces. 
The procedure adopted for handling native administration policy 
is as follows. Some of the different policies or methods of native 
administration used in other territories and in Uganda are discussed in 
general terms, and a more precise delineation of the differing methods 
is set forth for the subsequent, more specific analyses of British rule 
in Uganda. The indirect rule policy applied to Buganda then receives 
attention, to&~ther with its effects on the political system of the 
Baganda. Direct rule in other parts of Uganda is next considered, and 
the Acholi tribe is used to illustrate the policy's effects upon a 
non-Bantu traditional political system. There follows a brief discus-
sion of the initial steps taken by the British authorities late in the 
period to develop the local councils. 
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I. GENERAL APPROACHES TO LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
The aspect of colonial policy dealing with native administration 
was very much a variable in Africa, some powers applying a system of 
direct rule, some showing a preference for indirect rule but in practice 
employing both approaches. 
In the general discussion of colonial native administration 
policies which follows, the terms indirect rule and direct rule are used 
to draw only a very broad distinction--an indirect policy reflecting a 
more supervisory, guiding type of European rule, through Africans 
recognized as having traditional bases for their authority; and the 
contrasting policy reflecting a more directive type of administration 
of the African populations by European officials, the senior grades of 
African chiefs being generally regarded rather as civil servants of the 
territorial administration. The delineation of the terms is less 
precise than that set forth at the end of the section for the later more 
specific analyses of British native administration policy in Uganda. 
Variations in Native Administration Policy in Africa 
To give a perspective to British native administration policies 
in Uganda, those followed in some of the other territories in Africa by 
Great Britain and by the rest of the major colonial powers are briefly 
listed below. 
Colonial powers other than Britain. To summarize first the 
methods adopted in non-British Africa, in French colonies traditional 
chiefs were used only where convenient. On the whole, the French method 
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of native administration was one of direct rule, African chiefs acting 
as agents who clearly drew their authority from a highly centralized 
French colonial administration. 1 The Belgians, on the other hand, used 
the traditional political structures of the tribes as much as possible 
and rule was more indirect. The principal exception was in the urban 
areas; there the rule was decidedly direct. 2 Portuguese policy was 
3 
essentially one of direct rule except at the very low levels. In the 
Union of South Africa the rule in the rural areas was indirect in theory 
but direct in practice. The urban areas were directly ruled. 4 
Diversity of practice in British Africa. In attempting to 
analyze the varied British methods of administering local indigenous 
populations in Africa, the question to be initially clarified is the 
term "Indirect Rule" as employed by the British. 
Numerous writers have pointed out the confusion which often 
results when the phrase "indirect rule" is applied to a brand of 
colonial policy. When capitalized, "Indirect Rule" refers to the 
1Lord Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1957), pp. 544-547. 
2Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 551-557, 560. 
3Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p, 563. 
4Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 426-433. 
Although neither a colony nor a colonial power, the Union of 
South Africa must be included in any discussion of colonial policies in 
Africa. The effects of the Union's policies toward its African 
population have been widely felt throughout the continent and indeed 
throughout the world in later years. 
297 
1 
classic British policy of using traditional native authorities. In the 
first years of British rule the aim was to establish and then preserve 
law and order, at the same time suppressing those features of tribal 
1Lord Hailey has written that "the term 'Indirect Rule' as 
commonly used denotes that the Government concerned has on principle 
preferred the use of traditional Native Authorities, as such, for 
employment as the recognized agencies of Native Administration. To that 
extent, the procedure adopted in Indirect Rule is specifically and par 
excellence a Native Authority system." Hailey, An African Survey, 
Revised, 1956, p. 415. 
The Native Authority system was evolved by Lugard as a way to 
introduce African peoples gradually to the workings of the modern world. 
The idea was to soften the inevitable impact of Western civilization. 
The idea was not to maintain traditional authority almost for its own 
sake, as some of Lugard's successors in Nigeria advocated in practice. 
The Native Authority system preferred the use of traditional authori-
ties, whether they were chiefs or councils, because they were considered 
most suitable for the purposes. The idea was to avoid the use of 
non-traditional authorities. See, for example, Hailey, An African 
Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 540-542; L. P. Mair, "African Chiefs Today. 
The Lugard Memorial Lecture for 1958," Africa, XXVIII (July, 1958), 195. 
But there seems to be some inconsistency in the description of 
the source of authority of the traditionally-based appointees. Lucy 
Mair has written that such authorities were recognized as "local agents 
of government" and that their right to exercise authority rested on 
British recognition, which could be withdrawn. There was no question of 
their retaining power on the grounds that it was inherent in their 
traditional position. Mair, Africa, XXVIII (July, 1958), 195. She has 
thus stressed the dependence of the appointees on British approval and 
support and has minimized their claims to traditional status and support. 
Yet Lord Hailey has maintained that one of the concepts underlying 
Indirect Rule, as expressed in the Native Authority system, was that the 
local authorities used by the British should not only have held in the 
past a position of influence derived from tradition but should likewise 
rely mainly on that authority when carrying out British policy. Where 
Mair has stressed the role of African local authorities as agents of 
British government, Lord Hailey has emphasized their freedom of action 
and initiative within a broader framework of regulations and adminis-
trative supervision. Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 414-
415, 452, and especially p. 540. 
As to functions, Mair has stated that a Native Authority system 
must have exercised judicial, rule-making, and financial powers to have 
qualified as a Native Authority system, it being understood that these 
were exercised subject to British supervision. Mair, Africa, XXVIII 
(July, 1958), 196. Hailey has written that the Native Authorities "were 
viewed in the first instance mainly as agencies for the maintenance of 
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life considered repugnant by the British. Soon there was the additional 
hope that the traditional native authorities could be used to facilitate 
the adaptation of the tribal institutions and way of life to the needs 
and demands of the modern world. The key word in the concept of the 
process of change was "adaptation"; the concept's antithesis was the 
replacement of old or nonexistent institutions with new ones. The aim 
was to build for the future on whatever was already there. In this way, 
it was held, the disruptive effects of the inevitable social change 
1 
would be minimized. 
Implicit in many expressions of the classic concept of Indirect 
Rule was the idea that British administrative officers would advise the 
traditional authorities but would give directions only sparingly; they 
would guide even more than they would supervise. Yet Indirect Rule as 
practiced in many parts of British Africa was a far cry from such a 
restrained form of government. Uganda was no exception. 
A greater degree of direction and supervision was made quite 
necessary in many places in.light of the nature and constitution of the 
order, the administration of justice, or the collection of tax." 
Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p,.416; see also pp. 540-541. 
What does seem clear from otherwise conflicting sources is that 
even though the Native Authority system was susceptible to more precise 
definition than the broader term "Indirect Rule" as used by British 
authorities, it was still variable in scope of functions and degree of 
supervision. It cannot, therefore, be used as a label to identify a 
particular degree of indirect rule, as that term is later more precisely 
defined for. this study; Native Authority as a system was not similar 
enough in its application to permit this. Therefore, to obviate unnec-
essary confusion, the use of the term "Native Authority" has been 
avoided to the extent possible in the text of the study. 
lKenneth Robinson, "Colonial Issues and Policies with Special 
Reference to Tropical Africa," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 87. 
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traditional native authorities, which the doctrine of Indirect Rule 
prescribed should be officially recognized and used. Such authorities 
varied in progression from a strong Ruler with an organized native 
administration already in existence from previous times; to a Chief 
without such an organization; to a Chief-in-Council; to a Chief and 
Council; or finally, to a Council alone, composed perhaps of clan or 
merely village elders. It is easy to see that the last kind of 
1 
"traditional authority" was indeed far removed from the first. Even 
assuming an equally cooperative attitude toward the British officials on 
the part of a Ruler-Authority on the one hand and a Council-Authority on 
the other, a greater degree of British direction and supervision would 
obviously be required in the latter situation. And as indicated subse-
2 quently, this is in effect largely what happened in Uganda, where 
Indirect Rule was accepted as the guiding principle for many years, in 
contrast to the policy in a few other British territories. 3 
1sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (North-
western University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1959), p. 23. In some cases even the last type did not exist as 
an authoritative body. See May Mandelbaum Edel, The Chiga of Western 
Uganda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 112, 117-118; and 
I. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: Watts, 
1956), pp. 85-87. 
2see Audrey Richards, "The Tribal Kingdoms of Uganda," The 
[London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 11. 
3Lord Hailey has stated that "the Native Authority [Indirect 
Rule] system has during the first half of this century held the field as 
the procedure of local rule adopted by a large number of British 
dependencies in Africa." Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, 
p. 539. 
As for the influence of the concept on policy in Uganda's 
neighboring British territory, the same source concluded that "it may be 
premised that Kenya, though making wider use of Native agencies than the 
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Because the term "Indirect Rule" has been employed to cover so 
wide a range of native administrative systems, 1 it has been necessary to 
distinguish between its usage in the British historical and conceptual 
sense referred to above and the somewhat more precise but still general 
meaning given "indirect rule" at the beginning of this section. For, 
British Indirect Rule may in some instances not be synonymous with 
actual indirect rule; it may amount in fact to direct rule if the 
supervision of traditionally-based African authorities is extensive and 
they are generally regarded as civil servants of the territorial admin-
istration. 
Using the terms indirect rule and direct rule, British native 
administration policy in certain of the other territories was as 
2 follows. In Northern Nigeria the rule was indirect to a pronounced 
Union or Southern Rhodesia, has not in principle relied for this purpose 
[native administration] mainly on the use of the traditional organiza-
tion of Chiefs or Chiefs in Council. The failure to make use of 
traditional Native Authorities seems to have been a concession to 
circumstances rather than a decision of principle." Hailey, An African 
Survey, Revised, 1956, p. 446. The former Governor of Uganda and later 
of Kenya has written more bluntly of the disregard of Indirect Rule 
principles in Kenya. Sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: 
Hutchinson, 1954), p. 134. 
1 Further examples of variations outside of Uganda and other 
pertinent material have been provided recently in From Tribal Rule to 
Modern Government, Thirteenth Conference Proceedings of the Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute for Social Research, ed. with introduction by 
Raymond Apthorpe (Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia: The Rhodes-Livingstone 
Institute, 1959), pp. 1-216. 
2The descriptions are of necessity presented in the form of 
generalizations. There were exceptions in each of the territories and 
within each of the three regions of Nigeria as well. In most every area 
could be found the range of systems from indirect to the direct. But 
the descriptions provided are believed to.be generally true for the 
greater part of each of the individual territories mentioned. 
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degree, It was less so in Western Nigeria. In Eastern Nigeria it was 
1 direct. The Gold Coast was ruled by the indirect method in most areas. 
There was what amounted to a predominantly direct form of rule in 
Nyasaland, while Tanganyika was an instance of indirect rule. Kenya was 
perhaps the most marked example of the direct rule method. 
What of Uganda? As in most other British territories there were 
variations in methods actually applied throughout the territory. And as 
happened in certain other British territories, one general doctrine--
Indirect Rule--encompassed a multitude of diverse practices, some of 
which were far removed from the theory of the doctrine. These varia-
tions in Indirect Rule are next considered, attention being given at a 
later stage to the questions of which were "indirect rule" and which 
were "direct." 
The Broad Policy of "Indirect Rule" in Uganda 
Throughout the greater part of the period covered by this study 
the British in Uganda viewed their policy of native administration as 
one of Indirect Rule for the whole Protectorate. Before setting forth 
the broad conceptualizations of British rule in Uganda as held by 
various administrators, it is advisable to point up one feature of 
Indirect Rule which was unique in the Protectorate, distinguishing it 
2 from the first from other British African colonies. This was the idea--
1Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 454-467. For 
discussions of native administration policy for the territories mentioned 
later in the paragraph, see other appropriate sections of Hailey's 
Chapter VIII. 
2It has been highlighted by Lord Hailey in his general intro-
duction to the survey of Native Administration in Uganda, Lord Hailey, 
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derived from the traditional Baganda political system--of chiefs as 
members of a tribal civil service, not as holders of hereditary posts. 
A unique Uganda feature--tribal civil service. British contacts 
in the early years in Uganda were with the Kingdom of Buganda. The 
British were most impressed with the established organization of rule in 
Buganda and decided that it could and should continue to function in 
local affairs. The 1900 Agreement embodied the decision in the form of 
1 
a treaty of protection. Because admiration for the Buganda system was 
widespread, and no doubt also because most Protectorate officers served 
in Buganda first and became acquainted with the efficiency of the 
system, there seems to have been a general consensus that it should be 
applied to the rest of Uganda. As other areas were brought under 
British rule, attempts were made to do this. The aim was to build up a 
tribal civil service for each tribe, composed of whatever leadership 
material could be recruited from the tribe. 
Did it work? Did it prove feasible to apply the Baganda model 
to other tribes and at the same time rule indirectly as in Buganda? 
Success was not rapidly forthcoming in many parts of the country. Far 
Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part I: East 
Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika ([Great Britain,] Colonial Offic;;--
London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 1-2; see also pp. 
28, 81. 
1The 1900 Agreement "has an extrinsic interest in that it marks 
the establishment in eastern Africa of a policy of indirect rule [In-
direct Rule] many years before that policy was widely advocated as a 
solution of Africa's problems. The fundamentals of the Buganda settle-
ment have served as a model for native administration throughout the 
Protectorate until in Uganda indirect rule [Indirect Rule] has become, 
more than a policy, a habit of thought." H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, 
Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 40. 
303 
from it, for the application of the Indirect Rule concept, accompanied 
~ it ~ £y the extension of the Buganda political model, militated 
against there being any indirectness in rule. 
The cause of this paradoxical result was to be found in differ-
ences between the Baganda system and those of the tribes without single 
rulers. As stated in an earlier chapter, the Kingdom of Buganda was 
divided territorially into~~ or counties. Though such definite 
divisions were foreign to most other tribes, it was not this feature of 
the Buganda system which made Indirect Rule unfeasible. It was some-
thing else. Buganda's ~were administered by a cadre of official 
chiefs chosen, not according to hereditary qualifications, but rather on 
personal merits. Chiefs in Buganda were men who had proven themselves 
capable as administrators of part of their ruler's Kingdom, as well as 
of undoubted loyalty to their ruler, the Kabaka. He could transfer or 
dismiss them at will. Such was the "traditional" method of selection 
and appointment of chiefs in Buganda. Under British rule of Buganda 
there was Indirect Rule because the 1900 Agreement gave the Kabaka the 
right to exercise direct rule over his Kingdom and people, and authority 
over his chiefs was a part of such right. The method of selection and 
appointment of chiefs was, therefore, left unchanged from the "tradi-
tional" method, accepted by the Baganda as the correct one. 
But what did it mean to apply the Buganda model of a tribal 
civil service to other tribes? In the three smaller Agreement States 
where there were also rulers, it did not prove too difficult gradually 
to shift the bases for selection of chiefs if this was found necessary. 
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But in the other parts of Uganda where there were no rulers, the results 
were quite strange in terms of Indirect Rule. The "ruler" position was 
filled by the British District Commissioner. The qualifications of the 
chiefs came to be personal loyalty to the District Commissioner and 
ability to administer their areas according to his desires. 
Were these qualifications perhaps parallel to traditional 
institutional arrangements as they were in Buganda, from which the 
example came? They were not. The qualifications bore little relation 
to traditional requirements for leaders, which specified in many cases 
1 
that the office-holder meet certain hereditary prerequisites, and in 
most cases provided for no higher "ruler" authority to which traditional 
leaders were responsible. The Baganda tribal civil service was a 
political idea foreign to almost all other tribes. 
The fundamental concept of Indirect Rule was that native 
institutions would be used. The application of the Buganda model to the 
non-Kingdom tribes rendered impossible any serious implementation of the 
classic Indirect Rule policy. There were exceptions when particular 
attempts were made to select as chiefs men with traditional (hereditary 
in these cases) qualifications when it was the only way to obtain the 
necessary minimum cooperation from the people, or when a new adminis-
trator effected a temporary return to the classic Indirect Rule doctrine. 
But on the whole the British officers in Uganda were imbued with the 
1As is explained later, the British for a while used Baganda 
Agents as chiefs in some areas outside of Buganda, though by no means in 
all. Where they were used, this of course represented an even greater 
departure from the traditional system of the tribes concerned. 
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advantages of the Buganda-style official cadre selected on "merit." 
This feature, combined with the Buganda territorial division of a tribal 
area into the equivalent of counties, sub-counties, and parishes, served 
as one of the guiding principles throughout all of Uganda during the 
first two decades of native administration. But, as indicated above, it 
was not generally in accord with non-Baganda traditional polities. 
"Indirect Rule" in theory and practice. After the initial 
establishment of British administration in Uganda, the preoccupation was 
with Buganda and the immediate areas to the east and west, it being some 
years before administrators began to take over the northern part of what 
now constitutes the Protectorate. The restricted geographical scope of 
British administration explains the orientation of the statements 
regarding the method of administration made by official and other 
writers through the first decade of the century. 
Governor Bell in 1906 noted that the natives of the four 
Kingdoms were remarkably superior to their neighbors and had spontane-
ously evolved a highly organized system of native government. He was 
convinced that 
our policy should be the creation of an essentially African 
State which should prove, by its stability and honest government, 
that purebred Africans are really capable of governing themselves 
on progressive lines without suppressing the traditions of their 
race or abandoning manners and customs which are not inconsistent 
with humanity. 
He added that the Government must completely disregard any loud, semi-
educated group which might clamor for self-government long before the 
1 
country was fit, 
lsir Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life (London: 
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In a talk in London early in 1907, Bell's second in command, 
George Wilson, who had had many years of experience in Uganda, gave his 
version of British policy. After outlining the system used in Buganda--
the Kabaka, his audience chamber, the Lukiko, and the institution of a 
baraza (open meeting) with a British "political" officer present--Wilson 
informed his listeners that the same form was used in the three smaller 
kingdoms with only slight modifications. Significantly, he then added 
that it was being applied "in principle" to other tribes as well. 
According to Wilson, the advantage of the system was that it made 
possible a gauging of the native reaction before the framing of legisla-
tion. By this means the Government could avoid offending, or at least 
l 
could make the measures more palatable. As for interference in the 
affairs of the Africans, while not slacking the reins of responsible 
control, in his view the government should not be unduly meddlesome. In 
Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., [1946]), p. 122. 
1George Wilson, "The Progress of the Uganda Protectorate," 
Journal of the Society of Arts, LV (February, 1907), 294. 
A somewhat more critical view has been advanced by an Indian 
writer, who has maintained that native authorities were used to avoid 
the impossible expense of many more British officers, and because native 
officials could execute British colonial policy better than foreigners, 
as they knew their own people more intimately. Both statements are no 
doubt true. For substantiation of the former, see [Great Britain, 
Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1913-14, Cd. 7622-22 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915), p. 26. 
But the validity of the implications contained in the writer's 
further remarks is open to question. He held that through Indirect 
Rule, the British could for a while "hood-wink the peoples into believ-
ing that no qualitative change had taken place in Uganda since the 
country came under British control. 11 They could use the chiefs as a 
defense against the peoples, whom the chiefs kept in a subject state. 
The writer also stated that the system was found so successful that a 
similar one was extended to those areas of the Ptotectorate where chiefs 
had not as yet really developed. Ramakrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of 
Uganda: A Study in Acculturation (Berlin: Academie-Verlag, 1956), p. 130 
and pp. 131, 139-140. 
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this way the people would remain amenable to the authority of their 
chiefs. Looking to the future, Wilson considered it would take a long 
time--"generations" of civilization--to prepare indigenous peoples for 
1 
complete rule of themselves. 
What appears to have been a theory of restricting British control 
in the Agreement States (then Buganda, Toro, and Ankole) primarily to a 
firm grip at the top of the native administration, experienced a change 
by the end of the third decade. In a speech to the Legislative Council 
in the fall of 1928, Governor Gowers, referring to the special considera-
tion extended to the Agreement Kingdoms, nevertheless deplored the 
criticism Government evidently was getting from Africans to the effect 
it was interfering unduly with the work of the Native Governments. He 
declared that it must be realized that "the time is not yet in sight 
when the active assistance and advice of the Protectorate Government can 
be dispensed with." It was necessary for the work to "be supervised and 
directed" if it was to be performed promptly and efficiently. The 
Governor's further remarks make it clear that it was not officially 
recognized, or perhaps appreciated as a fact, that such close direction 
of native affairs was inconsistent with the preservation of the tradi-
tional institutions. 
Indeed the willing acceptance of a certain degree of control and 
guidance at the present stage is the surest road to securing the 
stability and permanence of the traditional and historic native 
1George Wilson, Journal of the Society of Arts, LV, 297. As for 
Wilson's belief that the less interference the better, the view that 
British domination, where exercised more directly, was less effective in 
achieving the ends of government, can be found in Henri Rolin, Le Droit 
de l'Uganda (Bruxelles: Etablissements Emile Bruyland, 1910), p. 91. 
institutions and organisation which are so much cherished by 
them,l 
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An additional indication that the Government of that day wanted 
a direct channel down to the population was Gowers' abolition after his 
arrival in Uganda of the separate post of Secretary of Native Affairs. 
It was his view that the existence of such a position incorrectly 
implied that it was possible to separate the affairs of natives from 
those of non-natives, when the latter numbered less than one half of one 
per cent of the population. Straighter to the mark of his personal 
orientation was his conviction that the Provincial Commissioners, as the 
Protectorate's senior Administrative Officers, were the proper advisers 
2 
on native affairs and the appropriately responsible Government agents. 
An explanation in the mid-thirties of British policy by a Uganda 
official close to the question reiterated the broad applicability to 
Uganda of the doctrine of Indirect Rule and at the same time furnished 
an indication of its limitations in regard to the tribes without rulers. 
The policy adopted in Uganda is definitely that of Indirect Rule, 
i.e. the development of ordered government as far as possible by 
means of indigenous institutions, and through the native rulers 
themselves. With the Nilotic [Northern] element this has meant 
building up from scanty foundations; with the Bantu, the adapta-
tion of an existing organization.3 
1All above references to Governor Gowers' statements are from 
Uganda Protectorate, Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative 
Council of Uganda, Eighth Session, October 11, 1928, p. 44. 
2uganda Protectorate, Summary of the Proceedings of the Legis-
lative Council of Uganda, Ninth Session, October 31, 1929, p. 59. 
3E. Dauncey Tongue, "The Contact of Races in Uganda," British 
Journal of Psychology, XXV (January, 1935), 357. On page 364, the same 
writer added that the general policy was to graft on to the best ele-
ments of native culture the most suitable British concepts in order to 
facilitate the evolution of a stable African civilization. 
An observer somewhat less involved personally--a German scholar 
--about the same time came to the conclusion that the indirect type of 
administration used for the Agreement Kingdoms had not been feasible 
elsewhere because there were not the similar institutions on which to 
build. Therefore, direct rule--he called a spade a spade--had to be 
used in the north and east of Uganda. Because British officials were 
few in number, this was done through the medium of Protectorate-paid 
Baganda Agents. These were later slowly withdrawn as they could be 
1 
replaced by men selected from the local tribe for appointment as chiefs. 
The trend in Uganda over the years up to the mid-thirties seemed 
to point to a gradual disillusionment with Indirect Rule as a practical 
theory. It was not applied in its full spirit even in the instance of 
the Agreement States. As for the tribes without rulers, the application 
of the doctrine can be regarded as nothing more than an extraordinary 
example of the powers of illusion, of wishful thinking at its ultimate. 
A new personality entered on the scene in the form of Philip 
Mitchell (later Sir Philip), who became Governor of Uganda late in 1935. 
Coming from experience in Tanganyika and thoroughly indoctrinated in the 
1Horst Brendel, Die Kolonisation Ugandas (Grossenhain: Georg 
Weigel, 1934), pp. 56-58. The reference is a published dissertation, 
based not on work in Uganda but on some 300-odd sources cited in the 
bibliography. The latest reference cited by Brendel on the pages indi-
cated above related to material published in 1928. 
Brendel wrote that it wasn't easy to build chiefs of such 
material as was available among, for example, the individualistic 
Nilotic Lango. 
As for his calling the rule in the north and east of Uganda 
direct rule, the term appears not to have been used by officials up to 
that time to describe the method of administration employed for any of 
the tribes in the Protectorate, except as the Kabaka of Buganda was 
acknowledged as having the right of direct rule over his subjects. See, 
for example, the discussion as of 1935 in Thomas and Scott, pp. 82-84. 
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1 
concept of Indirect Rule advanced and practiced by Sir Donald Cameron, 
the new Governor's tour of duty was marked by a determined attempt by 
the Administration to revive and revitalize traditional African institu-
tions. 
A correlation of facts ten~ to support the conclusion that the 
reversion to the past was inspired by Mitchell. He was an able exponent 
of the philosophy, generally preferring Indirect Rule according to a 
2 
rather reticent personal admission. Most stressed by him was that he 
regarded the use of native institutions only as a means to an end; there 
was no intrinsic value for the method in and of itself. But he did 
think the use of the method would best assure the more ultimate aim, 
which was to see that the people themselves modernized and adapted their 
tribal organizations so the latter could serve the present and the 
future, as well as the past. In some parts of Uganda a more direct form 
of administration was, he realized, inevitable, but he still wanted to 
3 
utilize traditional customs and leaders where possible. 
During his service in the Protectorate two developments among 
others can be mentioned as examples of the new tack policy took under 
Governor Mitchell's guidance. To accord more with the spirit of 
Indirect Rule as expressed in the Agreement of 1900 with Buganda, he 
changed the title of his Provincial Commissioner for Buganda to that of 
1Governor of Tanganyika. 
2Philip Mitchell, pp. 129-131, 134-135. 
3sir Philip Mitchell, "Indirect Rule," Uganda Journal, IV (1937), 
101-107, cited by Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), p. 192. (All subsequent shortened-form 
citations to Philip Mitchell refer to his book, African Afterthoughts, 
previously footnoted in full.) 
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Resident, indicating that the post was henceforth to reflect political 
1 
as opposed to administrative duties. In the east and in the north of 
Uganda there were administrative changes which brought traditional 
leaders back into office: 2 in Acholi as chiefs of different ranks; in 
Teso as local chiefs; and in several districts as members of councils at 
various levels, councils newly broadened as a means of counteracting a 
trend of autocratic behavior which had developed in British-appointed 
3 
chiefs. 
The next Governor, Sir Charles Dundas, served from 1940 to 1944. 
He carried Mitchell's policy as regards Buganda one step further and 
abolished the posts of the District Commissioners who had formerly 
resided in certain populated centers within that Kingdom. The junior 
officers assisting the Resident were also to assume the functions of 
advisers. 
But Dundas did not continue the Mitchell-regime policy for areas 
without tribal rulers. In fact, it was reversed. The Acholi experiment 
lPhilip Mitchell, p. 170; Hailey, Native Administration . 
Part I, 1950, p. 23. Mitchell was much impressed by the superior 
qualities of the Baganda (see his referenced book, p. 179). 
. . ' 
2The changes in Acholi were the most reversionary, the tradi-
tional political units and sub-units being reconstituted in large meas-
ure, and determined efforts being made to find the hereditary claimants 
to the two traditional levels of chieftainship (the rwot and the~). 
3Evidence that these changes were inspired by Mitchell is less 
conclusive, although it seems to support the contention. At the least 
the District Commissioners carrying out these programs had good support 
from their chief officer in Entebbe. Lord Hailey, "Native Administra-
tion and Political Development in British Tropical Africa" (unpublished 
Report, 1940-42, prepared for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
[1944]), pp. 193-195; Hailey, Native Administration ... , Part I, 1950, 
pp. 29, 32-35, 61, 82; J. C. D. Lawrance, The Iteso: Fifty Years of 
Change in a Nilo-Hamitic Tribe of Uganda (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1957), p. 36. 
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was dropped and chiefs were increasingly selected on merit. And a start 
was made in adding non-traditional members to the various local councils 
in the district administrations of the Eastern Province. 1 Despite his 
Tanganyika experience, or perhaps because of it, Dundas became sceptical 
of the merits of Indirect Rule, feeling that such a policy encouraged 
tribalism and made more difficult the building of larger nation 
. 2 group1ngs. 
Conclusions. With the war-time Governor, then, the fiction of 
Indirect Rule as a system of native administration for all of Uganda was 
definitely dropped. It was never in fact really an accurate term to 
describe the type of rule for any area in the Protectorate except the 
four Kingdoms. In addition, the British concept of Indirect Rule was 
only partly applied--and here especially in most of its superficial 
attributes--to the three smaller Kingdoms, which were administered by a 
form of rule which was not indirect but was in sum predominantly direct. 
And there can be no question about the areas without tribal rulers. 
1Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . 
. ' 
pp. 187, 193-195; Hailey, Native Administration .. ,, Part I, 1950, p. 
61; Sir Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London: Macmillan & Co., 
Ltd., 1955), p. 212. 
" 
2Dundas, African Crossroads, pp. 135, 214. For Governor Dundas, 
Buganda was evidently a special case. He had a high regard and respect 
for its traditional political system. His view was that the 1900 Agree-
ment intended to limit the Kabaka's independence only to the extent 
necessary to ensure decent and civilized government. In fact, the 
Governor referred to Buganda as a semi-self-governing state. He con-
sidered he should neither give positive directions to the Buganda 
Government nor exert heavy pressure to obtain reforms; that he should 
limit h~mself to suggestions, intervening only in exceptional cases. 
Otherwise, he hoped that pride or public clamor would induce the Buganda 
Ministers to effect reforms, especially regarding the democratization of 
the Lukiko. [Sir Charles Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency the Governor 
[of Uganda] on Native Affairs in the Post-War Era" (unpublished official 
document; n.p.: n.n., n.d. [Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1944?]), 
pp. 1-2. 
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Admittedly, in several places traditional leaders were utilized in 
positions of authority on occasion, but this was not widespread. In all 
such areas the degree of interference and direction by British officials 
was appreciable. There was direct rule, pure and simple, of the tribes 
lacking native rulers. Lord Hailey has furnished the most conclusive 
evidence. After referring to the policy elsewhere of recognizing 
traditional authorities as legal native administrations, he has 
described the system adopted in Uganda for the non-Agreement areas in 
these words: 
The principle which it [the system] followed may best be expressed 
as the creation in each District of a District Native Administra-
tion of which the District Commissioner was the controller and 
chief executive, operating through a heirarchy of chiefs and sub-
ordinate chiefs in charge of territorial units. Though given 
statutory powers as Native Authorities for the discharge of the 
duties imposed on them, these chiefs were not Native Authorities 
in the same sense as in some other territories, for though an 
effort was often made to select as chiefs men who were tribal or 
clan leaders, this was not the universal rule, and the basis of 
their authority lay not in their traditional status, but in the 
place they occupied as a part of an official or semi-official 
organization, the District Native Administration.l 
The Analytical Approach to Systems of Native Administration 
Before proceeding to a more intensive discussion of the methods 
of local administration employed by the British authorities in Uganda to 
govern the African population, it is advisable to delineate more pre-
cisely the terms 11 indirect rule" and "direct rule 11 to sharpen the 
examination of the thesis. 
What is it about the systems of native administration that is of 
interest to a study of political change in Uganda? In the broadest 
1Hailey, Native Administration ... , Part I, 1950, p. 28. 
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sense the interest lies in how the systems of native administration, as 
an aspect of British colonial policy, operated as a force shaping 
political change. More specifically, it would be useful to gain some 
idea about how the specific method, applied in the rule of this or that 
tribe, affected the traditional polities. 
Answers to these questions would seem to require knowledge, or 
an estimate, of three aspects of the methods of native administration at 
the local, tribal level. These are all in effect indices of the degree 
of directness or indirectness of different instances of British rule. 
The three aspects are as follows: the (traditional versus 
non-traditional) bases of selection by the British of African holders of 
local authority; the local governmental functions exercised by these 
African authorities, in relation to those exercised by British officials; 
and the extent of interference of British authorities in the functions 
assigned to the African authorities. 1 
As for the first, it is concerned with the extent to which the 
1It may be pointed out that the distinction above is made 
between African authorities and British officials to simplify the 
analyses. 
A more accurate distinction would be that between, on the one 
hand, authorities indigenous to the particular tribe under consideration 
in each case and, on the other hand, other officials not of the tribe. 
The latter category would include Baganda Agents as well as British 
officials. However, this distinction, or one which differentiated 
between local government employees and central government employees 
(civil servants) working in the local areas, would result in a much more 
involved presentation, since for each of the three aspects there would 
have to be a further distinction between British officials and Baganda 
Agents, for example. 
The analytical approach used for the study simplifies the matter 
by dealing with the question of identity of authorities under only the 
first aspect--the bases for selection by the British of African holders 
of authority. 
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colonial administration used traditionally-based native authorities--
chiefs or elders or both, whichever were traditionally sanctioned--in 
positions of authority, in contrast to Africans having no such claim or 
1 basis. The greater the use of traditional authorities, the more 
indirect the rule. 2 
The second significant aspect of methods of administration is 
concerned with the relation between, on the one hand, the functions 
carried out by the African authorities holding official positions and, 
on the other hand, the functions exercised more directly by British 
officials. The greater the local governmental functions of the former 
authorities compared to the latter, the more indirect the system of 
d . . . 3 a m1.n1.strat1.on. 
1The extreme example of the latter is the use by the British in 
Uganda of Baganda as agents to rule certain, though not all, of the 
other tribes in the early years of administration. 
2The positions of authority with which this criterion of direct-
ness is concerned are those at the "sub-county" and 11 county" levels, and 
any positions in the tribal-wide local governmental institutions. 
Excluded from consideration are positions at the village and parish 
levels. These almost everywhere were traditionally-based. 
3In determining whether functions carried out by the indigenous 
tribal authorities were greater than those exercised by other officials, 
precise judgments are not possible, but certain guidelines may be set. 
The list of functions may be restricted to those generally recognized as 
functions of the more indirect rule (Native Authority) type of local, 
native administration during that era--the maintenance of order, the 
administration of justice, the collection of taxes, rule-making, and the 
provision of local services (including the allocation of revenues for 
them), the latter a more recent addition. Hailey, An African Survey, 
Revised, 1956, pp. 416, 540-541; Mair, Africa, XXVIII (July, 1958), 196. 
Where all functions were performed by the indigenous officials, 
rule in this aspect would be more indirect than where none of them were 
so performed. Where functions were divided, other considerations such 
as the relative importance of the functions must be taken into account. 
The difficulties in making such assessments point up the impossibility 
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The third aspect of methods of rule for which information is 
helpful is the extent of actual interference--control and direction--by 
British colonial officers in the affairs of the African population at 
the local level. Were the African chiefs or councils--traditional or 
non-traditional--allowed to carry out their assigned functions with a 
minimum of supervision from the British authorities above them; or, at 
the other extreme, were senior African authorities of the tribe subject 
1 to detailed direction by British superiors? The greater the degree of 
African autonomy, the less the impact of British colonial policy. 
To combine the three aspects in examples, where the system of 
native administration gave a large measure of autonomy over a wide range 
of local governmental functions to traditionally-based tribal authori-
ties, such a system of administration is referred to as "indirect rule." 
Its opposite, a system using non-traditional Africans in positions of 
authority over only limited governmental functions, and marked by a 
high measure of interference by British officials, is referred to as 
''direct rule.'' 
of exact measurements of the degree of directness of rule. These, 
together with similar problems for the other two aspects, and the 
problem of weighing the relative importance of the conclusions regarding 
each of the three aspects, render the final judgments very general 
approximations when the evidence does not point to a clear predominance 
of factors for either indirect or direct rule. 
1
"Senior" would have to be defined differently in each case, but 
it refers generally to authorities at the "county" and higher levels. 
To avoid complex analytical terminology and method, the three 
criteria for estimating the directness or indirectness of native admin-
istration methods are not more precisely delineated; that is, 
sub-criteria for each of the main criteria are not delineated, for it is 
not considered that the problem to which the study is directed requires 
an analysis refined and structured to that depth and extent. 
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Between the examples of the two general types of rule given 
above, there can exist numerous gradations. These may be regarded as 
representing a continuum of degrees of indirect rule and of direct rule, 
the one set flowing into the other. Designations of the numerous 
gradations are not being precisely specified, since the main concern in 
this study is with the broad effect of the two generally variant types. 1 
Where appropriate, however, positions on the continuum, in relation to 
others, are made the subject of special comment. 
II. INDIRECT RULE IN BUGANDA 
Buganda has been described as "not only the example, it was the 
2 prototype, of Indirect Rule." The Kingdom's history since 1900 
generally bears out the statement. The British concept of Indirect Rule 
3 
was subscribed to throughout. 
But British policy was not in fact consistent during the whole 
of the four decades if, as is done in this study, policy is regarded as 
1In addition, it would not be possible to s·pecify gradations and 
apply them as descriptive terms to particular cases without further 
refining the analytical approach by adding sub-criteria and advancing 
postulates about relative importance of these and the main three factors. 
In any event, the evidence is not sufficiently detailed to justify such 
a procedure. 
2Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 214. One of many earlier 
expressions in the same vein was made by another Governor. See Sir 
Robert T. Coryndoq, "Uganda," United Empire, XI (June, 1920), 295. 
3 Mair felt the history of British rule in Buganda constituted a 
justification for the system of Indirect Rule. She wrote that it was a 
means of adapting the native society with the least dislocation; that it 
was necessary to preserve native institutions to maintain social 
stability; that the system permitted gradual instead of abrupt change. 
L. P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century (London: George 
Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1934), pp. 286-287. 
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the settled courses adopted and followed by governments. Although for a 
good part of the period there was indirect rule in the analytical sense 
as defined above, such was not the case for the entire span of forty 
years. Like a chameleon adapting to mutations in surrounding conditions, 
the indirect rule of the first two decades changed into what amounted to 
a form of direct rule during the early 1920's. Late in the following 
decade the process was reversed, culminating in the 1944 full-fledged 
return to the spirit of the 1900 Agreement. 
The variations in policy are taken up below in successive 
discussions of the three different eras. Interwoven with the narrative 
are accounts of events which proved significant in the interaction of 
policy with the Buganda political system. Following conclusions about 
the extent of the variations in the directness of rule of Buganda over 
the years, an assessment is made of the Buganda political system at the 
beginning of 1945. 
Authentic Indirect Rule in the Early Years 
The guidelines for the relations between the British authorities 
and the Buganda Kingdom were laid down in the 1900 Agreement. The 
Kabaka was to exercise direct rule over his people, assisted by three 
state officers or ministers--a Prime Minister (Katikiro), a Chief Judge 
(Omulamuzi), and a Treasurer (Omuwanika). Daudi Chwa was Kabaka at the 
time, and since he was yet a child, the three ministers were to act as 
Regents until his eighteenth birthday in August 1914. 
The Agreement also set forth in detail the composition of the 
native council--called the Lukiko. Laws of the Protectorate were not to 
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apply to Buganda if they were in conflict with the Agreement, The 
Lukiko's powers to legislate in the field of native custom and adminis-
tration, subject to the Governor's and Kabaka's approval of its 
measures, were confirmed by a 1910 supplementary Agreement following a 
Uganda court decision to the same effect. 
To the Protectorate Government the 1900 Agreement gave ultimate 
control of Buganda's purse-strings, as all taxes were to be merged with 
the Protectorate's general revenues and the central government was to 
pay the salaries of the Kingdom's officials, Although in most matters 
responsible to their Baganda superiors, the Kingdom's county chiefs were 
answerable to British authorities directly in regard to their tax 
collection and assessment duties. If a county chief failed in these 
duties, the Governor could ask the Kabaka to dismiss him. Otherwise, 
jurisdiction over the Kingdom's "civil service" was left where it had 
always been--with the Buganda Katikiro and his ruler. 
The Agreement was conditional on the continued loyal cooperation 
of the Kabaka, chiefs, and people with Her Majesty's Government. Also, 
the Kabaka was required to follow the advice of Her Majesty's represent-· 
ative in Uganda on matters of native administration. 1 Despite such a 
blanket grant of authority to the Protectorate Government, the whole 
tone of the Agreement was such as to give the Kingdom a wide measure of 
autonomy in the running of its internal affairs. 
For the first two decades of the Agreement's life everything 
!Articles 6, 11, and 20. The text of the Agreement is provided 
in several sources, one of which is Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native 
Problem in Africa (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), I, 633-642. 
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went very smoothly. The British authorities gave advice but did not 
insist it be accepted. Usually, however, it was accepted. Both parties 
to the Agreement, as far as can be determined, apparently cooperated in 
a spirit of mutual good will. It is possible of course to interpret 
those years in a light less favorable to the Protecting Power by saying 
that the chiefs, who had received so much land in freehold by the 1900 
1 Agreement, were only too glad to toady to their patrons. Or, it could 
be argued that the real power was held by the Governor and exercised by 
his officers; but that this was all done behind a facade of native 
authority which preserved appearances, so that in the eyes of the mass 
of the Baganda it was their Kabaka who governed with the assistance of 
2 
the Lukiko. Neither of these approaches seems justified. On the 
contrary, the evidence available points to a practice of the British 
d 1 . 3 authorities of not pressing their a vice to ensure its imp ementat1on. 
A Trend Toward Direct Rule After 1920 
Sometime in the early 1920's an apparent change occurred in the 
1This slant can be inferred from [Great Britain, Foreign Office,] 
Instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Sadler on Appointment as His 
Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General in the Uganda Protectorate, 
Africa series, No. 2 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), 
p. 2; Buell, I, 578-579; and Anthony Low, "The Composition of the 
Buganda Lukiko in 1902," Uganda Journal, XXIII .(March, 1959), 67. 
2Jules Leclercq, Aux Sources du Nil par le Chemin de Fer de 
l'Ouganda (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1913), pp. 213-214. He has 
written further in the same place that in order to enable the Kabaka to 
maintain his prestige and the appearances of power, the Governor--head 
of the supreme administration--resided some twenty miles distant from 
the "capital" of the Kingdom. 
3H. B. Thomas and A. E. Spencer, A History of Uganda Land and 
Surveys and of the Uganda Land and Survey Department (Entebbe, Uganda: 
Government Press, 1938), pp. 67-70; Brendel, p. 100. 
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situation. The vigorous, young, and progressive Christian oligarchy of 
chiefs of 1900 fame had begun to age, and with this process they became 
1 less dynamic and more of a satisfied, conservative class. Yet despite 
strong evidence of the class-oriented behavior of the chief-and-landowner 
majority in the Lukiko, the Protectorate Government nevertheless did not 
intervene as a regular matter in the Lukiko affairs even during the 
1920's. 2 Only once, in the case of a land-rent law as explained later, 
did the central government apply considerable pressure to see its wishes 
carried out, There are numerous examples where the British did not 
press their ideas. One was the dropping of the request that the Lukiko 
pass a law requiring the compulsory teaching of Swahili in Buganda's 
schools. 3 
Main features of the policy shift. While the British authorities 
1uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 
1920 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1920), pp. 44-45 (cited 
hereafter as UP, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920); C. 
C. Wrigley, "The Christian Revolution in Buganda," Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, II (October, 1959), 45-46; and especially C. C. 
Wrigley, "Buganda: An Outline Economic History," Economic History 
Review, X (August, 1957), 77. 
Zone practice, stemming from the requirement of the Governor's 
consent to Buganda laws, reduced the necessity of intervention. It was 
customary for projected Lukiko legislation to be discussed with the 
Provincial Commissioner in Buganda and his agreement obtained by the 
Buganda Ministers before the bills were submitted to the Lukiko. 
Hailey, Native Administration •.• , Part I, 1950, p. 11. See also 
Mair, An African People •.. , p. 204. 
3Thomas and Spencer, p. 70; Buell, I, 596; Ingham, The Making 
.•• , pp. 167-168; P. G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labour, ed. W. 
Elkan (East African Studies, No. 10; Kampala, Uganda: East African 
Institute of Social Research, 1957), pp. 22, 32; Hailey, Native Admin-
istration ••• , Part I, 1950, pp. 9-11. For another example, see 
Ingham, The Making ••. , pp. 168-169. 
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in the 1920's continued the policy of non-intervention as regards the 
Lukiko, there was increasing interference in administrative and judicial 
matters of the Kingdom. The development stemmed from several things, 
The natural growth of government functions found the older 
incumbent chiefs less able to maintain the former very high level of 
efficiency of the native administration. 1 There were changes in both 
the British and Baganda personnel holding positions of authority at the 
2 different levels. Such factors combined to bring about a deterioration 
in amicable relations. Misunderstandings occurred. Increased interfer-
ence by British officers was the end result, 
One kind of intervention was the greater number of British 
revisions of judgments handed down by the Buganda courts. The revisions 
were so extensive as to represent in certain cases a violation of the 
3 Buganda Government's rights under the 1900 Agreement as amended. 
Interference in the judicial function of the Buganda Government became 
seriously perturbing to the Baganda, especially to the Lukiko. 
1Mair, An African People ••. , p. 199. 
2Mulira has stressed that in the years 1930-1935 the older 
generation of missionaries and British Government officials retired, 
breaking the "continuity of relationship" and resulting in "back-sliding 
both in human relationships and in moral progress." E. M. K, Mulira, 
Troubled Uganda (Colonial Controversy Series, No. 6; London: Fabian 
Publications Ltd., 1950), p. 20. 
3Examples of the conflict of British and Buganda values, as 
reflected by some of the revisions, are as follows. After the Lukiko 
Court had sentenced a man to five years for raping a woman, despite 
evidence of a degree of compliance on her part, the sentence was revised 
by the Provincial Commissioner, who directed that the defendant be 
required only to pay the woman twenty shillings. In another case, the 
British officer considered that a one hundred shilling fine imposed by 
the Buganda court for an offense of forgery was too light. Buell, I, 
583. 
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A second manifestation of a shift from indirect to a more direct 
rule for Buganda was also a result of the factors outlined above. It 
grew out of the chiefs' direct responsibility to the central government 
under the 1900 Agreement for tax collections. The District Commis-
sioners stationed at the various district headquarters in the Kingdom 
had always inspected the tax returns at the county and sub-county 
headquarters. There had been instances of dismissal of chiefs in cases 
of proved embezzlement. All this could be justified by the letter of 
the Agreement, if not by the spirit. However, the British officers came 
to interfere at the county and sub-county levels in many other duties 
and with numerous other responsibilities which were the agreed preroga-
tive of the Buganda Government. 
An equally if not more important change was the high degree of 
control which the British officers began to exercise--probably in the 
1 2 
early 1920's --over the appointment, transfer, and dismissal of chiefs. 
1That it was not exercised prior to 1920 may be inferred from 
UP, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920, pp. 44, 45. 
Also, Governor Coryndon(l917-1922) was apparently an advocate of in-
direct rule for Buganda in the real as well as the theoretical sense. 
Coryndon,United Empire, XI, 295. 
2sources for the three previous paragraphs were: Buell, I, 575-
577, 583, 585-587; Lord Hailey, African Survey (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1938), pp. 444-445, 452; Hailey, Native Administration •• 
__ ., Part I, 1950, pp. 22-23; Thomas and Scott, pp. 83, 228; Ingham, The 
Making ..• , p. 168; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 17, 20; Colin Legum, 
Must We Lose Africa? (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1954), pp. 51-52. The 
last source has inaccurately understated the extent of British inter-
ference and overstated Buganda's autonomy. 
As regards the British interference in the appointment of 
chiefs, Mair wrote that a responsible British official had assured her 
that only if a "notoriously unfit person" were appointed by the Baganda 
authorities would their choice be interfered with. She added that she 
had heard of no complaints from the Baganda on this score. Mair, An 
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This represented a significant departure from the traditionally-sanctioned 
practice which gave to the Kabaka or those Baganda acting for him the 
right to exercise these powers. 
Two events marked the period of direct rule between the early 
and later eras of indirect rule--Sir Apolo Kagwa's retirement in 1926; 
and the Lukiko's passage of the land-rent law the following year. The 
first of these events particularly illustrated the directness to which 
British rule had progressed at one point. 
The forced retirement of Sir Apolo Kagwa. In 1914 the young 
Kabaka Daudi Chwa came of age and assumed the active discharge of his 
1 
duties as defined in the 1900 Agreement. However, he had been a minor 
for so long, and the Katikiro had been so effective a centralizer of 
authority and had worked so well with the British, that Sir Apolo 
continued in his earlier position of active leadership. 2 
In 1925 a difference arose between the Katikiro and one of the 
minor chiefs. It concerned a question of policy, and the chief went to 
a British official posted in Buganda. The official acted on the chief's 
African People •. ,, p. 199. Evidence cited in the other references 
conclusively negates the reliability of the statement of the situation 
as reported by Mair. 
1uganda Protectorate, The Handbook of Uganda, by H. R. Wallis 
(second edition; London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1920), p. 21. 
Cited hereafter as UP, The Handbook ... , 1920. 
2Philip Mitchell, p. 164. 
Governor Bell in his memoirs has stated that Sir Apolo was 
knighted by mistake, because the recommendation that he be awarded a 
C.M.G. was misread by a clerk in the Foreign Office and he was given 
instead a K.C.M.G.--Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of 
St. Michael and St. George. Bell, p. 114. Another source has corrob-
orated the story. Norma Lorimer, By the Waters of Africa (London: 
Robert Scott, 1917), p. 100. An African source has not mentioned the 
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report, Sir Apolo was very provoked. He objected strenuously to the 
departure from what he regarded as the accepted and correct procedure--
that chiefs in Buganda did not report directly to British officers of 
the Protectorate Government without first going through the Kabaka. He 
wrote in this vein to the Acting Provincial Commissioner, J. R. P, 
Postlethwaite, who considered his letter tantamount to open insurrection. 
The Governor wrote the Kabaka, who was given to understand that 
the 1900 Agreement might be suspended if his reply was not satisfactory. 
Daudi Chwa's answer was expertly drafted to meet the requirements of the 
situation. 
After resisting for some time, Sir Apolo finally agreed to 
resign in August 1926. The reason publicly announced was illness. He 
died the following year, a bitter and disappointed man. 1 
Daudi Chwa at that time assumed a more active role of leadership 
2 
of Buganda's affairs. Mistrust between Buganda officials and the 
British increased, however, owing to various issues. Two examples were 
the British attempt to introduce Swahili into the Buganda schools as the 
medium of instruction, and the cession of the Rudolf Province to Kenya. 
alleged mistake, reporting only that Kagwa, knighted in 1905, was the 
first African to attain that honor. Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 14. 
1The account of the Kagwa affair has been taken primarily from 
Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 17. Mulira drew from primary sources. A 
source which presents the version advanced by the other major person-
ality in the situation is J. R. P. Postlethwaite, I Look Back (London: 
T.V. Boardman, 1947), pp. 41-43, 106-112. 
2 L. A. Fallers, "Despotism, Status Culture and Social Mobility 
in an African Kingdom," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II 
(October, 1959), 30. 
Daudi Chwa then began to suffer ill health around 1930 and 
apparently lost interest in maintaining a central position of real 
1 
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political authority. (This became especially pronounced after 1935.) 
From 1930 on, Buganda lacked a unified, strong leadership. Intrigue 
between the Court, Ministers, Lukiko, and Kabaka replaced the unity of 
previous years. There were also some slight stirrings among newly 
forming elements of younger, educated men, who wanted a degree of 
2 
representation in the Kingdom's affairs. 
In the meantime, during earlier years Buganda had been polit-
ically exercised by claims of the bataka (clan heads) to land which they 
maintained belonged traditionally to their clans, but which had been 
lost by the manner in which the 1900 Agreement's land provisions had 
3 been implemented by the Lukiko. The question assumed greater impor-
tance after 1920 with the formation of a Federation of the Bataka, 
supported by varied groupings. Representations were made to the Kabaka, 
but his attempts to help were unavailing against the opposition of the 
landowning membership of the Lukiko. A Protectorate Government solution 
proved impracticable. Finally, in 1926 the existing distribution of 
land had to be confirmed as irrevocable. 4 
1Mair, An African People ..• , p. 203. 
2sources for the two preceding paragraphs: Mulira, Troubled 
Uganda, pp. 18-20; Philip Mitchell, pp. 169, 171; Ingham, The Making 
__ ., p. 189. 
3The Lukiko was composed then almost entirely of chiefs who had 
benefited by the land allocations. 
4Thomas and Spencer, pp. 70-72; Ingham, The Making .•• , pp. 
165-166. 
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The 1927 rent-restriction law. However, over these years the 
British authorities had become concerned about the rents and traditional 
tribute which the landowners were requiring of their peasant tenants. 
The Uganda Government "declared its intention of insisting upon the 
passage" by the Lukiko of a bill to guarantee tenants security of 
tenure and to limit the payments which the landlords could levy. The 
law--known as the Busulu and Envujo Law--was passed in 1927, after some 
considerable pressure had had to be applied by British authorities on a 
l 
reluctant Lukiko. 
Elements of indirect rule. The preceding account has stressed 
the ways in which the 1900 Agreement was violated during this interim 
period in fact as well as in spirit. Most significantly, the British 
exercised the Kabaka's traditional right to appoint, transfer, promote, 
and dismiss chiefs; and there was considerable interference by Protec-
torate officials in the Baganda administrative heirarchy's execution of 
its functions. 
On the other hand, the functions themselves continued to be 
performed by the Buganda Government's civil service, and in some ways 
they increased. 
The Kabaka-in-Lukiko continued to legislate in native adminis-
tration matters, subject as before to the Governor's approval of such 
legislation. The Treasurer of Buganda was given increased responsibil-
ity for the preparation of the annual estimates and their submission to 
the Lukiko for discussion. The executive branch of the Buganda 
1Thomas and Spencer, p. 72; Ingham, The Making ..• , pp. 166-
167. 
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Government carried out a long list of activities, including maintenance 
of order, collection of taxes for both the Protectorate and Buganda 
Governments, construction of certain public works, and enforcement of 
specified Protectorate ordinances. Jurisdiction of Buganda Government 
1 
courts extended to practically all cases involving Africans. 
The Protectorate Government was concerned directly, without 
reference to the Buganda Government, with certain aspects relating to 
Protectorate revenue and licensing, with township and trading center 
matters, and with non-native affairs to the extent they did not involve 
Buganda Government activities and interests. Otherwise, the central 
government worked through or with the Buganda Government authorities, 
for example, even on matters such as the Veterinary Department's desire 
to innoculate native cattle. 
The R@turn to Indirect Rule, 1938-1944 
For Buganda the years from 1938 to the end of 1944 were eventful 
ones. Among other developments, they brought two changes which together 
represented a return to indirect rule. 
The Provincial Commissioner becomes a Resident, 1938. The 
practices of the past which had been tantamount to a policy of direct 
rule were first countered by Governor Philip Mitchell. For, after a 
study of the situation he had come to the conclusion that unless action 
were taken serious difficulties could arise. In 1938 he announced a 
change in the title of the Provincial Commissioner for Buganda to that 
1Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development .•• , " 
pp. 182-186. 
of Resident. The aim was to reflect a shift in emphasis of functions 
from executive-administrative to advisory-political. 1 About the same 
time, to overcome the Lukiko's annoyance at revisions of its Court's 
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judgments by British Administrative Officers, Sir Philip created the 
2 post of Judicial Adviser to the Buganda Government. The Protectorate's 
Administrative Officers lost the powers of revision they had exercised 
formerly. The function was assumed by the new appointee, who also took 
over the consideration of most of the appeals which previously went to 
3 the Protectorate's High Court. 
The earlier Baganda-British conflict in the judicial sphere 
evidently was resolved by the above changes. British interference in 
Buganda's administration at the top governmental level was also appar-
ently somewhat reduced. Governor Mitchell has written, for example, 
that the change kept British authorities from becoming directly involved 
in a dispute where the Kabaka and his Court were ranged against the 
Ministers and the Lukiko, with Daudi Chwa threatening abdication.4 
1Hailey's statement that this occurred in 1935 is contradicted 
by the other sources, which are considered more reliable in this matter. 
Hailey, Native Administration ••• , Part I, 1950, p. 23; Ingham, The 
Making •.• , p. 193; Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legis-
lative Council, Thirty-Eighth Session, Fifth Meeting, Part I, 
September 18, 1958, p. 130. 
2Hailey has written that this was done in 1940. Hailey, Native 
Administration ••• , Part I, 1950, p. 20. 
3 For these changes, see also Philip Mitchell, pp. 168-171; 
Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development ..• , " pp. 20, 
185. 
4According to Mitchell, the dispute concerned the use of 
Buganda's revenues for maintenance of the Kabaka's household, and also 
the Kabaka's unwillingness to take part in public functions on grounds 
of illness. Philip Mitchell, p. 171. There is an indication that 
330 
Daudi Chwa's death, 1939. Not only was the political situation 
within Buganda deteriorating with the increase of intrigue and faction-
alism, but the Kabaka and the Governor came to be at odds. For the 
Kabaka had withdrawn from public life almost completely, taking up 
residence in the country. The Governor wanted him to reside at his 
official residence and receive modern medical attention for his ill 
health. The war broke out in the late summer of 1939, some European 
troops came to Kampala, and there was a rumor that the Kabaka was 
planning a rebellion. Finally, Daudi Chwa returned to his official 
1 
residence, but he died a few days later, on November 22, 1939. "The 
Baganda took great offense over this. They thought the British Govern-
2 
ment had no sympathy with their dying king. II 
The Kabaka 1 s successor, Mute sa II, was only fifteen. A Regency 
was constituted of the three Ministers of the Buganda Government, led by 
Nsibirwa, the Katikiro, and including S. W. Kulubya, the Omuwanika 
(Treasurer). Both were men of long service in these posts. Kulubya was 
noted for his efficient management of the Kingdom's finances, but he was 
disliked by some elements for the strictness of his control over 
3 
official funds. 
Mitchell may have felt the illness was not as 
claimed; but Mulira has inferred that it was. 
pp. 20-21. 
serious as the Kabaka 
Mulira, Troubled Uganda, 
~ulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 20-21; Ingham, The Making •.• , 
p. 222. 
2Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 21. 
3Mair, An African People ••• , p. 203: He was also widely 
acclaimed for the impression he made in giving testimony against Closer 
Union (with other territories) to a Parliamentary body in London in the 
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Before Daudi Chwa' s death a group called "The Sons of Kintu" had 
been formed with the aim of effecting the dismissal of these two senior 
officials. 1 With their additional appointments as Regents to govern on 
2 
the Kabaka's behalf, jealousies were intensified and the factional 
lines began to be more sharply delineated. Ranged against those in the 
highest posts were certain senior disgruntled chiefs, a "traditionalist" 
element, some Bataka supporters, and a small amorphous collection of 
young educated men who wanted a greater voice in Buganda's political 
system. 
The Nama sole Affair, 1941. The political "outs" were handed 
their issue on a silver platter, so to speak. In 1941 the widow of 
Daudi Chwa remarried. As the mother of the current Kabaka, she held the 
title of Namssole, or Queen Mother. Her official position in the 
traditional political system had continued; she was second in rank only 
3 
to the Kabaka. Although the matter was not entirely clear, the 
overwhelming consensus was that according to traditional rules she was 
not allowed to remarry. Her marriage shocked the great majority of the 
Baganda. The sense of outrage was deep. That she chose a commoner did 
early 1930's. Ingham, The Making ••• , p. 189. 
1 Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Disturbances in Uganda during April, 1949 (Entebbe, Uganda: Govern-
ment Printer, 1950), p. 72. Cited hereafter as UP, Report of ..• 
Disturbances ••. 1949. 
2 Ingham, The Making .• , p. 223. 
3see A. Kalule Sempa, The Buganda Government and Its Constitu-
tional Functions (Kampala, Uganda: East African Literature Bureau [The 
Eagle Press], 1953), p. 12. (In Luganda and English.) 
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not help to alleviate the situation. 
The incident might have been kept out of the political arena 
except for the action of the Katikiro. Nsibirwa, for reasons which are 
1 
not plain, sided with the Queen Mother. He lent his car for, and also 
attended, the wedding. At one point he was stoned. 
The Anglican Bishop was severely criticized for having issued a 
marriage license and many Baganda were said to have lost confidence in 
the Church as a result. The role played by the Protectorate Government 
at this stage is variously reported, but it appears likely that the 
British authorities chose not to interfere with what was considered an 
2 internal affair of the Baganda. 
The customs of the Baganda were further violated when the 
3 
Namasole and her husband lived for some days in her·official residence. 
The chiefs in the political grouping opposed to the Katikiro were then 
successful in forcing Nsibirwa to resign against his will, for at this 
point they obtained the support of the British authorities. What is 
more, the opposition chiefs, although unable to depose Kulubya as 
Omuwanika, were permitted to select the new Katikiro from their own 
number. To replace Martin Luther Nsibirwa they chose his arch-rival, 
1He may have felt the old customs had to give way to the new 
Christian ideas; he may have been socially or politically aligned over 
the years with the Namasole; he may have been pressured by the Church or 
the Protectorate Government. The latter does not seem likely, for there 
is good indication that his support of the Queen Mother represented his 
personal decision. 
2The conflicting evidence is in Mukherjee, p. 34; UP, Report of. 
Disturbances •.. 1949, p. 111; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 23; 
Dundas, African Crossroads, pp. 210-211. 
3s. P. Kigozi. 
1 Samwiri Wamala, and the choice was approved by the Governor. 
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The action then taken against the Namasole through the institu-
tions of the Baganda political system was severe. Her husband was 
prosecuted and sentenced to "rustication"--exile to a rural area of the 
Kingdom. She herself was banished from the Court, and the Lukiko 
deprived her of her extensive official estates. That body even tried to 
declare her no longer the mother of the Kabaka, but the Governor ob-
jected, feeling such action was going too far. The Lukiko did, however, 
expel one of her most powerful supporters, Ham Mukasa, who had played a 
leading role in Buganda since the turbulent years prior to 1900. 
The Namasole Affair was far more than a tempest in a teapot; it 
2 
was a veritable storm, which rent asunder the Baganda, dividing them 
into a large majority set against a small minority which had supported 
the Queen Mother. The division thus created was kept alive for a long 
time as a political issue by those who had opposed the marriage. As for 
the position of the young Kabaka, he felt he should not disregard the 
sentiments of the mass of his people, particularly as it was just about 
3 the time when he was to come of age. 
Mutesa II comes of age, 1942. From the time when he was about 
five years old, Edward Mutesa had lived at the Anglican, British-type 
1The account in the last paragraph has followed most closely 
that given in Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 23. 
2Mulira has also written: '~e were all like sheep without a 
shepherd." Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 24. 
3
oundas, African Crossroads, p. 211. 
Sources for the above account of the Namasole Affair as a whole 
include those already cited, together with Legum, pp. 61-62. 
334 
boarding school known as King's College, Budo, the Eton (or Groton) of 
1 
Uganda. On November 19, 1942, he was eighteen. The following day the 
traditional installation ceremonies took place on Budo hill, the 
customary site for the accession rituals. 
But Mutesa did not formally assume his office without some 
unexpected prior fanfare, which was indicative of the continued state of 
tension in the Kingdom, For on November 6 the European Headmaster of 
King's College, Budo, had cut short a concert program in honor of 
Mutesa, and his action was bitterly resented by a group of the students 
who were performing. In the next three days the students stoned some of 
the masters of the school--mostly Baganda--and set fire to some smaller 
buildings. King George V's portrait from the assembly hall was found 
lying on the playing field, torn and with its glass shattered. A host of 
authorities descended on the school--a detachment of police; the Baganda 
Regents; the British Resident; leading Baganda alumni. The school was 
officially closed down and students sent home by the Protectorate 
Government's Director of Education on November 11. 
The matter did not end there. On November 13 the Headmaster was 
informed by eighteen of the African members of Budo's staff that they 
intended to resign unless he did, and that they had submitted their 
ultimatum to the Anglican Bishop. The reasons for their attitude have 
not been clarified. It appears they were not supporting the student 
insurrection, It seems rather that the Headmaster, who was evidently 
not a very tactful person, gave them numerous responsibilities but 
1 Legum, p. 21. 
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rarely the authority needed to discharge them. The significance of the 
masters' action lies first in the decision of the majority of them to 
stick by their ultimatum and to resign when those in authority refused 
to meet their demand. The second point of note is that these masters at 
Budo were a large part of the cream of the young educated Baganda. 
The political significance of the Budo events as a whole rests 
paradoxically in the fact that they were not turned into a political 
issue. Again, just why they were not is unclear. What does seem 
certain, however, is that the weight of all authorities was brought to 
bear against both the students and the staff members who were in revolt. 
Anglican Church, Buganda Government, Protectorate Government, leading 
alumni~-all combined to support the constituted authority of the Head-
master against the challenges of staff and student body. The school 
reopened in January 1943 lacking many of its old staff. 
And so it was that in such an atmosphere of tension Edward 
. 1 Mutesa assumed the Kabakaship and the Regency was d1ssolved. 
It was appatently the Kabaka's intention to steer a neutral 
course among the various Baganda political factions. Yet it was not 
long before he was put in a position where he felt compelled to indicate 
support for one side as against the other. 
The Kabaka had moved from Budo to his official palace on one of 
1The Budo incidents have never been thoroughly narrated in a 
published study. A Board of Inquiry was set up in December 1942 but its 
report was not made public. The above account should not be regarded as 
authoritative. It is based in small part on the scant data in Mulira, 
Troubled Uganda, pp. 24, 35. Much of the account, however, derives from 
personal notes of casual conversations with varied persons in Uganda in 
1958-1959, while engaged in another research project. 
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the more prominent hills of Mengo, the capital of Buganda adjacent to 
Kampala. His time was taken up with the program of tutored studies 
arranged for him at Makerere College, but he was also quite fully con-
cerned with official affairs of the Kingdom. One of the most important 
of the earlier decisions he had to make stemmed from a meeting of 
fourteen senior (~) Baganda chiefs in 1943. They were opposed to 
Kulubya's continued position as Treasurer, and in 1944 they sent a 
formal petition of complaint to the Kabaka. They charged that the 
Omuwanika "was spending the money of the country irrespective of the 
wishes of the Government"; and, demanding his resignation, they alleged 
"that he had assumed greater powers than his office entitled him to." 1 
The Kabaka investigated the complaints, found no support for them, and 
wrote the chiefs to that effect. The chiefs were much provoked that the 
Kabaka had not dismissed Kulubya. Rumors were spread that he was 
selling out the country (Buganda) to the British. Inevitably some of 
2 
Kulubya's steadily growing unpopularity began to rub off on the Kabaka. 
The land acquisition issue, 1944. In Chapter V the developments 
surrounding the issue of the compulsory acquisition of land for public 
purposes were set forth. Significant for the discussion here is that 
the issue was one on which the Baganda had extremely strong convictions 
which were highly emotional. Also, on the issue the political factions 
apparently ranged themselves along similar lines as previously. That is, 
1Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 25 and 35 respectively. 
2In addition to the source cited, the action of the fourteen 
chiefs has been reported in Ingham, The Making ... , p. 223. 
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Katikiro Wamala plus a large group of senior Buganda chiefs opposed the 
British-sponsored bill to authorize compulsory acquisition. They had 
the popular support of most of the Baganda, and especially the tradi-
tionalists, the leaders of the earlier Bataka movement, and some of the 
1 young educated men. Arrayed against this imposing coalition were 
Kulubya, a few senior chiefs and other Buganda Government officers, and 
the Kabaka. The latter grouping was very much the weaker except for one 
fact--behind them they had the support of the Protectorate Government, 
which was considerable, but which also had the effect of reducing further 
2 
their popular support. In the final count, the land bill was overwhelm-
ingly defeated by the Lukiko in 1944. Wamala and his allies gained in 
3 popularity; Kulubya and the Kabaka lost. 
The 1944 reorganization introduced by Dundas. For some time 
Governor Dundas had been observing the young Kabaka and was impressed 
with what he saw. Confident that Edward Mutesa possessed the qualities 
lLegum, p. 62. For the Bataka movement, see p. 326 above. 
2A similar difference of opinion between an earlier Buganda 
Government and the Baganda at large was reflected in the reactions to 
the war effort. Despite a Baganda "disinclination to fight on the side 
of the British" at first, a minority, presumably sparked by Nsibirwa and 
Kulubya, turned the tide. However, while appreciable, the Baganda 
contribution to the war effort was far from wholehearted. Mulira, 
Troubled Uganda, pp. 21, 23; Uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the 
Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, for the Period 
1939-1946 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1949), pp. 2, 65 (cited 
hereafter as UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports .•. 1939-1946); Dundas, 
African Crossroads, p. 224. 
3,. . . The part which the Kabaka and Mr. Kulubya had played in 
the negotiations and their loyalty to the Protectorate Government was 
used by their opponents to undermine their position." Ingham, The 
Making .•. , p. 223. The same writer has commented on "the lack of 
subtlety with which the Protectorate Government during the war period 
handled the political problems of the country and particularly of 
Buganda." (P. 222.) 
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of a ruler, and trusting in the Kabaka's sound justment, the Governor 
1 decided to relax British administrative control in Buganda. Because it 
meant the creation of a number of additional senior posts in the Buganda 
Government and the recruitment and training of men to fill them, it was 
not possible formally to inaugurate the reorganization until October 1, 
1944. 2 
In his desire to reduce the degree of British interference in 
the Kingdom's internal administration, especially at the lower levels, 
the war-time Governor defined the distinction between Protectorate and 
Buganda Government affairs. Responsibility for the former--including, 
for example, non-native affairs and the collection of revenue from the 
Baganda--was delegated to Uganda Government officers newly styled as 
Protectorate Agents. Though stationed in different places in Buganda, 
these officers were not to be allowed to give instructions to Buganda's 
chiefs. All communication with the Buganda Government at any level was, 
according to the sweeping changes embodied in the new policy, to be 
channeled through the Resident. 
As for affairs which were the responsibility of the Buganda 
Government under the 1900 Agreement as amended, British advice on such 
matters was to be given only by the Resident. The District Commissioner 
posts were abolished and replaced by Assistant Residents who would no 
1These are the reasons given in Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 
212. Governor Mitchell had also been favorably impressed with Mutesa. 
Philip Mitchell, p. 167. 
2There is some evidence that Dundas took the decision to 
reorganize not long after his arrival in Uganda late in 1940. Hailey, 
"Native Administration and Political Development ... , " p. 187. 
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longer reside at the outlying district headquarters but rather would be 
based at the "capital" with the Resident. Duties of inspection formerly 
exercised by District Commissioners were to be handed over to additional 
Buganda Government staff assembled for that purpose. In these ways the 
relations between the Protectorate and the Buganda Governments were 
redefined publicly to accord more with the spirit of the 1900 Agreement. 
l 
Not only that, but practical steps were taken to implement decisions. 
The changes amounted to a substantial return to the earlier 
2 policy of indirect rule. They also brought into clearer focus two 
related problems of fairly recent genesis. The first one stemmed from 
the central government's responsibility for economic and social 
services, 3 functions not mentioned or foreseen in the 1900 Agreement. 
During World War II it was expected that the limited activities of the 
Protectorate's technical departments would soon be expanding, and it 
would seem that the Buganda Government's sense of responsibility for its 
internal affairs would naturally lessen, Yet Buganda exhibited no desire 
1uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 
Twenty-Third Session, May 25, 1944, p. 5; U~anda Protectorate, Secretar-
iat, "Re-organisation in Buganda," Circular MemorandumS. M. P. Q, 37/3, 
October 11, 1944, pp. l-3; UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports ••. 1939-
1946, p. 7; Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development 
.," pp. 22-23, 183, 187, 197; Hailey, Native Administration • , ,, 
Part I, 1950, pp. 20-23; Ingham, The Making , .• , pp. 224, 226, 
2British "advice" to the B-uganda Ministers--though not to the 
chiefs under them--was, however, probably more akin to "direction" on 
occasion, A. B. Mukwaya, Land Tenure in Buganda: Present Day Tendencies 
(East African Studies, No. l, East African Institute of Social Research; 
Kampala, Uganda: The Eagle Press, 1953), p. 20. 
3 For example, agriculture and veterinary technical services; and 
to a lesser extent because of the Christian missions' activities, educa-
tion and health programs. 
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to assume greater responsibilities for the new type of services, despite 
suggestions from the central government. According to Lord Hailey, the 
Kingdom held these services were the Protectorate's responsibility; 
insistence that Buganda assume part of it "would be regarded as a 
failure by the Protectorate to recognize its interest in Buganda and its 
. t .. 1 obligations towards ~ . 
The other policy question which arose with the reaffirmation of 
the indirect rule orientation concerned the absence of a democratic base 
for the Buganda political institutions. The Lukiko was dominated by 
2 
chiefs and landowners. Wishing to provide an outlet for greater 
expression of popular views, the Protectorate Government pressed for 
3 broadened Lukiko representation. As a result, the first very limited 
4 
measures in this direction were effected in 1939. 
In his address to the Lukiko on October 2, 1944, when he 
1Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . • • , " 
p. 189; see also p. 188. 
2 Tongue, British Journal of Psychology, XXV, 358. 
3Mair had held earlier that this was not desirable. Mair, An 
African People ••. , pp. 283-285. 
There had been a limited degree of popular pressure for widening 
the basis of representation for some years and in about 1925 certain of 
the vernacular newspapers had joined in the attack. w. P. Tamukedde, 
"Changes in the Great Lukiiko" (paper prepared for the East African 
Institute of Social Research Conference, KampaLa, Uganda, January, 1954), 
p. 2. (Mimeographed.) Nothing came of this at the time, nor of a later 
spurt of criticism in 1931. Ingham, The Making .•. , pp. 165-166, 189-
190. 
4The Kabaka agreed to nominate twenty unofficials in lieu o,f 
some of the former official members. But in practice he appointed those 
recommended by the~ chiefs, and they naturally chose men who sup-
ported them. Thus the 1945 change to election of some representatives. 
Tamukedde, "Changes in • . . , " p. 2. 
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announced the reorganization of administration, Governor Dundas advised 
the Kabaka to see that the peasants and the professional classes were 
1 
given more adequate representation in the Lukiko, (However, it was not 
until the following year, after the 1945 disturbances and the consequent 
dismissal of leading anti-British office-holders in Buganda, that the 
suggestion was acted upon.) Although the Protectorate's pre-1945 
pressures to democratize the Lukiko were limited, they represented 
initial steps in British efforts to deal with a frequent dilemma in 
Africa, The dilemma was that posed by the desire to hand over more 
power to the indigenous peoples and at the same time to insure that the 
2 
actual recipients would not abuse their power. 
The Variations in Rule--In Summary 
Looking at the whole period from 1900 on, it is possible now to 
generalize about the real character of the British "Indirect Rule" 
1Ingham, The Making •• ,, p. 224; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p, 
24. The portion of the Governor's address purportedly dealing with 
Lukiko representation was not included with the version which appeared 
as an Appendix to the Lukiko's Kintu Committee report. That text dealt 
only with the administrative reorganization. Past direct interference 
beyond the scope of the Agreement was acknowledged, and the Governor's 
intention that the Resident and his assistants confine themselves to 
advice and not direct Buganda's affairs and officials was stated, 
Kingdom of Buganda, The Report of the Sub-Committee of the Lukiiko Which 
Was Set up to Examine the Recommendations Made by the Hancock Committee 
(n,p.: n.n., n.d. [printed by the White Fathers' Printing Press, P.O. 
Box 87, Kisubi-Entebbe, Uganda]), pp. 46-48. 
2 Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development • 
. , " pp. 8, 180, 188-189; Hailey, Native Administration ••• , Part I, 
1950, pp. 9-10, 23, 
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policy in Buganda. 
For the first two decades practical policy closely corresponded 
with theoretical Indirect Rule. 
For the next fifteen or twenty years after that there was an 
increased measure of interference by British officers in the judicial 
and administrative spheres of the Kingdom's government. Did the inter-
vention amount to a policy of direct rule instead of indirect rule? 
Using the criteria outlined previously, the answer is yes. Traditionally, 
chiefs were selected by the Kabaka or his Regents--by the Kingdom's 
supreme political authority of the time. During the period under 
review there is ample evidence that this was not the case; chiefs were 
widely selected, transferred, and dismissed by the British. 
This direct rule characteristic is somewhat compensated for by 
the preponderance of the Buganda Government's functions. Although the 
Protectorate Government's functions were increasing in the field of 
economic and social services, the process had not advanced far, and 
throughout the period the Buganda Government had the lion's share of 
governmental spheres of activity. 
The third criterion, however, weighs the judgment on the same 
side as the first. Intervention of British authorities in the exercise 
by the Buganda Government of its functions was considerable during the 
1920's and 1930's. Therefore, for the second twenty years of estab-
lished British administration in Uganda, "Indirect Rule" in theory was 
direct rule in practice, although not extensively so. 
With the change in the title of the Protectorate's most senior 
official in Buganda from Provincial Commissioner to Resident in 1938, 
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there was a major departure from the practical policy of direct rule. 
However, it was not until 1944, when additional steps in that direction 
were taken, that the actions amounted to a substantial return to an 
indirect rule policy for Buganda. 
In summary, up until about 1920 the system of rule employed by 
the British in Buganda was indirect both in theory and in practice. In 
the next two decades, however, British rule was direct, though not 
extensively so, Beginning in 1938 there was a return to indirect rule, 
and by late 1944 rule in Buganda was decidedly indirect. 
The Baganda Political System at the Beginning of 1945 
It may be recalled that in Chapter III, following an analysis of 
the Baganda political system in 1877 and of the changed characteristics 
of the 1905 system, several conclusions were reached. The 1905 system 
was considered to have remained a traditional system; the changes were 
not such as to have rendered it a new system. An examination of twelve 
aspects of the 1905 political system resulted in the finding that it had 
the following characteristics contributing markedly to its cohesiveness: 
its unitary nature, in terms of territorial centralization; the concen-
tration of authority along other lines also; and the minimum extent of 
membership conflict within the system. {The Acholi traditional system 
of about the same time was, in comparison, not favored in any of these 
or in any other pronounced characteristics of solidarity.) In addition, 
Buganda's natural and human resources at that time were extensive in 
contrast to the limited resources of most of the other eleven main 
Uganda tribes reviewed, 
344 
Strength in the sense of solidarity. In analyzing the early 
1945 political system of Buganda, first to be considered are the changes 
over the years in the twelve characteristics relevant to the solidarity 
of the system. These may be summarized before the more detailed dis-
cussion of each one. 
The political system in late 1944 remained a unitary system, but 
political authority had become otherwise diffused, although not very 
greatly so. The system was a semi-sovereign one. Its scope of activity 
was moderate. The main source of legitimacy of political authority 
continued to be tradition. In extent, legitimacy remained moderate. 
Common ties of the total membership were, however, only those of 
residence. The largest politically dominant group was still the tribe 
--the Baganda. Political mobility stayed mixed--both open and closed in 
part. Institutional conflict increased to marked, in degree. Member-
ship conflict also increased--to moderate. The incidence of leadership 
was less, being only occasional. 
With regard to territorial centralization, the early 1945 system 
remained a unitary system. Despite increased administrative autonomy in 
certain fields, the twenty ~ (county) chiefs continued to constitute 
1 
what was in essence a civil service bureaucracy. 
What about the aspect of sovereignty? The 1877 sovereign system 
was by 1905 semi-sovereign; Did the subsequent years affect this 
characteristic? 
1Hailey, ·~ative Administration and Political Development .• '' 
. ' 
p. 180. 
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Separate analyses of the Baganda political system at points in 
time between 1905 and 1945 are not within the scope of the study, so 
explicit conclusions about the effects of the varying British policies 
of indirect and direct rule are not offered. It would seem probable, 
however, that the extent of the British interference in Buganda's 
exercise of the powers and functions which were the prerogative of the 
Kingdom was so great, especially in the period 1930-1935, 1 that Buganda 
could have been characterized for a few years as a dependent political 
2 
system. 
By the end of 1944, with the Dundas reorganization which came 
into full effect in October of that year, the Buganda political system 
was a semi-sovereign one. In the context of the general political 
situation of the Protectorate, and with specific reference to the Uganda 
Government's relationship with other tribes, Buganda's measure of 
sovereignty was an important characteristic of strength. 
It was stated above that the political system remained a unitary 
one. Did political authority otherwise continue to be concentrated as 
it was in 1905? Or had the early 1945 system become one where political 
authority was considerably diffused institutionally or in other ways? 
1The Governors who apparently were most predisposed to direct 
rule were Gowers (1925-1932) and Bourdillon (1932-1935). One impediment 
to more direct rule was Baganda leadership, but with Kagwa's resignation 
in 1926 and Daudi Chwa's increasing retirement from public affairs after 
1930, British interference may be assumed to have increased. 
2The fact that the Agreement of 1900 was violated both in the 
letter and in the spirit during the "intermission" between the periods 
of indirect rule has been documented previously. See also Fallers, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 30. 
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Except for a short period in the late 1920's the Kabakaship 
after 1905 did not regain any appreciable part of the very great 
authority it had held some years previous to the period under review. 
Although the traditional authority and prestige remained in great 
measure in that institution, Daudi Chwa had largely failed to capitalize 
on the potentialities of his position. Young Kabaka Mutesa, though 
1 
regarded with much promise by both Mitchell and Dundas, had not enjoyed 
a very propitious rule in his first years of majority. His alignment 
on the unpopular side of the Kulubya and the land political issues had 
damaged his authority. 
Not only did the Ministers and chiefs still represent, as in 
2 
1905, a kind of political oligarchy, but after Nsibirwa's forced 
resignation because of the 1941 Namasole Affair there was not the 
previous strong central leadership usually provided by the Katikiro. 
For the new Katikiro (Wamala) was selected by the chiefs who opposed 
Nsibirwa, and in this respect was politically somewhat responsible to 
them instead of their being responsible completely to him. 
A further deterrent to the concentration of authority within the 
executive branch of the Buganda Government was the existence since 1939, 
and especially since Nsibirwa's resignation, of two separate political 
factions of chiefs. One, the larger, was that led by Wamala. But when 
he succeeded Nsibirwa he did not, most probably because the British 
would not allow it, replace Ministers and chiefs who opposed him with 
1 See also Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Develop-
ment . . . , " p. 182. 
2Hailey, Native Administration •.. , Part I, 1950, p. 11. 
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those who supported him. Kulubya and a small group of senior chiefs of 
the rival faction remained. 
Another instance of diffusion of authority is to be found in the 
steadily increasing responsibilities and powers which devolved over the 
. 1 years on the Luk1ko. There were a number of instances where it refused 
to do the bidding of various other political authorities, such as the 
2 Protectorate Government, the Kabaka, or the Ministers. Judicial 
authority also became somewhat more autonomous, but not very much so in 
3 practice. 
By the end of 1944, there was, therefore, not only no increase 
in concentration of political authority in the Kabakaship, there was 
also greater diffusion in other ways. The executive under the 
near-titular Kabaka was more of a collective leadership than a single or 
even ministerial leadership. In addition there was a deep political 
schism within the executive branch of the Government. Further diffusion 
1This was mostly the consequence of custom and precedent, not of 
law. See W. J. A. Harris, Review of The Buganda Government and Its 
Constitutional Functions, by A. Kalule Sempa, Uganda Journal, XVIII 
(September, 1954), 210; [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda Protec-
torate: Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, Cmd. 
9028 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), p. 4. 
2The Lukiko evidently lost power after 1944. See the descrip-
tion in Sempa, pp. 10, 36-42. 
3A Muganda official's description of the judiciary may be found 
in Sempa, pp. 16-24. 
In one respect judicial authority was weakened, Matters per-
taining to land succession were made the exclusive prerogative of the 
clan councils. Neither native nor Protectorate courts had jurisdiction. 
The Kabaka decided such appeal cases as arose. Thomas and Scott, pp. 
256-257; H. B. Thomas, Correspondence, "The Inheritance of Land in 
Buganda," Uganda Journal, XXI (March, 1957), 122-123. 
had resulted from accretion of power by the legislative body, the 
1 Lukiko. 
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Buganda's political system at the beginning of 1945 may, then, 
be described as diffused with respect to the degree of concentration of 
political authority. It was not, however, greatly diffused, compared to 
the possibilities. 2 
What of the Baganda political system's scope of activity in 
early 1945? Did the spheres of activity recognized as subject to 
political authority--did these remain moderate in scope as they were 
previously, or were they appreciably reduced or enlarged? They were 
3 
enlarged, but not appreciably. 
By 1905 the dominant source of legitimacy of political authority 
had changed from charisma to tradition in view of the absence of an 
active Kabaka. It was still tradition at the beginning of 1945, for 
circumstances were similar--the charismatic source of authority for the 
4 
Kabaka was not being utilized. 
1Hailey wrote, presumably referring to 1942, that the Buganda 
state organization was dominated by the bureaucratic and landlord ele-
ments. Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . ," 
p. 197. This observation would seem to ignore the splits within and 
between these two elements. 
2
see, for example, the description of the diffusion of political 
authority within the traditional Acholi political system, in Chapter Ill. 
3The "political" still, ·however, was the general aspect of life 
of greatest consequence to the Baganda. To be a chief remained the most 
universal goal. E. M. K. Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African (Africa's 
Own Library, No. 14; London: United Society for Christian Literature, 
1945), pp. 59-60; Zake, p. 2. 
4The source of legitimacy had not shifted from tradition to 
reason. As an example of a number of authorities supporting this con-
clusion, Lord Hailey, writing with reference to the situation in 1940, 
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What of the extent of legitimacy of political authority? In 
Chapter III it was concluded that this was moderate in 1905 (compared to 
the 1877 system's marked legitimacy). With the considerable assumption 
by the British authorities in the 1920's and 1930's of more direct 
appointive and dismissal powers, a development which apparently was 
1 fairly common knowledge among the people, the extent of legitimacy 
accorded by the members of the political unit to political authority 
2 
must have fallen to a fairly low level. After 1938, however, the trend 
was toward much less British disregard of Baganda traditional rights of 
selection of officials. The most obvious example at the senior level 
was the Resident's, and then the Governor's, approval of Wamala as 
3 
Katikiro to replace the more pro-British Nsibirwa. 
That Wamala and the larger group of chiefs who supported him 
stated that "publicly it is necessary for the ministers and officers of 
the Government of Buganda to preserve the convention that they speak and 
act for the Kabaka ...• They have been careful to show the fullest 
respect to the young Kabaka .... " Hailey, "Native Administration and 
Political Development . • . , " pp. 181-182. See also Dundas, African 
Crossroads, p. 210. A writer who has stressed the shift from tradition 
to law as the basis for chief's authority is Mulira, Thoughts of a Young 
African, pp. 61-62. Still another has emphasized the dependence of the 
chiefs on British authority and their demise as "leaders." Zake, p. 3. 
See also Tongue, British Journal of Psychology, XXV, 358; Mair, An 
African People .•. , p. 283. 
1 Fallers, Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 30. 
2chiefs' authority likewise was lessened by 
growing non-chiefly landowner class, which began to 
monopoly chiefs had had on social rank and status. 
the challenge of the 
dispute the previous 
Powesland, p. 19. 
3It should be acknowledged that the approval may have stemmed 
from a belief that the force of popular opinion was too great to resist, 
or that Wamala's group would be less oligarchical and more disposed to 
listen to elements unrepresented in the Government. 
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were regarded as legitimately exercising political authority is 
evidenced by the overwhelming acclaim of their position opposing the 
land acquisition bill in 1944, an acclaim voiced in the Lukiko and by 
the public at large. The legitimacy of certain other holders of 
authority was, however, undermined by the belief of many of the people 
that they were serving not Buganda but the British. Kulubya and the 
Kabaka, and their smaller group of official supporters, were the clear-
est examples. The extent of legitimacy of political authority under 
1 
these varied circumstances may be characterized as moderate. 
How close were the common ties of the members of the Kingdom's 
political system? Whereas in 1877 practically everyone had been a 
Muganda, by 1905 there were an appreciable number of Africans of other 
tribes who were living within the expanded Buganda, and were therefore 
subject to the authority of the Buganda political system and thus 
members of it. Yet, these non-Baganda were still of the same general 
culture. By 1945, however, only sixty per cent of all Africans resident 
in Buganda were Baganda. Forty per cent were of other tribes, and many 
2 
of these were culturally quite dissimilar. Common ties of total 
membership were, then, limited to those of residence; they were not 
3 
close. 
1It would seem that it was probably somewhat less than in 1905, 
but that it was not as low in extent as during the period of more direct 
rule in the 1920's and 1930's. 
2see Audrey Richards' discussion of varied tribal attitudes and 
the question of assimilation in Audrey I. Richards (ed.), Economic 
Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda 
(Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., [1954]), pp. 161-188. 
3Proliferation of categories under this analytical aspect of 
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The largest politically dominant group in the total membership 
remained what it was in 1905--the Baganda as a tribe. 
Likewise, political mobility remained mixed; that is, there were 
characteristics of both an open and a closed system. Political posi-
tions and status remained largely closed to non-Baganda and fairly open 
1 
to Baganda. 
What was the degree of general institutional conflict and of 
unresolvable membership conflict in the system as of the beginning of 
1945? 
In 1905 institutional conflict was moderate, mainly due to the 
politically significant rivalry between the religious institutions, 
especially the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Churches. This re-
mained but seemed to lessen a bit throughout the years. As for the 
conflict between the Christian Churches and the Buganda traditional, 
pre-Christian system, it was explained in Chapter III how that had been 
resolved by 1905. However, it again manifested itself in an intense 
fashion in the Namasole Affair of 1941. What was potentially a Church 
versus State issue was settled for the foreseeable future with the 
political systems would make possible a finer distinction. Common ties 
could then be characterized as racial, for the members of the system 
were all Africans resident within Buganda. Non-Africans were not sub-
ject to the general political authority of the Buganda Government, 
coming under the jurisdiction of the Protectorate Government, 
1The land-owning chiefly aristocracy of 1905 sired the upper 
social class of 1944. J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African 
Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 
1958), p. 235. But the upper class were not all of the ruling class, 
nor was the latter restricted to the upper social class. The sons of 
the 1900 chiefly oligarchy were educated to become chiefs but the great 
majority proved to be failures, wider recruitment proving necessary (as 
in traditional times). Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 20, 30-31. 
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complete and rather acquiescent defeat of the Anglican Church. 
The embryonic conflict which existed in 1905 between the clan 
authorities (bataka) and the Kingdom's chiefs over title to clan lands 
assumed considerable proportions during the period but had subsided well 
before 1944. 1 
Other potential institutional conflicts of 1905 had developed 
quite fully by 1944. They were sufficiently serious to characterize the 
late 1944 system as one of marked institutional conflict. The institu-
tiona involved were three--the Kabakaship; the Ministers; and the 
Lukiko, dominated by the senior bureaucracy. 
Under the old traditional system the Kabaka had been supreme, 
thus leaving no room for this type of conflict. By 1905, Sir Apolo 
Kagwa, in the dual role of Katikiro and Senior Regent, had largely 
assumed the Kabaka's place, and institutional conflict was only potential. 
But subsequent years brought a change in the situation. British 
influence increased. This was no problem as long as those in political 
authority in Buganda were in accord with the Protectorate Government. 
One of the first major breaks in the general correspondence of views 
came in 1926 with the disagreement involving Kagwa, and with his 
resignation. The Kabaka's assumption at that time of an enhanced role 
of leadership pointed up the institutional conflict between the Kabaka 
and his Ministers. He could no longer ensure their agreement with him, 
because he was no longer a free agent in choosing them or the senior 
1The term bataka continued to be used, though somewhat in-
accurately, by certain discontented groups to enlist political support 
on other matters. See pp. 326, 331, and 337 above. 
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1 
chiefs. He had henceforth to be confident of the support of the 
2 Governor to dismiss a minister. That actual institutional conflict 
took place between these two institutions is clear from the disputes 
Daudi Chwa had with his Ministers and the differences between Mutesa and 
Katikiro Wamala on the 1944 issue of land acquisition. 
3 
The rise in power of the Lukiko as a semi-independent body 
brought the number of the political Jystem's major institutions up to 
three, and there was created a triangular situation of potential con-
flicts. These conflicts were acted out in different combinations over 
the years. Daudi Chwa was unsuccessful in his efforts in the early 
1920's to get the Lukiko to redress the land grievances of the clan 
4 heads (bataka). He was also at odds with the Lukiko in the late 
1930's. The Lukiko failed to heed the advice of the young Mutesa on the 
1944 land question. And on at least one occasion, the Lukiko clashed 
severely with the Ministers, led by Nsibirwa, when the Namasole re-
married. No one of the three institutions had the practical authority 
to resolve differences between them, for although the Kabaka had the 
authority in theory under the Agreement, he had lost it through lack of 
subsequent precedents. In addition, he dared not exercise his powers 
1Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African, p. 61. 
2Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . . . , " 
p. 180. 
3From an early time the Protectorate Government expected the 
Kabaka "always" to consult the Lukiko, and the latter to give the 
Kingdom's ruler its advice on all matters of importance to Buganda. 
George Wilson, Journal of the Society of Arts, LV, 293-294. 
4 rngham, The Making •.• , p. 146. 
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heedless of the views of the Protectorate Government. 
The Baganda political system in early 1945 was, then, one 
characterized by marked institutional conflict. There appeared to be 
no effective institutional mechanisms within the political system for 
resolving differences between the institutions in cases of conflict. 
Outside and above the system the Governor had the power of overrule, 
which presumably could be used if necessary. But the invocation of that 
power under the 1900 Agreement represented a drastic step. It can be 
assumed that the British authorities were desirous all along of avoiding 
its direct use if possible. After 1938 this was a deliberately con-
scious policy, brought to its apex with the 1944 reassertion in prin-
ciple and practice of the 1900 Agreement's embodiment of the doctrine of 
Indirect Rule. Dundas' policy during World War II was in fact to let 
the Baganda administer their own affairs as far as was compatible with 
order and civilized conditions. He preferred not to give positive 
directives nor even to apply much pressure to obtain reforms; rather he 
followed the practice of offering suggestions, hoping the Buganda 
1 
Government would be "induced" to introduce needed measures. 
If institutional conflict increased throughout the years to a 
marked extent in 1945, what was the position regarding membership 
2 
conflict, which was minimum in 19057 
Although there were perceived conflicts between religious 
1[ Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency • . . , " pp. 1-2. 
2It may be recalled that the concern here is with those con-
flicts between membership groups of which the groups are aware and which 
are unresolvable. 
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adherents--especially Protestants and Catholics--there were institutions 
(such as the Lukiko) sufficient to their resolution; and the different 
groups were represented politically through the reservation, by a 1900 
convention, of certain high political posts for members of the two 
1 Christian faiths. 
A potential membership conflict of earlier times remained 
potential. Non-Baganda African residents in the Kingdom, though further 
increased in number and dissimilarity to the Baganda, apparently in late 
1944 still did not feel a sense of grievance because of their compare-
tive lack of political rights as members of the political system. 
However, reference has been made in preceding sections to 
certain new membership groups which commenced to take rather amorphous 
2 forms through the years, especially after 1920. For several reasons, 
these are impossible to describe with precision. Unlike the situation 
in 1905, political and social status were no longer usually synonymous. 
Whereas formerly a chief was a landowner and vice versa, by 1944 there 
were numerous wealthy Baganda of considerable social prestige who held 
no political office, about which fact they were incidentally rarely 
entirely happy. Some of the new groups were led by upper class descend-
ants of the old aristocracy; others were not. 
lrhe posts of Katikiro and Omuwanika were reserved for Protes-
tants and that of Omulamuzi (Chief Judge) for the Catholics. See, for 
example, Sempa, pp. 14, 16. 
2rhe unofficial non-African majority of an official commission 
practically invited Young Turk rebellion. It opined that the membership 
of the Lukiko was too conservative and maintained that "the younger 
generation of Buganda are becoming dissatisfied with the manner in which 
acute social problems are dealt with by the Lukiko. " UP, Report 
of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920, p. 44. 
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Another reason for the difficulty in sharply delineating 
pre-1945 membership conflicts stems from the fact that there was no 
clear antithesis between traditional and modern groupings. As was 
stressed in the discussion in Chapter III, there was no question of 
whether or not Buganda would accept Western ideas. Buganda was very 
receptive to innovation. Knowledge of modern techniques and Western 
skills was eagerly sought. Yet the Baganda always made these things a 
part of their own culture, and in such a manner were able to maintain a 
sense of continuity during a period of considerable change. The ele-
menta of European culture considered useful were absorbed into what the 
Baganda regarded as their own distinctive (and distinguished) way of 
life. Instrumental in the process was Daudi Chwa, who admonished the 
young Baganda to seek the best out of the West but to take care that 
they did not destroy the best of their own traditions, which, with some 
remodeling perhaps, were as good as those of the civilized countries. 
With this approach the Baganda retained their full sense of societal 
identity. 1 In such circumstances, the issue as regards traditionalists 
versus modernists was not at all a nativist versus European matter. It 
was rather between varying degrees of a generally accepted large measure 
of acculturation. 
The new groups which took form after 1920 included the somewhat 
more traditionalist movement called the Sons of Kintu; groupings of 
lThe source for the remarks in the above paragraph was primarily 
L. A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism" ([paper read 
at the] Southwestern Anthropological Association Meeting, April 25, 
1959), pp. 2, 5-7. (Duplicated.) 
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young educated; and at times, clearly defined bodies such~ a 
registered union made up of owner-drivers of motor vehicles. 
Although certain of the newer groupings enjoyed representation 
indirectly or by coincidence in the Lukiko.or in the bureaucracy, some 
l 
did not; and those that did often felt it was insufficient. Prior to 
Nsibirwa's resignation as a result of the Namasole Affair, there was 
some agitation by these groups for more "popular" representation. There 
was also reliable evidence that such demands would be resisted by those 
2 in power in Buganda. The agitation for more popular representation 
seems to have died down with Wamala's appointment as Katikiro and the 
increased popular support he and his group received on the land issue. 
On the surface, it would appear, therefore, that as of the end of 1944 
there was a minimum of unresolvable membership conflict, for all groups 
apparently were represented in one way or another in the political 
system of that moment. 
Yet with the advantages of hindsight, it is clear that the 
resignation of Nsibirwa and the appointment of Wamala had settled only 
the Namasole issue and not the broader problem of representation in the 
political system. For, some of the groups mentioned above participated 
actively in the 1945 riots. In addition, Wamala and certain of the 
chiefs supporting him were found later to have condoned if not contrib-
uted to the disturbances. The January 1945 events proved at least one 
thing--that there were no effective mechanisms for certain Baganda to 
lrngham, The Making .•. , pp. 165, 189. 
2Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development .. 
pp. 180-181, 188-189. 
II 
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bring their real economic grievances to the attention of Buganda's 
political authorities, and for the latter to see that remedial action 
was taken. There must, then, have existed in the later part of 1944 a 
real membership conflict. Therefore, the system can be described as one 
of at least moderate--instead of minimum--membership conflict at the 
time. 
Just as the conflicting alignments were not clearly delineated, 
so also was the case as regards their relative positions of power. It 
seems more than possible that in actual power exercised, through control 
of finances and offices, Kulubya and his supporters, backed by the 
British, were actually in a much stronger position than one might 
otherwise gather from Wamala's apparent monopoly of power and popularity 
in 1944. With respect to the latter, the Katikiro's faction did not, 
for example, have the authority to redress the economic grievances of 
the lower-income Baganda who were suffering from the wartime inflation, 
even if these grievances had been brought to the notice of Wamala and 
his group of supporting chiefs. 1 Only the Protectorate Government could 
take effective action in such a sphere. And in this connection, it is 
fairly certain that whether they knew of the real state of affairs or 
not, neither the British authorities nor Kulubya--whose judgment the 
British respected--were sympathetically predisposed at that time to 
2 
measures to raise the wages of the low-income groups. 
lone source has written that there was no longer effective 
communication from the people through the chief to the Buganda Govern-
ment at the top. Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 32-33. Also, Goldthorpe, 
Outlines •.• , p. 79. 
2Ingham, The Making ... , pp. 216-217; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, 
p. 25. Most of these "groups" were unorganized. 
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In view of the several reasons listed above, it is not possible 
to state with surety the facts about the 1944 membership conflicts, 
Therefore, it is assumed, pending further evidence, that the situation 
was basically one of conflict between a grouping, on the one hand, of 
1 
temporary have-nots created by wartime conditions, led by some dis-
2 gruntled young educated Baganda, and at least condoned by an 
anti-British traditionalist faction of senior officials; and a grouping, 
on the other hand, comprised of a smaller core of the wider ruling 
group, better entrenched in power because of the support of the British 
authorities, and resistant to the requests for increases in income made 
by those elements with economic grievances. 3 
The last aspect of political solidarity concerns the incidence 
of leadership. Formerly, in 1877 and 1905, it had been persistent. But 
with the resignation of Kagwa in 1926 and the withdrawal of Daudi Chwa 
1There was no large class of landless proletariat or oppressed 
peasantry in Buganda. Tenants had security of tenure. Ingham, The 
Making .. ,, p, 189, This gave practically all Baganda the chance to 
gain income other than the traditional way through service to a chief. 
In this and other ways they were freer and better off than in 1905. 
Wrigley, Economic History Review, X, 77. 
The situation late in 1944 was primarily a temporary one where 
those Baganda peasants with lesser but still usually more than adequate 
subsistence incomes were hard hit by wartime inflation. Wage laborers 
in Kampala, further removed from their land holdings, were worse off. 
Zone source attributes some disgruntlement to lack of success in 
business and exclusion from political influence in Buganda, "Uganda's 
History: The Long Road to Self Government," The [London) Times British 
Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 8. 
3sources are not in general agreement about the group forces 
operating before and during the 1945 disturbances. Cohen, p. 35; Legum, 
p. 62; Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Disturbances Which Occurred in U~anda during Januarv. 1945 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, 1945), p. 12; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 24. 
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from public affairs shortly after, leadership incidence in Buganda 
became only occasional. 
From the preceding discussion of the Baganda political system in 
terms of twelve aspects relating to political solidarity, certain conclu-
sions may be drawn. 
The late 1944 political system was characterized by fewer 
factors contributing to solidarity than the 1905 system, Although the 
system remained a unitary one as regards territorial centralization, in 
other ways political authority became further diffused. Three more 
changes were also particularly significant--institutional conflict 
increased from moderate to marked; membership conflict increased from 
minimum to moderate; and the incidence of leadership had declined from 
persistent to occasional. 
Yet the 1944 Baganda system still had certain important attri-
butes of political solidarity which were not possessed by the new tribal 
political system of the Acholi, to be discussed later in the chapter. 
Especially notable were the Baganda system's semi-sovereign nature; its 
source of legitimacy in tradition; and its moderate extent of legitimacy. 
Strength in the sense of resources. It was shown in Chapter III 
that the general natural and human resources of the political system of 
Buganda were extensive in 1905 compared to those of the other tribes. 
The same was still true at the beginning of 1945. Buganda's lead in 
1 
terms of population, though slightly reduced, remained appreciable; and 
during the intervening years the Kingdom continued to be considerably 
1see population figures in Appendix I. 
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richer than any of the other areas in terms of economic resources and 
human skills as a consequence of the greater economic and social devel-
1 
opment there than elsewhere. 
The system's adaptability. What about the system's adaptability 
2 
to certain specific Western-type demands for change? 
As anticipated in Chapter III, the system proved adaptable to 
demands for individual economic opportunity, and there was no indication 
that this would not continue to be the case. 
With regard to demands for political equality, it was stated 
that the 1905 system was characterized by political inequality and that 
it was not adaptable. A demand for political equality with the Baganda 
members of the system was not made during the period by the Banyoro and 
other non-Baganda resident in Buganda, As for the ordinary Muganda, 
over the years the smallness of his political voice compared to that of 
Baganda of official and higher social rank was accentuated. Not only 
that, but certain Baganda groups commenced to demand a greater say. 
Did the system prove unadaptable to these demands as anticipated; 
or, did other forces outside the system bring about changes? On the 
whole the Baganda institutions as they developed became more unadaptable. 
1see Chapters IV and V. 
2It has already been pointed out that the Baganda traditional 
political system of 1905 proved generally adaptable to the forces of 
change, and that it remained what was fundamentally a traditional and not 
a new political system. The authorities for this conclusion are 
numerous. See, for example, Mair, An African People ... , pp. 273, 275; 
Fallers, "Ideology ••. ," pp. 2-5, 7-8; Wrigley, Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, II, 33, 46; Hailey, "Native Administration and 
Political Development . . . , " p. 188. 
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The only source of possible change appeared to be outside or above the 
system--the Protectorate Government. As a result of some initial 
pressure from the British authorities a slight change was made in 1939 
to democratize the Lukiko, but it proved inconsequential. 
At the end of the period under review, although additional 
pressure had just recently been applied, no action had yet resulted. 
Whether the political system would prove adaptable to the "popular" 
demands and to the British pressure was problematical, because further 
broadening of Lukiko representation would require the approval of that 
body. 
Granted that the Protectorate Government possessed certain 
powers directly to compel the Kabaka and the Ministers to initiate and 
support legislation desired from the Lukiko by the British, yet it was 
open to question whether the Governor would have used them. In 
addition, there was no direct means of forcing passage of legislation. 
Should the Lukiko decline to give its approval--a likely possibility 
considering the threat that wider representation would constitute to 
the landed chiefs making up the bulk of that body's membership--the 
Governor's only recourse would be to engineer the replacement of 
opposition Lukiko members by more cooperative Baganda. To do this would 
require the dismissal of a number of chiefs. Such a course would be 
fraught with possible difficulties, and it was one which had not been 
resorted to even to obtain passage of the crucial land acquisition bill 
in 1944. 1 It may be concluded, therefore, that in the context of the 
1In the event, it was the course which was followed, though not 
by prior design--rather as a consequence of developments after the 
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situation existing at the end of 1944, the prospects were that the 
Baganda political system as then constituted would prove unadaptable to 
such demands for change. 
It was stated of the 1905 system that it was already organized 
to meet demands for an increase in the general welfare and in the 
political prestige of the unit--the Buganda Kingdom. This continued to 
be true. The organization was there. Was it utilized? It was in the 
case of the goal of political prestige, although not as fully as it 
could have been. As for general welfare, the organization was little 
used for that positive purpose, outside the assistance given in agri-
cultural matters to the development of cash crop production. In 
addition, as indicated earlier, there was evidence that the Baganda did 
not wish to assume greater responsibility for technical and social 
services. 
Conclusions 
The discussion of British policy in Buganda for the years 1905-
1945 revealed that the system of rule used by the Protectorate Govern-
ment for the Kingdom was indirect up until shortly after 1920, both in 
theory and in practice. For about the next two decades it was pre-
dominantly direct, but not extensively so. Commencing in 1938 there was 
a trend back toward indirect rule. By the end of 1944 the policy had 
come full circle to one that represented a system of substantial 
unexpected 1945 disturbances. For the latter resulted in the dismissal 
and deportation of Wamala and the subsequent removal from office of a 
number of chiefs. Legislation desired by the British then met little 
Lukiko opposition. 
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indirect rule. 
The Baganda political system, though remaining a traditional 
system, underwent changes during the period. With respect to attributes 
of strength in the sense of political solidarity, it was characterized 
by fewer of these in late 1944 than it had been in 1905. 
Certain conclusions may be reached about the relationship 
between the variations in British policies of rule in Buganda and the 
changes in the system's attributes of political solidarity. 
It seems clear that there was no lessening of such factors after 
1905 until British policy shifted from one of indirect to direct rule, 
when Buganda's system changed from a semi-sovereign to a dependent 
political system. That change was entirely attributable to the more 
direct British policy instituted after 1920. 
With the shift back to indirect rule after 1938 the Baganda 
political system became again semi-sovereign, and for this the Protec-
torate Government was responsible. But at about the same time there 
were changes in other characteristics, changes which detracted rather 
than contributed to the system's solidarity. Was British native admin-
istration policy responsible for these changes, especially the increase 
in institutional conflict from moderate to marked and of membership 
conflict from minimum to moderate? It was, because, in some contrast to 
areas where rule was more direct, British officials after 1938 con-
sciously permitted such developments and generally followed a deliberate 
1 
policy of noninterference in Buganda's internal political conflicts. 
sent 
lExceptions to the general policy were rare 
Protectorate efforts to resolve the conflicts. 
and did not repre-
Interference 
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However, the British policy of indirect rule in Buganda was not itself 
responsible for actively generating conflicts and thus stimulating the 
1 
above changes. Yet other Protectorate policies played a part. 
Viewed from a broad perspective, the institutional and member-
ship conflicts arose out of the social and political situations as they 
evolved through the years. These in turn were significantly affected by 
the British economic and social policies, the consequences of which were 
2 
such as to build up new groupings. The latter by the end of 1944 were 
still limited in numbers and organization, but they nevertheless 
represented challenges to the successors of the 1905 chiefly oligarchy. 
The successors themselves no longer formed a single social-political 
status group. Social and political changes had resulted in their 
formation along new and diverse lines. 
One particular British policy did have a direct effect on the 
extent of both institutional and membership conflict. The decision of 
the Protectorate Government to push a policy of compulsory acquisition 
occurred only when some other major Protectorate objective, unconnected 
directly with native administration objectives, was involved. The 1944 
issue of land acquisition for public purposes was the outstanding 
example. 
1Ruled out are such interpretations as, for example, that 
British native administration policy was the main force in the Namasole 
Affair, because it did not prevent Nsibirwa from supporting the Queen 
Mother; and that therefore it was responsible for swinging popular 
opinion against him, causing his resignation and replacement by Wamala. 
3These did not materialize to any notable extent before the 
early 1930's. Mair, for example, concluded that the early recognition 
of native (as opposed to alien) rights in land, and the Protectorate's 
encouragement and assistance in peasant production of cash crops, were 
important in maintaining [not challenging] social cohesion. Mair, An 
African People •.. , p. 273. 
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of land for Makerere College and the cotton experimental station had 
greatly intensified conflict in the Baganda political system as of 1944. 
Also, despite criticism of a wartime Uganda Government inflation-control 
policy which worked special and unfair hardships on lower-income 
Africans, notably those in the urban areas, the Protectorate authorities 
took no steps to remedy the situation. 1 Economically dissatisfied 
elements among the Baganda took shape. 
It is appropriate to consider at this point the more specific 
relation of the above conclusions to the first part of the thesis of the 
study. It was stated in the Introduction that in the area of indirect 
rule (Buganda), change in the local, tribal political institutions was 
relatively limited; and that policy was one of the two most important 
forces shaping the limited change. Final conclusions cannot be reached 
on the validity of these propositions until later, but some preliminary 
comments can be made. 
Was change in the political institutions of Buganda relatively 
limited? An answer must be related to change in the institutions of the 
other tribes, and this has not yet been documented. All that can be 
conclusively stated now is that, since the traditional system was 
adapted--or adapted itself--throughout the years and was not displaced, 
the change was not extensive in light of the possibilities. In this 
sense the change was relatively limited, for the traditional system was 
preserved as a traditional system, its institutions experiencing evolu-
tionary modifications rather than revolutionary extinction. 
1 Ingham, The Making ..• , pp. 216-217. 
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How important was policy as a force shaping the extent of change 
in the institutions? Given the system as it existed in 1905 and start-
ing from that point, it may be concluded that the policy of native 
administration, as it varied from indirect to direct and back to in-
direct rule, was on the whole a very important factor shaping the 
changes. The role played by the indirect rule policy was a positive one 
in that it intentionally operated to preserve the traditional system and 
thus restrict the limits of possible change; it was a passive and per-
missive factor, though deliberately so, in that it did not prevent 
certain changes which did occur. That these changes were in large 
measure products of other British policies has already been indicated. 
British native administration policy in Buganda was, then, one 
of the most important forces shaping the relatively limited change in 
the Baganda traditional political institutions. The other very impor-
tant force referred to in the thesis as also limiting the extent of 
change was Buganda's traditional political system itself. However, the 
argument in support of this proposition is reserved for the study's 
final conclusions, for it cannot be properly set forth until after the 
review analysis of the interaction of policy and the other forces in 
Chapter VIII. 
III. DIRECT RULE IN OTHER PARTS OF UGANDA 
As indicated in the previous discussion, British policy in 
Buganda was one of "Indirect Rule" in theory; and except for a period in 
the 1920's and 1930's, practical policy corresponded generally with the 
theoretical policy. 
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In the areas of the Protectorate outside of Buganda, the policy 
was also IOOst frequently expressed as one of "Indirect Rule." In 
practice, however, although in the three smaller Kingdoms there existed 
some of the superficial forms of such a type of rule, there was never in 
fact an effective policy of indirect rule in the sense in which the term 
has been analytically defined for this study. British rule was direct 
in practice. 
The synopsis below of the history of administration in the 
non-Buganda areas is intended to document this. There then follows a 
brief analysis of the variations in directness of rule according to 
different groups of tribes, succeeded by a more detailed presentation in 
depth for one tribe--the Acholi. 
The History of Direct Rule, 1905-1945 
By 1905 British administration had been established in at least 
rudimentary form in Busoga, Bugisu, and Teso, as well as in the Kingdoms 
of Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole. It had been the very definite policy of 
the Colonial Office since around 1900 to keep the area of the Protec-
torate small for the time being. By forbidding the expansion of British 
administration into adjacent areas, it was expected that the obligations 
--military and financial--of the home government would be held within 
the necessary narrow bounds. 
For the first five years or so after the turn of the century, 
the policy of containment had been adhered to reasonably well by the 
Protectorate's administrative command. Punitive expeditions to punish 
recalcitrant or obstreperous natives in surrounding areas were forbidden, 
because it was realized they would inevitably lead to the territorial 
extension of the administration. 1 
Enlargement of administrative Jurisdiction. Under Governor 
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Bell's term of office, however, the non-expansionist policy was put to 
tests which caused its subversion and its consignment to Limbo. Indian 
and Swahili traders, lacking any guarantee of protection from the 
British, ventured into nonadministered areas to the north and northeast. 
A number lost their lives. Punitive expeditions were then sanctioned. 
As a result, the spread of pax Britannica and established British admin-
2 
istration were inevitable. Other territory in the west was acquired in 
the first half of the second decade after the boundary adjustments with 
the Belgian Congo and the Sudan. 
Baganda Agents as Protectorate-wide "civil servants." The 
Protectorate authorities were much impressed with the Buganda political 
organization. That became the model to be applied in the outer areas as 
they were opened up. 
Yet the British administrators assigned to establish new posts 
could find no, or insufficient, material with which to work, either in 
the form of tribal institutions or acknowledged leaders. It was decided 
to recruit from among the Baganda men who had the necessary experience, 
using them as agents of the British in the administration of the majority 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1904-5, 
Cd. 2684-13 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), p. 29; 
Captain H. A. Wilson, A British Borderland: Service and Sport in 
Eguatoria (London: John Murray, 1913), pp. 132-135. 
2 Bell, p. 188. 
. 1 
of the other tr1bes. 
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The degree to which Baganda Agents, as they came to be officially 
termed, were employed in the different tribal areas varied according to 
the need and other factors, as did the success of the system. On the 
whole they were quite widely utilized and generally represented a 
successful experiment. 
Although in some areas where they were posted they showed a 
tendency to assume for themselves the role of chief, in most instances 
they acted primarily as planned--as authoritative advisers to the chiefs 
of indigenous origin who were appointed or sanctioned by the British. 
It was a primary task of the Baganda Agents, in the case of each tribe 
where they were used, to mold the indigenous, British-approved chiefs 
into a tribal civil service in accordance with the Buganda model. The 
Baganda trained their pupils so well that by the end of the 1920's most 
Agents had worked themselves out of a job and were withdrawn by the 
British. 
1one of several statements of the policy of extending the 
Baganda system to other areas and of employing Baganda Agents was made 
in 1920 by Governor Coryndon. Cor~, United Empire, XI, 295. 
Baganda Agents were used in Busoga, Teso, and Bugisu, as stated 
in Chapter III, and in Lango, Kigezi, Toro, and Karamojong. Ingham, The 
Making ... , pp. 116, 119, 122, 131; Hailey, Native Administration .. 
__ ., Part I, 1950, pp. 47-48; perwenal conversation with P. H. Gulliver, 
Associate Professor of Anthropology, Department of Sociology, and 
Research Associate, African Studies Program, Boston University, 
August 12, 1960. Non-indigenous Africans were used as Agents for the 
Lugbara, but whether they were Baganda is not clear. Aidan W. Southall, 
Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge, 
England: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, [1956]), pp. 287, 290-291. 
Baganda Agents were not used in Acholi. Ingham, The Making . 
__ ., p. 120. 
In the absence of information to the contrary, it is assumed 
that relatively few or no Baganda Agents were used in Bunyoro and Ankole. 
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As might be expected in any such situation, the system had its 
abuses, and these no doubt were responsible for the withdrawal of the 
Agents from certain areas. Arrogance there was, and a small amount of 
corruption. 1 Some Agents were murdered, no doubt not without provoca-
tion as far as the local people were concerned. Yet unquestionably the 
contribution of these Baganda, acting as Protectorate "civil servants," 
was a great one. Without them the British staff could not have handled 
the problem as more than a holding operation, if that. Also, the 
training in administrative matters provided by the Baganda to individ-
uals of these different tribes constituted preparation for their later 
advances, which would otherwise have had to be delayed. 
Bases for selection of indigenous chiefs. Regardless of whether 
Baganda Agents were used or not, during the early years of British 
administration the men chosen from a tribe to serve as British-sanctioned 
chiefs were undoubtedly selected on the basis of extent of local support 
and willingness to cooperate with the new authorities. The idea was to 
find any indigene who would, and who could, for one reason or another, 
2 help in administering an area. 
1The main sources for the two preceding paragraphs were: [Great 
Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report by the Governor on a Tour 
Through the Eastern Province, Cd. 4524 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1909), pp. 3, 13, 17-19 (cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda, 
Report by the Governor on •.. Eastern Province); UP, The Handbook •. 
__ ., 1920, pp. 53, 63; Buell, I, 564-565; Brende1, pp. 56-57; UP, Annual 
[Provincial) Reports ... 1939-1946, p. 38; Uganda Protectorate, Annual 
Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, 
Northern Province for the Year Ended 31st December, 1948 (Entebbe, 
Uganda: Government Printer, 1950), p. 40; "Uganda's History, , .,"The 
[LOndon] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20, 7. 
2[Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency ... ," p. 4. 
372 
In time, although efforts were made to obtain traditionally-based 
chiefs if they were also otherwise qualified, it came to be accepted 
practice that men were appointed on grounds of ability to do the job 
rather than on the basis of traditional qualifications. There were 
exceptions in specific areas, notably in Acholi during the 1937-1943 
period and in some other districts in the late 1930's. These were 
probably due to the lead given by Governor Mitchell, whose preference 
for the vitalization of native institutions in lieu of the imposition of 
new institutions was well known. Yet they were in the nature of excep-
tions which proved the rule. And the rule provided for the selection of 
chiefs in accordance with this aspect of the Buganda model--an official 
cadre or heirarchy of chiefs and subordinate chiefs in charge of terri-
torial units, who "might in some cases be clan leaders or might in other 
ways possess traditional authority, but were primarily selected for 
1 
their personal qualifications." The aim was what amounted to a native 
civil service for each tribal district, indigenously recruited. 
However, outside of the Agreement States there was no tradi-
tional authority at the head of a tribe and thus at the head of the 
tribe's native civil service, as there was in Buganda; there was instead 
the British District Commissioner. Therefore, in the nonruler Districts 
the British-selected chiefs who lacked a personal source of traditional 
authority could not draw on any higher traditional sources of authority 
to further British policy; they were executive officials of the Protec-
torate Government and regarded as such. What was intended to be a 
1Hailey, Native Administration •.• , Part I, 1950, p. 28. 
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native tribal service for each district took shape, in the eyes of the 
people, as an indigenously-staffed Protectorate civil service, which in 
some areas also included Africans not indigenous to the tribe--Baganda 
Agents. 
In the three smaller Kingdoms the situation was different only 
in that the rulers were the formal intermediaries between their chiefs 
and the British authorities. 1 
Governor Dundas, the last to head the Protectorate Government 
during the period under review up to 1945, was of the above persuasion--
merit instead of traditional bases for selection of chiefs. He 
corrected any sliding back to traditional prerequisites for chiefs which 
2 
may have occurred during his predecessor's tour. 
The official composition of councils. S.ince the Baganda had 
their Lukiko, it was decided that other tribes might also have similar 
councils when the tribes were individually sufficiently advanced. An 
Ordinance of 1919 provided for recognition of these councils, which were 
1
sources for the preceding three paragraphs: Hailey, Native 
Administration •.• , Part I, 1950, pp. 1-2, 28; Tongue, British Journal 
of Psychology, XXV, 359; J. H. Driberg, "The Lango District, Uganda 
Protectorate," Geographical Journal, XVIII (August, 1921), 127-129; 
Philip Mitchell, p. 134; F. Burke, "The New Role of the Chief in Uganda," 
Journal of African Administration, X (July, 1958), 155; Hailey, "Native 
Administration and Political Development ... ," p. 197; Mair, Africa, 
XXVIII (July, 1958), 15. 
2[Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency •.. ," pp. 5-7. This is 
not to say that all older chiefs were replaced. "Many" of the older 
chiefs who were in office in 1930 in the Northern Province absorbed 
change and kept pace with the times, according to a Provincial Com-
missioner (R. M. Bere) of long service. Uganda Protectorate, Annual 
Reports on the Eastern Province, Western Province and Northern Province 
for the Year Ended 31st December, 1954 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government 
Printer, 1955), pp. 140-141. 
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to be given the authority to alter native law and custom subject to the 
approval of the Governor. Separate legislation conferred judicial 
1 powers on the same councils, which were styled "Lukiko." 
Excepting the practically untouched area of Karamoja in north-
east Uganda, the last Districts to have their councils formalized under 
law were Kigezi and Lango--in 1927 and 1935 respectively. But in 
reality the councils were of little significance other than as a prelude 
to later development. Rarely did they take extensive advantage of their 
"legislative" powers. Their practice was to convene once a year, 
discuss current matters, and give their views to the District Commis-
sioner. The membership was entirely made up of native officials--county 
chiefs and sometimes representation of the next lower level of chiefs. 2 
Because the chiefs were acting as executive officers of the government, 
the councils were really administrative conferences more than anything 
else. 
As is explained later, shortly before World War II the first 
experiment in broadening the representation of the councils was intro-
duced. During the war the idea was accepted as a constttuent of 
general policy. Yet the new development, partly because it was in its 
infancy in most areas, did not effect any material change in the direct-
ness of British rule in the areas outside Buganda. 
The directness of rule throughout the years. That the actual 
1
"Lukiko" is both the singular and the plural form. 
2Buell, I, 564-565; Hailey, Native Administration ... , Part I, 
1950, p. 32; Burke, Journal of African Administration, X (July, 1958), 
155-156. 
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method of administration was direct is explicitly substantiated by 
official sources. 
An official report for the year 1930 explained that the "Native 
Administrations" in Uganda were constituted, depending on the degree of 
advancement of the tribe, to a greater or lesser extent on the Buganda 
model; that they were, however, advisory bodies to the District Com-
missioners, who decided on the appointments of local officials, select-
ing on the basis of merit. 1 From a later report it was clear that the 
three smaller Kingdoms were not excepted from this description. All 
these Native Administrations were regarded as mainly projections of the 
District Commissioners' offices. Even Governor Mitchell, the prime 
exponent of indirect rule during the latter part of this period, 
admitted that direct rule was the inevitable order of the day in parts 
2 
of the Protectorate. 
The inescapable conclusion is that there was in practice in the 
areas of the Protectorate outside of Buganda a system of native admin-
istration of the population which was direct, and not indirect. The 
British selected the African authorities, and this was generally done 
with little regard to traditional bases of authority, the primary 
1[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1930, 
Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1556 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1931), pp. 45-47. 
2Thomas and Scott, p. 69; [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] 
Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the 
Uganda Protectorate, 1937, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1860 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), p. 5; Brendel, p. 100; Hailey, 
"Native Administration and Political Development ... ," p. 198; Ingham, 
~he Making .•. , p. 192; UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports •.• 1939-
1946, p. 65. 
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concern being other personal qualities fitting a man for his tasks; even 
Africans not indigenous to the tribe (Baganda) were used in positions of 
local authority in some of the areas outside Buganda, and where they 
were employed rule was especially direct. 1 Functions carried out by the 
African authorities of the local administrations were generally less than 
those exercised in Buganda by that Kingdom's administrative heirarchy, 
especially in judicial affairs and in the field of rule-making or tribal 
legislation. British interference in these and other functions such as 
the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes was much greater 
than in Buganda, amounting clearly to direction as contrasted to super-
vision. 
Variations in Directness of Rule by Tribal Groups 
How direct the rule was in each of the different non-Buganda 
areas varied from tribe to tribe according to the circumstances and the 
times. As explained later, over the years it was probably generally not 
1The greater directness derived from the simple fact that they 
were more numerous and were posted at lower territorial levels of the 
native administrations than were the British officials in the areas 
lacking Baganda Agents. 
In addition, it is the impression that the British officials by 
and large took into account native customs in their actions when they 
were apprised of them, and that such officers were often sympathetic to 
a tribe's traditional ways of life. The Baganda, on the other hand, are 
generally known to have felt that other tribes were inferior, and it is 
probable that the Baganda Agents were less hesitant to ride roughshod 
over another tribe's customs. That this was true for the Iteso has been 
pointed out in Chapter III. In view of the particular disdain felt by 
the Baganda for non-Bantu peoples, it is probable that where Baganda 
Agents were used in such areas their feeling of contempt, together with 
a real lack of understanding of the indigenous ways, resulted in an 
especially direct rule. It was probably more direct than that which 
would have resulted had the British been able to do the financially 
impossible, that is, post British officials at all points where Baganda 
Agents were used. 
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so very direct in the Kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole, and in 
Busoga. It was probably quite direct in the rest of the Eastern 
Province, in the Northern Province, and in Kigezi. 
The three small Kingdoms. Knowing of the British policy 
preference for "Indirect Rule" and that its classic form is usually 
associated with an Agreement, it would be logical and natural to assume 
at first glance that the administrative system applied to the three 
small Agreement States in Uganda was one of indirect rule. In fact, 
such a view has been widely held in some quarters. Because of this, in 
addition to the generalized points already made, limited additional 
evidence is presented below to show that the logical assumption did not 
follow in the real situation. Examples of direct rule in certain other 
parts of Uganda are then provided, following which the Acholi are 
treated in greater depth. 
In the Kingdom of Toro the ruling class of Bahima chiefs had to 
1 be replaced by Baganda Agents, who remained there until 1933. 
The murder of a Protectorate officer in Ankole in 1905 resulted 
in the suspension for a number of years of the 1901 Ankole Agreement and 
the imposition of severe measures of collective punishment by the 
Protectorate Government. Further, the ruler, Kahaya, was quite com-
pletely overshadowed by his Enganzi (Prime Minister), Mbaguta, who 
2 
cooperated closely with the British. 
1Hailey, Native Administration .•. , Part I, 1950, pp. 47-48. 
For a story of the punishment of Kasagama, the Toro ruler of the early 
days, for insubordinate behavior, see Lorimer, pp. 200, 253-256. 
2Bell, pp. 147-149, 152; Caroline Kirkland, Some African 
Highways (Boston: Dana Estes & Company, 1908), pp. 175-182; [Great 
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Bunyoro for a number of years was in a state of almost complete 
1 
lethargy. Then a new ruler, Tito Winyi, came to the throne in 1924. 
He succeeded in impressing the authorities with his "progressive" 
ideas, 2 which, it might go without saying, were in accord with measures 
the Protectorate Government wished to introduce. 
Compared to Buganda these Kingdoms had had a relatively retarded 
level of political organization as of the turn of the century. They did 
3 
not deserve a more indirect rule in the eyes of the British. That this 
state of affairs had not altered by World War II is evident from a 
conclusion reached by Lord Hailey during the war. 
. . • for all practical purposes the authority of the Protectorate 
Government over these areas [the three Kingdoms] must be considered 
as complete and unfettered ..•• 4 
Rule in the non-Agreement areas. Busoga probably came the 
closest to the three Agreement States in that the rule was somewhat less 
direct there than in certain other parts of the Protectorate. At a 
fairly early date Busoga was given a Lukiko, plus a President for it. 
(Significantly, he was accorded a native title--Kvabazinga.) But the 
Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda Protectorate. Report for 1905-6, Cd. 
3285-12 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1907), pp. 22, 27, 31; 
[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1908-9, Cd. 4964-10 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1910), p. 30. 
lrngham has remarked on the apathy in all three Kingdoms. 
Ingham, The Making ... , p. 131. 
2[Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency 
Making • . . , p. 195. 
3Thomas and Spencer, pp. 48-49. 
. , " p. 4; Ingham, The 
4Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development .. 
p. 190. 
.. " 
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absence of an Agreement resulted in a more direct rule in Busoga than in 
1 the Agreement States. 
Even in Acholi, where a decided effort was made in 1937 to use 
traditional authorities as chiefs, the rule was clearly direct. It was 
also equally direct in the remaining areas of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces and in Kigezi. 2 
Conclusions. In considering the directness of the method of 
native administration in the different non-Buganda areas, the summary 
analysis may be carried out in terms of the bases for the selection of 
African authorities, the division of local governmental functions 
between the native and central administrations, and the extent of 
British interference in the functions allocated to the native authori-
ties. British rule in most of these areas has not been studied at 
length; therefore, the conclusions about it are in the nature of 
assumptions, regarded as reasonable in light of the limited evidence 
cited. 
As for the selection of chiefs under British rule, in the case 
of all tribes indigenous chiefs were not--by and large--selected on 
traditional bases; and in certain areas Baganda Agents were used as 
African authorities. Authority did not derive from traditional 
institutions except in the Agreement States, where the existence of a 
ruler made this the case (although to a varying extent). 
1GB, CO, Uganda. Report by 
Province, p. 6; Ingham, The Making 
the Governor on . . . Eastern 
., p. 190; Buell, I, 564. 
2UP, The Handbook .•• , 1920, pp. 106-107; UP, Annual 
[Provincial] Reports ... 1939-1946, pp. 74-75. 
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The functions of the African authorities in the three smaller 
Kingdoms were more restricted vis-a-vis the central government than was 
the situation as regards Buganda; yet because tribal political organiza-
tions existed in some form from earlier times, the functions exercised 
were wider than those of the other local, tribal administrations. Also, 
for all tribes, entirely new local governmental functions had been 
assumed by the central government by 1945--mainly in the field of 
technical and social services. Generally speaking, the functions of the 
African authorities increased less than those of the Protectorate 
Government. 
The last of the criteria is the degree of interference. Avail-
able documentation indicates that this was uncircumscribed in all 
·non-Buganda areas. 
The conclusion is that in the three smaller Agreement States, 
and to a greater extent Busoga, there was direct rule, but that it was 
not extensive in degree; in the remaining tribal areas outside of 
Buganda, there was decidedly direct rule. 
Acholi--An Example of Political Change 
The traditional Acholi political system was analyzed in some 
depth in Chapter III. The conclusion was reached that the total tribal 
political system was characterized by a paucity of sources of political 
solidarity and by limited resources compared to Buganda. There were a 
number of reasons for the former, but they largely derived from the 
system's pronounced confederate nature. For Acholi in the days of 
pre-British rule consisted of about forty chiefdoms, each lacking any 
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appreciable concentration of political authority, and all intermit-
tently cooperating and fighting with one another. 
In the following pages it is the intention to summarize certain 
of the forces of change in the evolving social and political situation 
in Acholi up to 1945, to cite those elements of the traditional system 
which still remained after the forces had operated for thirty-odd years, 
and to furnish a brief appraisal of the new political system of the 
Acholi District as of early 1945. 
1 
The forces of change in summary. The forces of change which 
affected the Acholi traditional political system from the period of the 
advent of British rule to the year 1945 were manifold. Some of them are 
separately considered for the whole Protectorate in other chapters. At 
this stage it is necessary to restrict the discussion to the forces of 
direct import and for which there is available specific research data 
pertaining to Acholi. 
The most crucial force was the establishment of British rule 
itself and the various official policies subsequently put into effect in 
Acholi. A non-secular, non-official force of secular significance was 
the dichotomous introduction of Christianity; that is, of the Protestant 
1A detailed and documented description of the forces, prepared 
for this study, is not included because of its length. It is provided 
in C. H. Walter Howe, "The Acholi Political Systems," Boston, October 
1959, pp. 45-61. (Typewritten.) Some of the more important sources for 
the account, other than those already cited as general sources at the 
beginning of the Acholi section in Chapter III, were as follows: A. B. 
Adimola, "The Lamogi Rebellion 1911-12," Uganda Journal, XVIII 
(September, 1954), 166-177; Thomas and Scott, pp. 468-469, 471, 473, 
475; UP, The Handbook .. ,, 1920, pp. 106-107; Tongue, British Journal 
of Psychology, XXV, 359; Ingham, The Making •.• , p. 121; Hailey, 
Native Administration •.. , Part I, 1950, pp. 59, 61, 63-64; UP, Annual 
[Provincial) Reports .•. 1939-1946, pp. 71, 74-75. 
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versus the Roman Catholic faiths and the reverberations along political 
lines of cleavage. Other forces of change were less spectacular. They 
operated in a steady, less "political" way to affect custom and 
customary law, as for example in the matter of land tenure; to bring 
about a small though perceptible shift to a more individualistic value 
orientation; and to produce a new and untried organization--the Acholi 
Association--as an institution cutting across other divisions and 
relating the old and the new. These varied forces of change are 
discussed in more detail below. 
Historically, colonial rule in Acholi up to 1945 can be con-
veniently divided by three points in time--its establishment in 1911-12, 
subsequent major changes in policy in 1937, and further changes again in 
1943. 
During the years prior to the contact with British authority, 
non-European traders had entered and operated within Acholi. By their 
tactics of helping those chiefs who favored them, and especially after 
the introduction of firearms and the active pursuit of slaving, the 
conflicts between chiefdoms were stepped up in tempo and intensity. 
These developments did not fundamentally alter the traditional political 
system but they had other consequences. There was "soon struck a note 
1 
of terror and horror all over the country." Although the traders were 
mostly Swahili, the Acholi extended to all foreigners the resulting deep 
distrust and suspicion, making the work of the British authorities at 
first very difficult. 
lAdimola, Uganda Journal, XVIII, 169. 
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One expression of this feeling was the Lamogi Rebellion of 1911-
1912, when a chiefdom in the southwest of Acholi forcibly resisted the 
efforts of British authorities to relieve the men of their firearms. The 
Lamogi chiefdom was joined by other Acholi elements, and the British 
were in turn assisted by certain of the tribe's rwodi (chiefs). The 
British forces won after a several months' siege of the Lamogi. 1 
As already indicated, the most direct and telling force operating 
on the traditional political system in the 1911-1945 period was British 
administrative policy. In the initial stage the establishment of law 
and order by the British undermined traditional authority in the smaller 
"connnunities" and in the larger, more inclusive chiefdoms by depriving 
them of two of their main reasons for existence: soon individuals and 
kin groups no longer had to look to and cluster in the traditional 
political units for their physical safety; nor could they under pax 
Britannica pursue their aggrandizement through raiding and looting as 
members of the traditional units. 2 Yet, for the British to maintain 
order and fulfill other minimum administrative requirements, not the 
1 Adimola, Uganda Journal, XVIII, 166-177. Hardly accurate was a 
contemporary official statement that the disarmament of the Acholi "was 
carried out practically without opposition and without resort to mili-
tary force .... " [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 
1912-13, Cd. 7050-28 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914), 
p. 26. 
2Girling has written to the effect that British rule resulted in 
a disintegration of the tribal system of chiefdoms, dependent as the 
latter were for their political organization on the conditions of 
[overt] mutual hostility which the British brought to an end. F. K. 
Girling, "The Traditional Social and Political Order of the Acholi of 
Uganda" (typescript on· file in the Library of the East African Institute 
of Social Research, Kampala, Uganda, [1953?]). (As indicated previously 
in Chapter III, no page references are provided for citations to this 
short seven-page typescript.) 
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least important of which was the collection of taxes along new, 
non-traditional lines, a measure of some kind of political organization 
was necessary. To this end the Protectorate's officers at first tried 
to use the hereditary leaders to execute the range of political duties. 
But in frequent instances the traditional leaders proved insufficient in 
number, authority, or ability; and there were no Baganda Agents posted 
1 
to Acholi who could guide and train them. It became necessary to 
select as chiefs men who had little or no hereditary qualifications, but 
who could for one reason or another better perform the tasks set by the 
British authorities. This was the practice for some twenty-five years. 
Born of necessity, it accorded with the Protectorate's aim of establish-
ing tribal civil services on the Baganda model in each area of local 
administration. 
2 For reasons which are not entirely clear, efforts were made in 
1937 to reconstruct the above system along entirely traditional lines, 
reverting to traditional social-political units and to traditionally 
qualified chiefs. The scheme proved a failure and was replaced some six 
years later. But among other things, it revived and intensified 
rivalries between the larger-scale traditional political units. 
Referred to as chiefdoms in the discussion of the traditional political 
system in Chapter III, and inaccurately called clans in many modern 
writings, these political groupings are more appropriately described 
1sources available do not indicate why Baganda Agents were not 
employed in Acholi. 
2The main factor was probably Governor Mitchell's personal 
orientation in favor of traditional African institutions; this was 
discussed earlier in the chapter. 
1 
under British rule as "tribal sections." 
The new policy of 1943 relied on chiefs chosen by "merit," 
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serving away from their home areas, and arranged in a definite hierarchy 
of command in contrast to the traditional system of numerous autonomous 
chiefdoms. The rejection of tradition was not complete, however, for 
tribal-section and clan-section heads received a large proportion of the 
seats in the newly established councils which were formed to advise and 
2 
assist the chiefs. The councils were intended to give the ordinary 
people a greater voice in the tribal administration, their views to be 
channeled through their traditional leaders acting as spokesmen in the 
councils. The councils were also to serve as a check on chiefs' 
behavior, which had shown a tendency to become autocratic under British 
rule. 
Another direct result of colonial policy in Acholi was the 
division of the region which the tribe inhabited in the Protectorate 
into two parts. In the late 1930's these two parts--the eastern Chua 
District and western Gulu District--became one Acholi District. But the 
effects of the divergence in policies and administration of the two 
1rn a personal communication dated October 22, 1959, Paula 
Hirsch Foster has confirmed that current references to Acholi "clans" in 
fact refer to the traditional chiefdoms [consociations] as they may 
still exist, here called tribal sections; also that there are still 
loyalties to these groupings, as well as to the traditional "communities" 
or clan-sections. Mrs. Foster, an anthropologist who has carried out a 
field study of the Acholi, calls the "communities" lineages. 
A personal letter dated February 3, 1960, from an Acholi in 
Uganda similarly confirmed that modern references to clan loyalties and 
clan divisions were actually references to the old chiefdom units. 
2The system of councils is dealt with in the next major section 
of this chapter. 
areas prior to that time continued afterward as one of the major 
political divisions of the tribe, a division not known in pre-British 
days. 
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The second major force of change originated from unofficial 
sources, and it introduced yet another new political division. The 
Christian missionaries came to Acholi, as to other parts of Uganda, in 
the form of two different versions of that faith--the Roman Catholic and 
the Protestant. Their converts grouped themselves socially and to some 
degree politically according to this division. Important political 
facts arising from the history were the greater number of Catholics 
among the population, yet the considerable predominance of Protestants 
as chiefs. 
Other economic and social forces of change have been discussed 
in Chapters IV and V, where it was pointed out that they were much less 
extensive in areas such as Acholi, compared to Buganda, They, therefore, 
operated less pervasively in Acholi, occasioning more of a slow and 
partial adaptation of the economic and social aspects of the traditional 
society rather than either a clear break with it or its reinvigoration. 
Just prior to the end of the period under review there was formed an 
organization--the Acholi Association--which seemed particularly to suit 
the process of adaptation. Although it was not derived from any 
traditional institution, even in part, and although it represented what 
must have been a new grouping of individuals in the society cutting 
across other groupings, nevertheless its activities suggested an 
appreciable orientation toward the past. Together with its emphasis on 
the present, the total orientation gave the Association the characteristic 
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of a transitional social institution potentially very serviceable to 
Acholi society. 
The remains of the traditional political system in late 1944. 
The effects of the operation of the forces described in the preceding 
paragraphs, and more particularly of native administration policy, were 
so extensive and central as to represent the replacement of the tradi-
tional system by a new one. This occurred at both the level of the 
total tribal political system and at the level of the traditional 
political systems of the chiefdoms. The conclusion that such were the 
consequences is based on the following analysis of what remained of the 
1 
traditional system around the end of 1944. 
In considering first the different aspects of traditional 
political authority, the chiefdoms, as the highest level and largest 
constituent units of the confederate tribal political system, had 
disappeared as territorial political units by 1945. Some of them 
carried over, however, as unofficial political pressure groupings, and 
2 
in this form they may be referred to as tribal sections. Their 
1rn the original analysis prepared for this study the discussion 
of the remains of the traditional system in early 1945 followed, and 
therefore was derived from, a more detailed consideration of the effects 
of the forces of change on each aspect of the traditional system. Howe, 
"The Acholi Political Systems," pp. 64-87, and 87-95. 
Because of its length the extra material is not included. 
2The historical situation in Busoga is somewhat analagous. 
According to Fallers, there were traditional states of varying size, 
with both commoner and aristocratic clan-sections as constituent parts, 
and a ruler chosen from a particular lineage of the aristocratic clan. 
By a process more gradual than that in Acholi, the states have been 
replaced by a modern administration. They have persisted either as 
social units or as "shadow states" lacking effective authority. Fallers 
has not used any particular term in describing them in the modern 
setting, but they probably would correspond to what have been referred 
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geographical areas did not correspond to the new counties, which were 
more extensive. Although certain of the tribal-section areas may have 
been roughly the same in boundaries to one or more divisions 
(sub-counties), such was the limited extent of any correspondence with 
the traditional confederate territorial picture. Authority in the 
mid-1940's was, as indicated later, constituted quite differently with 
regard to the territorial distributions of political authority. 
Of the sovereignty of the traditional system, not a trace 
remained in the new situation. 
The traditional diffusion of authority along other than terri-
torial lines was replaced by a concentration structured in a very 
different way, with only one minor element of tradition left as a 
tenuous link--the tribal-section and clan-section leaders as members of 
the lower councils. The relation to tradition was minor, for the new 
nature of these leaders' roles and of the councils themselves as 
institutions was quite non-traditional. 
In scope of activity there was only one carry-over, and it was 
so indirect as to have little traditional connection. Some of the 
political activities exercised by the traditional chiefdoms were similar 
to those of the new counties. But the latter's included new activities 
and this, together with the fact that the counties were hardly at all 
otherwise reminiscent of the chiefdoms, meant that the bridge from the 
to as tribal sections in this study of Acholi. It is also of interest 
that the traditional rulers, sitting as members of the Busoga Local 
Government councils, have officially yet incorrectly been referred to as 
"clan heads." Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integra-
tion and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African 
People (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [ 1956]), pp. 126-154, 
171-173. 
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traditional was very slight. It was practically nonexistent when the 
relatively large and varied activities of the new District political 
system were compared with the extremely limited activities of the 
traditional tribal political system. 
With regard to sources of legitimacy for the 1945 system, there 
remained only small vestiges of authority deriving from tradition. For 
different reasons, all of these were of decreased significance, and just 
1 
one related directly to the question of legitimacy of the new system. 
That was the incorporation of tribal-section and clan-section heads into 
the recently established councils. As of 1945 this represented an 
insignificant ingredient in what legitimacy there was in political 
1 As regards two other vestiges of authority, which related only 
indirectly to legitimacy in the new system, one was the strength which 
the various leaders in the old chiefdoms drew from the traditional 
aspects of their positions. But since these leaders, as heads only of 
tribal and clan sections in the new political system, were not holders 
of authority, their tradition-based strength was no longer relevant 
directly to the question of political legitimacy. 
The second vestige of authority based on tradition which was no 
longer relevant directly to political legitimacy was the use in the new 
system of the traditional titles of .!J!2i and j.!&2_ for the "modern" 
chiefs and of the old chiefdom and community appellations as place names 
for some of the modern territorial units making up the district. These 
terms carried with them a traditional connotation and therefore an 
association with the original traditional elements. However, with the 
considerable changes which had taken place, it is doubtful that the 
association could have been very strong. The use of the terms did not 
in effect represent the incorporation into the new system of a 
tradition-source ingredient, since it did not involve a normative belief 
that, for example, the modern chiefs exercised legitimate authority 
because they had titles sanctified by tradition. The use of the terms 
represented the use of something which was only traditional in the 
existential, and not the normative, sense; that is, it represented 
something which had merely been handed down from the past. (Tradition-
source, as defined, presupposes a belief in the sanctity of the order of 
the past. Traditional-source, if used as a hyphenated term, would 
simply refer to that which has been handed down from the past. The 
meaning of the former is normative; of the latter, existential.) 
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authority. 
Just as the sources derived from tradition did not live on as a 
notable factor in the legitimacy of the new system, so also did the 
sources derived from charisma in the old system fail to live on in terms 
1 
of appreciable legitimacy for the new. 
From the preceding discussion of the sources of legitimacy it is 
clear that the traditional system also contributed almost nothing to the 
extent of the new system's legitimacy, which appears to have been as 
minimal as that of the traditional tribal system. 
In terms of membership, something more of the traditional system 
remained. The new system was tribe-membership at both the district and 
the county level. This takes on significance when the other possibili-
ties are given a glance--intrusion of large elements from other tribes, 
or from other races. The retention of the same general membership group 
was an important factor, albeit more in the post-1944 situation than as 
of the end of that year. 
In the new system there were several dominant groups as was the 
case in the old. However, the sets of groups concerned were all new 
except one. In addition, that one had drastically changed its character 
--the chiefdoms had become tribal sections which were political-pressure 
type groups. Therefore, proportionately, little of the traditional was 
to be found in the new system on the district level, although on the 
county level there may have been a tendency for a tribal-section group 
to be one of the more important several dominant groups. 
lFor example, the institution of the war leader was gone from 
the scene, and the rain-maker became divorced from political activities. 
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The traditional system was a closed one in terms of political 
mobility, as most political offices were hereditary. This character-
istic of the traditional era carried over to the 1945 situation in part, 
since the transition from a closed to an open system was in mid-process 
at that time. The new system was a mixed open and closed political 
system. In the case of Acholi, it meant that although appointments to 
political offices were made on the basis of merit without regard to 
hereditary qualifications, the great majority of those who could qualify 
came from families which by reason of their hereditary position were 
wealthy and were able to give their sons the education and training 
required to be appointed on "merit. ,.l But the significance of the 
survival of the traditional system in this indirect manner is reduced 
practically to zero--in the general terms of tradition living on--when 
it is realized that there was nothing solidifying the favored position 
of the sons of hereditary chiefs; and in fact the recognized goal was to 
2 
get completely away from the closed kind of recruitment. 
The traditional system's unresolvable institutional conflict did 
not survive, and there was no such membership conflict to carry over. 
The new political system inherited the same unfavored position 
1
"Nominal" school fees were still so high in terms of Acholi 
standards that few could afford much education. And it was only in 
later years that "scholarships" began to change the system from a mixed 
open and closed system to an open system. 
2If the new tribal-section groups were very influential as 
pressure groups, and if the recruitment to leadership of these groups 
remained hereditary, then the traditional system could be said to have 
significantly affected the new system. However, there is not the data 
to deal with this possibility, which is in any event beyond the scope of 
the discussion. 
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as regards weak leadership and limited resources relative to the more 
favored Baganda and Basoga, but this is not germane to the discussion of 
what remained of the traditional political system. 
In terms of adaptability of the traditional political system to 
certain Western-type demands for change, the old system's adaptability 
to possible demands for individual economic opportunity, for political 
equality, and for general welfare and political prestige proved in all 
cases irrelevant in the actual circumstances of the changed situations. 
Factors other than those present in the traditional system operated to 
1 
render these qualities superfluous. 
What in summary were the "remains" of the traditional political 
system in late 1944? As far as the total tribal political system of 
traditional times was concerned, the situation was as follows. 
Political authority was considered in six of its characteristics 
--territorial centralization, sovereignty, concentration, scope of 
activity, source of legitimacy, and extent of legitimacy. Only the 
inclusion of the tribal-section and clan-section leaders in the lower 
councils in 1943 proved of possible political significance as a 
carry-over of traditional authority, as regards the latter's third, 
fifth, and sixth characteristics above. And in the total view of the 
1945 political system, this link with the past was shown in the analysis 
to be minor indeed. It was practically negligible in respect tG the 
1For example, the traditional institutions which could have been 
used to eliminate the measure of political inequality between commoner 
and aristocratic elements were not utilized. Nor were they really 
needed. British policy imposed basic political equality along with the 
new politicalsystem. 
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last two listed characteristics. 
That the new political system did retain the former 
tribe-membership basis was the one most important political fact in the 
transitional process. Considerably less noteworthy because they were 
only shadows of the former chiefdoms were the tribal-section groups 
which shared the non-official scene in varying degree with other new 
political groupings. 
In all the rest of the aspects there were no "remains" of the 
tribal traditional political system, The incidence of survival, after 
considering the various different aspects of the old system, is scant 
indeed: tribe-membership; the very limited flavor given to some of the 
characteristics of political authority by the inclusion of tribal-section 
and clan-section leaders in the new lower councils; and the presence on 
the unofficial and non-authoritative side of the political scene of, 
along with other new groupings, the remnants of the chiefdoms in the 
form of tribal sections. 
At the lower, chiefdom level of the traditional system, what 
were the "remains" which could be found in 1945? They were the same in 
kind as those for the tribal system though different in degree. 
Because the chiefdom and county units were smaller than, and constituent 
parts of, the tribal and district units, the tribe-membership character-
istic was of less importance for the smaller units; thus its survival 
was less significant at that lower level. On the other hand, the very 
fact of the lesser size of the constituent parts meant that the 
political consequences of tribal-section and clan-section leaders 
sitting on councils and of defunct chiefdoms operating as tribal-section 
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pressure groups would be heightened in such a local setting. This 
follows because the other interest and loyalty groups which operated in 
the district-wide political scene were, or tended to be, less operative 
1 
as conflicting groups in individual local areas. 
The general conclusion, then, is that at both the tribal and 
chiefdom levels, the traditional political system disappeared in every 
essential respect, and that those aspects which endured were of only 
limited political significance to the new system as it existed in early 
1945. 2 
1For example, the religious division cut across the entire 
district, but some of the counties are believed to have been largely 
Protestant or Catholic. This meant that in those cases the religious 
division would not act very thoroughly in the purely pluralistic 
functional sense of preventing a marked predominance of one major 
grouping. Similarly, there was not, of course, the east-west division 
within the counties that there was for the district as a whole. 
2The fact that the chiefdom political systems disappeared along 
with the traditional tribal system is indicative of the completeness of 
the displacement of the traditional political aspect of the society at 
the two top levels. 
In this connection, it is of interest to note what Robert 
LeVine has written on the general subject. "When a stateless society 
comes under colonial administration or is integrated into a developing 
nation-state, the new system is often superimposed, substituting a 
single politically integrated unit for the 'ordered anarchy' of compet-
ing smaller groups, but leaving the internal authority systems of the 
smaller groups relatively intact. Under such circumstances these latter 
authority systems are likely to continue to function and to provide 
individuals with their ideological orientation concerning the proper 
allocation of authority." Robert A. LeVine, "Problems in the Study of 
Stateless Societies" (Central States Anthropological Society Meetings, 
1959), p. 3. (Duplicated.) 
Further on, the same writer has stated: "The local authority 
systems appear to be relatively enduring sources of political behavior 
and political ideologies capable of surviving under and influencing 
superimposed central administrative systems, while the external rela-
tions of small groups in stateless societies are fragile networks of 
social control which are more easily superseded by the introduction of 
large-scale political integration." LeVine, "Problems in . • . , " p. 12. 
In the case of Acholi, the chiefdom political systems did not 
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The result was that, in contrast to the case of Buganda, the 
Acholi traditional political systems at the tribal and the chiefdom 
levels just did not exist as a force in the territorial political 
situation for all of Uganda in early 1945. 
The new Acholi political system of early 1945. The new Acholi 
District political system was a creature of British policy, with several 
new distinctive characteristics. 
As a result of the sweeping reorganization of the administration 
of the Acholi District in 1943, political authority became highly 
centralized from a territorial point of view; Counties were con-
stituted, each with several divisions, and with sub-units of these at 
levels further down. Counties and divisions were given councils to 
advise their chiefs. But none of these developments lodged consequen-
tial powers in the territorial units of the district. Acholi as of 1945 
possessed a political system which was strongly unitary in character, 
political authority being territorially centralized at Gulu, the 
District headquarters. 
In addition to concentration by reason of the territorial 
centralization, authority was concentrated in the other two possible 
ways. First, of the different political institutions, one--that of the 
District Commissioner--was markedly dominant; practically all spheres of 
1 
political activity were subject to its political authority. Secondly, 
prove capable of surviving as "local authority systems." Even the much 
more numerous "coDDDUnities," at the level next below the chiefdoms, 
apparently failed to endure, although data on this point is very limited. 
1A possible exception as regards activities was in the judicial 
sphere: the Acholi native courts handed down judgments according to 
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by reason of its being a one-man institution instead of a committee or 
council, it was itself concentrated in nature. 
As regards other aspects of political authority, the new system 
was dependent, not sovereign or even semi-sovereign. It was limited in 
its sphere of activities, though much less so than the traditional 
tribal system. Whereas the legitimacy of the pre-British system was 
grounded in tradition, with a good measure of charisma included, these 
did not carry over. What legitimacy was accorded to the new system as 
of early 1945 most probably, therefore, was based on reason; that is, on 
the belief that the system of political authority was a good one because 
it worked to achieve valued ends, as contrasted to beliefs that it was 
good because it was sanctified by tradition or by a charistmatic leader. 
Yet there is no evidence that the extent of legitimacy accorded 
by the Acholi to their new system was more than minimal; and there is 
evidence to support the conclusion that the new, non-traditional 
political system had not by 1945 been institutionalized or legitimized 
to any appreciable extent in the eyes of the Acholi. Because the 
conclusion about the extent of legitimacy is of particular relevance to 
later analyses, further discussion of supporting arguments for it is in 
order. 
customary law. But even here the District Commissioner, directly 
through powers of review and indirectly through the civil service type 
of judicial and administrative chain of command, exercised effe~tive 
control and direction. 
Another relevant development was the establishment of councils. 
These were not, however, significant in terms of lessening the extent of 
political authority clustered in the one institution of the District 
Commissioner at the Gulu headquarters. 
The system in 1945 was, then, authority-concentrated as opposed 
to authority-diffused, 
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As indicated above, the new system drew practically not at all 
on the sources of political authority which characterized the old 
system--tradition and charisma. Further, the new system had been in 
effect only since 1943. It followed the wartime disintegration of the 
system which was introduced in 1937 in an attempt to revert to tradi-
tional political units and hereditary chieftainships. The 1937 system 
had led to such intratribal jealousies that officials doubted whether 
tribal unity could ever have been achieved under it. 1 According to 
Governor Dundas, even some traditional elements of Acholi came to favor 
selection of chiefs according to "merit" and without regard to 
2 hereditary qualifications. 
But, had the new system in this and other essentials generally 
been accepted by the Acholi tribe as its own in the less than two years 
it was in existence prior to 1945? It is probable that the chiefs in 
office accepted it--either from conviction of its worth or for obvious 
personal reasons. However, the people as a whole could hardly have done 
so except in a very small measure. For, after all, it was not until 
1943 under the new system that the people "'obtained for the first time 
a voice in their own administration.'" So wrote the Acholi District 
Commissioner, part of whose District report was somewhat unusually 
quoted verbatim in the official report of the Provincial Administrations 
covering the war years. Inferring that the process of education in the 
use of the councils was still in process at the end of 1946 (two years 
1UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports ••. 1939-1946, pp. 74-75. 
2[Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency ..• ," p. 5. 
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after the end of the period under review in this study), he added that 
"'some of the Local Councils cannot yet be said to be politically 
conscious.'" In fact, according to the Provincial Commissioner, the 
main task undertaken by the administration during 1946 was 
the consolidation of the system set up in 1943. The rules of the 
various Councils defining their constitutions, functions, scope, 
etc., were collated and administrative officers on tour gave 
particular attention to this aspect and to seeing that the ordi-
nary people understood the workings of the Councils and the 
system of elections thereto.l 
There is additional evidence that the people, whose very limited 
schooling could be expected to inhibit their understanding and appreci-
2 
ation of the new system for some years, could also not have been 
convinced of the goodness or rightness of the system. The evidence is 
provided by another of the Acholi District Commissioner's statements 
from the same source: 
"It may be anticipated that ig the course of time the chief will 
take an increasingly less autocratic position until eventually he 
becomes the executive carrying out the will of the people."3 
For the above reasons, though lacking quantitative proof it has 
been concluded that the extent of legitimacy accorded to the new, 
non-traditional political system of the Acholi District was minimal. 
With regard to membership aspects of the new Acholi District 
political unit, like the traditional system it was tribe-membership. It 
also was characterized by several dominant groups, though they were new. 
1This quotation and those preceding it in the paragraph are from 
UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports .•• 1939-1946, p. 75. 
2see the discussion at the end of Chapter IV. 
3UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports .•. 1939-1946, p. 75. 
Underscoring added; not in the referenced publication. 
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The mixed open and closed quality of the system as regards political 
mobility was a change from the traditional, bringing to chieftainships 
new and more competent talent, drawn from the privileged families. 
Institutional conflict was moderate, consisting of that between 
the Protestant and Catholic churches. Unresolvable membership conflict 
was minimum. 
As for incidence of leadership, there was an absence of strong 
Acholi leaders commanding wide tribal support. 
In 1945 the system was badly off in terms of general natural and 
human resources in contrast to Buganda's extensive resources. 
With respect to adaptability to certain Western-type demands for 
change, the new system was in a good position. Subject to possible 
inhibiting turns in British policy, the system was already adapted as 
regards probable increased demands for economic individualism. Since 
basic political equality among Acholi had been incorporated as a feature 
of the new system, there was no problem of a future demand by membership 
groups with unequal rights. And lastly, the new system was an organized 
system and was therefore prepared to deal with demands for increases in 
general welfare and political prestige of the District. 
Certain of the characteristics listed above represented factors 
contributing to the strength of the new system; others could be 
described as contributing to weakness; and some were not markedly 
important one way or another in the context of the different tribal 
systems existing in Uganda up to 1945. 
Compared to the system of the Baganda, the tribe given equally 
extensive treatment, there was in Acholi a greater degree of 
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1 
concentration of authority on other than territorial lines. Additional 
important attributes of solidarity were the lesser extent of unresolv-
able institutional and membership conflict in Acholi than in Buganda. 
Characteristics of the new Acholi system notably detracting from its 
strength in the sense of political solidarity were its dependent status 
in contrast to that of semi-sovereignty in Buganda; the absence of 
tradition as a solid source of legitimacy for political authority> and 
most significant, the minimum extent of legitimacy accorded by the 
2 Acholi to their new system. Factors of less consequence one way or the 
other, or concerning which a judgment is not feasible, were the Acholi 
system's more limited scope of activities; its tribe- as opposed to 
culture-membership; the existence of several dominant political groups; 
3 its mixed open and closed political mobility; and its weaker leadership. 
1The degree of territorial centralization in both systems was 
marked, the systems being unitary in this respect. 
2The judgment concerning the significance of the characteristic 
of minimum legitimacy is based on the assumption that without a personal 
sense of conviction and commitment by the members of a political unit to 
their system, such a unit cannot hope to be favored with a solid, sus-
tained spring-core of strength irregardless of other of the system's 
characteristics. Absence of legitimacy is considered to be the most 
politically debilitating characteristic of all. 
3As for the first two, the differences between the systems was 
not very great and in the context of the situations in the areas in 1944 
they did not assume a special importance; in any event, while in the 
first one the Buganda system was more favored, the Acholi system was in 
the second. 
Both systems were characterized by mixed open and closed 
political mobility. 
Buganda had a greater incidence of leadership, but in the 
circumstances it would be hazardous to hold that this was to the system's 
advantage, for there was disunity among the leaders. 
Similar reservations preclude a statement that Buganda's system, 
with the tribe as the single largest dominant group, was therefore 
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Acholi's much more limited natural and human resources, 
together with the especially significant absence of any measure of 
sovereignty and the minimum legitimacy of the new system, would seem to 
point to a general weakness of the system compared to that of Buganda as 
of 1944. Judgments of strength or influence which the two tribes could 
actually bring to bear in their relations with the Protectorate Govern-
ment cannot be made except with reference to particular situations. It 
has been shown, for example, that the traditional Acholi system, 
charac~erized by a paucity of attributes of political solidarity, was 
unable to withstand the British policy which operated to replace it. In 
Buganda, during the interim period of direct rule, the Baganda system 
proved insufficiently strong to prevent the rather ignominious retire-
ment of its long-respected leader--Sir Apolo Kagwa--in the circumstances 
of that situation. On the other hand, the system, bolstered by the 
return to an indirect rule policy, effectively opposed the Protectorate's 
efforts to force on the Baganda the land acquisition measure in 1944. 
And in the next chapter, the reaction of Africans in the Protectorate--
stronger in this respect than the Acholi system, with several dominant 
groups. Too much would depend upon the particular situations and the 
issues in them. In addition, it would not appear feasible to attempt to 
generalize about the strength or weakness of different kinds of plural-
dominant-groups systems. These can vary greatly. For example, where 
there is no general consensus on ultimate goals or at least on consti-
tutional mechanisms, a two-party system can be very weak indeed. At the 
other extreme, in certain situations, many systems with a large number 
of groups the membership of which overlap would be more capable of 
cohesion on a particular issue than would systems with just two main 
groups, especially if organizations like the Acholi Association existed 
and were politically important. For these reasons, and since there is 
no detailed data about the pluralistic groups in Acholi, an estimate 
cannot be made of the relative weakness or strength deriving from this 
characteristic of the system. 
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and especially of the Baganda--to the proposals for their participation 
in the Legislative Council is discussed. 
The conclusion that the new Acholi system's characteristics of 
strength appeared to be less impressive than those of Buganda must be 
qualified to some extent if the view is shifted to its future prospects. 
The adaptability factors, with respect to Western-type demands for 
change, were all favorable for Acholi whereas the Baganda system as of 
1944 exhibited no appreciable measure of adaptability to a future demand 
for political eqqality by certain elements of its membership. In 
addition, there was no reason to believe that the new local government 
institutions which had been established--especially the councils--would 
not be accorded increasing legitimacy by the people of Acholi as they 
gained familiarity with them. 
Summary and conclusions. In light of the relatively limited 
data currently available on the Acholi, only a provisional analysis of 
the transition from a traditional to a new political system can be made. 
But there seems sufficient source material to validate certain general 
conclusions, both in the form of a summary of findings and conclusions 
deducible from these. 
The Acholi living within what is now the Uganda Protectorate had 
a traditional tribal political system characterized by factors contrib-
uting to its weakness. These stemmed primarily from its confederate 
nature, there being a number of separate chiefdoms, the interests of 
which were mutually irreconciliable. The political systems of the 
individual traditional chiefdoms were somewhat though not strikingly 
better off in solidarity factors than the tribal system. The systems 
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at both levels possessed qualities of adaptability to certain Western-
type demands for change, As regards resources, the traditional tribal 
system was ill-favored in comparison with that of Buganda. 
The traditional political systems were affected by a number of 
forces of change operating between 1911 and 1945. Two of the most 
important were British rule and missionary activities, the former being 
by far the vital instrument of change, 
British rule brought first a large measure of law and order, with 
a virtual cessation of warring and raiding. The main functions of the 
chiefdoms as institutions were thus cancelled out and the bases of their 
inherent separate identities were undermined. Political authority in 
the chiefdoms was sapped, and the process was carried further by the 
appointment of non-hereditary chiefs. 
British policy as of 1937 represented an attempt to revive the 
traditional chiefdom systems. There was then another complete reversal 
of approach in 1943. Chiefs were chosen on merit, traditional qualifi-
cations were disvalued, and new territorial units took the place of 
traditional political units. The chiefdoms as such ceased to exist. As 
of early 1945, the traditional political system was represented only by 
the membership of some traditionally-based leaders in what were 
non-traditional institutions--councils to advise the new corps of chiefs 
at the different administrative levels, 
Certain of the former chiefdoms lived on in a new form--as 
conflicting political-pressure groups, inaccurately described in some of 
the literature as clans but here referred to as tribal sections. A 
second type of political division, attributable in this instance to 
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earlier British policy, was also sectional but on a larger scale. It 
was the antipathy between the eastern and western parts of the district. 
Another significant expression of new kinds of political 
loyalties was that based on religion. The divisive Protestant and Roman 
Catholic missionary activities were responsible initially for what 
became a secular split along these lines. And lastly, at the end of the 
of the period under review there was formed a new organization--the 
Acholi Association--with membership apparently cutting across all 
groupings, but the political history of which was too young to predict 
its course or significance. 
The sum effect of the forces of change on the traditional tribal 
and chiefdom political systems can now be reckoned. The systems were 
unable to withstand the onslaught. Their qualities of adaptability to 
certain Western-type demands for change proved both irrelevant and 
superfluous in the actual course of events. The traditional systems 
disappeared in every essential respect. The few features which endured 
--tribe-membership, traditionally-based leaders in the new councils, 
defunct chiefdoms as "tribal section" political pressure groups--were of 
only limited political significance in the total context of the new 
system of 1945. 
The forces of change which destroyed Acholi' s traditional 
political system produced a new one. It was largely a creature of the 
British authorities. Because of this fact, because the early 1945 
system was less than two years old, and because relatively few oppor-
tunities for Western education had existed for the Acholi--for these 
principal reasons, the new Acholi system was characterized by factors 
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seriously detracting from political solidarity. There were prospects, 
however, that the system would be more favored in the future, though a 
crucial limiting factor would continue to be Acholi's poor resources 
position in contrast to that of Buganda. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the survey and analysis of the 
Acholi political systems in a process of change validate, it is 
submitted, the first part of the thesis as stated in the Introduction in 
so far as it is relevant and applicable to Acholi. One major finding was 
that the Acholi traditional political system did not survive in its 
essentials and was in fact replaced by a new, non-traditional system. 
Therefore, in the Acholi District--an area of decidedly direct rule--
political change in the local, tribal institutions was extensive. A 
second major finding was that in Acholi 1 s history of political change in 
the years 1911-1945, by far the most crucial force was British adminis-
trative policy as applied in the district. 
Conclusions 
In closing the discussion of direct rule in Uganda, it may be 
recalled that even outside of Buganda the British policy of native 
administration was "Indirect Rule" in theory prior to World War II. In 
practice, there was throughout the period 1905-1945 a policy of direct 
rule. 
In the three smaller Kingdoms situated in Western Uganda there 
was direct rule, but it appears not to have been extensive in degree. 
Rule in Busoga in the Eastern Province was apparently somewhat more 
extensive in the form it took. The remaining tribal areas outside of 
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Buganda were more clearly areas of decidedly direct rule. 
With respect to the Acholi, the tribe given special attention as 
an example of change over the years in an area of decidedly direct 
British rule, it was concluded that the relevant portions of the thesis 
were validated. More specifically, it was found that the policy of direct 
rule in Acholi did constitute the most important force responsible for 
extensive changes which occurred in the local, tribal political institu-
tions for governing that people. 
As regards the other tribes outside of Buganda, analysis in 
depth is outside the scope of the study. Some observations may, however, 
be made on the basis of a superficial review of a few sources. 
In the areas where, like Acholi, British native administration 
policy was most direct, change from the polities of old to the new 
political systems introduced by the British--in many cases with the aid 
of Baganda Agents 7 -was pronounced. The tribes so affected were the 
Iteso and Bagisu as of 1905, and the Bakiga, Lango, Karamojong, and 
Lugbara after 1905, 
In Busoga where the rule apparently was somewhat less direct, 
although a new political system at the tribal level was instituted 
around 1905, the changes viewed as a whole were not as extensive as with 
the previous group of peoples. As one example, the traditional Basoga 
chiefs were utilized for some time, and the transition to a selection of 
chiefs on the basis of merit was a sufficiently gradual one to render it 
an adaptation of this traditional aspect of the Basoga political norms. 
In the three smaller Agreement Kingdoms where British rule, 
though direct, appears to have been less so than in any of the other 
7 
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areas mentioned above, no new system was imposed wholesale. Instead, 
the traditional systems were adapted. The process was, however, more 
one of change at British direction than was the case in Buganda. The 
changes seem to have been less extensive than those in Busoga and the 
other direct rule areas. Whether they were greater than those brought 
about in Buganda, where change was stimulated more so by economic and 
1 
social policies, would be difficult to assess. 
IV. MEASURES TO DEVELOP THE LOCAL COUNCILS 
It has been explained that British policy was to allow the 
Buganda Lukiko to enhance through the years its functions as a deliber-
ative and legislative body. Policy also favored the establishment of 
councils resembling the Lukiko in other parts of Uganda. "By the 
thirties all districts had native councils consisting entirely of 
2 
chiefs. . . ." 
Buganda 
With respect to the functions of Buganda's senior council, as 
indicated above there was at the least a permissive policy encouraging 
lsome of the sources for the preceding three paragraphs were: 
Hailey, Native Administration ... , Part I, 1950, pp. 2, 28; UP, The 
Handbook ••• , 1920, p. 91; Edel, p. 125; Pamela Gulliver and P. H. 
Gulliver, The Central Nilo-Hamites, Part VII of East Central Africa, 
Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde (London: International 
African Institute, 1953), p. 30; Southall, Alur Society, pp. 287-299; 
Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 241-242, 249; Hailey, "Native Adminis-
tration and Political Developments . , " p. 190. 
2"Uganda' s History . . . , " The [London) Times British Colonies 
Review, No. 20, 7. 
For the evolution of policy with respect to local councils in 
other British territories, see Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, 
pp. 201-203, 416-417, 452-453, and 539-542. 
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an increase in the responsibilities of the Lukiko. As for its composi-
tion, rather hesitant steps were taken in 1939 to provide for limited 
popular representation, and additional action had been publicly sug-
gested by Governor Dundas in October 1944. 
Concerning lower councils in Buganda, during the period before 
World War II it was the custom for the chiefs at all levels of the 
native administration to hold open meetings at their headquarters on a 
. 1 
regular and frequent bas1s. At these meetings, also called lukiko, the 
instructions received from the heirarchical command above the chiefs 
would be conveyed to those present. Current matters of interest would 
be discussed, and the chief would pass on his view of the "sense of the 
meeting" to his superior. There was nothing formal about these 
"councils." They were primarily forums for the expression of griev-
2 
ances. 
(It was not until 1945 that the traditional institution of a 
lukiko at each administrative level was regularized by a law of Buganda's 
supreme Lukiko. Besides legislating the introduction of an increase in 
popular representation in the latter, known sometimes as the Great 
Lukiko, the law provided for a definitely constituted and periodically 
elected popular membership for the~ (county), gombolola (sub-county), 
3 
and miruka (parish) councils. Their function did not, however, change; 
lcoryndon, United Empire, XI, 295; Hailey, "Native Administration 
and Political Development ... ," pp. 179-180. 
2It is believed that further study might indicate a closer cor-
relation between Baganda and French concepts of the proper functions and 
structures for local government than between Baganda and British ideas. 
3Miruka changes to muruka in the singular; the other terms do 
not alter. Richards, Economic Development ••• , p. 12. Some sources 
409 
the lower councils remained as less than advisory bodies. 1) 
The Three Smaller Kingdoms 
The situation in the three smaller Agreement States roughly 
paralleled that in Buganda. 
The functions of the Kingdoms' central councils were similar to 
but more restricted than those of Buganda's Great Lukiko. No noteworthy 
steps were taken prior to 1945 to broaden the composition of these 
councils to include other than native officials and a few officially 
nominated members. The existence in the three Kingdoms of the Agree-
ments, with their constitutionally specified institutions, made it more 
difficult to change the councils along the lines of the new Protectorate 
policy which, as explained further on, evolved during the war. 
(The first measures to democratize the Kingdom councils were 
carried out in Ankole for its Eishengyera--central native council--in 
1946. For the Rukurato, Toro's central council, and for that of 
Bunyoro, the matter was still in the stage of proposals in 1946.) 
Nothing of significance was done about lower councils in the 
three Agreement States prior to 1945. (In 1946 lower councils were set 
- 2 
up in Toro and Bunyoro. ) 
refer to the gombolola as parishes and to the miruka as villages. UP, 
Annual [Provincial] Reports .•• 1939-1946, pp. 70-71. 
1Hailey, Native Administration ., Part I, 1950, pp. 15-16. 
2Hailey, Native Administration ., Part I, 1950, pp. 51-52, 
54; Kenneth Ingham, "Some Aspects of the History of Western Uganda," 
Uganda Journal, XXI (September, 1957), 148. 
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The Areas of Uganda Without Rulers 
It was in the areas of the Protectorate without rulers that the 
greatest change occurred, in part "greatest" because change began at a 
zero point and progressed further in one respect than the development of 
councils in the Kingdoms. 
Under British rule, councils in the (non-Agreement) areas 
lacking native rulers were at first just ad~ bodies. The 1919 
legislation made it possible to formalize the meetings of chiefs at the 
District level. The senior chiefs in a District collectively became a 
Council, which met annually to suggest revisions to native law and 
custom, and which also served at times as a superior court for the 
District. 
Teso's 1937 experiment. By the mid-1930's there was a recogni-
tion on the part of some Protectorate administrative officers that 
British-supported chiefs in the direct rule areas were developing into a 
civil service oligarchy. More to the point, the chiefs were exhibiting 
a tendency to indulge in arbitrary, autocratic, and at times repressive 
1 behavior toward the people. To counteract the dangers of the situa-
tion, District Commissioner Kennedy of Teso in 1937 obtained approval to 
introduce there a system of councils at all levels of the administrative, 
territorial divisions. In incidence, they corresponded to Buganda's 
open lukiko at the parish, sub-county, and county levels. But there was 
a distinct innovation from the Buganda model. Popular representation 
1That native administration policies and practices in British 
territories rendered chiefs relatively immune to popular dissatisfaction 
has been pointed out by Lucy Mair in Mair, Africa, XXVIII {July, 1958), 
198. 
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was definitely provided for, and it constituted a majority in the 
sub-county councils. Elected members, who were drawn mostly from the 
ranks of the heads of kin groups, included peasants, traders, and 
schoolmasters. Although in the case of Teso the mutuality of interests 
of the chiefs and the kin-group leaders vitiated the full possible 
effect of the system for the first years, the change none the less 
represented an institution which functioned to prevent the worst 
1 
excesses by the chiefs. 
The other feature of the new system of councils in Teso was that 
it divorced the judicial and deliberative functions. The former was 
assumed from that time on by a separately constituted Native Court 
(Lukiko). The deliberative function was left to the new Native Council, 
which retained the responsibility of advising on alterations in native 
2 
custom and law. 
The system of councils introduced in Teso was generally applied 
in the succeeding years in other non-Agreement Districts, but this 
proved a slow process. In the meantime relevant developments were 
occurring on the central government institutional level. 
The shift in Protectorate policy. Beginning in 1942, and 
possibly before, the Protectorate Government started giving serious 
attention to two aspects of native administration--the functions of the 
1The large number of kin-group leaders (who were traditionally-
based) in the councils probably reflected Governor Mitchell's predilec-
tion for traditional institutions as the best means to the ends. 
2Burke, Journal of African Administration, X (July, 1958), 155-
156; Lawrance, The Iteso ••. , pp. 33-36; Hailey, Native Administra-
tion ••. , Part I, 1950, p. 32. 
412 
latter in relation to those of the central government; and the composi-
tion and relationship of the various institutions making up a District 
Native Administration. As regards the former (the functions), up to 
1945 little of significance had materialized in the way either of 
clearer definition of respective responsibilities or of an actual 
1 increase in functions of the Native Administrations: 
On the subject of the institutions of a District Native Admin-
istration, the wartime Governor, Sir Charles Dundas, had strong views. 
These represented a departure from past approaches. Policy was given a 
new orientation. 2 He believed that in the non-Kingdom areas, such as 
Lango, Acholi, and Busoga, the people of a tribe as a whole were the 
only genuine tribal authority. He regarded the Native Administrations 
as only temporary organizations until popularly-constituted councils 
could be developed at each of the levels within the Districts. Clans 
lR. C. Pratt, "The Evolution of Local Government: Promoting 
Efficiency and Democracy," The !London] Times British Colonies Review, 
No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 13. 
2From information available it is impossible to set forth the 
factors which were most influential in causing the shift in policy. One 
may have been the value-orientation of the Governor himself. Another 
may have been the war. Local circumstances in Uganda may have dictated 
the changes. 
Lord Hailey held similar views to those of Dundas, but it is not 
possible to state whether these were held independently of the Governor, 
or whether one of the two men markedly influenced the other. In the 
Uganda section of an unpublished report submitted to the Colonial Office 
and printed in 1944 for distribution to colonial officers, Lord Hailey 
has implied that it was he who agreed with Dundas. He has written in 
tones of approval of the Protectorate's attempt to find a new basis for 
its system of native administration outside of Buganda, noting at the 
same time that some of the institutions were still in the experimental 
stage and that as yet they exercised little responsibility. He also 
wrote it was anticipated that as the councils evinced a growing appreci-
ation of their responsibilities, their executive officers "will tend to 
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were not appropriate bodies as native authorities, but their leaders 
should be well represented on the councils. The most notable departure 
from former policy was his conviction that chiefs should be controlled 
by their respective councils--a county chief by the county council, and 
so forth. Chiefs, chosen by merit, were to be the servants of their 
councils. Also quite revolutionary was his view that the executive 
l 
officials of the council should be chosen by that body. Here he 
apparently was referring only to the senior African officials of the 
District; that is, those in top positions in the central administration 
at the District's headquarters--not the county or other chiefs of 
territorial units making up the District. 
The description of the Governor's views as "revolutionary" is 
accurate in the context of what had gone before in Uganda, Granted, 
there were certain similarities with the Buganda system, but the 
differences from it were much more marked, and Buganda cannot be said to 
have provided the model for some of the changes in policy. 
The model was, however, not very distant ideologically, and in 
this sense the Governor's views were far from revolutionary. In fact, 
they were if anything traditional, in the sense that he drew on the 
traditions of local government in his own land. A civil service of 
administrative officers, responsible to a local council, which also 
chose its executive officials--these were basic concepts in the pre-war 
become more and more their servants and their appointment will increas-
ingly rest with these bodies." Hailey, "Native Administration and 
Political Development . . • , " pp. 197, 198. 
1[ Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency " . ' pp. 4-6. 
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theory of British local government. If a senior British administrator 
were dissatisfied with the operation of institutions in a colony, and if 
combined with this there were a new world orientation calling for an 
increased attention to indigenous political progress, what would be more 
natural for the administrator than to look to his own national 
traditions? It was inevitable that British forms of local government, 
which the British could introduce and administer better than forms with 
which they were unfamiliar, would be chosen as the basis for future 
policy. As for the specific rationale generally connected with the 
policy, it was that these new institutions would prepare the peoples for 
political progress at higher levels; they would give training in 
1 
democracy where mistakes would not be so consequential. 
The shift in policy was given official and definite expression 
in a Protectorate report published in 1949 covering the years 1939-1946. 
It called attention to the establishment of the lesser councils and to 
the broadening of the base of the District Councils as important 
developments of the period. The aim was that the various councils would 
serve as a means for the expression of the views of all classes of 
people, high and low. The system, it was explained, provided for the 
election of the majority of the members of a council by the membership 
of the next lower tier of councils, and for popular election of the 
councils at the lowest level. The democratization of the councils' 
composition was emphasized, As to responsibilities, the report stated 
that the councils did not exercise executive functions, that they were 
lMair, Africa, XXVIII (July, 1958), 12, 17; Sir Charles Jeffries, 
The Colonial Office (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc, 1956), pp. 
165-166. 
1 
still "mainly advisory" bodies. 
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Progress in implementing the new policy. It would be a mistake 
to conclude that the new system of councils was in effect in all areas 
of Uganda except Buganda by 1945, or even by the end of 1946, the period 
covered by the above report. Progress varied greatly from district to 
district, not only in the introduction of the system but in its 
operation. On the whole it added up to only a limited application of the 
policy to new areas as of 1945. 
Teso already had such councils. It appears that the system was 
adopted in Busoga in 1938, in the Karamoja District and what was then 
the Mbale District in 1941, and in Acholi in 1943. The system was,.not 
introduced until 1945 in Kigezi, and 1946 saw only its partial imple-
mentation in Lango and the West Nile. (In Lango, for example, the 
well-entrenched heirarchy of British-appointed chiefs successfully 
resisted proposals for more popular representation in the District 
Council up to 1946. 2) But even where the new system was introduced 
prior to 1945, the work of its consolidation--the transition from 
councils on paper to councils effectively functioning--proceeded quite 
1UP, Annual [Provincial1 Reports 
See also Hailey, Native Administration 
84. 
.• 1939-1946, pp. 55, 70-71 • 
. , Part I, 1950, pp. 28, 82, 
2one observer has written that at the end of world War II there 
were two incipient sources of conflict in the field of local government 
in Uganda. One was that between old versus young chiefs, the latter 
regarded as more progressive, especially with respect to "development." 
The other was between the elements who wanted the councils (presumably 
the District Councils) to remain constituted mostly of chiefs, and other 
elements desiring more unofficial representation. David E. Apter, "Some 
Problems of Local Government in Uganda," Journal of African Administra-
~. XI (January, 1959), 28. 
1 
slowly. 
Conclusions 
To summarize the developments, prior to the war there was an 
experiment in one District of Uganda--Teso--with a system of popular 
councils. The councils were to serve as checks on a tendency for 
British-appointed chiefs to behave in an autocratic manner. 
During the war, probably with the special impetus of the new 
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Governor, a shift in general policy occurred. It was decided that the 
Teso system would be extended to other areas of the Protectorate. And 
the eventual aim was that chiefs, chosen on merit, would be the servants 
of and controlled by the councils. This amounted to the pre-war version 
of local government in Great Britain. 
Up to 1945 very little progress had been made in applying the 
1942 policy in the non-Agreement areas, to which it was especially 
directed. Only in one district had popular councils been introduced as 
something novel. No progress at all had been made in Buganda or in the 
other three Kingdoms, although the next two years brought a restricted 
2 
amount of advance in the direction of the aim. 
If there was no~"Yer,y ~h at the beginning of 1945 in the way 
of democratized councils in Uganda, there was less to point to in the 
way of achievements of the complementary goal--increased responsibility 
1UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports •.. 1939-1946, pp. 36, 74-78. 
2some fifteen years later Sir Andrew Cohen wrote that "not much 
progress has been made" in Buganda, since that Kingdom's Government has 
"so far proved too centralized to allow any effective devolution of 
local government powers." Cohen, p. 33. 
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for the councils, especially for those at the District level. They 
remained at the most advisory bodies, with the exception, of course, of 
the Great Lukiko of Buganda. That body, dominated by chiefs, had grown 
in powers over the years. 
In conclusion, it might be said that prior to 1945 policy had 
shifted to a new orientation, the change had been spelled out, but its 
wholesale application had yet to be effected. 
What was the meaning of these developments in terms of the thesis 
of the study? To explain this adequately would necessitate anticipating 
much of what is to follow in the next chapter, and comments here are 
restricted to the presentation of one conclusion and a statement of its 
general relation to the problem. 
Except for the three smaller Kingdoms, in the areas of direct 
rule in Uganda there had been introduced political institutions for 
l 
governing the tribes at the local level which were new. They had 
replaced, or were in addition to, traditional political systems. That 
such was the case has been shown for the Acholi in a preceding section 
of this chapter. That it was also true for the Basoga, Bagisu, and the 
Iteso was indicated in Chapter III. Although it has not been as well 
documented, the same situation occurred as regards the Bakiga, Lango, 
Lugbara, and Karamojong. 
But had the new institutions become institutionalized by the 
beginning of 1945; that is, had they been legitimated, had the people 
accepted them as their own? Although the situation varied from tribe to 
l See especially Hailey, Native Administration ..• , Part I, 
1950, p. 28. 
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tribe, it seems certain that the Acholi could not have accorded legit-
imacy to the new institutions by the end of 1944. There is some 
evidence that several of the other tribes also had not accepted the 
1 
modern-day political systems as their own. Provisionally, the range of 
acceptance from less to more might be suggested as being as follows at 
the end of 1944: the Karamojong; the Lango; the Acholi; the Lugbara; the 
Bakiga; the Bagisu; the Iteso; the Basoga; the Banyankole; the Banyoro; 
the Batoro. It may be tentatively proposed that the dividing line 
between nonacceptance and acceptance was about at the point where the 
2 
Iteso were on the ordering of tribes, Differences between tribes' 
positions no doubt may be explained primarily by variations in the 
extent of the break with the past, in length of time the new institutions 
had been operating, and in number of years the tribes had had councils 
with popular representation. 
1one scholar had implied that the councils were not accepted as 
tribal institutions until after two further basic reforms were made in 
the 1945-1955 period. Pratt, The [London] Times British Colonies Review, 
No. 20, 13. 
2The above ranking is not based on detailed study; it is derived 
from impressions gained from a cursory look at several of the pertinent 
sources, some of which were: UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports ..• 1939-
1946, pp. 36-41, 43-44, 47, 49, 53, 71-72, 74; Cohen, p. 67; Southall, 
Alur Society, pp. 313-317; John Middleton, "The Political System of the 
Lugbara of the Nile-Congo Divide," Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in 
African Segmentary Systems, ed. John Middleton and David Tait (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 226; Edel, pp. 125-126; P. W. E. 
Baxter, Review of The Chiga of Western Uganda, by May M. Edel, Uganda 
Journal, XXII (September, 1958), 194; Jean Sackur, "Struggle for Power 
in Bugisu," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 34 (Second 
Quarter, 1959), 23; Lawrance, The Iteso •.• , pp. 36-38; Pamela 
Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, pp. 21, 27, 35; Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, 
pp. 186-187, 189, 197, 201, 222-223, 241-244, 246, 249; T. R. F. Cox, 
Review of Bantu Bureaucracy, by L. A. Fallers, Uganda Journal, XXII 
(March, 1958), 88; Hailey, "Native Administration and Political 
Development •.. , " pp. 190-191. 
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If the new institutions were not generally accorded legitimacy, 
and this was surely the case with the Acholi, why was it so? One reason 
already indicated was that in some Districts--Acholi was one example--
the new system was too complete a break with the old for any appreciable 
measure of legitimacy to carry over. It had to be built from practi-
cally nothing. An obvious way of obtaining a people's support in such 
circumstances is to give them representation in the institutions. But 
the preceding section has shown that the policy of increased popular 
representation in the conciliar institutions had made little real 
progress in its implementation as of the end of 1944. 
It may be concluded, then, that the British policy of native 
administration in the direct rule areas, to the extent that it intro-
duced in the non-Agreement areas new political institutions divorced 
from the traditional political way of life, created a problem of gaining 
the peoples' acceptance of these institutions; and that as of late 1944, 
although a shift in British policy had indicated the way this would be 
sought, little had been accomplished. 
The conclusion is relevant to one part of the thesis proposed in 
the Introduction--namely, that native administration policy in the areas 
of decidedly direct rule operated to shape the limited change in central 
territorial political institutions. As is indicated later, 1 the absence 
of legitimated political institutions in these tribal areas reduced the 
possibilities of pressures being applied on the Protectorate Government 
for change in the central institutions. 
1In the discussion in the next chapter of the attitudes of 
Africans outside Buganda to the central institutions. 
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V. SUMMARY 
The chapter has shown how policies of colonial powers with 
respect to native administration varied from indirect rule to direct 
rule, and that there was al~o diversity of practice between and within 
different British territories in Africa. 
In Uganda the Protectorate Government's policy was one of 
"Indirect Rule" for all of the territory in theory, but in practice the 
policy was in most instances actually one of direct rule. 
With regard to the Kingdom of Buganda, widely looked on as the 
prototype of "Indirect Rule," the theory and practice of policy did in 
fact coincide for a while in that policy was actually one of indirect 
rule until about 1920. It then became in reality a policy of direct 
rule, which was, however, not extensively direct. A trend toward the 
late 1930's back to indirect rule culminated in a quite complete form of 
this type of native administration by the end of 1944. 
There was a close correlation between the increase in directness 
of rule in Buganda after 1920 and the decline in the Baganda political 
system's attributes of strength--in the sense of political solidarity--
after that year, However, because of other developments, the return 
later to indirect rule was not accompanied by a concurrent increase in 
the factors contributing to the solidarity of the Kingdom's political 
system. For, while there were certain changes in the system's charac-
teristics which favored its solidarity, there were also changes after 
the mid-1930's which detracted from it, Some of the latter changes were 
attributable to the deliberately permissive indirect rule policy. 
421 
Others were shaped to a considerable extent by aspects of policy outside 
the strictly defined field of native administration, These, which 
included various economic and social policies, had also generally 
operated to augment appreciably Buganda's natural and human resources 
compared to those of most of the other tribes. 
The changes in the Baganda traditional institutions referred to 
above were, on the whole, relatively limited when compared to those 
which took place in the local, tribal institutions in the areas of 
decidedly direct rule, The British native administration policy of 
indirect rule, practiced except for an interim period, was one of the 
most important factors in so limiting the extent of these changes in 
Buganda. 
In the areas of the Protectorate outside of Buganda, native 
administration policy was direct rule in practice. The degree of 
directness varied, appearing to be less in the three smaller Kingdoms 
and in Busoga than in the other tribal districts. The example of the 
Acholi indicated that a decidedly direct rule policy brought about 
extensive changes in the political institutions at the local, tribal 
level; the traditional political way of doing things was quite com-
pletely replaced, and a new, non-traditional set of institutions was 
introduced. 
The chapter concluded with a discussion of decisions taken 
toward the end of the period to develop further the conciliar system. 
The Protectorate's approach provided for an increase in popular repre-
sentation in councils at the local government, tribal levels. Although 
such measures might be expected to bring about a greater acceptance of 
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the new tribal political systems of the more direct rule areas on the 
part of the peoples embraced by them, implementation of the freshly 
oriented policy had not progressed very far as of the beginning of 1945. 
